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Abstract 
 
This thesis employs global governance theory to undertake a critical investigation of the 
function of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) as a governance regime in relation to 
concepts of legitimacy and authority, particularly in response to the state of Yemen as a 
state in crisis.  Fundamental to this investigation is the conceptualisation of the global 
human rights framework as an ‘international human rights regime complex’.  This 
contributes to an evaluation of the UPR’s governance function as an entity that supports 
multi-directional interaction between the institutions within that regime complex.  
This study evaluates the governance function of the UPR regarding its input (source) 
legitimacy, procedural legitimacy and output (substantive) legitimacy.  It assesses the means 
by which the UPR commands authority and legitimises other entities within the proposed 
‘international human rights regime complex’ and the evolving role of civil society.  Alongside 
this, a central focus is a recognition and exploration of the various challenges to the UPR’s 
legitimacy and authority.  This includes matters of process compliance above substantive 
compliance, states failing to implement recommendations, politicisation and ritualism, and 
reprisals against human rights defenders.  These matters are variously subject to the 
historical, cultural and social context of a state or region and the broader geopolitical 
dynamic, as well as the institutional failings of the United Nations (UN).  Whilst a peer review 
mechanism such as the UPR cannot resolve these challenges of itself, it has an important 
role to play. 
Taking account of this context, this thesis concludes with recommendations to strengthen 
the UPR’s governance function generally and in particular for states in crisis such as Yemen.  
It closes by contemplating what states such as Yemen might lose in the absence of the UPR.  
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Chapter 1: An Introduction to the Thesis 
1.1 Universal Periodic Review (UPR) and global governance 
Taking a conditional international law theory approach, this study examines the United 
Nation’s (UN) Universal Periodic Review (UPR) mechanism against the concepts of legitimacy 
and authority by assessing its function as a global governance entity and arguing that it 
forms part of a broader ‘international human rights regime complex’.  The incorporation of 
global governance theory helps to analyse the UPR’s apparent and applied legitimacy and 
authority as a significant intergovernmental body in light of a number of roles it plays, 
particularly its role in relation to the Arab Republic of Yemen (Yemen) as a state in crisis.   
The focus on states in crisis, which often struggle to follow up and implement UPR 
recommendations, has been chosen to examine how the state concerned, reviewing states, 
and other stakeholders, contribute to the UPR process and react to each other.  The UPR’s 
governance function is critically explored in the particular context of states in crisis to 
examine the impact that not implementing UPR recommendations received has upon the 
UPR’s authority and legitimacy.  In doing so, the study describes and evaluates the spectrum 
of state engagement with the UPR process, from the submission and content of a state’s 
national report through to the review process and follow up, as well as assessing state 
engagement with the mechanism as a reviewing state making recommendations to other 
states under review.   
The purpose of this study can thus be distilled into two objectives: one, to conduct an 
empirical assessment of the function of the UPR through the conceptual lens of global 
governance and, two, to take a case study approach to explore the nature of the UPR’s 
governance function for Yemen as a state in crisis. 
This study provides an original contribution to the research and scholarship on global 
governance and on the UPR.  There is an emerging body of work focusing upon the UPR that: 
analyses its successes and its challenges;1 discusses the impact of politicisation on the 
                                                             
1 Philip Alston, ‘Reconceiving the UN Human Rights Regime: Challenges confronting the new UN Human Rights 
Council’, (2006) 7 Melbourne Journal of International Law, 185; Rosa Freedman, ‘Section 1: Background: from 
Commission to Council’, The Human Rights Council: A Critique and Early Assessment (Routledge 2013); James H 
Lebovi and Erik Voeten, ‘The Politics of Shame: The Condemnation of Country Human Rights Practices in the 
UNHCR’, (2006) 50(4), International Studies Quarterly, 861-888; N. Schrijver, ‘The UN Human Rights Council: A 
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process of states making and receiving recommendations at the UPR;2 and that evaluates 
the extent of the UPR as a medium of ritual and ritualism.3  Literature on ritual and ritualism 
at the UPR includes scholarship on the regulatory and governance function of the UPR as a 
‘public audit ritual’.  In this work, Jane Cowan and Julie Billaud adopt an anthropological 
perspective approaching the UPR from outside the ‘governance matrix’ to ask the open 
question of ‘how does the UPR work’? (emphasis in the original), rather than inquiring how 
well it works and how it might work better.4  The analysis they provide is, however, firmly 
rooted in the physical and textual space of the (UN); this thesis does take those central 
spaces within its scope, but it travels further in its particular focus on states in crisis and by 
giving careful consideration to civil society’s contribution to the governance process.   
The research conducted and the studies reviewed in the preparation of this thesis reveal no 
comprehensive assessment of the UPR’s governance function and how that relates to its 
legitimacy and authority.  The concept and operation of regime complexes has been 
evaluated in the field of climate change and plant genetic resources,5 and reference has 
been made to ‘international human rights regimes’ and ‘human rights regimes’,6 but not to 
the specific concept of an ‘international human rights regime complex’.  
A key theme of this study is transparency; to uncover and propose how the UPR’s standing 
might be preserved by making transparent what it is that this mechanism has to offer for 
states in crisis, such as Yemen, and what it cannot.  Original empirical data generated by 
                                                             
New “Society of the Committed” or Just Old Wine in New Bottles’, (2007) 20(4), Leiden Journal of International 
Law, 809–823, 810-812, Schrijver also charts the negotiation and drafting of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights 1948.  
2 Rochell Terman and Erik Voeten, ‘The Relational Politics of Shame: Evidence from the Universal Periodic 
Review’ (2018) 13, The Review of International Organizations, 1-23. 
3 Hilary Charlesworth and Emma Larking (eds), Human Rights and the Universal Periodic Review: Rituals and 
Ritualism, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2014); Damian Etone ‘The Effectiveness of South Africa’s 
Engagement with the Universal Periodic Review (UPR): Potential for Ritualism?’ (2017) 33(2), South African 
Journal on Human Rights, 258-285. 
4 Jane K. Cowan, ‘The Universal Periodic Review as a Public Audit Ritual: An Anthropological Perspective on 
Emerging Practices in the Global Governance of Human Rights’, and Julie Billaud, ‘Keepers of the truth: 
Producing ‘Transparent Documents for the Universal Periodic Review’, both in Charlesworth and Larking (n 3) 
44-45. 
5 Robert O. Keohane and David G. Victor, ‘The Regime Complex for Climate Change’, (2011) 9, Perspectives on 
Politics, 5 and Kal Raustiala and David G Victor, ‘The regime complex for plant genetic resources’, (2004) 58, 
International Organization, 277-309, respectively. 
6 Alston (n 1); Gregory Shaffer and Tom Ginsburg, ‘The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship’, 
(2012) 106, American Journal of International Law 1-46, 25; and Moravcsik, ‘The Origins of Human Rights 
Regimes: Democratic Dialogue in Postwar Europe’ (2000) 54 International Organisations 217. 
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conducting interviews with UPR stakeholders as part of this study’s research process has 
revealed perspectives and dilemmas that to date have not been fully investigated in relation 
to the UPR.   
In the field of international human rights monitoring the UPR is unique.  It is a significant 
international human rights mechanism in terms of its universal application to all UN member 
states and is relatively young, having commenced its work in 2008.7  It is centred upon a 
state-led peer review of the human rights commitments and progress of UN member states, 
with input from treaty bodies, civil society and human rights experts.  Premised upon a 
cooperative rather than an adversarial or inquisitive approach, reviewing states make 
recommendations in a space giving equal airtime to a plurality of voices and views.8  State 
delegations gather before UN state missions at the UPR Working Group in Geneva centred 
upon peer review.  Meeting at a legal, cultural and political crossroads, a state under review 
(SuR) receives comments, observations and recommendations on the state’s human rights 
achievements and challenges.  In turn, the contribution made by reviewing states promotes 
human rights principles and norms associated with universal rights and realisation.  This is a 
large-scale event at the Palais des Nations in flagship Salle XX, attended by a delegation 
representing the SuR, state missions to the UN, and accredited civil society.  The process and 
modalities of the UPR are provided in the institutional building provisions of Human Rights 
Council Resolution 5/1, and related resolutions and decisions, discussed further in chapter 
2.9  
One objective of the UPR is to review an SuR’s fulfilment of its legal obligations and 
commitments to human rights protection.10  However, as chapter 2 illustrates, the UPR is not 
a legal mechanism, it is inter-governmental and innately political; the key actors in the room 
during the Working Group are diplomats and civil servants.  The recommendations made to 
                                                             
7 The first states to be reviewed, in this order, during the first Working Group of the UPR were: Bahrain, 
Ecuador, Tunisia, Morocco, Indonesia, Finland, the United Kingdom, India, Brazil, the Philippines, Algeria, 
Poland, the Netherlands, South Africa, the Czech Republic and Argentina, ‘Meeting highlights for the first 
session’, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/MeetingsHighlightsSession1.aspx last accessed 09 
July 2018. 
8 Louisa Riches, ‘Legal and normative pluralism, hybridity and human rights: The Universal Periodic Review’ in 
Nicholas Lemay-Hébert and Rosa Freedman (eds), Hybridity: Law, Culture and Development (Oxon and New 
York: Routledge 2017) 162. 
9 UNHRC ‘Institution building of the United Nations Human Rights Council’, A/HRC/RES/5/1, 18 June 2007. 
10 ibid para 1(c) and 4(b). 
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SuRs have no legal status and there is no means of enforcement or legal means to hold 
states to account for a lack of follow up and implementation.  Powers are vested in the 
Human Rights Council (the Council)11 regarding persistent non-cooperation with the UPR, as 
considered in section 2.3 of chapter 2 and the introduction to chapter 5, but these have yet 
to be used.  That said, those recommendations requiring the SuR adhere to legal 
commitments it has previously made, for example, as party to an international human rights 
treaty, engage legal concepts such as good faith and pacta sunt servanda, whilst 
recommendations that an SuR ratify a particular treaty reflect the UPR’s normative function.  
Whilst international human rights treaty bodies have been accorded (by some) quasi-judicial 
status, in particular, the status ascribed to treaty body General Comments,12 and the 
capacity of treaty bodies to accept and hear individual complaints,13 the UPR is not a vehicle 
for the judicialisation of human rights.14  Nonetheless, it promotes and supports the 
legalisation of human rights via recommendations that a state introduce, amend or enforce 
domestic legislation to give better and/or full effect to rights protection and treaty 
obligations.  A strength claimed on behalf of the UPR, where treaty bodies are weak, is 
universal engagement by UN member states; at the time of writing, all member states have 
participated in the UPR during each cycle, although the nature of engagement varies.  States 
have universally submitted a national report,15 attended the Working Group in Geneva and 
                                                             
11 Reference throughout this thesis is either to ‘the Council’ or ‘the Human Rights Council’. 
12 Kersten Mechlem, ‘Treaty Bodies and the Interpretation of Human Rights’, (2009) 42, Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law, 905; the findings of treaty bodies have been said to contribute to international 
jurisprudence, Ilias Bantekas and Lutz Oette, International Human Rights Law and Practice, (Cambridge 
University Press 2013) 205; Wouter Vandenhole, The Procedure Before UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies: 
Convergence or Divergence? (Intersentia 2004), citing Manfred Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights: CCPR commentary (N.P. Engel 1993); Alfred de Zayas, Jakob Th. Möller, Torkel Opsahl, ‘Application of 
The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights under the Optional Protocol’, (1985) 28, German Yearbook of 
International Law, 9, see also Michael Davala, ‘Conflict of interest in universal human rights bodies’, in Anne 
Peters and Lucas Handschin (eds), Conflict of Interest in Global, Public and Corporate Governance (Cambridge 
University Press 2012), 125-144. 
13 For information regarding the complaints processed in relation international human rights treaty body 
complaints, see OHCHR ‘Human Rights Bodies: Complaints Procedures’ 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/TBPetitions/Pages/HRTBPetitions.aspx last accessed 24 May 2018. 
14 See Surya Subedi, The Effectiveness of the UN Human Rights System: Reform and the Judicialisation of 
Human Rights (London/New York: Routledge 2017) for a discussion of the judicialisation of human rights. 
15 Although not all states did so in time for translation and on occasion the report has been submitted on the 
day of the state’s review, see appendix 1 ‘Compliance with UPR Reporting – 3rd Cycle’. During the first cycle, 
South Africa was the only state reported as having failed to submit its report prior to the Working Group in 
Geneva, instead submitting it on the day of its review, Etone (n 3) 264. 
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responded to recommendations.  There was some doubt over Israel’s attendance during the 
second cycle and this is discussed in section 4.4, chapter 4.   
In terms of ratification or compliance with reporting obligations, treaty bodies cannot claim 
universal engagement.16  Despite the UPR’s ostensible achievement in this respect, a 
number of states proceed to subsequent UPR cycles with little, or unreliable evidence, of 
recommendations from the previous cycle having been implemented.  This was the case for 
Yemen during its second cycle review.17  Whilst this thesis illustrates various reasons for a 
lack of action by states, some posited, others implicit (lack of political will, civil war, famine, 
lack of resources, etc.), this failing, or absence, raises questions as to the UPR's current and 
future legitimacy and authority, particularly in relation to states in crisis.  These questions 
are problematic for the UPR; as discussed in chapter 6, the UPR was not designed as a first 
response to situations of crisis and emergency, however, instances of significant human 
rights failings and violations are rarely unforeseen.   
This thesis takes as its period of focus the start of the UPR’s operation in 2008 up to and 
including July 2018, just over one year into the UPR’s third cycle.  Preparations by civil 
society for Yemen’s third cycle review, which is scheduled for January 2019, have begun with 
the deadline for stakeholder submissions to the mechanism having been 12 July 2018.  By 
including July 2018, reference is made to stakeholder submissions and information relating 
to Yemen’s review that the researcher has been able to access as part of the thesis’ 
research.  
The evidence is that states in crisis continue to engage with the UPR, although the nature of 
this engagement, as this thesis demonstrates and theorises, varies.  This begs the question, 
why?  What is the gain for states in crisis such as Yemen when it comes to the UPR?  Are the 
                                                             
16 ‘Status of ratification of human rights instruments’, and ‘Human Rights by Country’ for access to individual 
state information regarding treaty ratification and reporting status against treaty review cycles for details of 
those states that have submitted reports on time, late or still to submit, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/TreatyBodies.aspx and 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/AsiaRegion/Pages/AFIndex.aspx respectively, both last accessed 06 
February 2018. 
17 Lack of implementation or follow up was noted in a joint submission made to the OHCHR by the Middle East 
Foundation for Social Development and Youth Development Foundation, Giza, Egypt, and Youth Without 
Borders for Development, Giza, Egypt ahead of Yemen’s second cycle review, UNHRC ‘Summary prepared by 
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in accordance with paragraph 15 (b) of 
the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1 and paragraph 5 of the annex to Council resolution 16/21: 
Yemen’ A/HRC/WG.6/18/YEM/3 para 14. 
 
 
18 
 
factors that motivate engagement with the UPR akin to those driving engagement with the 
international human rights framework per se?  How fundamental is the UPR to asserting 
statehood and good international relations?18  Are the consequences of failing to engage too 
high a price to pay in terms of international diplomacy and keeping aid donors on side?19  Or 
is this the only means by which to capture the attention of the international community 
without having secured special agreement, for example, via a Commission of Inquiry or other 
independent international investigation?  By conceptualising the UPR and its function 
through the lens of global governance theory and, as proposed in this thesis, as a vehicle 
firmly rooted in an ‘international human rights regime complex’ we can start to more 
properly investigate the answers to some of these questions.20  
1.2 Structure of this thesis 
This thesis is presented over eight chapters, including this one.  This chapter introduces the 
foundations and context of the study and its conceptual framework.  It presents the thesis’ 
definition of a state in crisis and those states the study refers to, and the research design and 
methodology, including ethics approval, as well as highlighting the work’s originality, impact 
and limitations.  Chapter 2 is a critical assessment of the context within which the UPR was 
conceived.  It also presents the UPR’s foundations, objectives and procedure.  In chapter 3 
the concept, evolution and components of global governance and related concepts are 
discussed, paving the way for conceptualising and evaluating the UPR’s legitimacy and 
authority in the chapters that follow.  
Building upon chapters 2 and 3, it is argued across chapters 4 and 5 that the UPR fulfils a 
governance function that complements the work of other governance entities located within 
an ‘international human rights regime complex’, taking inspiration from Robert O. Keohane 
and David G. Victor’s concept of a regime complex for climate change.21  The international 
human rights regime complex comprises a variety of mechanisms, as presented in chapter 4, 
                                                             
18 See section 1.4 below for an account of some of the factors deemed to motivate state engagement with 
international human rights treaty and charter mechanisms.  
19 This latter point was raised by an international NGO during an interview for this thesis, interview CSO 07. 
20 See chapter 3 of this thesis and in particular: Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane, ‘The Legitimacy of 
Global Governance Institutions’ (2006) 20, Ethics and International Affairs, 405; Daniel Bodansky, ‘The 
Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law?’ (1999) 93, 
American Journal of International Law, 601; Keohane and Victor (n 5) 5. 
21 Keohane and Victor (n 5) 15-16. 
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and figure 2, appendix 2.  It is proposed that individually and collectively these mechanisms 
fulfil a governance function and the, generally speaking, lack of hierarchy means the 
theoretical and conceptual framework of global governance is an apt lens through which to 
discern and define the function of the UPR as a single governance entity situated within a 
broader international human rights regime complex.  Within chapter 4, the authority and 
legitimacy of the UPR is assessed with reference to its input (source) legitimacy and its 
procedural legitimacy.22  Deep concerns have been expressed that the mainstreaming and 
institutionalisation of human rights promotes bureaucratisation that risks tangible 
achievements for those whose rights require urgent protection, and these matters are given 
critical consideration in chapter 4.23   
Chapter 5 interrogates the UPR against the concept of output (substantive) legitimacy.  It 
defines the nature of UPR output and explores state motivation to implement accepted 
recommendations, with reference also to theories of state practice and compliance.  The 
challenges posed by measuring compliance using quantitative human rights indicators are 
also addressed.24  Chapter 6 looks specifically at Yemen as a state in crisis, contemplating in 
more detail the global governance function of the UPR for Yemen.  It analyses the nature of 
the recommendations Yemen receives, as well as those recommendations it makes as a 
reviewing state to other SuRs.  Similar analysis by way of comparison is conducted regarding 
Iraq and Somalia as other states in crisis and the UK and New Zealand as stable states, as 
explained in section 1.5 below.  Examination indicates states in crisis receive more 
recommendations than stable states and that a greater number of states make 
recommendations to states in crisis.  This suggests the UPR directs a greater degree of the 
international community’s attention towards those states where rights protection is most at 
risk. 
In chapter 7, the role of civil society in relation to the UPR is critically assessed and the 
challenges faced by civil society seeking to operate in states in crisis are examined.  These 
                                                             
22 Michael Zürn, ‘Democratic governance beyond the nation state: the EU and other international institutions’, 
(2000) 6(2), European Journal of International Relations, 183-221. 
23 Gerd Oberleitner, Global Human Rights Institutions: between remedy and ritual, (Polity Press 2007); Gerd 
Oberleitner, ‘A Decade of Mainstreaming Human Rights in the UN: Achievements, failures, challenges’ (2008) 
26(3) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 359-390. 
24 Zürn, ‘Democratic governance beyond the nation state’ (n 22) 183-221. 
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matters are pertinent given the heavy reliance the UPR mechanism places upon civil society, 
and the central role of civil society as a stakeholder and a non-state actor in global 
governance theory.  Chapter 7 also critically addresses the evolving role of civil society and 
the OHCHR (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights) in respect of UPR follow up 
and implementation.  In doing so, it explores the concept of communities of practice and the 
opportunities for states in crisis where civil society and the UPR is concerned.  It concludes 
that the global governance function of the UPR has the capacity to facilitate and generate a 
new nexus between voice, entitlement and civil society and this is crucial in respect of 
supporting the function of the UPR in relation to states in crisis.   
In the final concluding chapter, chapter 8, this thesis draws together the conceptualisation of 
the UPR's function and purpose as a global governance mechanism as a whole and in 
particular in relation to states in crisis.  It is not the aim of this study to advocate or make 
proposals for a complete overhaul of the international human rights regime and framework, 
particularly as mainstream discussions of reform by key political players focus on 
improvement within the current system rather than of the current system.25  Rather, this 
study is concerned with investigating through the lens of global governance theory the 
current function of the UPR in relation to states in crisis with the objective of formulating 
and formalising this function, making recommendations to strengthen the mechanism and 
state and non-state actor engagement accordingly.  Current frustrations with the 
international human rights regime complex will inevitably persist,26 and human rights 
                                                             
25 ‘Secretary-General's remarks at UN Reform Event [as delivered]’, 18 September 2017, New York, 
https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2017-09-18/secretary-generals-remarks-un-reform-event-
delivered last accessed 21 August 2018, although see Thomas G. Weiss, What’s Wrong With the United 
Nations and How to Fix It (Cambridge: Polity Press 2009). 
26 The reports and oral updates provided by the Commission of Inquiry for Syria provide a stark example of 
this, in particular, the closing words of Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro Chair of the Independent International 
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, in his statement on 16 September 2014, ‘I cannot bring 
myself to repeat the statistics of this war. I no longer have faith that enumerating the thousands of dead and 
displaced will provoke you to act. Read instead the stories of the victims. The paper before you contains the 
voices of 12 people. The Commission has thousands more, sealed in our database, demanding to be heard. 
What they want – these people who disappear, who are tortured, who starve – what they want is to return to 
what is left of their lives, in peace, in their country. How much longer will we deny them this?’ OHCHR 
‘Statement by Mr. Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro Chair of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the 
Syrian Arab Republic’ (16 September 2014) 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15039&LangID=E#sthash.LvooGsTX.
dpuf last accessed 21 August 2018; and ‘Through their [the international community] inaction, a space has 
been created for the worst of humanity to express itself’, UNHRC ‘Oral update of the Independent 
International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’ A/HRC/26/CRP2 (6 June 2014) para 6. 
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monitoring and reporting can only go so far to effect change on the ground whilst the 
presiding geopolitical dynamic of international public law, emanating from post-war 
principles and power and encapsulated by Security Council with the permanent five 
members at the helm, continues to operate as it does.27 
It is in this vein that chapter 8 makes a number of recommendations and considerations for 
the future.  It is recommended, for example, that the Human Rights Council pass a resolution 
to require states amongst other things: to devise and submit at the mid-term an 
implementation plan reporting on progress to date and ongoing implementation measures, 
this currently being optional; to establish a specific domestic mechanism tasked with UPR 
follow up; and to more effectively evidence in the national report the methodology and the 
specific extent of consultation with civil society and other stakeholders.  In addition, the 
Council is recommended to garner and commit support from other relevant UN agencies, 
including country teams, to complement the OHCHR’s support with a particular focus on 
states in crisis that persistently struggle to implement UPR recommendations.  
The UN is widely discussed as possessing the primary responsibility for addressing matters of 
global concern in the context of peace, security and human rights.28  The consensus is that 
human rights protection and promotion is a key component of achieving and maintaining 
state and global security; security, liberty and human rights are presented in international 
legal and political discourse as being inextricably linked.29  Security of the person is 
fundamental to the right to liberty yet human rights and freedoms are (inevitably) 
compromised and limited in the pursuit of domestic and global security.30  Conversely, 
                                                             
27 See, for example, David D. Caron, ‘The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council’ (1993) 
87(4), American Journal of International Law, 552-588; and Thomas G. Weiss, ‘The Illusion of UN Security 
Council Reform’, (2003) 26(4) The Washington Quarterly, 147-161.  
28 Philip Alston and Ryan Goodman, International Human Rights: the successor to international human rights in 
context, (Oxford University Press 2013); Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing 2012). 
29 Development is also considered to be part of the equation that links security and human rights, for example, 
see, UNGA Kofi Annan, ‘In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all’, Report of 
the UN Secretary General, General Assembly, A/59/2005/Add.3, 26 May 2005, para 17: ‘We will not enjoy 
development without security, we will not enjoy security without development, and we will not enjoy either 
without respect for human rights’, this report being the precursor to a number of fundamental reforms to the 
charter based human rights institutions, namely the replacement of the Commission for Human Rights with 
the Human Rights Council and the creation of the UPR. 
30 Joan Fitzpatrick, ‘Speaking Law to Power: The War Against Terrorism and Human Rights’ (2003) 14(2) 
European Journal of International Law 241–264; Conor Gearty, ‘Terrorism and Human Rights’ (2007) 42(3) 
Government and Opposition 340-362.  
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human rights failings and violations by states foster dissent, ungoverned spaces and an 
absence of the rule of law that can prompt and/or exacerbate security risks with a domestic 
and transnational reach.  More than ever, in the face of matters such as climate change, 
political instability, transnational terrorism and a migration crisis, there is a pressing need for 
world powers to address the tangible link between security, development and human rights, 
being the three pillars of the UN, in a meaningful way and to take action accordingly.31  
Keohane and Victor’s work on regime complexes is used as a framework to conceptualise 
the governance function of the human rights framework spearheaded by the UN and how 
that function can be further strengthened and contribute to addressing this link. 
1.3 Universal Periodic Review: towards implementation 
At the start of the UPR’s third cycle, the then High Commissioner for Human Rights posed 
the following question about the mechanism: 
Has there been real improvement? As we enter the third round of 
scrutiny, is the UPR deepening in relevance, precision and impact? Is 
it merely an elaborate performance of mutual diplomatic courtesies, 
or is it leading to real and powerful changes to anchor peace and 
development and improve people's lives?32 
This question is pertinent.  It alludes to the many challenges, dilemmas, and difficulties 
facing any human rights promotion, protection and monitoring mechanism, such as that of 
the UPR.  Indeed, these matters and others have informed the motivation for this thesis 
from an early stage. 
The field research for this thesis commenced in January 2014, during the second cycle of the 
UPR, with a visit to the UN during the UPR’s 18th session.  The reviews of several countries 
were observed, including Afghanistan, Cambodia, Chile, New Zealand, and Yemen.  It was 
                                                             
31 Sigrid Quack, ‘Expertise and authority in transnational governance’, 361-386, in Roger Cotterrell and 
Maksymilian Del Mar (eds), Authority in Transnational Legal Theory: theorizing across disciplines, (Cheltenham, 
UK, Northampton, MA, USA, Edward Elgar Publishing 2016). 
32 ‘Denial of access and lack of cooperation with UN bodies will not diminish scrutiny of a State's human rights 
record’, Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, [the then] United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights 
Council 35th Session, 06 June 2017, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21687 last accessed 21 August 2018 
2018. 
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evident that certain states, Afghanistan and Yemen in particular, were attending the 
Working Group of the UPR’s second cycle facing allegations by civil society and reviewing 
states of a failure to implement few, if any, of the recommendations received during the 
previous first cycle.33  In their defence, the delegations of Afghanistan and Yemen explained 
the challenges faced in follow up and implementation due to political instability and civil 
unrest, extreme poverty, and/or transitioning to a liberal democracy in a post-conflict 
context.34 
Even so, it was strikingly apparent at that early stage of the fieldwork that if there continued 
to be a failure to implement recommendations, or report on tangible efforts to implement, 
the credibility of the UPR may be deemed to be at stake.  Yet, having little tangible progress 
to report was not dissuading states from attending their scheduled UPR in Geneva, begging 
the question why this might be the case.  Documentary analysis and empirical data 
generated via interviews as part of the research for this thesis reveals various reasons.  
These are presented primarily across chapters 5, 6 and 7 and include some intriguing 
revelations, such as a strategic approach on the part of the architects of the UPR to the 
scheduling of those states to be reviewed during the first sessions of the UPR, the influence 
of political allegiances, the appeal of the UPR as a state-led peer review, an opportunity to 
assert statehood, and the UPR’s particular standing and status amongst the diplomatic 
community.  
Nonetheless, engagement in the form of submitting a national report and sending a 
delegation to Geneva may not be sufficient to secure the ongoing authority and legitimacy of 
the UPR; the emerging narrative is a pressing need for states to implement UPR 
recommendations and report upon implementation.  This was emphasised ahead of the 
third cycle during a debate held by the Human Rights Council as part of its 34th regular 
                                                             
33 Author’s own notes taken during the 18th session of the UPR Working Group (January – February 2014) 
observation of the reviews of Afghanistan, New Zealand, Cambodia, Yemen and Chile. 
34 ibid, see also the UPR documents cited in chapter 6. 
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session in March 2017,35 and has been revisited more recently in a high-level panel 
discussion on human rights mainstreaming and the UPR.36   
The President of the Human Rights Council affirmed that the start of the third cycle 
presented an opportunity to take stock of implementation and follow up processes.37  The 
importance of implementation is reflected in a newly created OHCHR overview of the third 
cycle building into the process the timescale for a state to produce an implementation 
plan.38  Whilst the importance being afforded to implementation and follow up is 
imperative, it is not the only marker of the UPR’s success.  As highlighted in measuring the 
UPR’s source (input) and procedural legitimacy in chapter 4, it would be remiss to only focus 
on follow up and implementation in assessing the UPR’s governance function.  A central 
function of a governance entity is the space it creates for a variety of actors to coalesce and 
commune, to contribute to and influence debate and normative change at the local, regional 
and global level, and in this respect the UPR has made progress, including for states in crisis.   
1.4 The source and concept of human rights  
There is not the scope in this thesis to conduct comprehensive and detailed analysis of the 
concept, source, purpose and function of human rights.  This section therefore gives brief 
consideration to scholarship that has sought to conceptualise and comprehend the evolution 
of the international human rights landscape. 
Charter based mechanisms overseen by the Council, which include Council regular sessions, 
special procedures, Commissions of Inquiry (CoIs) and of course the UPR, revolve around an 
                                                             
35 OHCHR ‘Council holds general debate on the Universal Periodic Review and concludes the general debate on 
human rights bodies and mechanisms’ 17 March 2017, 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21404&LangID=E#sthash.JZzr3oS5.d
puf last accessed 21 August 2018. 
36 UNHRC, ‘Annual high-level panel discussion on human rights mainstreaming - Theme: The promotion and 
protection of human rights in the light of the universal periodic review mechanism: challenges and 
opportunities’, Concept note (as of 20 February 2018), 37th Session of the Human Rights Council, reference to 
event on Monday, 26 February 2018, 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=22708&LangID=E last accessed 21 
August 2018. 
37 Mr Joaquin Alexander Maza Martelli opening the first Working Group of the third UPR cycle, the review of 
Bahrain, at the United Nations, Palais Des Nations, Geneva, on 01 May 2017, from author’s own notes, taken 
whilst in attendance.  
38 OHCHR UPR third cycle (2017-2021/22) 
http://www.ohchr.org/SiteCollectionImages/bodies/UPR/3rd_UPR_cycle.png last accessed 21 August 2018.   
 
 
25 
 
assessment of progress against legal state obligations that emanate from the Charter of the 
UN and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),39 the latter of which has been 
said to encapsulate principles of customary law.40  A variety of Charter and treaty based 
actors, none of which occupy a formal judicial role, assess a state’s satisfaction of its human 
rights obligations, with frustration being expressed on occasion of the value of the reports 
produced when the content appears to be largely ignored.41  
The current UN framework of Charter bodies and treaty bodies emerged in the wake of the 
Second World War, designed as a means of standard setting.42  Although some would say 
they fulfil a quasi-legal function,43 lack of binding adjudication powers is symptomatic of the 
evolution of the character and function of the framework and international human rights 
law.  A fundamental purpose is the setting of standards, defining that which is lawful and 
unlawful, encouraging and strengthening in terms of capacity building and good practice, 
and reflecting the normative expectations of a society, its culture, politics and morality, all of 
which are important aspects of general principles of the rule of law,44 as well as international 
relations, between which there has been an historic divide.45  Success depends upon the 
transfer and adoption of international norms and principles.46   
                                                             
39 Charter of the United Nations 1945 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948.  
40 Bruno Simma and Philip Alston, ‘The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens and General 
Principles’, (1988-1989), 12, Australian Yearbook of International Law, 82-107, 84. 
41 Pinheiro (n 26) para 6. 
42 Todd Landman, Human Rights and Democracy: The Precarious Triumph of Ideals (London: Bloomsbury 
Academic 2013). 
43 Vandenhole (n 12) de Zayas, Möller, and Opsahl (n 12) 29-30. See also Davala (n 12) 125-144; Nigel Rodley, 
‘Monitoring Human Rights Violations in the 1980s’, in Jorge I Dominguez, Nigel S. Rodley, Bryce Wood, and 
Richard Falk (eds), Enhancing Global Human Rights, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company 1979). The 
findings of treaty bodies has been said to contribute to international jurisprudence, Bantekas and Oette, (n 12) 
205. 
44 Thomas M Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations, (Oxford University Press 1990); Harold H. Koh, 
‘Why Do Nations Obey International Law?’ (1997) 106 Yale Law Journal, 2599; Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law 
(Oxford University Press 1979).  
45 For discussion of the bridge between international law and international relations particularly since the end 
of the Cold War, see Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘International Law in a world of liberal states’ (1995) 6, European 
Journal of International Law, 503-538.  
46 For a model seeking to conceptualise this process, see the spiral model as proposed in Thomas Risse, 
Stephen C Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic 
Change (Cambridge University Press 1999), and the subsequent revisions and responses to the criticisms and 
praise it received, with a re-focus on compliance, Thomas Risse, Stephen C Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), The 
Persistent Power of Human Rights: From Commitment to Compliance (Cambridge University Press 2013). 
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Patrick Macklem neatly captures both the local and more expanded global relevance of 
human rights and their part in society as whole; human rights can be conceived as moral, 
political and legal concepts.47  Macklem observes that human rights ‘frame the moral, shape 
the political, and distinguish the legal in places as local and diverse as the family, the school, 
the workplace, the community, the nation and the State.’48  His view, however, is that ‘their 
true significance lies in their status as international legal entitlements that call for radical 
revision of the ways in which international law organizes [sic] politics into an international 
legal order’.49  The legal concept of human rights emerges, for example, when states take a 
political decision to voluntarily commit to legal obligations imposed by human rights 
treaties.  This involves a role for human rights whereby they are designed to ‘monitor the 
distribution and exercise of sovereign power’, by imposing obligations and mobilising critical 
judgment.50  These facets are both implicit and explicit in the content of this thesis; the UPR 
is an invention that pursues these functions and this study critically engages with the UPR’s 
success in this respect.  
In terms of the legal source of human rights, the UN Charter alongside the UDHR provides 
the backdrop for the various Charter and treaty bodies.  Under the Charter ‘the peoples 
of the United Nations’ are determined to ‘reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in 
the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of 
nations large and small’ and also to develop the means to maintain ‘justice and respect’ in 
relation to obligations arising from treaties.51  The UDHR has been described as 
encapsulating ‘the minimum norms of customary international law in international 
human rights’.52  It is a ‘common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations’ 
and recognises ‘the dignity and worth of the human person’, in particular it should be 
noted that the UDHR supports a progressive approach to educating and promoting 
human rights.53  Emanating from the UDHR are arguably the two most important 
international human rights treaties - the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
                                                             
47 Patrick Macklem The Sovereignty of Human Rights (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press 2015) 3-26. 
48 Macklem (n 47) 1. 
49 ibid. 
50 ibid. 
51 Charter of the United Nations, Preamble 
52 Amrita Mukherjee, Torture and the United Nations: Charter and Treaty-based Monitoring, (London, Cameron 
May 2008) 12. 
53 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, adopted by the General Assembly 10 December 1948, Preamble. 
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Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) - which all others complement and seek to further advance.   
Whilst identifying the source of a state’s human rights obligations may appear a relatively 
straightforward exercise given rights have been distilled into treaties, declarations and 
stated principles, the concept of human rights continues to attract debate.  Marie-Benedicte 
Dembour articulates four schools of thought as to the concept of human rights: the natural 
school ‘that identifies human rights as those rights one possesses simply by being a human 
being’; the deliberative school for which ‘rights come into existence through societal 
agreement’; the protest school whereby human rights are ‘claims and aspirations that allow 
the status quo to be contested in favour of the oppressed’; and the discourse school which 
holds the view that ‘rights exist only because people talk about them’.54  In conceptualising 
according to these four schools of thought, Dembour seeks to determine which of the 
schools is the most prevalent, citing the natural school as having been ‘long represented’ 
Western thought, but with deliberative scholars replacing this orthodoxy in academic 
circles.55 
Constructing, or perceiving, different means of conceptualising human rights allows for 
those rights to be situated in a framework and context which helps to unravel and make 
sense of what is a complex array of competing, colliding and overlapping agendas. 
Conversely, such segregation of rights protection overlooks intersectionality and risks 
conceptual over-simplification.  To some extent the UPR implicitly addresses this because it 
is not limited to one set of rights or a particular protected characteristic.  In a moral sense, 
human rights focus on the ‘universal features of our common humanity’.56  The distillation of 
the moral concept of human rights into legally binding treaties, which states then choose 
whether or not to commit to, is the result of ‘deep political contestation’.57  The factors that 
motivate that commitment are varied, ranging from a genuine desire to protect the 
                                                             
54 Marie-Benedicte Dembour, ‘What are Human Rights? Four Schools of Thought’ (2010) 32 Human Rights 
Quarterly 1-20, 2-4. 
55 ibid 19. 
56 Macklem (n 47) 13. 
57 ibid 20. 
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vulnerable in society, to securing better leverage when it comes to trade negotiation and 
domestic economic performance.58 
Ultimately the value of the origin and concept of rights is to be judged according to the 
benefit those rights afford to those they purport to protect.  Research indicates that ‘good 
human rights conditions are associated statistically with stable states’.59  This gives rise to 
the issue of human rights protection in those states that are not stable and those that are, in 
terms of stability and/or human rights protection, ‘in crisis’. 
1.5 Universal Periodic Review and ‘states in crisis’   
This section defines the meaning of ‘states in crisis’ in this thesis.  It considers the current 
state-based world order from a constructivist and realist perspective and details those states 
relevant to this study.  It closes with reference to the enduring challenge and paradox the 
‘international human rights regime complex’ poses for the principle of state sovereignty.  
That states in crisis generally return to subsequent cycles of the UPR having failed to take 
action against few, if any, of the previous cycle(s) recommendations is at the heart of this 
thesis.  The success of the international human rights framework in general, and the UPR in 
particular, will be undermined if the protection, promotion and monitoring of human rights 
is addressed in a vacuum that fails to acknowledge and encompass the broader context of 
complex matters of human rights protection and promotion in tandem with political 
(in)stability.  An SuR at the UPR may appear to willingly and gratefully support the majority 
of the recommendations it receives with the intention of taking action, however, ongoing or 
intervening matters disrupts resource, supply and capacity and curtails progress.  Conflict in 
the form of war and/or civil unrest inevitably derails action that may be in progress in terms 
of human rights protection, with Yemen being a case in point.  
‘States in crisis’ is a broad term not limited to a particular type of ‘crisis’; matters of human 
rights, security and development are inter-related and complex and some flexibility is 
                                                             
58 Oona Hathaway, ‘Why do countries commit to human rights treaties?’ (2007) 51(4) Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 588-621, and Oona Hathaway, ‘Do Human Rights Treaties make a difference?’ (2001-2002) 111 
Yale Law Journal 1935-2042. 
59 Neil A. Englehart, Sovereignty, State Failure and Human Rights: Petty Despots and Exemplary Villains 
(London and New York: Routledge 2017) 53. 
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required in identifying those states facing the greatest challenge in terms of human rights 
promotion and protection.  Crisis within the remit of this thesis relates primarily to ongoing 
human rights failings and internal state insecurity and instability.  States in crisis, including 
weak states and fragile states, pose a greater risk of human rights breaches and violations 
due to a loss of agency and failings in proper policing and functioning of public institutions 
and infrastructure, resulting in poor levels of individual security, vis-a-vis strong states.60  
That said, the state occupies the role of both protector of human rights and primary abuser 
and strong states often pose their own risk to human rights protection.61   
The concept of a ‘state in crisis’ reflects a broader move to adopt more positive language 
when referring to states with deep seated issues; the Failed States Index was renamed the 
‘Fragile States Index’ in 2014,62 and there has been a shift in focus away from failure towards 
‘resilience’,63 particularly in light of the contested nature of the term ‘failed state’.64   
Furthermore, literature on the nature, causes and consequences of failed states is 
fragmented and there is a vacuum of authority in this respect.65  For the purpose of this 
study, for a state to be ‘in crisis’ there must be evidence that individual and/or collective 
rights are being seriously compromised and/or habitually disregarded or violated, with a 
causal link to the collapse, or extreme fragility, of state infrastructure, often directly related 
to conflict.66   
                                                             
60 Neil A Englehart, ‘State capacity, state failure and human rights’, (2009) 46(2) Journal of Peace Research, 
163-180, 164-166, applying Mitchell’s principal–agency theory to the realm of human rights, citing Neil J. 
Mitchell, Agents of Atrocity: Leaders, Followers, and the Violation of Human Rights in Civil War, (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan 2004).   
61 Englehart ibid 163-180. 
62 Fund for Peace, Fragile States Index, http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/ last accessed 21 August 2018.  
63 Morten Boas and Kathleen M Jennings, ‘Insecurity and Development: The Rhetoric of the ‘Failed State’’ 
(2005) 17(3) The European Journal of Development Research 385-395 and Olivier Nay, ‘Fragile and failed 
states: Critical perspectives on conceptual hybrids’ (2013) 34(3) International Political Science Review 326-341. 
64 See for example, James Putzel and Jonathan Di John, ‘Meeting the challenges of crisis states’, Crisis States 
Research Report, (Crisis States Research Centre 2012) 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/crisisStates/download/finalreport/Meeting-the-
Challenges-of-Crisis-States.pdf and ‘A note on the fragility Assessment’, launched in Kinshasa, DRC, 2013’, 
Fragility assessment, fragility spectrum, G7+, 
http://static1.squarespace.com/static/5212dafbe4b0348bfd22a511/t/538e3f65e4b01aec8314ebe5/14018312
69040/g7%2B+English+FS+Note+Design.pdf both last accessed 21 August 2018.  
65 Peter Burnell, Vicky Randall and Lise Rakner, Politics in the Developing World (4th edn Oxford University Press 
2014) 249. 
66 Putzel and Di John (n 64), the definition of states in crisis or ‘crisis states’ adopted by the Crisis States 
Research Network, London School of Economics, crisis states is those that have collapsed ‘into violence and 
war’ or are recovering ‘from episodes of extreme violence’, ii. 
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The concept of ‘crisis’ also has the capacity to encompass states with high levels of 
corruption in terms of governance, giving rise to related implications for the adequate and 
proper provision of public services such as policing, a fair and transparent justice system, 
health and education.   Further, it incorporates states within which the definition, promotion 
and protection of human rights is, sometimes violently, contested.  Whilst fragile states 
might meet the definition of a state in crisis in terms of human rights protection and 
promotion, not all states in crisis from a human rights perspective are fragile; consider, for 
example, China and Saudi Arabia.  The genocidal regimes of Nazi Germany and Pol Pot’s 
Cambodia did not mean those states were fragile or failing; if anything during perpetration, 
the political and military might of the state was reinforced.67  To only consider the function 
of the UPR in relation to ‘fragile’ or ‘weak’ states would not accommodate the fact that a 
state may be strong, governed by an autocratic regime, and yet still be ‘in crisis’ in terms of 
human rights recognition, malpractice and violation.  
Nonetheless, the primary focus here is upon Yemen, a fragile and arguably failing state.  The 
strength of a state and its statehood is measured in part by the strength of state institutions 
and scope of state functions.68  The OECD’s view is that ‘states are fragile when state 
structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for 
poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their 
populations’.69  The optimal position of a state in relation to each will very much depend 
upon the perspective being taken.  As Francis Fukuyama highlights, in economic terms, the 
preference would be to build and maintain states with strong institutions but more limited 
scope.70   
From a global governance and human rights perspective, however, one might argue that 
strength lies in pursuing strong public institutions with a more expanded scope in terms of 
capacity to protect, tempered sufficiently to maintain individual freedoms and liberty.  For 
                                                             
67 Stefan Wolff, ‘The regional dimensions of state failure’, (2011) 37 Review of International Studies 951-972, 
956, 957.  
68 Francis Fukuyama, State Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century (London: Profile 
Books 2004) 6-15, with reference to a number of indexes based upon various indicators that measure the 
capacity of the state to carry out those functions deemed attributable to the state, such as defence, law and 
order, property rights, public health, education, etc. 
69 ‘International engagement in fragile states: can’t we do better?’, Preliminary Version, (OECD 2011) 
https://www.oecd.org/countries/somalia/48697077.pdf last accessed 22 August 2018 
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states in crisis, the malfunction and corruption of public institutions contributes to a human 
rights protection deficit that is characteristic of limited statehood; a state claims to have the 
will to act to protect human rights, but lacks the strength and the scope.71  Autocratic states 
also betray a human rights deficit which in the case of Syria was the seed that swiftly 
destabilised the state, prompting a human rights and humanitarian crisis with implications 
for internal, regional and international security.72 
Strength and scope can be related to the ‘two faces of the state’: the state’s function in 
terms of ensuring individual and collective security and the provision of public services, 
against its lack of capacity to fulfil its function.73  Under a global governance approach, civil 
society plays a key role in checking and holding to account the exercise of power and 
authority by states; it has the potential to complement the state’s role and shape the 
relationship between the individual and the state.   
The government or ruling elite of those states that are weak, fragile or failing commonly 
lacks universal authority and legitimacy,74 contributing to limited statehood.75  This accords 
with Weber’s analysis of statehood and the impact of the government’s loss over the 
monopolization of the use of force.76  A situation of political, economic and military 
instability compromises the security of the general population in terms of daily life, and the 
security of national borders as militant and/or religious non-state actors coalesce and have 
the capacity to flourish.77  The failure on the part of weak and fragile states to promote and 
                                                             
71 The idea of limited statehood is discussed in Tanja A. Borzel and Thomas Risse. ‘Human rights in areas of 
limited statehood: the new agenda’ in Risse et al The Persistent Power of Human Rights (n 46). 
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76 M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Tübingen: Mohr, 1972) 821–2, cited and translated by Wolff (n 67) 
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protect security has a concomitant detrimental impact upon the state’s capacity to promote 
and protect human rights thus creating, or entrenching, a human rights deficit.78  As the 
World Bank notes, fragile states are ‘characterised by a debilitating combination of weak 
governance, policies and institutions’,79 contributing to the growth of militant non-state 
actor groups.80   
Western powers over the last two decades have reconceptualised the sources of security 
risk from a sole focus on state actors to now encapsulate non-state actors and insurgents, 
whose training often occurs in fragile states and states in crisis that are characterised by 
power vacuums and pockets of ungoverned space.81  This may well be a significant factor in 
the higher number of recommendations made to states in crisis and by a greater proportion 
of reviewing states, as demonstrated in chapter 6.  
1.5.1 Yemen: a state in crisis  
Yemen is the primary state in crisis this study focuses upon.  As noted above, it was evident 
during the author’s observation of Yemen’s second cycle UPR in January 2014 that Yemen 
                                                             
Afghan town that rose up and drove out its leaders, The Guardian (27 October 2014), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/27/taliban-return-afghan-town-gizab; Nicola Abé, ‘What 
Germany Left Behind: A Feeling of Abandonment in North Afghanistan’, (Der Speigel Online International, 22 
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german-withdrawal-a-965522.html, all last accessed 22 August 2018.  
78 This idea is not new, see for example, Françoise J Hampson, ‘International Humanitarian Law in Situations of 
Acute Crisis’, Report of the Conference on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in Acute Crisis 
(Department for International Development/ Human Rights Centre, University of Essex 1998), 
http://www.essex.ac.uk/rightsinacutecrisis/english.htm last accessed 22 August 2018. 
79 Fragile States: The Low Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) (World Bank 2006) 
http://ieg.worldbank.org/Data/reports/licus.pdf last accessed 21 August 2018, see also Stewart Brown (n 74) 
2. 
80 Although these factors cannot be attributed to internal insecurity alone: motivations for engagement in and 
joining violent jihad are both theological and political, Andreas Armborst, ‘Modelling terrorism and political 
violence’, (2010) 24(4) International Relations 414 – 432, as well as attributable to broader matters relating to 
informal association and friendship, Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror networks in the twenty-first 
century, (University of Pennsylvania Press 2008), Scot Atran and Marc Sageman, ‘Theoretical Frames on 
Pathways to Violent Radicalization: Understanding the Evolution of Ideas and Behaviors, How They Interact 
and How They Describe Pathways to Violence in Marginalized Diaspora’, (ARTIS research and risk modelling, 
August 2009) https://sites.lsa.umich.edu/satran/wp-
content/uploads/sites/330/2015/10/ARTIS_Theoretical_Frames_August_2009.pdf last accessed 22 August 
2018. 
81 The UK’s International Engagement Security Strategy states ‘The key threats are terrorism, extremism and 
instability; cyber; and the weakening of the rules-based international order, making it more difficult to achieve 
the consensus needed to deal with global threats’, ‘UK’s International Engagement Security Strategy’, Ministry 
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had made little if any progress against first cycle recommendations.  Further investigation at 
that time into the political, economic, social and cultural fabric of Yemen revealed a 
burgeoning crisis with regard to human rights promotion and protection in terms of capacity 
and capability as well as political and cultural will, indicating Yemen to be an apt focus for 
this study, and as further outlined below.82  
The World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) provides data sets and 
indicators of a country’s development position that rate a country against 16 criteria 
grouped into four clusters: economic management; structural policies; policies for social 
inclusion and equity; and public sector management and institutions.83  This data set is one 
of a number of sets referred to by the Fragile States Index,84 which offers a means of 
ascertaining the extent of crisis for a state as reported annually over a period of time.  It is 
accepted that there are limitations with using indexes that seek to measure a country’s 
performance against a set of criteria be they human rights or development based.85  Those 
states experiencing crisis in terms of governance and state infrastructure are more likely to 
suffer from poor data collection and poor resources allocated to this task and will therefore 
inevitably perform poorly in terms of their rankings; the challenge of reliance upon 
indicators is explored in more detail in section 5.4, chapter 5.  
Notwithstanding the limitations of collecting and collating data for states in crisis, in 2008 at 
the commencement of the UPR, Yemen was categorised as being the world’s 21st most 
fragile state.86  Yemen’s first cycle UPR was during May 2009, by which time it was ranked as 
the 18th most fragile state.  By the time of its second cycle review in January 2014, it was 
ranked 8th.  In 2017, Yemen was ranked the 4th most fragile state, and the third most fragile 
                                                             
82 Initial research involved reviewing various human rights reports for Yemen, for example, both first and 
second cycle UPR documentation and matters relating to Yemen’s human rights treaty commitments.  
83 CPIA, World Bank https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/country-policy-and-institutional-assessment 
last accessed 20 May 2018. This data has been used by academics for example, W. Naudé, A. U. Santos-
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84 ‘Methodology’, Fund for Peace (n 62). 
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in 2018, and was in receipt of significant support from the World Bank’s IDA (International 
Development Association) including emergency projects relating to electricity access, health 
and nutrition, and crisis response, all symptoms of Yemen’s fragility and its ongoing war.87   
The World Bank’s ‘Fragility, Conflict and Violence Group’ 2014 publication contains an 
analysis of fragile and conflict affected states.88  This report focuses on those states that are 
beneficiaries of IDA funds and presents findings in relation to progress made against the 
World Bank’s strategic priority of supporting fragile and conflict affected states.  For the 
purpose of this study, the findings are less relevant, and arguably out of date given the fast-
moving pace of conflict issues, particularly in the Middle East, but for reference, Yemen 
features on the ‘partial FCS’ (fragile and conflict affected states) list.89  Further detail of 
Yemen’s complex historical and religious / political divisions is provided by the European 
Council on Foreign Affairs.90 
The matters referred to in this subsection therefore illustrate that Yemen meets the 
definition of a state in crisis set out in the introduction to section 1.5 above.  
1.5.2 Other sample states: Somalia, Iraq, the UK and New Zealand 
There is not the space in this study to focus in detail on more than one state in crisis. 
However, to only focus upon one state may cast doubt upon the reliability and robustness of 
findings made.  To mitigate this, other states including those in crisis, Iraq and Somalia, and 
those that are stable, the UK and New Zealand, are also referred to.  
Iraq is in the same regional group as Yemen, the Asia-Pacific group, and Somalia is in the 
African Group.91  Like Yemen, each has been reviewed as part of the first and second cycle, 
but not yet the third.  In 2008 at the start of the UPR, Somalia was ranked by the FSI as the 
                                                             
87 World Bank, IDA projects and operations, 
http://projects.worldbank.org/search?lang=en&searchTerm=&status_exact=Active%5eClosed&prodline_exact
=GU%5ePE&countrycode_exact=RY last accessed 18 May 2018.  
88 Laura Ralston, ‘Success in Difficult Environments: A Portfolio Analysis of Fragile and Conflict-affected States’, 
Policy Research Working Paper 7098, World Bank Group, Fragility, Conflict and Violence Group, November 
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most fragile state in the world and Iraq as the fifth most fragile.92  Somalia’s first cycle UPR 
was in May 2011 and its second cycle review during January 2016; over this period it was 
continually ranked as the world’s most fragile state.93   
Somalia has been said to suffer historically, socially, culturally, economically and politically as 
a post-colonial country in part due to the imposition of Western style centralised state-
governed structures of law and order onto a clan and kinship model.94  Modern day Somalia 
has struggled to maintain stability following prolonged periods of civil war, food insecurity, 
famine, drought and outbreaks of cholera as well as the monopoly of state power in the 
hands of a few, generally according to ethnic grouping.95  Whilst Somaliland, which operates 
as an autonomous region in Somalia, has succeeded in creating some stability by operating 
under a parallel legal and political system it is not internationally recognised; for the 
purposes of international law Somaliland remains part of Somalia despite meeting 
conditions of statehood by satisfying certain normative criteria related to basic human rights 
protection and democratic governance.96 
Iraq’s first cycle review was February 2010, at which time it was ranked as the 7th most 
fragile state, it was the 13th most fragile state at the time of its second cycle review in 
November 2014.97  It was ranked in 2017 as the 10th most fragile state.  Iraq has been the 
site of international and domestic conflict, particularly since the invasion led by the US and 
the UK in 2003 and more recently as a result of the hold taken by Daesh in the northern 
regions of the country.98  Discussions of the identity of Iraq as a state including from its 
formation to contemporary geopolitics and complex domestic religious / political divisions,99 
and the 2003 Iraq invasion by Western powers and its ongoing relationship with the West,100 
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go well beyond the scope of this thesis.  However, as a fragile state that has been the site of 
invasion by an international coalition and subsequent internal conflict, Iraq presents a useful 
comparator when looking at recommendations data.  Whilst Somalia is included on the 
World Bank’s ‘always FCS’ (fragile and conflict affected states) list, Iraq is absent, no doubt 
because it was not eligible to be included in the measure, the criteria being those IDA funded 
states that had been ranked as FCS for at least two years during the period the report covers 
(2001-2013).101 
The two stable states identified for comparison are the UK and New Zealand.  New Zealand 
is grouped into the same UPR session as Yemen and therefore provides a contemporaneous 
comparator stable state.102  In 2017, it was ranked as one of the most stable states in the 
world, 170 out of 178.103  Including the UK in this study reflects the nationality of the 
researcher and presents a comparator that is not only a strong state but was a member of 
the Human Rights Council at the start of the UPR and one of the very first states to be 
subject to review.104  It is also one of the five permanent members of the UN Security 
Council.105   
Additional states are referred to for illustrative purposes, as appropriate.  There are a 
number of other states that might have been specifically included as well or instead, but 
given the geographical location of the most fragile states in the world and those with the 
lowest Human Development Index score, this would have led to a bias towards Central and 
East Africa.106   
Whilst UPR follow up and implementation by states in crisis may be poor, these states 
continue to engage with this mechanism by continuing to submit a national report and 
                                                             
and occupation from 2003 to 2008’, International Criminal Court, https://www.icc-cpi.int/iraq last accessed 06 
April 2018. 
101 Ralston (n 88) 5-6. 
102 For past and future timetables of the UPR, see ‘UPR sessions’, 
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sending a relatively high status delegation to the Working Group in Geneva.  In this context, 
this research piece identifies and critically explores those factors that secure this 
engagement.  It considers the extent to which a lack of UPR follow up or implementation 
inhibits normative change and examines whether the nature of engagement by states in 
crisis serves to undermine or, paradoxically, reinforce the authority and legitimacy of the 
UPR, and thereby its governance function.  
1.6 Research methodology, design and method  
This PhD is a socio-legal study within the paradigm of conditional international law theory, 
taking a critical constructivist approach, each of which is defined below.   
Conditional international law theory is an emerging practice of empirical research in the 
field of international law.  In the context of conditional international law theory empirical 
work, which ‘involves the systematic use of qualitative or quantitative methods’,107 is 
concerned with two aspects of international law: ‘the conditions under which international 
law is formed and those under which it has effects in different contexts, aiming to explain 
variation’ (emphasis in the original).108  This theory operates to ‘narrow the gap between 
abstract theory, empirical research and the world of practice’ by ‘oscillating’ between each 
and through the conduct of ‘empirically grounded work regarding particular international 
law contexts’.109  This approach encapsulates the methods and methodology underpinning 
this research project which takes theories and concepts of global governance combined with 
empirical research to map and define practice related to the UPR in a specific real world 
context.   
Interestingly, Gregory Shaffer and Tom Ginsburg suggest that outlier states should be 
disregarded when assessing the impact of international law to better focus on those states 
‘in the middle’ where international law has the greatest impact.110  This thesis countenances 
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this suggestion precisely because of the conditional international law approach adopted.  
Central to the thesis is an assessment of the global governance function of the UPR for 
states at the margins, paying attention to the particular challenges and conditions within 
those states and the imperative of non-state actor contribution in subsequent compliance, 
re-building and implementation.  
Aspects of international relations theories are relevant to the UPR; it places the eyes of the 
international diplomatic community on compliance, setting the UPR apart from treaty 
bodies, regional human rights courts and ad hoc tribunals.  By its nature, this study is 
therefore socio-legal with interdisciplinary elements.  Scholarship and research in the field of 
international law has emerged as a separate discipline to legal scholarship, the latter having 
been historically divided into two categories; black letter law, commonly accepted as 
involving doctrinal research,111 and law in context.112  Further, the concept of legal research 
has expanded to encompass methods and methodologies more common to the field of 
social sciences, namely, socio-legal research where research is undertaken from a 
perspective that involves assessing and evaluating the social function of law and has led to 
‘the theoretical empirical analysis of law as a social phenomenon’.113 
Until recently, research in the field of international law was largely from a positivist 
perspective, with a socio-legal approach all but absent.114  Positivism encompasses those 
theories that describe the law ‘as it is’, as encapsulated in treaties, custom and other forms 
of consent, tending ‘to view states as the only subjects of international law, thereby 
discounting the role of non-state actors’.115  Positivist normative hierarchies held attraction 
for international lawyers by validating international law as a separate credible field of study 
                                                             
111 Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui, ‘Introduction and Overview’, in Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui 
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and practice, but the need for such justification has since dissipated.116  The result has been 
a drive to seek out the specificity of legal norms.117  The predominant view amongst 
constructivists, however, is that law and morality are not entirely separate, they are not 
‘radically distinct concepts’ and attempts to separate them by focusing on the specificity of 
legal norms are criticised as reflecting positivist assumptions.118  However, constructivism 
has fallen prey to the criticism of being circular by implying that causes and their results are 
‘mutually constitutive’; critical constructivism acknowledges the weakness of a purely 
constructivist approach, seeking to break such circularity.119   
For Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope, the international lawyer can ‘unpack the positivist 
underpinnings of most IR [international relations] theorists’ understanding of rules… to offer 
alternative explanations of normativity’.120  They propose an interactional theory of 
international law that links the ‘bindingness’ of law to the internal morality of the subjects 
and the creators of that law.121  Linked to this is the critical constructivist’s concern with 
what actors actually do, where ‘doing’ including words spoken as well as action taken.122  
This aligns with the analysis of this study of the words and actions of SuRs and reviewing 
states to determine the global governance function of the UPR.   
As such, there are three key elements to the research design for this study, which is 
characterised by a mixed methods multidimensional approach.  A mixed methods approach 
does not limit the researcher to an ‘either/or’ approach, being committed neither to purely 
qualitative research nor purely quantitative research, but driven by ‘the broad inquiry logic 
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that guides the selection of specific methods and that is informed by conceptual positions 
common to mixed methods practitioners’.123   
One element of the research design of this study is qualitative research.  This has taken the 
form of the analysis of original empirical data generated via interviews undertaken with 
various UPR stakeholders.  The sample of interviewees was formulated by identifying which 
civil society organisations (CSOs) had made stakeholder submissions to Yemen’s second 
cycle UPR.  Contact was made with CSOs to request an interview with an appropriate 
person.  As is to be expected with such an endeavour, not all those contacted responded.  In 
addition, successful contact was made with personnel at the OHCHR.  Attempts to arrange 
interviews with diplomatic permanent missions to the UN were less fruitful, with only one 
formal interview being carried out in May 2017.  Contact was also made with a Yemeni 
NGO.  During an informal conversation between the author and the director of the NGO at 
the UN in Geneva it was apparent that the potential interviewee was not at that time fully 
aware of the UPR mechanism.  The author shared details of the UPR but it was not possible 
at the time of data collection to arrange a further and more formal interview.   
Ultimately, a total of eleven formal interviews were conducted, seven with representatives 
of CSOs, two with personnel from the OHCHR, one with a permanent mission to the UN and 
one with a human rights journalist.  Interviews were conducted during May and June 2017 
in person in Geneva save for two via telephone/Skype.  In January 2014, during the initial 
field visit to the UN, informal conversations were had with a Permanent Mission to the UN 
for a stable state in this study’s sample, and with two civil society representatives.  The 
content of these conversations have also informed deliberations within this thesis.  Whilst 
the final sample size may appear small, the position and experience of those within the 
sample and the quality of the interviews undertaken offers a sufficiently robust source of 
qualitative data to fulfil a triangulation purpose in terms of documentary analysis and 
analysis of available statistical data, and to reveal perspectives and knowledge that would 
not be available from documentary analysis alone.   
                                                             
123 Charles Teddlie and Abbas Tashakkori, ‘Overview of Contemporary Issues in Mixed Methods’, in Abbas 
Tashakkori and Charles Teddlie (eds), Sage Handbook of Mixed Methods in Sociological Research (Sage 
Publications Limited 2010) 5. 
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A semi-structured approach was taken to the interview process to permit specific focus and 
direction in terms of subject matter and theme, as well as allowing scope during the process 
for interviewees to be unfettered by the confines of tightly focused questions, and thereby 
enabled to speak more freely.  The interview process provided an opportunity to uncover 
unforeseen, less visible or more nuanced themes and matters.  Transcripts have been 
analysed to detect and measure attitudes towards the UPR and its function in relation to 
states in crisis.  The analysis contributes to the determination of the global governance 
function of the UPR in general and for states in crisis in particular and has been integrated 
throughout the thesis.  
A further key aspect of the research methods underpinning this study is qualitative research 
in the form of documentary analysis.  This has involved analysis of documents that directly 
contribute to a state’s review.  These comprise a national report, an OHCHR compilation of 
UN information and an OHCHR summary of stakeholder submissions regarding a particular 
SuR.  These documents and their function and content and are considered in more detail 
primarily in chapters 2, 4, 6 and 7.124  
Finally, quantitative data in relation to UPR recommendations collated by an INGO based in 
Geneva, UPR Info, has been accessed and analysed.  UPR Info hosts a significant body of UPR 
data that has been coded and organised under the instruction of Edward McMahon, 
culminating in two open source databases.  One database codes UPR recommendations 
according to the recommending state, the SuR, and a recommendation’s theme or action 
category.125  The second provides access to statistics regarding recommendations, for 
example, those states that make the most recommendations and statistics according to 
regional grouping, response, action, issue, etc.126  Analysis within  chapter 6 refers to these 
two databases in particular.  
Conclusions as a result of this analysis have contributed towards determining the function of 
the UPR in relation to Yemen as a state in crisis, supported by observations made regarding 
recommendations relating to other states in crisis.  Measurement of the rate of acceptance 
                                                             
124 UNHRC A/HRC/RES/5/1 (n 9). 
125 UPR Info: Database of Recommendations https://www.upr-info.org/database/ last accessed 21 August 
2018. 
126 UPR Info: Statistics of Recommendations https://www.upr-info.org/database/statistics/ last accessed 21 
August 2018. 
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of recommendations made, and the type of recommendation accepted has been conducted 
to discover any emerging patterns, for example, in terms of regional allegiances, the 
prominence and influence of normative orders and action taken against supported 
recommendations.  Consideration is given to whether subsequent state action in 
implementing recommendations is influenced by the identity of the recommender. 
As noted, there are aspects of this thesis that are interdisciplinary involving elements of 
international relations theories and security studies.  Research in these two areas of study 
has been textual and the relevant concepts and theories are applied to the UPR in this 
chapter above in section 1.5, and in chapters 4, 5 and 6, as well as referred to in questions 
put to interviewees.  All elements of the research design are underpinned by thematic 
analysis to address the question of the UPR’s global governance function and its associated 
legitimacy and authority to respond to the question of how the UPR functions in relation to 
states in crisis. 
1.7 Originality and impact 
By having as its focus states in crisis and by providing detailed analysis and evaluation of the 
global governance function of the UPR mechanism, this thesis provides an additional distinct 
perspective to other research and scholarly activity that focuses upon the UPR.127  It is an 
important piece of work that explores the complex and nuanced interaction of the human 
rights monitoring and protection function of one entity, the UPR, with state and non-state 
actors situated within what this thesis defines as an ‘international human rights regime 
complex’.   
In this endeavour it is original and takes a novel perspective; interrogating the challenge that 
states in crisis pose to the legitimacy and authority of the UPR considering the grave 
                                                             
127 See section 1.1 above for reference to other UPR related research, and also Felice D. Gaer, ‘A Voice Not an 
Echo: Universal Periodic Review and the UN Treaty Body System’ (2007) 7(1) Human Rights Law Review 109; 
Marianne Lilliebjerg, ‘The Universal Periodic Review of the UN Human Rights Council - An NGO Perspective on 
Opportunities and Shortcomings’ 26 (2008) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 311; Karolina M. Milewicz 
and Robert E. Goodin, ‘Deliberative Capacity Building through International Organizations: the Case of the 
Universal Periodic Review of Human Rights’ (2016) 48 British Journal of Political Science 513; Edward R. 
McMahon, ‘The Universal Periodic Review: A Work in Progress, An Evaluation of the First Cycle of the New UPR 
Mechanism of the United Nations Human Rights Council’ in Dialogue on Globalisation Report (Geneva: 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, September 2012); Christian Tomuschat ‘Universal Periodic Review: a New System of 
International Law with Specific Ground Rules?’ in Ulrich Fastenrath et al (eds) From Bilateralism to Community 
Interest: Essays in honour of Bruno Simma (Oxford University Press 2011). 
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difficulties those states face in terms of human rights progress and, as a result, the challenge 
of the UPR mechanism meeting its objectives.  In addition, this work provides a 
conceptualisation of the UPR and its function for states in crisis and proposes how the UPR’s 
standing might be preserved by making transparent what it is that this mechanism offers 
states in crisis, such as Yemen, and what it cannot.  
Impact, in relation to academic research, has been defined by the Research Excellence 
Framework (REF) as ‘an effect on, change or benefit to the economy, society, culture, public 
policy or services, health, the environment or quality of life beyond academia’.128  This piece 
presents recommendations to feed into policy consideration and provides originality by 
identifying the global governance function of the UPR and by providing a means to measure 
the authority and legitimacy of the mechanism via the form and extent of state engagement.  
The proposals and modelling will be shared in an executive summary document for 
distribution to individuals and institutions, namely civil society, UN permanent missions and 
personnel of the Human Rights Council, including those interviewed as part of the research 
process, some of whom have pledged their support in disseminating this research and its 
outcomes.  In addition, through links formed with INGOs it is anticipated that certain INGOs 
will be open to distributing the findings via their email alerters and social networking media.  
1.8 Limitations  
It is acknowledged that other fields of study might fall within the scope of this research 
project, for example, matters relating to development particularly given the focus on states 
in crisis which are in receipt of UK and international aid related to the pursuit of 
development goals.129  However, it is not feasible to situate the politics and ramifications of 
                                                             
128 Policy Guide, REF impact, The Higher Education Funding Council of England (HEFCE), last updated 19 
February 2016, http://www.hefce.ac.uk/rsrch/REFimpact/ last accessed 06 February 2018.  
129 For UK aid details: DFID Iraq Profile, July 2018, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/723176/I
raq-July-2018.pdf; DFID Somalia Profile, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/723292/
DFID-Somalia-Profile-July-2018.pdf; DFID Yemen Profile, July 2018, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/723344/
DFID-Yemen-Profile-July-2018.pdf, for international aid details: OECD Countries, 
http://www.oecd.org/countries/ all last accessed 22 August 2018. 
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international development policies and agendas as well as state fragility centre stage, 
though reference to presiding matters is made as and when appropriate.  
Determining the sample for any study requires decisions to be made about what to exclude.  
In focusing on Yemen with reference to Iraq and Somalia as states in crisis and the UK and 
New Zealand as stable states does, of course, mean there are many states that have not 
been included, particularly in chapter 6 in which quantitative data is assessed and 
conclusions made.  These conclusions would ultimately require testing against a larger 
sample of states to be certain of their robustness.   
Finally, whilst chapter 5 gives some thought to the motivations for state engagement with 
international organisations as embodied by the UPR, the thesis does not attend in detail to 
the reasons for states forming international organisations.  This is an area of research that 
has primarily attracted the focus of international relations scholars, but there is value in 
scholars in the field of international law giving careful thought to these matters given the 
growing authority and power of international organisations.130  This is not, however, the 
primary focus of this thesis’ subject matter.  
1.9 Ethics approval  
Ethics approval was sought and granted shortly after the researcher’s enrolment on the 
research degree programme by the University Faculty Research Ethics Committee in 
December 2013. 
  
                                                             
130 Clive Archer, International Organizations (4th edn Routledge 2015); Walter Mattli and Thomas Dietz (eds), 
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Chapter 2 Universal Periodic Review: context and concept, foundations, and procedure   
Introduction 
This chapter critically assesses the context within which the UPR was conceived.  It explains 
the UPR’s founding documents, objectives, and procedure.  These matters are critically 
addressed in chapters 4 and 5 when mapping the global governance function of the UPR.  
This chapter does not therefore interrogate global governance theory or the governance 
function of the UPR; it provides insight into the aspirations and criticality of the mechanism 
at the time of its conception and design and signposts some of the challenges the UPR faces 
for subsequent discussion.  
The first section briefly charts the demise of the Commission on Human Rights (the 
Commission) and its replacement by the Human Rights Council.  The second section sets out 
the UPR’s objectives according to its founding instruments and successive decisions and 
resolutions.  Section three describes the UPR’s modalities and procedures and discusses the 
defining feature of the Working Group, the peer review conducted as part of an ‘interactive 
dialogue’.  This chapter broadly concludes that structurally, the UPR effectively addresses 
the ills of the Commission and that state engagement with the UPR has been successful, 
although the substance of that engagement varies from one state to the next.  
The UPR is a Charter-based mechanism forming part of the machinery of the Human Rights 
Council with administrative functions being carried out by the OHCHR.131  A number of the 
UPR’s features mean it is distinct from other monitoring mechanisms, namely, it is: coopera-
tive in its approach, rather than adversarial or inquisitive; non-selective; and structured 
primarily around a state-led peer review.  Civil society and human rights experts contribute 
indirectly to the process, and treaty body recommendations are disseminated, matters that 
are given further consideration in chapters 4 and 7.   
For some, the UPR represents ‘the Council’s most important mechanism’ being premised 
upon ‘an exchange of good practices on the basis of dialogue and cooperation, the key pillars 
of the Council’;132 it is perceived to be an ‘innovative mechanism’,133 a ‘significant 
                                                             
131 UNHRC A/HRC/RES/5/1 (n 9). 
132 Statement by Venezuela, HRC General Debate on the UPR (n 35). 
133 Freedman (n 1) 253 – 295. 
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innovation’,134 and ‘perhaps the major innovation’ in the establishing of the Council,135 being 
‘the one entirely new mechanism’ that serves to distinguish the Council from its predecessor 
the Commission.136    
2.1 Conceiving the Human Rights Council and the UPR 
The Human Rights Council is a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly.137  Conceived at a 
particular moment in time in a very specific context it was lauded by its supporters as a fresh 
start to replace and present a departure from the much-criticised human rights monitoring 
hitherto conducted by the Commission.138  Conducting a detailed assessment of the context 
of the Council’s creation is beyond the scope of this thesis, and others have undertaken this 
task,139 however a brief summary illustrates the weight of expectation upon the Council and 
the mechanisms within its purview.  
The Commission was established pursuant to Article 68 of the UN Charter.  Its initial task was 
standard setting and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was an important 
output in 1948 that heralded early success.140  Implementation of standards was to follow 
and it is the Commission’s operation in this respect that became the subject of much 
criticism.  It betrayed a highly politicised ‘naming and shaming’ approach,141 to the extent 
that by the time of the US administration of George W. Bush, the Commission had become ‘a 
popular target in general attacks on the United Nations because of its perceived 
malfunctioning’.142   
                                                             
134 UNHRC ‘Annual high-level panel discussion’ (n 36). 
135 Freedman (n 1) 297-302; Rhona Smith, ‘China’s contribution to human rights through the UPR’, (2011) 17 
Asian Yearbook of International Law 85, 89, respectively. 
136 G Sweeney and Y Saito 'An NGO Assessment of the New Mechanisms of the UN Human Rights 
Council' Human Rights Law Review 9(2) 2009, 203. 
137 See ‘United Nations System’, 
http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/structure/pdfs/UN_System_Chart_2015_Rev.4_ENG_11x17colour.pdf last 
accessed 22 February 2018.  
138 Freedman (n 1) 9 – 37. 
139 Nico Schrijver provides a comprehensive review of the historical conditions at the close of the Second 
World War that led to the creation of the Commission on Human Rights by ECOSOC, pursuant to Article 68 of 
the United Nations Charter; a critical assessment of the newly formed Human Rights Council; and also charts 
the negotiation and drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, Schrijver (n 1). See also, Philip 
Alston (n 1). 
140 Schrijver (n 1) 811, citing chapter 5 in Philip Alston (ed.), The United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical 
Appraisal (Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
141 Lebovi and Voeten (n 1). 
142 Schrijver (n 1) 813. 
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A range of criticisms were levied at the Commission, including in relation to membership.  
The criteria used for membership attracted disapproval,143 members included states known 
as ‘human rights abusers’,144 and it was apparent that motivation for states seeking 
membership was ‘not to strengthen human rights but to protect themselves against criticism 
or to criticize [sic] others’.145  Further, there were allegations of failing to act in response to 
state-led gross violations of human rights including a failure to intervene in the genocide in 
Rwanda in 1994.146  Other criticisms were the apparently politically motivated country-
specific resolutions, a lack of resources to be equipped to respond to human rights crises, 
and the inhibiting effects of regionalism.147   
A High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change published its report in 2004 having 
been tasked with determining how to adapt the UN to meet the challenges of the twenty 
first century.148  The Panel acknowledged the interconnectedness of threats to global 
security and that ‘institutions must overcome their narrow preoccupations and learn to work 
across the whole range of issues, in a concerted fashion’.149  The report also focused on the 
Commission’s ‘legitimacy deficit’.150  The Panel concluded that consideration should be given 
to ‘upgrading’ the Commission to a ‘Human Rights Council’ with Charter status standing 
alongside the Security Council ‘reflecting in the process the weight given to human rights, 
                                                             
143 In terms of the Human Rights Council’s membership, when electing members, states are to take account of 
a candidate’s contribution to the promotion and protection of human rights (para 8) and it is required that 
Council members ‘uphold the highest standards in the promotion and protection of human rights’ (para 9), 
UNGA ‘Human Rights Council’ A/RES/60/251 (3 April 2006).  
144 Michael Jordan, ‘New calls for Reform of UN Rights Commission: Cuba’s Re-Election Law Week to the 
Commission on Human Rights is Drawing Criticism from Rights Groups’ The Christian Science Monitor (Boston, 
US, 7 May 2003) 7, cited by Alston (n 1) 188. Alston suggests in the same publication that the preoccupation 
with the issue of membership ‘fails to address the more important factors in the Commission’s downfall’, 185. 
145 UNGA ‘A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility’, Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change, chaired by Anand Panyarachun A/59/565 (2004), 02 December 2004, para 283. 
146 Address by Kofi Annan to the Commission on Human Rights, 07 April 2004, 
https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2004-04-07/address-kofi-annan-commission-human-rights 
accessed 01 November 2017.  
147 Freedman (n 1) 9 - 37, as summarised in Louisa Riches, ‘Book Reviews: The United Nations Human Rights 
Council: A Critique and Early Assessment’, (2015) 5 Asian Journal of International Law 415, 415. See also, Ron 
Wheeler, ‘The United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 1982-1997: A Study of ‘Targeted’ Resolutions’ 
(1999) 32(1) Canadian Journal of Political Science 75. 
148 UNGA Kofi Annan, ‘A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility’, report of the Secretary-General’s 
High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A/59/569, 2 December 2004, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/historical/hlp_more_secure_world.pdf last accessed 05 March 
2018. 
149 ibid vii. 
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alongside security and economic issues, in the Preamble of the Charter’, rather than being a 
subsidiary of the Economic and Social Council.151  
Building upon the High-level Panel report, Kofi Annan proposed an institution-building 
package reiterating the sentiment that a loss of confidence in the work of the Commission 
meant ‘a credibility deficit has developed, which casts a shadow on the reputation of the 
United Nations system as a whole’.152  Annan declared that:  
A Human Rights Council would offer a fresh start.  My basic premise is 
that the main intergovernmental body concerned with human rights 
should have a status, authority and capability commensurate with the 
importance of its work.  The United Nations already has councils that 
deal with its two other main purposes, security and development.  So 
creating a full-fledged council for human rights offers conceptual and 
architectural clarity.  But what is most important is for the new body to 
be able to carry out the tasks required of it.153 
 
Despite debates that were ‘protracted and at times heated’, during discussions preceding 
the Council’s creation there ‘was a surprising degree of consensus on three propositions’.154  
These were: that the Commission was discredited and ‘had largely failed’; ‘that a new, 
higher-level body with a different composition had to be established’; and that the 
institutional human rights machinery required strengthening.155  Implicit in Annan’s 
comments above is the desire to situate a Human Rights Council on a par with the Security 
Council and the Economic and Social Council, but the proposal for the Council to have equal 
standing was not met with open arms; there were ‘extensive consultations and at times 
really difficult negotiations’.156  The result was to position it within the General Assembly.157  
General Assembly Resolution 60/251 provides, amongst other things, that the Council 
                                                             
151 ibid para 291. 
152 ibid para 182. 
153 UNHRC Address by Kofi Annan to the Commission on Human Rights: ‘Secretary-General Outlines Major 
Proposals to Reform UN Human Rights Machinery, In Address To Geneva Human Rights Commission’, 07 April 
2005, http://www.un.org/press/en/2005/sgsm9808.doc.htm last accessed 10 November 2017.  
154 Alston (n 1) 186. 
155 Alston (n 1) 186. 
156 Schrijver (n 1) 815. The Security Council is superior to the General Assembly, as implicit in the wording of 
the Charter of the United Nations article 12: ‘While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute 
or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any 
recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests.’ 
157 UNGA A/RES/60/251 (n 143) para 1.  
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should: ‘address situations of violations of human rights, including gross and systematic 
violations, and make recommendations thereon’ and ‘promote the effective coordination 
and the mainstreaming of human rights within the United Nations system’; it is designed to 
‘serve as a forum for dialogue on thematic issues on all human rights’; ‘promote the full 
implementation of human rights obligations undertaken by States and follow-up to the goals 
and commitments related to the promotion and protection of human rights emanating from 
United Nations conferences and summits’.158  Resolution 60/251 requires the General 
Assembly to review the work of the Council within five years.159 
The formation and operation of the Council was unlikely to provide a panacea for the ills of 
the Commission given it mirrored much of the Commission’s character and its procedures.  It 
was designed as a reform mechanism rather than an overhaul of the system already in place, 
but its similarity to the Commission suggests a lack of appetite and vision to make 
meaningful changes to human rights monitoring.160  Despite proposals for a smaller number 
of Council members, membership was ultimately only reduced from 53 to 47.161  The Special 
procedures mechanism overseen by the Commission was transferred to the Council,162 as 
was the essence of its regular sessions, special sessions, commissions of inquiry and the 
participation and role of NGOs and other relevant non-Council members.163  The Human 
                                                             
158 ibid paras 3, 5(b) and 5(d) respectively. 
159 ibid para 1. 
160 As Scanella and Splinter highlight, the negotiation of UNGA A/RES/60/251 (n 143) was informed by the 
‘mantra’ that there ‘was the need to preserve what was best in the Commission and to fix its shortcomings’, 
citing the eighth preambular paragraph of resolution 60/251, Patrizia Scanella and Peter Splinter, ‘United 
Nations Human Rights Council: A promise to be Fulfilled’ (2007) 7(1) Human Rights Law Review. 41-72, 44. 
161 Weiss What’s Wrong with the United Nations (n 25) 50-51, cited by Rosa Freedman, ‘New Mechanisms of 
the UN Human Rights Council’, (2011) 29 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 289-323. The allocation of 
seats to the regional groups of the United Nations is detailed in UNGA A/RES/60/251 (n 143) para 7: ‘based on 
equitable geographical distribution (…) seats shall be distributed as follows among regional groups: Group of 
African States, thirteen; Group of Asian States, thirteen; Group of Eastern European States, six; Group of Latin 
American and Caribbean States, eight; and Group of Western European and other States, seven; the members 
of the Council shall serve for a period of three years and shall not be eligible for immediate re-election after 
two consecutive terms’. 
162 Special procedures were first introduced in 1967 as part of the Commission’s work to act against human 
rights violations related to colonialism, racism and apartheid with two mandates being agreed: an Ad-Hoc 
Working Group of Experts on South Africa and a Special Rapporteur on Apartheid. It is interesting to note that 
there were five abstentions on the vote on the resolution agreeing the mandate of the latter, France, Italy, 
New Zealand, UK and US, see Marc Limon and Hilary Power, History of the United Nations Special Procedures: 
Mechanism Origins, Evolution and Reform, (Universal Rights Group 2014) 5 and 49, citing UNCHR ‘Action 
effectively to combat racial discrimination and the policies of apartheid and segregation’ Resolution 7(XXIII) 
(16th March 1967). 
163 UNGA A/RES/60/251 (n 143) para 11: ‘the specialized agencies, other intergovernmental organizations and 
national human rights institutions, as well as non-governmental organizations, shall be based on 
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Rights Council does, however, hold more regular sessions than the Commission did being no 
fewer than three per calendar year, compared to the Commission having held only one 
annually.164 Nonetheless, the Council’s mechanisms broadly reflect those of the Commission.  
Sweeney and Saito see the UPR as ‘the one entirely new mechanism’ that sets the Council 
apart from the Commission.165  This was commonly perceived as a proposal to ‘fix’ the 
‘politicisation and selectivity that characterised much of the Commission’s consideration of 
country situations’.166  Freedman refers to the Council’s special sessions as a second new 
mechanism allowing ‘the Council to meet outside of plenary sessions to discuss grave and 
crisis human rights situations, either country-specific or thematic’ and being ‘specifically 
designed to combat criticism that the Commission did not have the time or flexibility to deal 
with grave or crisis situations’.167  Whilst the Commission did host special sessions, these 
totalled only five throughout its lifetime,168 compared to the Council having held, at the time 
of writing, 28 special sessions.169  
The Commission failed to be results-oriented and to ‘allow subsequent follow-up discussions 
to recommendations and their implementation’;170 implicit is the need for the Council not to 
follow suit.  Further, the Council ‘must find more mature ways of managing disagreement 
and confrontation’ and renounce the Commission’s method of ‘conducting business through 
                                                             
arrangements, including Economic and Social Council resolution 1996/31 of 25 July 1996 and practices 
observed by the Commission on Human Rights, while ensuring the most effective contribution of these 
entities.’ 
164 Scanella and Splinter (n 160) 46. 
165 ibid 203. 
166 ibid 45-46. 
167 Freedman (n 1) 312. 
168 Two on the ‘Situation of human rights in the territories of the former Yugoslavia’, 13-14 August 1992 and 30 
November - 1 December 1992; a third on Rwanda, 24-25 May 1994; a fourth on East Timor 23-27 September 
1999; and a fifth on the ‘Grave and massive violations of the human rights of the Palestinian people by Israel’, 
17-19 October 2000, pursuant to Economic and Social Council resolution 1990/48, 25 May 1990, ‘Human 
Rights Archives: Previous Sessions – Special Sessions’, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CHR/Pages/PreviousSessions.aspx last accessed 16 August 2018.  
169 Five of which have related to the human rights situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, no special sessions 
have as yet been held in relation to Yemen, despite United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres having 
declared it ‘the worst humanitarian crisis in the world’, OHCHR ‘Secretary-General's remarks to the Pledging 
Conference on Yemen [as delivered]’, in Geneva on 3 April 2018, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/SpecialSessions/Pages/SpecialSessions.aspx  and 
https://news.un.org/en/focus/yemen last accessed 01 June 2018.  For details of the Council’s Special Sessions 
since its inception, see ‘Human Rights Council: Special Sessions’ 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/Sessions.aspx last accessed 16 August 2018. 
170 Scanella and Splinter (n 164) 49. 
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regional groups and other blocks’.171  The Council however, finds itself plagued by similar ills 
to those that haunt the Commission.172 
At an early stage concerns arose around producing consensus on Council texts and 
recommendations.173  In its first year, the Council is said to have ‘faced more confrontations 
and polarization than even its discredited predecessor was used to’.174  The Council is also 
tarnished by politicisation; inevitable given it is comprised of government delegates.175  
Freedman identifies three main forms of politicisation: ‘ideological discourse, overt 
politicisation, and politicisation through an ostensible ‘success story’’.176  The danger posed 
by the politicisation of an organisation is that members’ engagement is motivated by the 
desire to pursue matters that support a social, political or cultural agenda that sits outside of 
the issue under consideration.  The work of Special Procedures faces similar funding and 
resourcing issues under the Council as it did before, and political drivers behind the 
establishment of country specific mandates persist as a matter of consternation.177   
Like the Commission, the Council has been criticised for failing to act in situations of serious 
human rights violations.178  Issues have also arisen regarding membership of the Council.  
Although the Council recommended that the General Assembly remove Libya as a Council 
member in 2011,179 similar concerns about Saudi Arabia’s membership have gone unheeded.  
                                                             
171 ibid 50, although Scanella and Splinter express concern that the Council continued the trend, in its early 
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One interviewee observed that Saudi Arabia ‘systematically commits intimidation and 
reprisals against civil society actors seeking to engage with the Council and its 
mechanisms’.180  For Richard Bennet, Head of Amnesty International’s United Nations Office, 
the Council’s failure to act puts its credibility at stake.181  The Council’s power to remove a 
member is evidence of formal power. 182  It is important that institutions use the powers 
bestowed upon them to be seen to be acting fairly (and thus command authority); 
subsequent adherence to founding principles and powers as part of the fulfilment by the 
Council of its governance function is vital.  
Not addressing the issue of Saudi Arabia’s membership is a potential governance failure on 
the Council’s part that may betray the political influence of allies to Saudi Arabia, including 
the UK and the US.183  If so, the US’s decision to withdraw cooperation with the Council is all 
the more surprising.184  To improve the standing of Council members, the INGO International 
Service for Human Rights produces a human rights ‘scorecard’ for states seeking 
membership, the scorecard is premised upon structural and process human rights 
                                                             
membership of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in the Human Rights Council’, A/RES/65/265 (01 March 2011), 
pursuant to UNGA A/RES/60/251 (n 143) para 8.  
180 Interview CSO 06. 
181 Human Rights Watch, ‘UN: Suspend Saudi Arabia from Human Rights Council ‘Gross and Systematic’ 
Violations in Yemen Threaten Council’s Credibility’, 29 June 2016,  
 https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/06/29/un-suspend-saudi-arabia-human-rights-council, Amnesty 
International, ‘Suspend Saudi Arabia from UN Human Rights Council’, 29 June 2016, 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/06/suspend-saudi-arabia-from-un-human-rights-council/ 
both last accessed 14 August 2017. 
182 UNGA A/RES/60/251 (n 143) para 8: ‘General Assembly, by a two-thirds majority of the members present 
and voting, may suspend the rights of membership in the Council of a member of the Council that commits 
gross and systematic violations of human rights’.  
183 For example, the UK government’s links with Saudi Arabia particularly in terms of the arms trade R (on the 
application of Campaign Against Arms Trade) v The Secretary of State for International Trade [2017] EWHC 
1726 (QB). The continued sale of arms by the UK to Saudi Arabia has not only raised concerns about 
compliance with the UK’s own checks and limits on such sales, but would appear to fall foul of ‘European 
Parliament resolution of 25 February 2016 on the humanitarian situation in Yemen’ (2016/2515(RSP)) calling 
for EU member states to implement an embargo on the sale of arms to Saudi Arabia.  
184 Nick Allen and Harriet Alexander, ‘United States withdraws from UN Human Rights Council as criticism 
mounts over border policy’ The Telegraph, 20 June 2018, 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/06/19/united-states-announce-withdrawal-un-human-rights-
council/; Katrina Manson, ‘US withdraws from Human Rights Council’, Financial Times, 19 June 2018, 
https://www.ft.com/content/ebc12438-73f7-11e8-aa31-31da4279a601; Julian Borger, ‘US quits UN Human 
Rights Council – ‘a cesspool of political bias’’ The Guardian (19 June 2018) 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/19/us-quits-un-human-rights-council-cesspool-political-bias all 
last accessed 10 July 2018. 
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indicators.185  Judging the human rights merits of a state on this basis is not without issue, 
often such indicators do not truly reflect the extent of rights protection on the ground, as 
section 5.4, chapter 5 outlines.  
2.2 UPR foundations, basis of review and objectives 
In the context of the Commission’s failings, a heavy burden was placed upon the Human 
Rights Council and its mechanisms, with some seeing the credibility of the Council being 
‘inextricably linked to the UPR’.186  A key feature of the UPR’s design is the ‘universality of 
the review, which was guided by the principles of non-selectivity and equality of all 
States’.187  As a result, both the functional nature of the UPR, underpinned by substantive 
matters relating to its objectives, and its structural nature, underpinned by procedure, serve 
to alleviate the weight of the Commission’s legacy.   
However, the functional and structural realisation of the UPR has generated complex 
challenges of its own.  These are explored more fully in chapters 4, 5 and 6 and include 
issues of tangible state engagement and follow up; travel bans and reprisals against 
members of civil society;188 and engagement with the UPR diluting the perceived need for 
some states to engage with other international human rights mechanisms.189  Furthermore, 
the UPR risks being symptomatic of the bureaucratisation, institutionalisation and 
legalisation of human rights whereby global human rights institutions ‘seek to translate the 
concerns of human rights – upholding human dignity, protecting the vulnerable, 
empowering the powerless, remedying wrongdoing – into processes and procedures’, 
considered in section 4.4, chapter 4 and section 5.3, chapter 5.190  Whilst the UPR’s 
prescriptive procedural parameters ensure a non-selective approach they risk process 
compliance over substantive compliance, an issue also addressed in section 4.4.  
                                                             
185 ‘HRC Election: How does Iceland Rate?’, International Service for Human Rights, 06 July 2018, 
https://www.ishr.ch/news/hrc-election-how-does-iceland-rate, for additional scorecards see 
https://www.ishr.ch/news/hrc-elections-how-do-candidates-2018-rate both last accessed 16 August 2018.  
186 Lilliebjerg (n 127) 311. 
187 Statement by Venezuela, HRC General Debate on the UPR, 2017 (n 35). 
188 Dr Purna Sen, Universal Periodic Review: Lessons, Hopes and Expectations, (Commonwealth Secretariat, 
2011). 
189 Interview CSO 01. 
190 Gerd Oberleitner, Global Human Rights Institutions (n 23) 14. 
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The UPR’s two founding resolutions are General Assembly resolution 60/251, ‘Human Rights 
Council’191 and the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1, ‘Institution-building of the 
United Nations Human Rights Council’, commonly referred to as the institution-building 
package.192  General Assembly Resolution 60/251 requires the Council to: 
Undertake a universal periodic review, based on objective and reliable 
information, of the fulfilment by each State of its human rights obligations 
and commitments in a manner which ensures universality of coverage and 
equal treatment with respect to all States; the review shall be a cooperative 
mechanism, based on an interactive dialogue, with the full involvement of 
the country concerned and with consideration given to its capacity-building 
needs; such a mechanism shall complement and not duplicate the work of 
treaty bodies; the Council shall develop the modalities and necessary time 
allocation for the universal periodic review mechanism within one year after 
the holding of its first session.193 
Subsequent to this resolution, Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1 details the basis of the 
review, its principles and its objectives.  The UPR is a unique mechanism for three reasons.  
Firstly, its focus is not limited to a particular right or set of rights and all UN member states 
are subject to it, distinguishing the UPR from UN treaty committees on both counts.  
Secondly, international humanitarian law falls within the UPR’s scope: paragraph 2 of 
resolution 5/1 refers to ‘the complementary and mutually interrelated nature of 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law’ advising that ‘the review 
shall take into account applicable international humanitarian law’.194  Thirdly, the peer 
review element is unique in the field of international human rights monitoring, though it 
features within other international institutions.  Indeed, the architects of the UPR 
                                                             
191 UNGA A/RES/60/251 (n 143). 
192 UNHRC A/HRC/RES/5/1 (n 9). 
193 UNGA A/RES/60/251 (n 143) para 5(e). 
194 Recommendations made during the first two cycles that referred to international humanitarian law as 
coded by UPR Info amount to 713 (233 first cycle, 480 second cycle) make reference primarily to child soldiers, 
ratification and/or compliance with Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
involvement of children in armed conflict. On occasion there is reference to a specific matter, for example, 
Canada recommended that Somalia ‘Take clear steps to ensure that Somali security forces (and militias under 
its purview) comply with international human rights law and international humanitarian law, including by 
integrating human rights training into security sector reform programmes’. This recommendation gives clear 
instructions as to specific action (and is coded as action category 5 – see chapter 5 of this thesis for an account 
of UPR Info’s coding of recommendations), and was supported by Somalia, UPR-Info database, with filter 
‘international humanitarian law’ searched against all cycles, UPR Info: Statistics of Recommendations (n 126). 
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investigated peer review in other institutions such as the OECD (Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development), the World Trade Organisation and the African Union.195  
The UPR’s peer review element might be seen as flouting principles of sovereignty and non-
interference by creating the conditions in which one state seeks to inform and influence 
another state’s domestic and internal affairs and makes direct comment upon a state’s 
perceived failings.196  This matter is given further thought in chapter 4, section 4.1.3.  Suffice 
to say there appears to be little evidence of this having prompted concern, save for 
comments made by Syria at the opening of its second cycle review when it declared its 
commitment to universal human rights and the building of a democratic society but stated it 
was only willing to accept advice from certain African, Asian and Latin American countries.197  
The institution-building package outlined in Resolution 5/1 states that UPR is to be based 
upon: 
(a) the Charter of the United Nations,  
(b) the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, human rights instruments to 
which a State is party (namely, international human rights treaties), and  
(c) voluntary pledges and commitments made by States.198  
The UPR’s objectives are broad, referred to in paragraph 4 of Resolution 5/1 in the following 
terms: 
(a) The improvement of the human rights situation on the ground; 
(b) The fulfilment of the State’s human rights obligations and commitments 
and assessment of positive developments and challenges faced by the 
State; 
(c) The enhancement of the State’s capacity and of technical assistance, in 
consultation with, and with the consent of, the State concerned; 
                                                             
195 Interview UN 01. Scanella and Splinter refer to peer review in the Council of Europe, The International 
Atomic Agency, the International Labour Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the New Partnership 
for Africa’s Development, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the Organisation of 
American States and the World Trade Organisation, Scanella and Splinter (n 164) 63-64.  
196 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), 
Merits, Judgment of 27 June 1986, [1986] ICJ Rep. 14, for a discussion of the principle of non-intervention, or 
non-interference see Marcelo Kohen, ‘The Principle of Non-Intervention 25 years after the Nicaragua 
judgment’ (2012) 25 Leiden Journal of International Law 157–164. 
197 The delegation’s view was that Western countries had no right to provide human rights advice given their 
role in, for instance, conflicts in Libya and Iraq and, furthermore, their colonial legacy, as referred to in Riches 
(n 8) 173. 
198 UNHRC A/HRC/RES/5/1 (n 9) Section A: ’Basis of the Review’, paras 1, 2 and 3. 
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(d) The sharing of best practice among States and other stakeholders; 
(e) Support for cooperation in the promotion and protection of human 
rights; 
(f) The encouragement of full cooperation and engagement with the 
Council, other human rights bodies and the Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights. 
The spirit of this lexicon is undoubtedly aspirational.  Guiding principles are for the process 
to be neither ‘overly burdensome’ nor ‘overly long’, and not to absorb ‘a disproportionate 
amount of time, human and financial resources’.199  The mechanism should not ‘diminish the 
Council’s capacity to respond to urgent human rights situations’, a gender perspective 
should be fully integrated and, as noted above, the participation of all relevant stakeholders, 
including NGOs and NHRIs is to be ensured.200  The requirement for the review to be based 
upon objective and reliable information provides a yardstick against which the content of 
the national report can be measured in the broader context of treaty body findings and 
stakeholder submissions.  
The UPR’s founding resolutions have been augmented by subsequent resolutions.201  In 
2009, an open-ended intergovernmental working group was established to review the 
Council’s work and functioning.  The Council subsequently adopted the group’s outcome 
document as a means of supplementing the institution-building package of Resolution 5/1, 
and improving procedural and operational aspects of the UPR.202  Developments included: 
increasing the sixty minutes previously allocated to the SuR to speak during the Working 
Group to seventy minutes; a state’s Working Group being increased from three hours to 
three hours and thirty minutes; and the length of each UPR cycle increased from four years 
to four and a half years for the second cycle and five years for the third.203  
                                                             
199 ibid para 3 (h)-(l). 
200 ibid (n 9) para 3(a)-(m). 
201 Namely, UNHRC ‘Follow-up to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1’ A/HRC/DEC/6/102 (27 September 
2007);  ‘Review of the work and functioning of the Human Rights Council’, 25 March 2011 adopted by Human 
Rights Council Resolution 16/21, A/HRC/RES/16/21, 12 April 2011; ‘Follow-up to the Human Rights Council 
resolution 16/21 with regard to the universal periodic review’, A/HRC/DEC/17/119, 19 July 2011, (which 
includes general guidelines for the preparation of information under the Universal Periodic Review);  Letter 
from President of the Human Rights Council on rules and practices of the Universal Periodic Review Working 
Group, 18 September 2013. 
202 UNHRC A/HRC/RES/16/21 (n 201). 
203 The Human Rights Council sought to address the time constraints prior to the start of the UPR’s second 
cycle, A/HRC/DEC/17/119 (n 201): the review within which the interactive dialogue takes place shall be 
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It was determined that member states should have three minutes during the interactive 
dialogue in which to speak, and observer states two minutes.  In the event of insufficient 
time for all states registered to speak, the time available would be divided equally between 
all states; this appears to now be the standard approach, at times amounting to as little and 
one minute ten seconds.204  It was agreed that the first cycle timetable of reviews would 
apply to the second and subsequent cycles, and that improvements to the Working Group 
report should be made, including the thematic clustering of recommendations.205  In terms 
of strengthening the UPR following the first cycle, it was agreed that ‘the second and 
subsequent cycles of the review should focus on, inter alia, the implementation of the 
accepted recommendations and the developments of the human rights situation in the 
SuR’,206 but no specific or tangible direction as to how focus on implementation should be 
achieved was proffered at that stage.    
The changes are merely procedural; there is no evidence of a review of the substance of the 
UPR having been conducted five years after the mechanism began.207  For some, the 
requirement for a review in five years was set to calm the minds of those states that may 
have been reluctant to initially give their full support to the UPR, with five years in truth 
being too short a time within which to conduct a full and substantive review.208  
2.3 UPR procedure, the Working Group and the interactive dialogue  
This section describes the process and modalities of the UPR and the documentation upon 
which the review is based.  It discusses the interactive dialogue that is the mainstay of the 
Working Group in Geneva.  It does so by way of context and to provide a reference point for 
the theoretical and conceptual analysis of chapter 3 that follows.  A critical discussion of the 
challenges that the UPR’s procedure, Working Group and interactive dialogue give rise to in 
relation to the global governance function of the UPR takes place in chapter 4.  
                                                             
extended to three hours and thirty minutes and that member States shall have 3 minutes in which to speak, 
and observer States 2 minutes. However, in the event of that not permitting sufficient time for all those States 
that have registered to speak, the time available shall be divided equally between all States, paras 3-8.  
204 Author’s own notes from observing UPR Working Groups in January 2014 and May 2017.  
205 A/HRC/DEC/17/119 paras 1 and 15, respectively. 
206 ibid para 6. 
207 UNGA A/RES/60/251 (n 143) para 16, and to report to the General Assembly as to the review. 
208 Interview CSO 02. 
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Each member of the UN is scheduled for one review during each UPR cycle, this means a 
review once every five years given the extended length of a UPR cycle from the third cycle 
onwards.  There are three phases of the UPR.  The first is the production of relevant 
documentation to inform the review, the second is the Working Group hosted by the OHCHR 
at the UN headquarters in Geneva, the third is follow up and implementation, including mid-
term reporting.  To date, there has only been one occasion when a state has not appeared 
before the Working Group as per the UPR timetable, and this was soon rectified.  
Israel’s second cycle review was scheduled during the UPR’s 15th session, however Israel 
declined to engage due to its ongoing suspension of relations with the Council and the 
OHCHR at that time.  It had suspended relations in response to being on the Council’s 
regular session agenda under standing item 7 which it perceived to be an act of 
discrimination and unfair treatment.209  Israel’s lack of cooperation prompted a request for 
‘all appropriate steps and measures’ to be taken to secure engagement.210  Following 
diplomatic discussions, Israel’s review was rescheduled for the 17th UPR session and a state 
delegation duly attended, meaning the Council narrowly avoided Israel being the first state 
to refuse to engage at all with the UPR.211  
2.3.1 Process and modalities – documentation  
Three documents are produced in anticipation of a state’s UPR that form the basis of the 
review.  These are a national report, an OHCHR compilation of UN information and an 
OHCHR summary of stakeholder submissions.212  Approximately two months before its 
Working Group, a national report of no more than 20 pages produced by the SuR,213 is due 
for submission to the OHCHR, allowing the OHCHR to produce and make available translated 
versions of the same.214  The Council encourages states ‘to prepare the information through 
                                                             
209 UNHRC ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Israel’, A/HRC/25/15, 19 December 
2013, paras 6 and 7. 
210 UNHRC ‘Report of the Human Rights Council of its seventh organizational meeting’, A/HRC/OM/7/1, 04 
April 2013.  
211 ibid para 5.  
212 UNHRC A/HRC/RES/5/1 (n 9) para 15 
213 ibid para 15 (a). 
214 ‘Both the State’s written presentation and the summaries prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights shall be ready six weeks prior to the review by the working group to ensure the distribution 
of documents simultaneously in the six official languages of the United Nations, in accordance with 
General Assembly resolution 53/208 of 14 January 1999’, ibid para 17. 
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a broad consultation process at the national level with all relevant stakeholders’.215  The 
nature of consultation varies significantly from one state to another; at one end of the 
spectrum are those states seeking to actively engage with civil society, for example New 
Zealand, whilst at the other end are those states for whom such consultation presents a 
challenge due to ongoing conflict, such as Yemen.216  Whilst the convention is to submit a 
written report, it would appear this is not compulsory: ‘information prepared by the State 
concerned (…) can take the form of a national report’ (emphasis added).217 
For the third cycle, the OHCHR issued supplementary guidance for the national report 
encouraging a comprehensive focus on follow up and implementation.218  The guidance 
refers to good practice and the use of headings to structure content, as well as practical 
suggestions and technical guidance.219  In addition, states are urged to provide information 
as to normative and institutional framework developments since the previous review.220  
This reflects a desire to harmonise the approach of states, no doubt driven by concerns of 
variance in terms of consultation and methodology and the reliability and detail of the 
national report’s content.221  According to Freedman, during the first cycle ‘the majority of 
states cooperated to a large extent with the collation of materials’.222  Exceptions fell into 
two categories: those that might have been expected to refuse to engage at all such as the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), ‘for whom failure to fully cooperate was still 
a ‘success’’ and, secondly, those states with limited resources for the collation of materials, 
such as Comoros.223 
                                                             
215 ibid para 15 (a).  
216 UNHRC ‘National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights Council 
resolution 16/21: New Zealand’ A/HRC/WG.6/18/NZL/1 (08 November 2013) paras 7-10 and 17. See section 
7.4, chapter 7 of this thesis for a discussion of Yemen’s consultation during the preparation of its second cycle 
national report, and intention for the third cycle.  
217 UNHRC A/HRC/RES/5/1 (n 9) para 15 (a).  
218 OHCHR ‘3rd Cycle Universal Periodic Review National Report – Guidance Note’ https://www.upr-
info.org/sites/default/files/general-document/pdf/ohchr_guidance_national_report_3rdcycle_en.pdf last 
accessed 19 June 2018. 
219 ibid 1-2.  
220 A/HRC/DEC/17/119 para 2B, additional guidance for the report’s focus is referred to in paragraph 2 of this 
decision.  
221 Sen (n 188) 12 and 21, reporting that Interviews with a selection of commonwealth states revealed that a 
somewhat haphazard and uncoordinated approach characterised preparations for the UPR’s first cycle and 
undermined the quality of state reports and civil society’s capacity to engage. 
222 Freedman (n 1) 262. 
223 ibid 262. A review of the UPR documentation via the OHCHR portal by the author of this thesis reveals the 
DPRK’s national report is dated 27 August 2009, well ahead of its first cycle review on 07 December 2009, 
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In addition, the OHCHR produces a compilation report limited to 10 pages summarising 
‘information contained in the reports of treaty bodies and special procedures, including 
observations and comments by the State concerned, and other relevant official United 
Nations documents’.224  It also identifies where a state has made progress.225  The 
convention during the first and second cycles was to include at the head of this report a 
table detailing the state’s reporting obligations to relevant treaty bodies and whether those 
obligations had been met.  In addition, cooperation with special procedures and whether 
standing invitations had been issued or not was noted.  This approach does not appear to 
have been adopted during the third cycle.226 
The deadline for civil society and other stakeholders to make written submissions to the 
OHCHR, of no more than 10 pages in length,227 is between six and eight months before the 
Working Group takes place.228  The OHCHR produces a summary of the submissions 
received, thematically collating matters of concern.  It publishes in full only those 
submissions and annexes to the submissions referred to in the summary document for 
member states to access.229   
                                                             
‘Universal Periodic Review: Documentation by Country’, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/Documentation.aspx last accessed 22 August 2018. The first 
cycle national report of Comoros appears to have been late; the report is undated but available only in French, 
unlike the second cycle national report available in translation, and dated 08 November 2013, the Working 
Group being on 31 January 2013, ‘Universal Periodic Review: Comoros’ 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/KMIndex.aspx last accessed 22 August 2018.  
224 UNHRC A/HRC/RES/5/1 (n 9) para 15 (b). 
225 Evidence of Tunisia being more open to the international human rights regime complex, for example, 
extending an open invitation to all special procedures mandate holders with visits at the time of the third cycle 
UPR (May 2017) having taken place, and strengthening the legislative framework enacting a range of national 
human rights legislation, ‘Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: 
Tunisia’, A/HRC/WG.6/27/TUN/2, 20 February 2017, paras 9 and 10 respectively. 
226 This is according to a review of OHCHR compilation reports by the author that have been submitted during 
the various UPR cycles, ‘Universal Periodic Review: Documentation by Country’ (n 223).  
227 UNHRC A/HRC/RES/5/1 (n 9) para 15(c). 
228 Stakeholder submissions for those states under review during the UPR’s 27th session (the first UPR session 
of the third cycle) were due 22 September 2016 for a review period that commenced 01 May 2017, just over 
seven months before the review, submissions for the 28th session were due 30 March 2017 just over 6 months 
before the review period that commenced 06 November 2017, OHCHR ‘3rd UPR cycle: contributions and 
participation of "other stakeholders" in the UPR (Last update: 22 May 2017)’,  
http://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/upr/pages/NgosNhris.aspx last accessed 22 February 2018.  
229 OHCHR ‘Universal Periodic Review (Third Cycle): Information and guidelines for relevant stakeholders’ 
written submissions’, para 7(d), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/NgosNhris.aspx last 
accessed 09 July 2018. 
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2.3.2 Process and modalities – the Working Group 
The cornerstone of the UPR is the Working Group, which incorporates the ‘interactive 
dialogue’, described in the paragraph below.  This takes place in Geneva at the UN 
headquarters, Palais des Nations.  It is a formal process that has been likened to both 
positive and negative aspects of ritual and ritualism, examined in section 4.4, chapter 4.230  
Reviewing states are also permitted to table advance questions to the SuR, as discussed in 
section 5.3.4, chapter 5.  The Working Group is facilitated by a troika comprising 
representatives from three Council member states chosen by the drawing of lots.231  An SuR 
can request for one troika member to be from its own regional group, and may make a 
single request for one troika member to be substituted.232   
The interactive dialogue involves peer-led review, although the extent to which it is 
interactive or characterises a dialogue is questionable.  At three and a half hours in length it 
does not permit in depth investigation or consideration.233  Nonetheless, the interactive 
dialogue is an innovation providing a space for a plurality of voices via which opinions are 
shared.  It encapsulates the normative character of the UPR; encouraging changes in state 
practice to more fully align with universally agreed human rights principles and norms.  The 
peer review character by state actors and the process of commenting, observing and making 
recommendations divorces the UPR mechanism from being a pure assessment of progress 
against legal obligations.  It is a forward-looking governance process, as well as a reflection 
upon achievement against previous pledges and commitments that involves an element of 
exchange.  
Part of this exchange includes up to 70 minutes for the SuR to make a verbal contribution.  
This is divided between an opening statement, during which the delegation generally speaks 
to the national report, has two opportunities to respond to comments and questions 
including advance questions, and then makes a closing statement.234  During this time, the 
SuR might respond to advance questions and those made by reviewing states during the 
interactive dialogue.  Despite the limited time, what is striking about the interactive dialogue 
                                                             
230 Charlesworth and Larking (n 3). 
231 UNHRC A/HRC/RES/5/1 (n 9) para 15(d).  
232 ibid para 19. 
233 ibid para 21. 
234 Author’s notes during UPR observation.  
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is that pertinent human rights challenges faced by an SuR are soon revealed via the 
comments, observations and themes of the recommendations made; they rise to the surface 
on a global stage from which there is no hiding.  
The interactive dialogue is a distinguishing feature of the UPR compared to other 
international human rights monitoring mechanisms structured as it is around peer review.235  
The peer review at the heart of the interactive dialogue was preceded by proposals for a 
working group made up of fifteen experts, but this was not welcomed by member states.236  
During discussions and negotiations as to the design of the UPR there was talk of it being 
called a Universal Peer Review; the words ‘peer’ and ‘periodic’ were often used inter-
changeably, with ‘peer’ ultimately disappearing in name but not in nature.237  The peer 
review within the interactive dialogue allows equal treatment of all states so that states are 
heard in equal measure.  This creates a parity of treatment, a novelty in relation to the five 
permanent members of the UN Security Council238 which dominate some of the most 
important international relations decisions.  Such parity of treatment is fundamental given 
the legacy of the Commission set out above.  
The interactive dialogue is designed to be progressive and focus on capacity-building needs.  
It involves comment, reflection and feedback from the SuR which might include reports on 
progress and implementation, and action taken to address nepotism and corruption within 
the state’s government.239  In addition, there are examples of general requests for support 
from the international community to assist a state in meeting its obligations and addressing 
its challenges.240  Observation of the interactive dialogues of a number of SuRs revealed that 
                                                             
235 This is process is distinct from that of treaty committees in which the rights position of the state being 
reviewed is measured and commented upon by a panel of independent experts that comprise the treaty 
committee and the approach adopted is inquisitorial. 
236 Interview UN 01. 
237 Gaer (n 127) 111-112; Freedman (n 1) citing Speech of Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the Commission on 
Human Rights, ‘Reforming UN Human Rights Machinery’, 7 April 2005, UN Press Release SG/SM/9808 
HR/CN/1108.  
238 Smith ‘”To see themselves as the others see them”’ (n 172). 
239 Author’s notes during UPR observation.  
240 As was the case during Afghanistan’s second cycle UPR, author’s observation of the UPR 18th session, 
January 2014. 
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the interactive dialogue is also informed by important contemporaneous matters of 
concern.241  
As noted, the UPR is not the first international mechanism featuring peer review.  The OECD 
has used peer review since the organisation’s inception over 50 years ago.242  It oversees a 
peer review of each country based on a similar periodicity to the UPR, being once every 4-5 
years.  The OECD peer review is driven by objectives that include accountability and learning 
and it is these objectives that are to be equally applied to all countries, although the OECD 
does acknowledge that each peer review should be situated within its own context with 
recommendations being adjusted accordingly.243  
In 2010, the Financial Stability Board (FSB), which is linked to the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, started a thematic and country peer review process.  This is 
undertaken as a means to encourage consistent implementation, to evaluate whether 
standards and policies have their intended results, and ‘to identify gaps and weaknesses in 
reviewed areas and to make recommendations for potential follow-up’.244  Furthermore, the 
FSB review is based on principles that include complementarity, transparency and 
engagement, which echo the objectives and principles of the UPR.  
Peer review has been described by Fabricio Pagani as: 
(…) the systematic examination and assessment of the performance 
of a state by other states, with the ultimate goal of helping the 
                                                             
241 During Cambodia’s review in January 2014 a number of states expressed concern about the government’s 
handling of demonstrations by garment workers earlier that month, with the majority requesting a credible 
investigation into the incidents and a lifting of the ban on peaceful assembly. The response of the Cambodian 
delegation was that the ban on peaceful assembly was in line with the country’s sovereign laws. Another 
example is Bahrain’s review during May 2017 at which concern was expressed that members of civil society 
had been refused permission to travel to attend the UPR, author’s notes during observation at the UPR, 18th 
session January 2014 and 27th session May 2017.  
242 OECD ‘The OECD’s Peer Review Process: a tool for cooperation and change’, 
http://www.oecd.org/site/peerreview/ last accessed 22 August 2018. 
243 OECD ‘DAC peer Review Assistance Guide’, OECD Development Co-Operation Directorate, Development 
Assistance Committee, DCD/DAC (2014) 52, 23 October 2014, http://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews/DCD-
DAC%282014%2952_Reference%20guide%202015-16.pdf last accessed 22 August 2018. 
244 ‘Handbook for Financial Stability Peer Reviews’, 12 March 2015 (which replaces earlier versions), 2, 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/FSB-Peer-Review-Handbook-12-March-2015.pdf 
last accessed 2 July 2015. 
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reviewed state improve its policy making, adopt best practices and 
comply with established standards and principles.245  
Pagani goes on to explain that under peer review, examination is non-adversarial and, where 
an international organisation is involved, depends for its success on the support of the 
secretariat and the reciprocity and mutual accountability of the states involved.246  Pagani’s 
view is that the impact of peer review ‘will be greatest when the outcome of the peer review 
is made available to the public…. When the press is actively engaged with the story, peer 
pressure is most effective. Public scrutiny often arises from media involvement.’247  UPR 
media coverage is relatively minimal; the timing of the UPR’s 18th session in January 2014 
coincided with Syria II Peace talks in Geneva, whilst the peace talks attracted the attention of 
the world’s media comparatively little was said of the UPR.248   
One criticism of the UPR is that states with questionable human rights records are given the 
floor, albeit for a short amount of time, in which to comment and recommend on matters 
when the same or similar issues are far from resolved in their own ‘back yard’.249  This may 
be so, but an exclusionary approach would reincarnate the problems of the Commission.  It 
would also detract from the character of the interactive dialogue in creating a unique space 
that accommodates diverse voices and fosters multi-directional interaction within a forum 
that is universal in terms of structure, scope and participation.  
2.3.3 Process and modalities – outcome of the Working Group   
Under Resolution 5/1, the outcome of a state’s UPR can involve: an assessment of the 
human rights situation including reference to positive developments and challenges; sharing 
of best practices; an emphasis on enhancing cooperation for the promotion and protection 
of human rights; commitment for the provision of technical assistance and capacity-building 
                                                             
245 Fabrizio Pagani, ‘Peer Review: A Tool for Co-operation and Change, An Analysis of an OECD Working 
Method’, (2002) 11 African Security Review 15, 15. 
246 ibid 15-16. 
247 ibid 16. 
248 A search via Google using the term ‘Syria II Peace talks media coverage’ revealed 31 separate news outlets 
reporting on the talks, whereas a search of ‘Yemen Universal Periodic Review 2014’ revealed only two reports 
referring to Yemen’s second cycle UPR, aside from United Nations press and comments by NGOs and 
international NGOs, one of which was attributed to the Yemen Times, the other was a blog post, 
www.google.co.uk, search carried out on 02 July 2015.  
249 Human Rights Voices ‘UN Rights Council trumpets process of equating Norway with Iran and company’, 28 
April 2014, regarding recommendations made to Norway during the UPR’s 19th session by Iran, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia and Sudan, 
http://www.humanrightsvoices.org/site/developments/?d=12139 last accessed 22 August 2018. 
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in consultation with, and with the consent of, the country concerned; and, voluntary 
commitments and pledges made by the country under review.250  As chapter 5 discusses, 
these are soft outcomes, they do not refer to output as such.  
Some three to four days after the Working Group, the troika presents the Working Group 
Report summarising ‘the proceedings of the review process; conclusions and/or 
recommendations, and the voluntary commitments of the State concerned’.251  The report is 
a factual summary; it is not an endorsement of the recommendations that have been made 
or an affirmation of the SuR’s response.252  Prior to its formal presentation, the SuR can 
provide replies to questions or issues that were not sufficiently addressed during the 
interactive dialogue and can review the draft report.253  At the subsequent Council regular 
session the agreed report is tabled for formal adoption and the SuR must state its position in 
relation to all recommendations, explaining its reason for noting certain 
recommendations.254  
An indicator cited as evidence of the UPR’s success is that the majority of recommendations 
are supported by SuRs.255  By stating its support, an SuR indicates that it accepts the 
substance of a recommendation and commits to implementation.  This support is superficial 
if little follow-up occurs; there is evidence during the early stages of the third cycle that state 
practice is changing with some states supporting a lower proportion of recommendations 
                                                             
250 UNHRC A/HRC/RES/5/1 (n 9), in relation to the provision of technical assistance, it is noted in resolution 5/1 
that ‘a decision should be taken by the Council on whether to resort to existing financing mechanisms or to 
create a new mechanism’ para 27. 
251 ibid para 26. 
252 ‘Modalities and Practices for the Universal Periodic Review Process’, Statement of the President of the 
Human Rights Council, 8/PRST/1, 09 April 2008, 
http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/HRC/p_s/A_HRC_PRST_8_1.pdf para 8, last accessed 05 March 2018. In 
addition, Human Rights Council President H. E. Mr Joaquin Alexander Maza Martelli, speech at the opening of 
the third cycle, author’s notes UPR 27th session (n 241). 
253 UNHRC A/HRC/RES/5/1 (n 9) para 29. 
254 ‘Recommendations that enjoy the support of the State concerned will be identified as such.  Other 
recommendations, together with the comments of the State concerned thereon, will be noted.  Both will be 
included in the outcome report to be adopted by the Council’, ibid para 32.  A reminder of this was given by 
the Human Rights Council President, H. E. Mr Joaquin Alexander Maza Martelli, (n 252). 
255 It was reported that during the first cycle ‘over 21,000 recommendations were issued and 74 per cent of 
those recommendations were accepted by the states under review’, ‘Beyond Promises: the Impact of the UPR 
on the Ground’, (UPR Info report, November 2014) 13 http://www.upr-info.org/sites/default/files/general-
document/pdf/2014_beyond_promises.pdf last accessed 26 February 2018. 
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compared to previous cycles.256   This might indicate states taking the renewed focus on 
implementation seriously and is given further thought in section 5.3.4, chapter 5.  
Whilst there is no explicit sanction for those states that do not implement 
recommendations, provided it has exhausted ‘all efforts to encourage a state to cooperate 
with the universal periodic review mechanism’, the Council may be requested to ‘address, as 
appropriate, cases of persistent non-cooperation’.257  It is possible that a failure to 
implement accepted recommendations will emerge as amounting to ‘persistent non-
cooperation’ however, there is no evidence of this as yet.   
Following the Working Group, the SuR is encouraged to devise an implementation plan and 
to provide an update as to progress against this plan at the mid-term point.  This is a 
voluntary process that has emerged over the course of the UPR’s lifetime.  As of July 2018, 
mid-term reports relating to the first and second cycles of the UPR had been submitted by a 
total of 74 members states.  Of these, 55 states had submitted mid-term reports relating to 
the first cycle, 15 submitted for the first and second cycles, and 34 for the second cycle only, 
although not all states are at the mid-term point following the second cycle.258  
Responsibility for implementation falls to the SuR and to ‘relevant stakeholders’.259  The 
submission of mid-term reports by NGOs at the time of writing totals only twelve.260  This 
suggests the voluntary approach is not effective compared to universal submission of 
national reports and the number of stakeholder submissions the OHCHR receives. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has addressed the conditions under which the Commission was disbanded and 
the Council and the UPR were conceived.  The UPR heralded a turning point for UN 
international human rights monitoring and reporting mechanisms in part by presenting an 
                                                             
256 Based on data extracted from UPR Info database, during UPR session 27, the first session of the third cycle, 
for example, Bahrain noted 59% of the recommendations it received (1st cycle 11%, 2nd cycle 25%), Ecuador 
noted 14% in the third cycle (2nd cycle 2% and 1st cycle 0%), Tunisia noted 24% in the third cycle (2nd cycle 13%, 
1st cycle 0%), and the UK noted 59% in the third cycle (2nd cycle 34%, 1st cycle 37%) UPR Info: Statistics of 
Recommendations (n 126). 
257 UNHRC A/HRC/RES/5/1 (n 9) para 38. 
258 OHCHR ‘UPR mid-term reports’, updated 06 July 2018, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPRImplementation.aspx last accessed 10 August 2018.  
259 UNHRC A/HRC/RES/5/1 (n 9), para 33. 
260 One submission for Bangladesh, two for China, two for Denmark, one for Germany, one for Honduras, one 
for Lebanon, one for Singapore, and two for the United States, OHCHR ‘UPR mid-term reports’ (n 258). 
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entirely new mechanism structured around a process and procedure premised upon equal 
treatment of states and non-selectivity.  For many, the UPR has proved itself to be an 
‘innovation’.261  It can be concluded that the UPR’s design, as distilled in its founding 
instruments set out in this chapter, has been successful in eschewing the partisan legacy of 
the Commission and its politicised focus on some states and not others.   
However, the Council’s review of the UPR’s operation after five years was satisfied in a 
cursory manner involving minor adjustments to procedural and operational aspects rather 
than substantive matters being reflected upon.  In order to improve the substance of the 
UPR, a focus on implementation was encouraged for the second cycle and has been treated 
as a priority for the third.  To enhance this focus, states are being encouraged to set up a 
national reporting and follow up mechanism mandated to report on UPR follow up.262  This 
will take time to take root; as chapter 4 shows, some states are already moving in this 
direction but, as with mid-term reports, this is an emerging and voluntary practice; given the 
stretched resources and capacity of states in crisis it is unlikely to be adopted by those states 
in the immediate future.  
In detailing the documentation produced in anticipation of a state’s review section three of 
this chapter demonstrates the UPR’s role in collating information from a variety of sources.  
This is addressed further in chapters 4 and 5 as part of the UPR’s multi-directional function 
within the ‘international human rights regime complex’.  In 2011, the Council issued further 
guidance urging states to describe their consultation methodology in the national report.263  
This relates directly to the governance function of the UPR discussed in the chapters that 
follow, and proposals are made in this respect in the concluding chapter of this thesis.  
The third section also confirms the distinctiveness of the UPR in terms of its structure around 
peer review and its inclusive approach, both of which are a novelty in the field of 
international human rights monitoring.  Unlike the treaty monitoring system, the UPR 
encompasses all states regardless of the human rights treaties a state has or has not ratified 
                                                             
261 Alston (n 1) 186; Freedman (n 1) 297-302; Smith ‘China’s Contribution to Human Rights through the UPR’ (n 
135); UNHRC Annual high-level panel discussion (n 36). 
262 OHCHR ‘National mechanisms for reporting and follow up: briefing for UPR delegations’, 29th UPR WG, 
January 2018, OHCHR, 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/UPR/National_Mechanisms_Reporting_Follow-up.pdf last 
accessed 27 February 2018. 
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and fosters state participation both as a peer reviewing state and as an SuR.  As with other 
monitoring mechanisms, state engagement with the UPR is not mandatory, yet as evidenced 
above, the UPR has thus far succeeded in securing universal engagement in terms of state’s 
submitting reports, attending reviews and giving a response to recommendations.264   
As a mechanism designed in part to rectify the partisan and selective nature of the 
Commission, the UPR is therefore a resounding success.  Unsurprisingly, the UPR has 
generated challenges of its own; the limited time of the Working Group may well encourage 
engagement but presents a struggle in facilitating a truly interactive and in-depth dialogue, 
although state missions generally succeed in keeping to time whilst conveying prepared 
comment and recommendations as well as matters of contemporaneous concern.265    
Additional challenges posed by the UPR, that are not necessarily unique to it, include the 
bureaucratisation of human rights, politicisation through the recommendation process and 
giving voice to states known as human rights abusers.  These, and others, are explored in 
further detail in chapters 4, 5 and 6.  Notwithstanding these challenges, the UPR’s interactive 
dialogue creates a unique space that accommodates a diversity of voices and opinions and 
fosters multi-directional interaction within a forum premised upon equal treatment. 
There are, however, no formal or legal powers vested in the UPR or the Council to take 
measures against a state that fails to substantively engage by way of implementing accepted 
recommendations.  One interviewee suggests there should be some power to act in relation 
to Council membership.266  It may be, as considered above, that a lack of implementation is 
ultimately defined as persistent non-cooperation.  In the meantime, the UPR remains 
toothless in terms of enforcement.  With this comes the risk that some states treat the UPR 
as a minimum core that absolves responsibility and commitment to engage substantively 
with other international human rights monitoring mechanisms, as one interview quoted in 
section 5.3.2, chapter 5, suggests.   
Nonetheless, the normative weight of the UPR is significant; thanks to the UPR, the active 
participation of states involved in human rights monitoring has transitioned from a markedly 
                                                             
264 Though arguably the process is compulsory in the terms of enabling Resolution 60/251, UNGA 
A/RES/60/251 (n 143), Smith ‘China’s Contribution to Human Rights through the UPR’ (n 135) 89-90. 
265 See reference to Cambodia’s second cycle review and Bahrain’s third cycle review (n241). 
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‘Western-dominated body’267 to that which now involves all UN member states.  In this 
respect, the UPR successfully champions an inclusive approach to rights protection and 
realisation.  Yet, as the UPR progresses through the third cycle the gloss of novelty and 
achievement loses its sheen and pertinent matters of follow up and implementation, and 
consultation with civil society during the UPR process,268 come into sharp focus.   
It is in this context that this thesis now proceeds to chapter 3 to interrogate the concept of 
global governance theory and practice, and its application to the UPR as a means of 
determining the legitimacy and authority of the UPR in general and its global governance 
function in relation to states in crisis in particular. 
  
                                                             
267 Schrijver (n 1) 812. 
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Chapter 3: On Global Governance: Legitimacy and Authority 
Introduction 
This chapter critically assesses the meaning of the concept of global governance, which is 
contested and complex.  This assessment is undertaken in the context of this thesis analysing 
the legitimacy and authority of the UPR, particularly in relation to states in crisis, through the 
lens of global governance.  There are three principal reasons driving this thesis’s examination 
of the UPR mechanism in this way.  Firstly, global governance scholars’ focus on legitimacy 
and authority as key determinants of governance, and it is the legitimacy and authority of 
the UPR that is questioned in the face of the non-implementation of recommendations.   
Secondly, there is an emerging body of scholarship whereby entities with a global 
governance function are being discussed regarding their function relative to other entities 
within the same ‘regime complex’, and this approach is adopted in this thesis to further 
model the UPR’s governance function.  Although the work on regime complexes is largely 
the domain of international relations scholars, the regime complex is an apt concept for a 
socio-legal study such as this thesis given the UPR’s political nature as an inter-governmental 
mechanism centred upon peer review by other states.  According to Ersan Ozkan and Hakan 
Cem Cetin: 
(…) for a regime to exist there should be cooperation among the 
actors… regimes facilitate the ‘institutionalization’ of a chaotic - if not 
anarchic - environment, namely international arena’.269   
A regime therefore seeks to promote and create a normative environment.  A regime 
complex, as discussed below in section 3.4, consists of several regimes or entities operating 
to address the same/similar matter or issue.  This reflects the ‘problem diversity’ of the 
particular issue at the centre of the regime complex.270  It can also give rise to ‘regime 
collision’, whereby there may be a conflict of laws between one regime and another within 
                                                             
269 Ersan Ozkan and Hakan Cem Cetin, ‘The Realist and Liberal Positions on the role of International 
Organizations in Maintaining World Order’ (2016) 12 (17) The European Scientific Journal 85-96, 88. 
270 Keohane and Victor (n 5) 13 whereby ‘problem diversity’ refers to the variety of problems inherent to a 
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the same complex, or an overlapping of the scope of one regime with another.271  One 
consequence is that the subjects of a regime complex can take advantage of the conflict or 
overlap between regimes, having the benefit of an element of choice as to which entity 
within the complex to engage with to better suit the subject’s needs.272  
Thirdly, legitimacy and authority are complex concepts that do not focus solely upon output 
meaning that the conceptualisation of a governance regime complex in the context of 
international human rights is especially apt due to the particular operation and function of 
the UPR.273  Exploring the application of these concepts to the UPR in the context of global 
governance relieves the pressure imposed by a binary perspective that otherwise limits an 
assessment of the UPR to one based upon output.  Determining legitimacy and authority 
only by a mechanism’s output risks the UPR being dismissed as ineffective if states, 
particularly those in crisis, do not implement and/or tangibly follow up recommendations.   
The purpose of this chapter is to therefore explore key literature that discusses the concept 
and definition of global governance and the meaning of ‘regime complex’.  As part of this 
process some consideration is given to the application of the conceptual framework of global 
governance to the UPR, but this is primarily undertaken in chapters 4, 5 and 6 that follow.  
This chapter comprises four sections.  The first evaluates the evolution of global governance 
theory and its definition over the last few decades.  In the second section, thought is given to 
the meaning of legitimacy and authority as being central to a governance entity maintaining 
its credibility and influence.   
The third section introduces global governance in the context of international human rights 
monitoring and opens the discussion of the non-state actor role of civil society in the 
international human rights monitoring process.  It also includes brief discussion of related 
concepts of new / experimentalist governance and global constitutionalism.  The final 
section explores the concept of a regime complex, which is then further developed in 
chapter 4.  With reference to the work of Robert O. Keohane and David Victor on regime 
                                                             
271 Gunther Teubner and Andreas Fishcer-Lescano, ‘Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the 
fragmentation of Global Law’ (2004) 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 999 and Neil Walker, Intimations 
of Global Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2015) 106-114. 
272 See section 4.1.4 chapter 4 below and Keohane and Victor (n 5) 15. 
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73 
 
complexes,274 this chapter concludes that the UPR mechanism is a single governance entity 
situated within a proposed ‘international human rights regime complex’.   
3.1 Conceptualising Global Governance 
This section firstly considers how a perceived need for governance at a global level has 
developed, including but not limited to human rights.  It then proceeds with a critical 
deliberation of the definition and evolution of global governance theory.  
3.1.1 The currency of global governance 
The concept of governance and its application at the global level has emerged as a topic of 
debate, inevitable given that ‘global governance institutions are novel, still evolving’.275  
Daniel Bodansky suggests that part of the reason for the legitimacy of international 
institutions having been largely overlooked is that until recently they have ‘…generally been 
so weak – they have exercised so little authority – that the issue of their legitimacy has 
barely arisen’.276  In the current climate of international and global institutions seeking to 
assert and expand their authority, the matter of legitimacy is pertinent and crucial in 
securing and maintaining the perceived need for international organisations with a 
governance function at a global level.   
In the last two to three decades, the concept and theory of global governance has emerged 
in tandem with discussions regarding the meaning and manifestation of transnational 
networks and communities of practice,277 the operation of regulation in the context of 
globalisation,278 and the ‘proliferation of non-state actors’ including NGOs, transnational 
corporations and global media.279  Governance at the global level must justify its concern 
with the domestic and local activities of states and their emanations.  In the context of a 
country’s political and economic governance, Thomas Weiss interrogates why discussions by 
                                                             
274 ibid 5. 
275 Buchanan and Keohane (n 20) 406. 
276 Bodansky (n 20) 601 
277 Roger Cotterrell, ‘Transnational legal authority: a socio-legal perspective’ in Cotterell and Del Mar (n 31) 
262 – 268 and Christoph Möllers, ‘European governance: meaning and value of a concept’ (2006) 43 Common 
Market Law Review 313. 
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international public polity of the quality of state-based governance systems have been 
deemed acceptable and finds a number of reasons.  These are ‘the glaring illegitimacy’ of 
certain regimes; the ‘third wave’ of democratic rule; the ‘proliferation of non-state actors’ 
having changed the political landscape exerting ‘a growing influence on what had once been 
almost exclusively matters of state policy’; and the ‘acute suffering of such failed states as 
Somalia, the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda’ having provided grounds for the international 
system to respond to humanitarian disasters lending ‘weight to the argument to examine 
governance patterns in as-yet un-failed states’.280  These historical matters are mapped to 
the 1990s which accords with the analysis within this chapter of the emergence and 
definition of global governance.  Michael Zürn also places a particular emphasis on the 1990s 
as a period during which there was an apex caused by the effects of post-second world war 
institutions and responses that created conditions which meant that by the end of the 
century, international organisations had acquired and were exercising considerable 
authority.281 
Despite principles of sovereignty and non-interference,282 historical and political factors have 
contributed to a rationale for the construction of contemporary governance structures at 
the global level to function as part of a normative process for the particular focus of concern.   
International relations scholars have debated the concept of ‘multi-level governance’, and 
have cast doubt upon assertions that the central authority and control of the nation state is 
being dispersed and weakened as a result of governance entities and the evolving role of 
non-state actors.283  In contrast, Michael Zürn’s most recent contribution to the global 
governance debate contends that: 
The normative principles of the global governance system qualifies this 
[the Westphalian] notion of sovereignty in three respects: It questions 
the implicit notion that all political communities are territorially 
segmented by pointing to the notion of common goods, that need to 
                                                             
280 ibid 795-800, including reference to the regimes of Idi Amin, Uganda, and Pol Pot, Cambodia and 
widespread democratisation in the wake of the collapse of the Cold War, as well as the monitoring of elections 
by the United Nations in countries such as El Salvador and Haiti, and prompting a focus on local governance. 
281 Michael Zürn, A Theory of Global Governance: Authority, Legitimacy and Contestation (Oxford University 
Press 2018) 108-110. 
282 Kohen (n 186) 157–164 and Weiss ‘Governance, good governance and global governance’ (n 279) 799-800. 
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be achieved together; it questions the view that political authorities 
are absolute by pointing to the rights of individual and entitlements of 
non-state actors that they have independent of being a member of a 
state; and it questions the notion that there are no authorities other 
than the state by pointing to the possibility of international 
authority.284 
These qualifications are relevant to the governance function of the UPR as this chapter 
alludes to, and as the remaining chapters in this thesis illustrate.  The UPR goes some way to 
questioning territorial segmentation by supporting a system premised upon global standard 
setting.  However, whilst its objective is to secure and protect the rights of individuals and 
the entitlements of non-state actors, and to assert the role of civil society in that process, 
the manner of the UPR’s construction ultimately reasserts the primacy of the state rather 
than undermines it. 
3.1.2 Defining (global) governance 
The concept of governance remains ‘misunderstood, contested and vague'.285  James 
Rosenau, writing in 1992, was of the view that ‘the exercise of control’ was a key ingredient 
of governance.286  Also in 1992, the World Bank defined governance in general terms as 
being the ‘exercise of authority, control, management, power of government’, with a more 
specific definition for the Bank’s purposes being: ‘the manner in which power is exercised in 
the management of a country's economic and social resources for development’.287  For the 
World Bank, good governance was ‘synonymous with sound development management’ 
dependent upon transparency, accountability and a lack of corruption.288  It is not obvious 
what the difference is here between governance and government, but transparency, 
accountability and a lack of corruption are crucial ingredients in promoting good 
governance.  
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John Ruggie is of the view that governance in a global context is distinct from government 
because there is no global government:  
Governance, at whatever level of social organization it occurs, refers to 
the systems of authoritative norms, rules, institutions, and practices by 
means of which any collectivity, from the local to the global, manages 
its common affairs. Global governance is generally defined as an 
instance of governance in the absence of government. There is no 
government at the global level. But there is governance, of variable 
effectiveness.289 (emphasis in the original)   
This explanation is not, however, sufficiently nuanced to accommodate the complexities of 
the exercise of authority and influence by global governance institutions.  The role of 
government, its source and exercise of power in a democratic society at least, is distinct 
from governance.  The government’s function operates alongside the other constituents of 
the state (legislator and judiciary).  The actions of the state in terms of its relationship to 
functions of government are addressed by the state’s internal machinery; for example, 
coercive law enforcement and revenue generation,290 and the role of the judiciary via judicial 
review to intervene when the executive is alleged to have exercised its power ultra vires.291  
It operates within a legal system that depends upon state sovereignty.  The standard setting 
and regulatory function of global governance is softer than that of government and 
therefore palatable to states in a way that a global ‘government’ may not be. 
Christoph Möllers finds that although the word governance can be traced back to ancient 
versions, that its current use is a ‘neologism’ attributed to the World Bank.292  The World 
Bank ascribed to governance a tripartite character dictated by: the form of political regimes; 
the process by which authority is exercised; and a government’s capacity to design, 
formulate, implement and discharge.293  The World Bank’s characterisation at that time 
                                                             
289 John Gerard Ruggie, ‘Global Governance and “New Governance Theory”: Lessons from Business and Human 
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previously, World Bank Governance and Development (n 287). 
 
 
77 
 
placed governance primarily at the feet of government.  Yet, as noted, governance is 
broader than government, encompassing the contribution of non-state actors to the field in 
question.  Möllers clarifies that governance is not a synonym for ‘a combination of statehood 
and civil society’ but is ‘rather a synonym for the promotion of these values by organisations 
beyond the nation state with a strong but informal influence on nation state’s development’ 
(emphasis in the original).294    
In a similar vein, Gralf-Peter Calliess and Moritz Renner describe global governance as ‘the 
ensemble of all forms of regulation that are oriented towards social values and have cross-
border effects’,295 whilst Michael Zürn tells us that global governance ‘refers to the exercise 
of authority across national borders as well as consented rules and norms beyond the nation 
state, both of them justified with reference to common goods or transnational problems’ 
(emphasis in the original).296  To stave off confusion, Zürn suggests there is a pluralisation of 
governance actors giving rise to conceptual distinctions as to the forms that global 
governance takes; he identifies world government via ‘global governance by government’, 
global governance with government via institutions such as the UN and global governance 
without governments (emphasis added), his example here being via transnational actors 
such as the International Accounting Standards Board.297   
Elsewhere, legitimate governance is modelled as any kind of political system in which those 
who are ‘ruled’ perceive those who ‘rule’ as having a legitimate right to do so.  Whilst this 
interpretation of governance limits it to a binary distinction between ruler and ruled, the 
normative success of a global governance mechanism with the state as its subject will be 
compromised if that state is itself perceived as lacking legitimacy by those ostensibly subject 
to the state’s authority; in short, there is a legitimate governance deficit due to weak 
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national institutions, absolutist regimes or those governing using their position for 
illegitimate ends.298   
The dominant view of governance has evidently expanded since the World Bank’s writing on 
the subject in the early 1990s.  David Armstrong and Julie Gibson explain that whilst the 
concept of governance ‘is not easy to define’, and many elements of governance and 
government overlap, governance tends ‘not to be based on coercive enforcement’.299  There 
is an almost universally agreed departure from the ‘control’ focus of the form of governance 
initially proposed by Rosenau and the World Bank in 1992, with its purpose now relating to 
regulation and influence, complex processes, non-state actors and technology.300  These are 
important distinctions that set the concept and function of governance apart from that of 
the state or of government, and reflect the approach adopted in this thesis.   
The use of legal knowledge in the governance sphere has been questioned on the basis that 
such knowledge ‘becomes a descriptive tool rather than a normative one’ because ‘the 
governance perspective transforms legal knowledge from questions of legality to questions 
of optimal institutional arrangement’.301  At first glance, one might be forgiven for equating 
questions of ‘optimal institutional arrangement’ with the function and character of 
government, but there is a key difference.  In a bid to seek out and clarify this difference, 
Möllers investigates the etymological roots of the words government and governance, and 
related concepts.  He aligns the rise of the concept of government with the rise of the 
nation-state.  The concept of the state is largely accepted as a Western construct that 
corresponds with the Westphalian notion of the state and statehood, as much discussed in 
international law literature,302 and which preferences a homogenised approach to law as a 
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positivist endeavour pursued by a system of state-based sovereignty.303  Such a construction 
is problematic in a global sense where state borders that are often arbitrary, with many 
having been imposed as part of an imperialist endeavour and post-imperialist settlement,304 
conflict with other potent frontiers, such as those that are tribal, linguistic, religious, social 
and/or cultural.305   
Even so, the current dominant global world order is premised upon the primacy of the state 
actor and this is entrenched by the UN.  This creates a paradox; as law makers in modernity, 
states act independently and autonomously and yet it is accepted that the very idea of 
human rights monitoring and protection at a global level contests notions of sovereignty, 
territoriality and principles of non-interference.306  The rise and influence of international 
organisations and their governance function therefore offers only a weak challenge to the 
concept of the state as the supreme sovereign power; if the challenge of monitoring 
mechanisms such as the UPR to state sovereignty was perceived as a real threat, no doubt 
states would vote with their feet and disengage, yet states are engaging with this particular 
mechanism in a universal fashion.   
Returning to the point Möllers raises about legal knowledge assuming a descriptive function 
rather than a normative one in the context of governance, by requiring a state to respond to 
the recommendations it receives by either supporting or noting each recommendation, and 
for those that are noted, being subsequently required to provide an explanation of its 
position,307 the UPR creates a governance function that goes beyond a mere description or 
statement of norms.  Given that engaging with governance mechanisms with a normative 
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function involves a voluntary surrender of sorts, the question arises as to why states endorse 
the creation of such entities in the first place.  Gerd Oberleitner gives three reasons, or 
assumptions, as to why states form human rights institutions.308  The first is they allow states 
a means of cooperation and stability that might be more difficult in ‘bilateral encounters’.309  
Secondly, international organisations afford the means for states to wield power in decision-
making processes and in doing so avert scrutiny of the state’s own human rights record.310   
Whilst this might have been so under the Commission, this is no longer the case for the UPR; 
indeed, one aspect of the UPR that has been welcomed (and also caused concern, as noted 
in section 2.3.2 of chapter 2) is that any state, regardless of its size or power, can comment 
upon the rights records of the permanent five members of the Security Council.311  
Oberleitner’s third reason is that human rights institutions offer a legitimising process 
‘endowing governments with legitimacy, credibility and reputation’.312  This point accords 
with the view expressed by some interviewees in relation to the UPR providing a means of 
asserting statehood by those states generally accepted as weak, fragile or failing, considered 
in section 4.4, chapter 4 and the conclusion to chapter 6. 
A further premise for the emergence of global governance is that it is a symptom of what 
Muckenberger refers to as ‘the crisis of the old governance mode brought about by 
decentration’.313  He views old governance as comprising gravitation points, centres, that 
include the nation-state and are also derived from the nation-state, his examples being 
companies and the family.  He describes the crisis in terms of a disruption to the previous 
nexus between voice and entitlement at the state level, which creates a legitimacy crisis.314  
‘Decentration’ is posited as the process by which parts of those decision making powers 
previously reserved to the centres of the old governance mode, of which the state is the 
primary centre, have moved away from the centre in all directions, upwards to higher levels 
(supra-), sideways to neighbouring levels (inter-), and downwards to levels subordinate to 
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them (infra-).315  The result is that the ‘power of the nation-state is shifting and thereby 
benefitting supranational agencies – and this implies a loss of sovereignty’.316  
The concept of ‘decentration’ resonates with the positioning of a state in relation to the 
various institutions that comprise the ‘international human rights regime complex’ (see 
below and chapter 4).  Transnational networks play a fundamental role when it comes to 
norm-building and implementation,317 and the concept of ‘decentration’ contributes a useful 
means of interpreting the dynamic between state, populace and other non-state actors at 
the global level in terms of the potential to create a new nexus between voice and 
entitlement.   
Mark Mazower, however, dismisses global governance as ‘a concept that is part of the 
problem and should be allowed to die without too much fuss’.318  This concludes his scathing 
response to a piece in the same journal volume by Thomas Weiss and Rordan Wilkinson.319  
Mazower sees global governance as a derivative term from corporate governance that is 
essentially meaningless of itself due to an absence in international relations of ‘a community 
with self-conscious direction of its own affairs’.320  In the ‘bewilderingly complex 
contemporary international arena’ he is concerned that Weiss and Wilkinson write of the 
complex in place of the chaotic, and gloss over the fragmentation of ‘international life’.321  
Such anxiety may be misplaced.  Part of the focus of global governance is the assessment in 
a globally constituted forum of the operation of those actors with a domestic governance 
function against previously agreed standards; in the international human rights field this will 
be treaty obligations, accepted recommendations, customary norms, etc.  There is arguably 
no overarching need for coherence and order in a substantive sense; the assessment of 
performance against standards will be specific to the domestic conditions under scrutiny.  
Indeed, to err towards cohesion risks reductionism and an oversimplification of norm 
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conflicts.322  The counter weight to chaos comes via procedural legitimacy and due process, 
which the UPR has accomplished, as introduced in chapter 2 and addressed in more detail in 
section 4.4, chapter 4.   
There are concerns that ‘legal theory [has] so far failed to grasp the intricate relationship 
between law and social norms in the context of global governance regimes’.323  This thesis 
implicitly acknowledges the limits of legal theory by taking the approach of conditional 
international law theory that accommodates inquiry into the ‘intricate relationship’ not only 
between law and social norms, but also political and cultural norms as well as other 
dynamics that influence state practice, for example, acculturation as discussed in chapter 5, 
section 5.3.2.  Calliess and Renner focus upon a governance regime evolving to assume a 
(formal) legal function; however, their argument is premised upon a regime having the 
potential to assume a legal function rather than it being required to attain that function.324  
Their analysis proceeds to interrogate how a global governance regime can ‘enter into a 
performance competition with both domestic and international law’ via its regulatory and 
dispute resolution service.   
The UPR does not possess a formal function in relation to either formal regulation or dispute 
resolution, but this does not detract from its capacity to function as a governance entity 
within a broader governance regime, if anything it enhances it.  Whilst the regulatory activity 
of the UPR is informal, and its dispute resolution function is all but absent, the role it plays in 
norm dissemination and influencing state practice in terms of human rights legislation, state 
commitment and practice, and the establishment and operation of state human rights 
institutions is fundamental and reflects both a legal and a political function.  
3.2 Legitimacy and authority 
This section explores the hypothesis that the capacity of a governance institution to function 
effectively is measured in terms of its command and maintenance of authority and 
legitimacy.  Sustaining a strong governance role is in part via perceived legitimacy and 
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authority.  Bodansky discusses the dimensions of the concept of legitimacy as being both 
sociological and normative: the sociological dimension is linked to popular legitimacy and 
the acceptance of an institution’s authority by the public;325 whilst an organisation will 
satisfy the normative dimension of legitimacy if its authority is perceived to be well 
founded.326  It would appear therefore that these two dimensions are co-dependent, relying 
as they do upon acceptance which in turn is influenced by perceived need / requirement.  
Yet they are also ‘conceptually and practically distinct’ on the basis that normative 
legitimacy lends itself to an evaluative process that does not solely depend upon the 
perception of a populace.327  This can be a factor but, given that perceptions can be 
influenced and subject to change, it is not the sole determinant.  Further, Bodansky sensibly 
explains that normative and sociological legitimacy ‘need not correspond’: ‘people may, in 
fact, accept authority based on tradition, myth or demagoguery’, namely sociological 
legitimacy.328  
Perceived legitimacy strengthens the stability and effectiveness of an institution and the 
commitment of those subject to it.329  This strikes a chord with the work of Hilary 
Charlesworth and Emma Larking who argue that ritual is present in the UPR process.330  They 
define rituals as ‘ceremonies or formalities that, through repetition, entrench the 
understandings and the power relationships that they embody’. 331  Ritual offers a means of 
‘enacting a social consensus’, that can function to reduce contestation and indicate ‘that a 
way of thinking or being has achieved some degree of permanence and importance’, as well 
as being a means of ‘helping make sense of incoherence in our social and political lives’.332 
There is a danger though; participation involves taking part in an ‘embodied performance’ 
that may direct a participant’s focus towards the requirements of the performance rather 
than its significance in terms of regulation, or governance.  A long-term symptom of process 
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compliance via an embodied performance at the UPR, occurring at the expense of 
substantive action and progress in relation to rights enhancement and protection, would 
ultimately erode actual, and therefore also perceived, legitimacy.  This point is also given 
further in section 4.4, chapter 4. 
3.2.1 Input, output and procedural legitimacy, and principles of democracy 
Bodansky and Zürn identify three types of legitimacy: input, or source-based; procedural; 
and output, or substantive.333  A mechanism’s input legitimacy refers to its origins; how and 
why it came into being, the factors that contributed towards its conception, the historical 
context of its invention and the extent to which that influenced its final shape and function. 
Procedural legitimacy is important because an agreed procedure that is perceived to be 
adequate and fair has as 'legitimising effect in international law as it has in national 
law'.334  Output legitimacy relates to the effectiveness of a system or organisation measured 
by its output; an institution commands respect and asserts authority in part by evidence of 
its system / organisation functioning as it ought to, of having an output relevant to its 
mandate.  As Möllers states, ‘if governance designates the institutionalized [sic] observation 
of nation-states, its legitimacy may be found in the output of a working self-government’.335   
That which is new in terms of governance, according to Möllers, is ‘the role of transnational 
institutions that are not directly democratically accountable, but simultaneously under an 
obligation to the political preferences of democratic nation-states’.336  This is true of the 
European Union project, which is the subject of Möllers’ analysis, but in the global context 
arguably less so because not all states are democratic and not all states would wish to 
subscribe to global governance structures shaped by the preference of Western 
democracies.337  For Zürn, democracy related to input legitimacy consists of two 
components: a democratic principle and a deliberative principle, although he questions 
whether the absence of democracy in the constitution of certain institutions is an issue to be 
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overly concerned with.338  The democratic principle relates to the principle of autonomy and 
a process of will-formation and decision-making whereby those affected by the decisions 
made have equal opportunity to actively participate and exert influence.339  Like Möllers, he 
focuses on those institutions that are external to nation states such as the EU, WTO, and 
OECD and explores the contradiction between output legitimacy and input legitimacy.340  
The creation of institutions in accordance with democratic procedures is problematic; Zürn 
wryly observes that the EU would not qualify for membership of the EU because there is not 
sufficient democratic content in its constitution.341   
By contrast, the deliberative principle dictates that ‘any decision should be backed by 
arguments committed to values of rationality and impartiality’.342  The deliberative principle 
is arguably achieved in respect of the process that underpinned the UPR’s creation, as 
section 4.3, chapter 4 contemplates, which in turn relates to its input legitimacy; the method 
by which an institution has been created influences acceptance and the perceived legitimacy 
of its function.  Such acceptance is crucial not only to those effected by decisions of the 
mechanism but also amongst those entities outside of but interacting with the institution in 
order to secure their ongoing interaction and engagement, for example, civil society and 
other human rights mechanisms.   
It is largely accepted that a governance entity will be assessed in terms of effectiveness and 
legitimacy.343  Whilst that effectiveness cannot be measured against elections or other 
means of popular approval linked to principles of democracy, it can be determined in terms 
of achieving set objectives.344  For Armstrong and Gibson, legitimacy is problematic because 
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it is ‘much harder to comprehend legitimacy in any context without bringing in some kind of 
democratic input’ (emphasis in the original).345   
This is complicated, as Möllers observes: 
(…) we are dealing with a well-known dilemma: the creation of 
democratic accountability would undermine the structure of 
governance institutions, it would also require formal rule-making 
powers and it could annihilate the expertocratic criteria as well as the 
external observing perspective. But this does not mean that 
governance structures do not need democratic legitimacy.346  
Arguably it is possible to go some way towards satisfying principles of democratic legitimacy 
in terms of input (source) legitimacy: the method by which an institution comes into being, 
the source from which it derives its objective and powers, and the process as to agreeing the 
founding principles and constitution that governs its operation and processes.  Whilst input 
legitimacy clearly plays a key role in shaping the democratic legitimacy, perceived or 
otherwise, of an institution or mechanism, as considered above, that is only one aspect that 
contributes to legitimacy and authority.  Zürn suggests that an acceptance that ‘the actual 
functioning of… international institutions does not meet democratic standards’ might be 
required, and that most democratic deficits cannot be remedied.347  He seeks to undermine 
the sceptic’s position that there is an irreconcilable structural dilemma by arguing in favour 
of the deliberative principle where, as noted, principles of rationality and impartiality inform 
the process of decision-making.348  However, the myriad of competing and coalescing 
interests operating within any given global / international institution undermines the 
capacity of state and non-state actors to operate within international organisation with a 
governance function in a fashion that is consistently, or at all, driven by rationality and 
impartiality.  This is given fuller consideration in section 5.3, chapter 5. 
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3.2.2 Authority  
As section 1 above indicates, authority sits alongside legitimacy as a key component of 
governance; international organisations via their mandate and proliferation are seeking to 
assert an expanded form of authority.  Roger Cotterrell considers the socio-legal perspective 
of authority and legitimacy in the context of transnational legal authority.349  This 
perspective perceives the practice and experience of authority ‘as empirical social 
phenomena’ that ‘does not need conclusive, timeless definitions of authority and legitimacy 
but only ways of understanding these ideas that can help in provisionally identifying relevant 
social practices’.350  Citing Susan Marks’ view of legitimation as ‘the process by which 
authority comes to seem valid and appropriate’,351 Cotterrell suggests authority might be 
thought of as ‘something primarily claimed in support of power by its holders, and legitimacy 
as something primarily conferred on power by those subject to it or who observe it’ 
(emphasis in the original).352  Those subject to the particular power that generate its 
legitimacy have been referred to as communities of practice and networks of communal 
practice.353  Chapter 7 explores the concept of communities of practice in relation to non-
state actors and civil society and the manner in which civil society’s engagement with the 
UPR serves to endorse its authority and legitimacy.  
Weber identified three types of authority and related legitimacy: legal-rational authority, 
linked to a legitimacy founded on legality; traditional authority, which relates to that which 
is because it has always been so, but which is said to be in decline in the modern word; and, 
thirdly, charismatic authority which relies upon the belief of a leader’s followers in their 
leader.354  Whilst Weber’s focus was on the charisma of the leader as an individual, Stephen 
Turner’s analysis suggests this can also be applied to a regime, institution or office,355 
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although  Turner casts doubt upon the status and value of the concept of charisma from an 
empirical, social and historical perspective.356   
For Roger Cotterrell, the authority of expertise is akin to charisma.  He claims that the 
authority of expertise provides ‘a vehicle both for (i) sharing a kind of (persuasive) legal 
authority ‘horizontally’ between state-centred constitutional structures and (ii) for building 
new ‘vertical’ hierarchies of authority (through standard-setting) outside these structures’ 
determined by transnational interactions ‘not effectively governed by states or international 
jurisdictions’.357  The codification of authority along the lines of horizontal and vertical 
structures provides a useful way of modelling certain dynamics operating within the UPR 
mechanism, as considered further in section 4.2, chapter 4.  What is certain is that for a 
regime to command authority it has to exercise its function and conduct its dealings in public 
and with transparency; ‘public authority’358 is secured by the UPR through the transparency 
of the Working Group and the availability of those documents upon which the review is 
based. 
The operation of governance can be assessed in terms of dispersal, which also maps onto 
the function and operation of the UPR; governance is ‘the exercise of public power in 
conditions in which normative authority and steering capacity are dispersed’.359  In a similar 
vein, Rosenau describes a bifurcation of the location of authority and governance via both 
integration and fragmentation: ‘the fragmenting and coalescing of groups into new 
organizational entities (…) has created innumerable new sites from which authority can 
emerge and towards which it can gravitate’.360  Civil society’s contribution to the UPR 
supports such bifurcation being active as it is on a local and a transnational level.  Via the 
formation of communities of practice a new locus of knowledge and authority is afforded to 
civil society and its contribution to the UPR’s governance process, see section 3.3.1 below 
and chapter 7.  
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Returning to the analysis that normative authority is dispersed via the operation of formal 
legal institutions.  Dawson refers to the German constitution and the Court of Justice of the 
European Union and their powers of enforcement; steering capacity is dispersed in the 
context of the relationship between the EU and its function through the vehicle of a member 
state.361  The UPR does not mimic the structure of the EU and lacks supra-national authority 
in terms of the dispersal of normative authority via legal institutions or because of 
contracting between the parties (which a treaty body could claim).  However, this is not to 
say the UPR lacks authority; what it creates is a climate of reflexive authority whereby there 
has been voluntary subordination to the institution of the UPR by those states that take 
seriously the requests made to them despite the limitations placed on their ‘local or partial 
rationality’.362  These limitations are not rejected, because under the operation of reflexive 
authority, the subject can call into question the authority of the holder at any time.  
The fragmentation of international human rights monitoring into various regimes gives rise 
to a ‘regime complex’ that presents a challenge in terms of functional certainty and 
accountability.  These challenges also manifest themselves in the context of the UPR and the 
international human rights regime complex proposed below and expanded upon in chapter 
4.  There are multiple rights regimes located within the regime complex and there is some 
discretion on the state’s part in terms of whether to engage and in turn the extent of that 
engagement.  A state’s inaction against supported UPR recommendations could be 
understood in different ways.  It may be symptomatic of the UPR failing to meet its 
objectives, or evidence of the progressive nature of the human rights movement.  
Alternatively, there may be very specific circumstances that have prevented progress, the 
war in Yemen being a case in point, or there may be the will but a lack in terms of means and 
infrastructure. This is considered in more detail in chapters 5 and 6.    
3.3 Global governance and international human rights monitoring  
Whilst over 25 years ago Philip Alston expressed the view that human rights institutions 
possess a governance function,363 Mark Dawson suggests there are certain challenges in 
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seeking to situate the concept and theory of governance in the context of (international) 
human rights.  He observes that governance is ‘an essentially political concept’ referring as it 
does to the exercise of power, whilst human rights principles and protections which impose 
limitations are designed as a form of ‘legal constraint: of limiting power’.364  However, as 
noted in the introductory chapter of this thesis, the UPR is not, per se, a legal mechanism, 
and in terms of rule setting and enforcement, it is heavily politicised;365 as Carraro wryly 
observes, ‘the politicization [sic] of the UPR is Geneva’s worst kept secret’.366  
The importance of law to politics and vice versa has been well rehearsed,367 and the 
proximity of law to politics is brought into sharp focus in the spaces created by those 
institutions tasked with promoting, protecting and monitoring human rights internationally.  
Furthermore, socio-legal matters play their part.  Social contract theory, which gained 
traction in the latter part of the 20th century with the work of John Rawls and Thomas 
Franck,368 focuses on concepts of legitimacy and authority and resonates with the legal 
framework of international and national human rights law: the state contracts with its 
population, particularly in liberal democracies, to provide peace and security, alongside civil 
and political freedoms.  Yet, in doing so, it occupies (or at least has the capacity to occupy) 
the dual role of both protector and violator of rights, a dilemma that sits at the heart of the 
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liberal, and neo-liberal, sensibility: for individual freedom and liberty to be enjoyed, power 
must be vested in the state, which in turn will inevitably curtail the freedoms thus defined.369  
3.3.1 Global governance and the role of civil society  
As stated in the introduction chapter of this thesis, the evolving role of civil society in terms 
of human rights advocacy, follow up and implementation, and the number and variety of 
international human rights mechanisms suggests a critical assessment of the application of 
global governance theory to the international human rights monitoring and protection 
framework is both timely and necessary.  This is more than a descriptive task; to echo the 
disquiet shared by Weiss and Wilkinson, more needs to be done ‘in order to realize [sic] the 
analytical utility’ of global governance.  They express the concern that ‘we have yet to fully 
understand the ideas and interests that drive the organizations [sic] that we have, and more 
particularly, how they arise and develop, and subsequently permeate and modify the 
international system’.370  Work that takes a critical approach to human rights indicators and 
fact-finding missions goes some way to address these matters, as discussed in section 5.4, 
chapter 5. 
Civil society is positioned as being a key non-state actor both in terms of norm building and 
implementation and its position in relation to the state and rights holders.371  Makau Matua 
identifies civil society as ‘nonstate, nongovernmental formations that are formally 
independent from the state’,372 whilst the OHCHR defines civil society actors as: ‘individuals 
who voluntarily engage in forms of public participation and action around shared interests, 
purposes or values that are compatible with the goals of the United Nations’.373  The 
potential for global governance structures to generate a new nexus between voice and 
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entitlement and civil society’s (at times contested) contribution can address the governance 
deficit and go some way towards absolving some of the tensions that arise as a result of a 
state-based paradigm.  This has been suggested via ‘common action’ that allows ‘a 
continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and 
co-operative action may be taken’ in a climate within which governments ‘do not bear the 
whole burden of governance’.374  This approach has echoes of scholarly proposals to replace 
‘the modern concept of the state community’ with ‘the notion of human community’ but, as 
Marcelo Dias Varella highlights, it risks being a ‘seductive notion’ that is deeply problematic, 
‘creating antagonisms’ not least because ‘the human community could be sometimes 
against the community of the states’.375  
Conversely, there are those that criticise the pursuit of governance in the global arena as 
failing to represent stakeholder interests being instead ‘driven by club models of power that 
subordinate decision making to club interests, making decisions above all for themselves’.376  
There are those interests that are over-represented and others under-represented and the 
same can be said regarding civil society; the competition for donor funds amongst civil 
society organisations can lead to some geographical areas and rights interests being 
‘flooded’ with civil society presence, and others abandoned.377  
A further characteristic of the operation of global governance is ‘externality’.378  A 
governance entity is said to function by taking ‘a perspective from outside the state’ by 
conducting an ‘institutionalized observation of nation-states’ whereby ‘the observing 
organization [sic] does not answer to the observed state’.379  Whilst the contribution of civil 
society as a non-state actor at the UPR might go some way to meet the requirement for 
externality, this is limited due to the exclusion of civil society from the UPR’s Working Group 
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(chapter 7 considers more fully the concept, origin and definition of civil society and 
appraises its evolving role and contribution to the governance function of the UPR).    
Satisfying the externality aspect of global governance is therefore potentially problematic 
when seeking to position the UPR as a governance entity because the institutionalised 
observation of nation-states via the UPR is a peer review undertaken by other states.  Whilst 
those other states are external to the SuR and do not answer to the SuR, they are not 
necessarily objective during the UPR process.  As chapter 5 illustrates, political and regional 
allies can operate in a way that undermines the externality that might be claimed.  This 
concern might be diluted when taking account of civil society’s role as a key source of 
recommendations made during the peer review process, as explored in chapter 6, and the 
role of civil society in follow up and implementation, as addressed in chapter 7. 
3.3.2 Other conceptual frameworks: experimentalist governance and global 
constitutionalism 
An emergent discourse that dislodges the state as the primary actor is that of 
experimentalist governance whereby: 
(…) arrangements acknowledge the enduring role of states, but also 
are characterised by their intent to accommodate all relevant 
stakeholders into the process, including non-governmental 
organisations, multiple levels of government, or private entities.380   
Writing in the context of global security, Nance and Cottrell describe experimentalist 
governance as aiming to: 
(…) keep pace with the transitory environment through an increased 
reliance on ideational and deliberative mechanisms designed to 
accommodate diversity, tap into new knowledge that may not 
emerge at the interstate level, and ratchet up standards and 
implementation strategies in response. Monitoring, verification, and 
enforcement are likely to remain important features of governance 
(…) but they alone may not be sufficient to address the regulatory 
                                                             
380 Mark Nance and M Patrick Cottrell, ‘A turn toward experimentalism? Rethinking security and governance in 
the twenty-first century’, (2014) 40(2) Review of International Studies, 277-301, 287. 
 
 
94 
 
challenges inherent in governing increasingly fluid and dense global 
interactions.381 
Experimentalist governance is predicated upon a flexible and responsive institutional 
dynamic.  As with any conceptual development, there is discord as to how such an 
institution operates.  Nance and Cottrell refer to divergence in how cooperation is to be 
secured.  One option is the threat of an imposition of legally binding rules ‘from higher up’, 
so that actors cooperate in the ‘shadow of hierarchy’.382  Another is a preference for a 
‘penalty default’ whereby rules that are ‘sufficiently unpalatable’ present an alternative 
means of securing cooperation.383  However, there is no explanation as to how such a 
penalty default actually differs from an imposition of rules from above, or how cooperation 
is being determined.  
An interesting facet of experimentalist governance is that it ‘consciously eschews the now 
standard division between ‘hard law’ and ‘soft law’’; it describes an iterative cycle ‘in which 
participants establish standards, implement those standards, report on compliance with and 
effectiveness of the standards, and then integrate any lessons learned into new ones’.384  
The UPR is constructed to be iterative via its cyclical nature and the return in the subsequent 
cycle to the previous one by way of reference and reinforcement and as such the principle of 
experimentalist governance has something to offer.  The iterative and recursive nature of 
the UPR is given some further consideration in chapter 5, however, given that 
experimentalist governance takes primacy away from the state whilst the UPR remains 
firmly focused upon the state as the primary actor, the concept of experimentalist 
governance does not lend itself to application beyond the brief consideration given here.  
Another relevant and emerging approach to theorising the current global dynamic where 
international law and legal norms are concerned is that of global constitutionalism.  Global 
constitutionalism ‘grapples with the consequences of globalisation as a process that 
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transgresses and perforates national or state borders, undermining familiar roots of 
legitimacy and calling for new forms of checks and balance as a result’.385  Wiener draws a 
distinction between the concepts of constitution and constitutionalisation; the former being 
an order established ‘to keep politics in check’, the latter being the putting of ‘innovative 
regulatory or principled practices into place’ on the global or supranational scale; whilst 
constitutionalism is presented as a field that is ‘still unwieldy and in-the-making’, and 
‘remains confusing to some, raises scepticism among many and inspires constructive debate 
among others’.386  
In addition, Weiner seeks to situate the contributions to the debate on global 
constitutionalism into three schools: normative, functionalist, and pluralist, highlighting the 
approach of each in terms of: shaping the global world order - normative school; mapping 
the global world order - functionalist school; or both - pluralist school.387  Varella is sceptical 
of global constitutionalism, citing a number of factors that contribute to its non-existence, 
namely: 
(…) asymmetry of power between the powerful states; absence of clear 
division of powers (legislative, executive, and judiciary) at a global level; 
and difficulties in determining the organic competence, the material 
dominium, and the capacity of a general protection of human rights 
according to pre-established procedures.388  
Although emerging and arguably uncertain, the concept of global constitutionalism 
understood as calling for new checks and balances, and wrestling with the impact of 
globalisation ‘as a process that transgresses and perforates national or state borders’,389 has 
some contribution to make to the focus of this thesis.  By theorising international human 
rights law and its intersection with international relations and geopolitics in terms of 
complexity, there is the potential to comprehend the various dynamics of power and the 
concomitant shifts prompted and/or supported by the UPR as a governance mechanism via 
methods informed by both norm mapping and norm shaping.390  This is in sharp contrast to 
                                                             
385 Wiener et al (n 303) 6. 
386 Wiener et al (n 303) 5-6. 
387 ibid 6-9. 
388 Varella (n 390) 20-21. 
389 Wiener et al (n 303) 6. 
390 Ibid, noting that it is important to keep the dimensions of shaping and mapping ‘analytically apart’, 11. 
 
 
96 
 
theorising the same in terms of fragmentation, wherein lies the potential for chaos and 
despair, or at least ‘certain worries and misgivings’.391 
Finally, some reference should be made to the term ‘international governance’.  
International governance is ‘a situation in which the principal actors are states and the 
objectives relate mainly to the regulation of interstate relations’ (emphasis in the original).392  
This conceptualisation of governance is aligned with what Muckenburger refers to as ‘old’ 
governance, which he sees as being ‘in crisis’ (as discussed in section 3.1.2 above).393  Global 
governance is more complex in terms of having a wider range of actors: state, non-state and 
inter-governmental, and being concerned with ‘broad areas of interaction involving this wide 
range of actors’.394  This accords with analysis of the UPR: focus is on a particular state’s 
human rights performance rather than inter-state matters,395 and there are a multitude of 
actors involved in that process - state actors as the SuR and as peer review states, non-state 
actors in terms of civil society (national and international NGOs) and other stakeholders, as 
well as other international human rights monitoring mechanisms including treaty bodies, as 
explored in chapters 4 and 5. 
3.4 Regime complexes and compliance theory  
Keohane and Victor present a regime complex as comprising different entities relevant to a 
particular field, in their case, climate change, that have an overlapping function.396   
Koskenniemi uses the term ‘rule-complex’, although his conceptualisation is related to a 
regime complex; a rule-complex has its own form of expertise and focus, such as, human 
rights, trade, or the environment, and possesses its own principles and institutions.397  A 
rule-complex and a regime complex therefore each comprise a collection of institutions 
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relevant to a particular field, although a rule-complex is presented as a more singular 
concept.  For Keohane and Victor, the institutions that populate a regime-complex have 
developed over time in response to a variety of factors, including political difficulties, a 
divergence in state interest, and/or the dysfunction of current or previous international 
organisation.398  This approach supports the concept of an international human rights 
regime complex, which chapter 4 defines and applies to the UPR.  
If we accept that regime complexes exist, questions regarding authority and legitimacy are 
no less relevant, if anything they are more so.  Keohane and Victor explore the credibility of 
a regime complex in terms of its normative justification and propose a model comprising six 
dimensions, with a variation running from dysfunctional to functional to measure 
credibility.399  The dimensions of the model are: coherence; accountability; determinacy; 
sustainability; epistemic quality and fairness.  In the following chapter, these dimensions are 
each taken in turn to test the modelling of an ‘international human rights regime complex’ 
and the UPR’s position within such a regime complex. 
Concerns have been raised that the expansion of international law has resulted in 
fragmentation into specialised and autonomous spheres, or regimes.400  There is some 
anxiety that ‘the emergence of new and special types of law, “self-contained regimes” and 
geographically or functionally limited treaty-systems create problems of coherence in 
international law’. 401  Although specialised and autonomous, such regimes are rarely 
discrete or self-contained nor do they operate wholly independently of one another, as 
illustrated by the International Law Commission (ILC) report with reference to the European 
Convention on Human Rights, which: 
(…) is not, and has not been conceived as a self-contained regime in 
the sense that recourse to general law would have been prevented.  
On the contrary, the Court makes constant use of general international 
law with the presumption that the Convention rights should be read in 
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harmony with that general law and without an a priori assumption that 
Convention rights would be overriding.402  
The fragmentation of international law and the collision and intersection of legal 
frameworks and regulatory systems has prompted discussion as to how conflicts arising in 
the substance of international law, for example a treaty dealing with trade that has 
implications for human rights law and environmental law, should be addressed,403 and 
whether international regimes matter in terms of their direct effect on national 
behaviour.404  Numerous technically specialised cooperation networks with a global scope 
have emerged that ‘transgress national boundaries and are difficult to regulate through 
traditional international law’.405  These include: ‘trade, environment, human rights, 
diplomacy, communications, medicine, crime prevention, energy production, security, 
indigenous cooperation and so on’.406   
Formal legal systems, for example, dealing with dispute resolution, matters pertaining to 
jurisdiction, and applicable law under a specific treaty, should ‘not be read in clinical 
isolation from public international law’. 407  Such cross-referencing has the potential to aid 
coherence, although problems arise when a legal matter might arguably fall within the 
jurisdiction of more than one regime or matters are dealt with in a vacuum.  This has 
prompted concerns not only about matters such as jurisdiction and applicable law but also in 
relation to the narrowness of focus and concern so that regimes ‘are tailored to the needs 
and interests of each network but rarely take account of the outside world’.408  
Fragmentation runs counter to a preference for coherence; coherence is ‘valued positively 
owing to the connection it has with predictability and legal security’, and yet it is ‘a formal 
and abstract virtue’ that does not properly conceptualise the complexity of international 
law.  Coherence needs to be situated alongside pluralism which is ‘a constitutive value of the 
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system. Indeed, in a world of plural sovereignties, this has always been so’.409  Whilst each 
rule-complex is constituted, for example, under a specific treaty to address a particular area 
of international law, lex specialis, the argument pursued by Koskenniemi is that in reality 
self-containment is neither feasible nor intended;410 lex generalis is to be taken into account 
and other relevant conventional international law. 411 
Even so, the context of these discussions is a formal, positivist conception of law and by 
association, of legitimacy and authority.  This approach is echoed by Buchanan and Keohane.  
They assert rigid concepts of legitimacy and authority in the context of global governance by 
referring to institutions mimicking the role of government whereby legitimacy is determined 
either on normative grounds, the institution has the right to rule, and/or on sociological 
grounds, the institution is widely believed to have the right to rule.412  
By comparison, Maksymilian Del Mar considers the approach of the ILC report to be an 
example of wrong-footing: ‘arguing for unity or coherence as between the rules of a legal 
system places at risk the responsiveness of specialized institutions to the changing nature of 
the peculiar social problems that those institutions deal with’.413  He perceives the ILC to be 
at fault by adopting analysis that extends only to ‘surface coherence’, instead advocating a 
focus on the ‘inextricability of rules from their factual adaptability in specific institutional 
contexts’.414  Del Mar is quick to explain that he is not seeking to criticise the purposive 
element of legal reasoning as such, but rather that ‘positing and maintaining a distinction 
between deductive reasoning and purposive interpretation is not conducive to providing an 
epistemologically rich and socially complex enough account of legal work performed in 
international legal institutions’.415  
To clarify, the dangers of the supposed fragmentation of international law presented by the 
ILC gives the ILC cause for concern in terms of consistency of application of international law.  
What Del Mar argues is that consistency, or coherence, is not at issue when one takes 
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account of the application of legal reasoning to a set of facts, and the social and narrative 
role of image and language in the process of legal reasoning which of itself promotes ‘deep 
coherence’.416  According to this analysis, one might set aside concerns that international 
law characterised by regime complexes detracts from the security of value and coherence.   
A move away from the desire for rigidity is also evident in the subsequent work of Keohane.  
In his later work, co-authored with David Victor, Keohane departs from positioning 
governance in tandem with a right to rule by exploring a concept of governance that has a 
diluted focus on the right to rule and favours a more flexible and adaptive approach that, it 
is argued, a regime complex is suited to.417  Linked to the fragmentation of international law 
is the collision of norms and ‘colliding sectors of global society’, Gunther Teubner’s view 
being that ‘any aspirations to a normative unity of global law are thus doomed from the 
outset’.418 
A key issue that subsequently arises, and has a corresponding impact upon the relevant 
institution’s legitimacy and authority, is the response of a government to the guidance / 
requirements of the constituent institutions of a regime complex.  If the government 
concerned addresses matters in accordance with the relevant institution’s direction, 
governance is validated.  If not, the opposite may be the case.  As Armstrong and Gibson 
note, ‘governance of any kind tends to be assessed by virtue of its effectiveness and 
legitimacy’ explaining that ‘effectiveness may be defined as the capacity to achieve a set of 
objectives without undue disruption’ whilst ‘legitimacy may be understood in terms of a 
broad degree of acceptance by those directly affected by governance’ (all emphasis in the 
original).419   
This prompts the question of state compliance and motivation for compliance.  Compliance 
theory and practice is explored in section 5.3, chapter 5, however, brief reference here to 
Buchanan and Keohane’s thoughts on content independent reasons for state action is 
relevant to assist in determining the nature of an entity’s governance function.   Buchanan 
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and Keohane present the argument that a party subject to the operation of a governance 
institution will have ‘content-independent’ reasons for supporting its operation, ‘or at least 
to not interfere with its functioning’.420  Content-independent reasons for compliance with a 
rule refer to an accepted obligation to comply without the need for an assessment of the 
nature of the content of the rule because the fact of having acknowledged an institution has 
authority is sufficient grounds for compliance.421  
Consideration of content-independent reasons is of primary importance when assessing the 
effectiveness of those governance institutions that are rules-based, which, when writing in 
2006 was the view of Buchanan and Keohane.422  However, an institution that issues or 
supports recommendations as part of its governance function is not within the realm of rule-
making and enforcement, therefore compliance is not mandatory; a recommendation is 
merely that, it is not an instruction or a demand.  Arguably, legitimacy should not be 
measured by rate or degree of compliance. This is an important feature of the function of a 
governance entity in terms of the function of the UPR, particularly when considering states 
in crisis that struggle to implement recommendations that they may have supported.  
To conclude this section, a regime complex has an overarching governance function and 
brings within its scope and composition multiple institutions that each possess, to various 
degrees, a governance function.423  The inter-relationship of these institutions, coupled with 
their independence from each other, can be understood through the lens of global 
governance theory.  Taking this approach assists with a more comprehensive 
conceptualisation and modelling of the capacity of the UPR and of its limitations.  This 
modelling is presented in chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis, and feeds into recommendations as 
to how to define and sustain the UPR’s authority and legitimacy as a mechanism with a 
complex governance function, particularly in relation to states in crisis. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has appraised literature that discusses the nature of governance in a global 
context generally and more specifically in the field of international human rights.  The 
analysis has explored and evaluated the key components of global governance to progress 
this thesis’ purpose of critically appraising human rights monitoring through the lens of 
global governance theory, with specific application to the UPR and Yemen as a state in crisis. 
Section 1 illustrates that governance is not primarily, if at all, concerned with coercive 
enforcement, command or control,424 but rather it relates to regulation and the promotion 
of values in a cross-border manner in which non-state actors such as civil society have a key 
role to play.  The UPR does not possess a formal function in relation to either formal 
regulation or dispute resolution, but this does not detract from its capacity to function as a 
governance entity within a broader governance regime complex, if anything, it enhances it.  
An entity with a global governance role is therefore taken in this thesis to be one that 
performs a regulatory function operating at a global level with a number of stakeholders, 
state and non-state, including civil society and other relevant institutions that might be 
situated within the particular regime complex of international human rights.   
The meaning and manifestation of legitimacy and authority as key components in a 
governance entity’s capacity to function effectively is addressed in section 2.  Output 
legitimacy, which includes functional legitimacy, is determined by the extent to which an 
entity satisfies its substantive objectives.  Its effectiveness, or perceived effectiveness is 
measured by the results that flow from its operation.  Legitimacy is not, however, secured by 
output alone and to focus only upon this aspect would overlook important matters of input 
legitimacy and procedural legitimacy.  The principle of input (source) legitimacy refers to the 
founding of an entity whilst procedural legitimacy is secured when an institution’s 
procedures are adhered to by those subject to it, and in accordance with its founding 
principles and processes.  These are important aspects when it comes to modelling the 
governance function of the UPR, as the chapter that follows demonstrates.  
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How output is defined in the context of the UPR is worthy of careful consideration and this is 
undertaken as part of chapter 5, which also assesses the role of norm dispersal and soft 
power in the regulatory field as recognised outputs and considers what role human rights 
indicators might contribute, if any, in this respect.  Section 2 also illustrates that the role of 
the democratic principle in determining a governance mechanism’s legitimacy has emerged 
as a key concern for some scholars that is not easily reconciled with the structure and 
operation of global governance institutions.425 
Authority is presented in section 2 in accordance with Cotterrell’s suggestion that authority 
might be thought of as something claimed in support of power by its holder whilst legitimacy 
is that which is conferred on a particular power by those subject to it.426  Two facets of 
authority emerge, one that is commanded on normative grounds - the entity possesses the 
right (to rule) and the other on sociological grounds - there is wide belief in the entity’s right 
(to rule);427 with authority being informed by expert authority, traditional authority and 
charisma.428  The codification of authority along the lines of horizontal and vertical 
structures is also set out in this section and provides a useful way of modelling interactions 
between state and non-state actors during the UPR process, as presented in section 4.2, 
chapter 4. 
As stated in section 2 above, there is a risk that prolonged compliance with process at the 
UPR that is not coupled with substantive action will amount to an embodied performance 
akin to ritualism; if the UPR does not effect, or is perceived as failing to effect human rights 
progress this will result in an erosion of perceived legitimacy.  Yet, if governance is not about 
command and control but is focused on standard setting, dissemination and persuasion, the 
logic would follow that the UPR satisfies this aspect of its governance role.  This presents a 
dilemma: compliance with an institution mandated to command and control would appear 
mandatory and central to measuring the legitimacy of that institution, however, for a 
governance entity such as the UPR, a failure to be persuaded does not strictly amount to a 
failure of its governance function.  Included in the UPR’s objectives are, however: ‘the 
                                                             
425 See also, Errol P. Mendes, Gobal Governance, Human Rights and International Law (Oxon and New York: 
Routledge 2014) 152-154, with reference to criticisms levied at the WTO for ‘creating and exacerbating the 
democratic deficits within and between member nations and civil society groups in the global trade regime’.   
426 Cotterrell (n 277) 263. 
427 Buchanan and Keohane (n 20) 405. 
428 S Turner, ‘Charisma Reconsidered’ (2003) 3 Journal of Classical Sociology 5, 9-10. 
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improvement of the human rights situation on the ground’ and ‘the fulfilment of the State’s 
human rights obligations and commitments and assessment of positive developments and 
challenges faced by the State’,429 and so part of its command of authority and perceived 
legitimacy does depend upon tangible achievements as a result.  This gives rise to two 
further questions, addressed in chapter 5: how output should be defined in the context of 
the UPR, and how state practice and action can be attributed to the UPR’s impact.  
Section 3 highlights concerns regarding the application of governance theory to state actor 
human rights obligations on the basis that the former, governance, is political and the latter, 
human rights obligations, relate to legal duties.430  This section argues that global 
governance as an apt framework within which to assess the operation of international 
human rights monitoring because conceptually and procedurally the monitoring process 
relates to both political covenants and action to effect legal change, the former by declaring 
the political will to make changes, for example to accept a recommendation to make a 
standing invitation to special rapporteurs, the latter by accepting to act upon certain existing 
legal obligations such as introduce or amend legislation to give full effect to a particular 
human rights treaty.   
Section 3 also considers the role of civil society in the global governance of human rights and 
state practice and the principle of externality as a component of global governance theory.  
It posits that for the UPR, externality is achieved via the role played by civil society and to a 
lesser degree by reviewing states, whilst also highlighting inherent challenges in terms of the 
subjective approach that might be taken due to politicisation and regionalism during the 
reviewing process.  It proposes the timeliness of an assessment of the effects of governance 
structures, partly because of the increase in the number of human rights monitoring 
mechanisms and activity, and to search out unintended and unanticipated consequences, 
which as Finnemore observes, are often overlooked because researchers find what it is they 
are looking for.431 
                                                             
429 UNHRC A/HRC/RES/5/1 (n 9), paras 5(a) and 5 (b) respectively. 
430 Dawson (n 285) 4 and Martha Finnemore, ‘Dynamics of Global Governance: Building on what we know’ 
(2014) 58 International Studies Quarterly 221-224, 222. 
431 ibid Finnemore 221. 
 
 
105 
 
Section three closes by citing other conceptual frameworks that can make a useful 
contribution to this thesis but are not suited as the central theoretical approach.  These are 
new/experimentalist governance and global constitutionalism.  In new/experimentalist 
governance the state no longer plays a central role; it is simply one of several relevant 
actors.  For this reason, new/experimentalist governance does not lend itself to the UPR 
because the state is firmly rooted as the primary actor.  However, of relevance to this thesis 
is that new/experimentalist governance describes governance as an iterative cycle,432 which 
accords with the UPR. 
The final section, section 4, presents the concept of a regime complex as comprising a 
collection of institutions relevant to a particular field.  In accordance with the work of 
Keohane and Victor, institutions of a regime-complex develop over time in response to a 
variety of factors, including political difficulties, a divergence in state interest, and/or 
dysfunction of current or previous international organisation.433  This mirrors the evolution 
of the entities that comprise what is proposed in the next chapter, chapter 4, as the 
international human rights regime complex. 
Section 4 also reveals pervasive anxieties regarding the expansion and fragmentation of 
international law because of various regime complexes and the perceived threat this 
presents to coherence.  Chapters 4 and 5 take account of these anxieties in their assessment 
of the legitimacy and authority of the UPR via a critical application of global governance 
theory.  Whilst regime complexes comprise entities that do overlap and intersect, this does 
not necessarily give rise to incoherence and fragmentation.  As the following chapters 
illustrate, the UPR operates in a particularly unique way within the proposed regime 
complex by collating information from a variety of monitoring sources into one space.  By 
doing so, it accommodates a dispersed approach to human rights monitoring whilst offering 
a space for a regrouping of information and an overall ‘stock take’ of the human rights 
position of the SuR at that moment in time.  
The risk that the unintended and unanticipated effects of governance structures will go 
unnoticed because they are not being searched for suggests the role of the scholar is 
                                                             
432 Nance and Cottrell (n 380) 285-6, citing Sabel and Zeitlin (2010) (n 384). 
433 Keohane and Victor (n 5) 13-15. 
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paramount: ‘scholars have more freedom to expand their range of vision so their 
responsibility for alerting us to unintended effects is far greater’.434  A number of unintended 
consequences and effects of the UPR have been uncovered during the research process of 
this thesis.  These include a discovery of certain state motivations for engaging with the UPR, 
how universal engagement with the mechanism was initially secured, and the evolving 
strategic engagement of civil society.   
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                             
434 Finnemore (n 430) 222. 
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Chapter 4 - A claim to governance: assessing the UPR’s authority, input (source) legitimacy 
and procedural legitimacy   
Introduction 
This chapter takes the concept of global governance as manifest by principles of authority 
and legitimacy and applies them directly to the UPR.  To model the UPR as a global 
governance mechanism it assesses the extent to which the UPR asserts and maintains a 
global governance function.  Taking inspiration from the work of Robert O. Keohane, David 
G. Victor, and Kal Raustiala on regime complexes,435 this chapter proposes an ‘international 
human rights regime complex’ within which the UPR is situated.  This exercise contributes to 
analysing how the UPR functions in relation to states in crisis, to determine what it is about 
the UPR that means states in crisis engage with the mechanism when, at first glance, it might 
appear that neither the UPR has much to offer in terms of resolving crisis, nor states in crisis 
to offer in terms of meeting the UPR’s objectives.  
As concluded in the preceding chapter, an entity with a global governance role is one that 
performs a regulatory function operating at a global level with a number of stakeholders, 
state and non-state, participating in the process.436  Regulation has been defined as: 
(…) the sustained and focused attempt to alter the behaviour of others 
according to defined standards or purposes with the intention of 
producing a broadly identified outcome or outcomes, which may involve 
mechanisms of standard-setting, information-gathering and behaviour-
modification.437   
As the analysis conducted in the preceding chapter indicates, governance is not about 
command and control; it is about standard setting, dissemination and persuasion,438 which 
correspond with a regulatory approach.  Ingredients to secure successful governance include 
the ongoing authority and legitimacy of the entity performing the governance function, and 
                                                             
435 Keohane and Victor (n 5) 5 and Raustiala and Victor (n 5), respectively.  
436 Muckenberger (n 278) and Weiss ‘Governance, good governance and global governance’ (n 279) 795. 
437 Charlesworth and Larking refer to the regulatory character of the UPR, and cite Julia Black’s definition of 
regulation, Charlesworth and Larking (n 330) 26. 
438 Calliess and Renner (n 295) 22 and Weiss ‘Governance, good governance and global governance’ (n 279) 
796. 
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its place within the broader context of the ‘regime complex’ it is situated within, if there is 
one.  The operation of global governance theory manifests itself in a procedural sense and in 
a functional one.  There is evidence of universal state engagement with the UPR’s procedure, 
but the nature of such engagement is varied.  This throws into sharp focus the long-term 
impact on the UPR’s legitimacy of those states that persistently engage in a superficial 
manner.  As part of the process of addressing the impact a state’s failure to present tangible 
evidence of follow up and implementation of recommendations has on the UPR’s legitimacy 
and authority, this chapter measures the UPR against key facets of legitimacy primarily by 
assessing the substantive and process aspects of the UPR in terms of its input (source) 
legitimacy and procedural legitimacy.439   
The ongoing legitimacy and authority of the UPR cannot rely solely upon its success as a 
mechanism that has thus far secured universal engagement and that eschews the selective 
approach that blighted the Commission.  To be credible, the UPR needs to have an effective 
function for all states that engage with it.  If it does not, the success of universal engagement 
and its non-selective approach will also be its failing.  Chapter 5 therefore picks up where 
this chapter ends by proceeding to evaluate the UPR’s output (substantive) legitimacy by 
discussing what its output might amount to and how it might be measured.  Combined, 
chapters 4 and 5 conclude that implementation is but one measure of the UPR’s legitimacy; 
that output (substantive) legitimacy defined by the implementation of recommendations 
neither is nor should be the only measure of credibility, and that whilst implementation is a 
crucial consideration, the nature of the UPR’s output varies for different states, particularly 
those in crisis.  
Before analysing input (source) legitimacy and procedural legitimacy, the first section of this 
chapter progresses this thesis’ proposal that there is an ‘international human rights regime 
complex’ within which the UPR is situated and plays a significant role.  The second section 
considers the nature of the UPR’s authority in the context of global institutions that possess 
                                                             
439 Bodansky refers to source-based legitimacy, procedural legitimacy and substantive legitimacy, whilst Zürn 
refers to input legitimacy, procedural legitimacy and output legitimacy, Bodansky (n 20) and Zürn ‘Democratic 
governance beyond the nation state’ (n 22), respectively. 
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an expanded form of authority, and with reference to the vertical and horizontal dimensions 
of authority at play. 
The third section assesses the input legitimacy of the UPR by reviewing its founding 
resolutions and the process by which those resolutions and their content were agreed.  It 
concludes that the source of the UPR’s founding instruments and their content secures its 
input legitimacy.  In the fourth section, the concept of procedural legitimacy is applied to the 
UPR.  Measuring procedural legitimacy is undertaken by assessing the nature of the 
mechanism’s procedure, evaluating state compliance with the same and gauging the extent 
to which procedure, both in form and substance, is adhered to by all stakeholders of the 
governance entity, state actors and non-state actors.   
4.1 The UPR within an international human rights regime complex 
This section illustrates how the inter-relationship of international human rights institutions, 
coupled with their procedural independence from each other, can be understood through 
the lens of global governance theory.  It takes the concept of a ‘regime complex’440 and 
proposes an ‘international human rights regime complex’.441  As noted in the introduction to 
this study, whilst there has been scholarship and research on regime complexes relating to 
climate change and plant genetic resources,442 and reference has been made to 
‘international human rights regimes’ and ‘human rights regimes’,443 there is no body of work 
on the concept and operation of an ‘international human rights regime complex’. An 
indication of the entities that come within the scope of the international human rights 
regime complex, and the multi-directional relation of each governance entity to another, is 
identified at appendix 2.  
                                                             
440 Keohane and Victor (n 5) 5. 
441 During the research for this thesis, no other reference has been found to the application of this model to 
international human rights, although reference to an international human rights regime has been made by 
René Wolfsteller as a generic descriptive term without any explanation of the entities within the regime or its 
governance function, René Wolfsteller, ‘The institutionalisation of human rights reconceived: the human rights 
state as a sociological ‘ideal type’, (2017) 21(3) The International Journal of Human Rights 230-251, 232, 234, 
235 and very recently in Alison Brysk and Michale Stohl (eds), Contracting Human Rights: Crisis, Accountability, 
and Opportunity, (Cheltenahm, UK, Northampton, MA, USA: Elgar Publishing 2018). In addition, Philip Alston 
refers to a United Nations Human Rights Regime, Alston (n 1). 
442 Keohane and Victor (n 5) 5, and Raustiala and Victor (n 5), respectively. 
443 Shaffer and Ginsburg (n 6) 25, and 21 citing Moravcsik (n 6) 217. 
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4.1.1 Function and structure  
As discussed in chapter 3, a regime complex has an overarching governance function and 
brings within its scope and composition multiple institutions with each possessing, to various 
degrees, a governance purpose.444  A regime complex has been described as ‘an array of 
partially overlapping and non-hierarchical institutions governing a particular issue-area’ 
whereby ‘the rules in these elemental regimes [the individual entities] functionally overlap, 
yet there is no agreed upon hierarchy for resolving conflicts between rules’.445  A regime 
complex thus reflects the disaggregation that characterises international law.446   
Conversely, the overarching aim of the international human rights regime complex takes a 
harmonising approach by promoting a universal set of norms to be accepted and adhered to 
by states, with support from civil society.  Writing in the late 1980s Bruno Simma and Philip 
Alston noted that the: 
(…) prospects for developing an effective and largely consensual 
international regime depend significantly on the extent to which those 
institutions are capable of basing their actions upon a coherent and 
generally applicable set of human rights norms.447   
The disaggregation in the international human rights regime complex is less about 
substantive matters and more about how state legal obligations towards rights protection 
are monitored and the methods employed in seeking to secure substantive state 
engagement with this process.  It would appear therefore that the international human 
rights regime complex is distinct from other regime complexes; it promotes agreed universal 
rights norms whereas for other regime complexes the rules developed in one entity may 
challenge those of another.448  However, as with other regime complexes, the international 
human rights regime complex may be perceived by state actors as providing a menu of 
human rights monitoring mechanisms with engagement with some entities presenting, or 
being perceived as presenting, a more palatable option than others.  As this section 
                                                             
444 Keohane and Victor (n 5) 5. 
445 Raustiala and Victor (n 5) 279. 
446 ibid 295. 
447 Simma and Alston (n 40) 82-3.  
448 Raustiala and Victor (n 5) 295. 
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illustrates, the UPR is preferred by some states because its peer review permits a 
congratulatory approach between allies,449 and a ‘shielding of friends’.450    
Although the UPR is a subsidiary of the Human Rights Council, it is presented in the regime 
complex (at appendix 2) as a separate entity with its own governance function, as well as 
contributing to the overall human rights governance function of the regime complex.451  This 
is a deviation from the parameters set by Keohane and Victor whereby the regime complex 
is characterised by a lack of hierarchy, but such deviation is necessary given the very 
particular procedure, actors and interaction of the other entities with the UPR.   
The international human rights regime complex encompasses state and non-state actors 
that operate at a domestic, regional and/or global level.  There are eight main institutions 
within this proposed regime complex: the state, comprising the machinery of the judiciary, 
legislature and executive; international human rights treaties and the corresponding 
committee, or treaty body; the Human Rights Council, including Special Procedures and 
Council regular sessions; the UPR, demonstrating its multi-directional interaction with the 
other entities in the regime complex; regional human rights conventions and the 
corresponding court; other treaties that address human rights matters; national human 
rights institutions (NHRIs); and civil society.  Whilst civil society is presented as a single class 
in that regime complex, it can be sub-divided into categories of domestic or international, 
and sometimes with reference to specific rights protection.  Arguably, civil society refers to a 
collection of non-state actors within the regime complex rather than a separate institution 
or regime, however, for illustrative purposes it serves to keep it separate. 
As the arrows of figure 2 at appendix 2 illustrate, no single institution operates in isolation 
and the UPR connects with each of the regime’s entities.  This connection takes a variety of 
forms.  It includes reports that refer to the work of one or more other mechanisms, for 
                                                             
449 Interview CSO 01 and Subedi (n 14) 119. 
450 Charlesworth and Larking (n 330) 14. 
451 As noted in chapter 3, It has been a view held by some for a number of years that human rights institutions 
possess a governance function Benjamin Mason Meier, Lawrence O. Gostin, Human Rights in Global Health: 
Rights-Based Governance for a Globalizing World (Oxford University Press 2018) 73, citing Alston (n 140), but 
the author of this thesis has not found an attempt to model this regime as a regime complex and conduct 
analysis according to the work of Keohane, Victor and Raustalia (n 5). 
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example, the OHCHR compilation for a state’s UPR refers to special procedures, treaties and 
other key instruments, often with reviewing states then making recommendations that refer 
to one or other of the regime complex’s other entities.452  Such references work in both 
directions, with special rapporteurs making direct reference to the UPR in their annual 
reports.453   
Other connections within the regime complex at the UPR include recommendations to ratify 
a particular treaty, or to establish an NHRI, given further consideration in chapter 6 
regarding the source of UPR recommendations.  As a subsidiary of the Human Rights Council, 
the UPR’s connection to the Council is strong; the Council can pass resolutions that 
encompass the function and operation of the UPR and the UPR features as a standing item 
on the Council’s regular sessions agenda,454 under which the outcome and Working Group 
report for states reviewed during the previous UPR session are adopted.455  Conversely, the 
connection between the UPR and domestic courts is indirect and therefore weak;456 
domestic courts function in accordance with national and regional legislation, where 
applicable, and the connection to the UPR is therefore via the UPR’s impact upon that 
legislation, which as noted in chapter 5, is extremely difficult to account for.  
                                                             
452 See for example the recommendation made by Chile to Ecuador during Ecuador’s second cycle review that 
refers to special procedures: ‘Address the recommendation made in 2009 by the then Independent Expert on 
Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, regarding the major efforts to be undertaken to incorporate and 
coordinate social programmes with a cultural approach and a gender perspective (Chile)’, UNHRC ‘Report of 
the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Ecuador’, A/HRC/21/4 (05 July 2012), para 135.7. 
453 See, for example, the annual reports of the Special Rapporteur for Cambodia (Rhona Smith, 2015-present), 
Surya Subedi (2008-2015), including ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in 
Cambodia’, A/HRC/36/61, 27 July 2017; A/HRC/33/62 05 September 2016; A/HRC/27/70, 15 August 2014 (the 
latter is referred to in further detail in section 5.3.4). 
454 UNHRC A/HRC/RES/5/1 (n 9) para 35: ‘The Council should have a standing item on its agenda devoted to 
the universal periodic review.’  
455 Adoption is via the standard wording that the Council ‘Adopts the outcome of the review of [the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland], comprising the report thereon of the Working Group on the 
Universal Periodic Review, the views of the State concerning the recommendations and/or conclusions made, 
and its voluntary commitments and replies presented before the adoption of the outcome by the plenary to 
questions or issues not sufficiently addressed during the interactive dialogue held in the Working Group’, 
UNHRC ‘Outcome of the universal periodic review: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’ 
Human Rights Council 36th session, agenda item 6, A/HRC/DEC/36/107 (26 September 2017).  
456 There is no evidence as yet of any direct reference by regional human rights or other courts to the UPR; 
when approached on this matter, UPR Info was doubtful that there would be, ’because of the nature of the 
UPR’, email Gilbert Onyango to the author, Regional Director for UPR Info Africa, 17 May 2018, on file with the 
author. 
 
 
113 
 
To conclude this section, the model presented in figure 2 at appendix 2 serves to identify 
and represent the primary domestic, regional and global institutions of the proposed 
‘international human rights regime complex’.  Each regime within the complex has a 
fundamental role to play in the promotion, protection, realisation and enforcement of 
international human rights norms and laws, and often the role and function of one regime 
overlaps, complements and/or is reinforced by the operation of another regime in the 
complex.  The model also serves to visually indicate the multi-directional operation of the 
regimes within the complex.  On balance, the structure and functional nature of this regime 
complex is robust; across the complex is the promotion of universal human rights norms. 
This strengthens the regime complex and also means that if a state prefers to engage with 
some entities and not others, there should still be a measure of norm dissemination and 
dispersal at a global level in accordance with internationally agreed principles and laws.     
4.1.2 Dimensions of a regime complex  
Keohane and Victor explore the credibility of a regime complex in terms of its normative 
justification and propose a model comprising six dimensions to measure credibility, with a 
variation running from dysfunctional to functional.457  In assessing the extent to which the 
UPR forms part of an international human rights regime complex and the credibility of that 
complex, this subsection briefly appraises the UPR and the broader regime complex against 
each dimension.   
Taking firstly the dimension of coherence: ‘a regime whose components are compatible and 
mutually reinforcing is coherent’.458  Compatibilities in the climate change regime encourage 
linkages allowing for an easier channelling of resources from one element of the complex to 
another.459  The UPR promotes compatibility by endorsing universal human rights principles 
promoted by each governance regime within the complex.  This is achieved in particular via 
the recommendations that are sourced from those other entities and that make direct 
reference to them, as discussed in chapter 6, and also by the content of the OHCHR 
compilation report.  This report draws together information from treaty bodies and other 
human rights monitoring mechanisms and other relevant UN reports, providing a fertile 
                                                             
457 Keohane and Victor (n 5) 16-17, as highlighted in chapter 3. 
458 ibid. 
459 ibid. 
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source of information as to a state’s international human rights situation and cooperation 
with relevant bodies.  As explained in chapter 2, concerns, recommendations and other 
points of encouragement from these sources are summarised, citing where action has 
followed.460  This report is one means of tracking state progress against these matters from 
one UPR cycle to the next, encouraging coherence in terms of the UPR’s function as well as 
promoting the multi-directional nature of the regime complex it sits within.   
The second dimension is accountability; this fosters legitimacy and lowers 
uncertainty.461  The regime is accountable to ‘relevant audiences’ including the state’s 
populace and those that interact with the state as individuals or collectives, NGOs and other 
states.462  Within the international human rights regime complex, treaty bodies issue general 
comments and make recommendations, special rapporteurs produce reports and make 
representations, NGOs lobby and campaign, but if states dodge efforts by the governance 
regime to be held accountable and fail to implement recommendations from across the 
complex, the individual and collective authority of the complex’s entities is undermined.  
Those states celebrated for their good practice, for example, seek to engage in public 
dialogue ahead of their UPR, and produce a mid-term report.463  This is a measure of 
accountability and enhances the UPR’s authority.  Taking Keohane and Victor’s spectrum of 
                                                             
460 UNHRC, ‘Compilation on the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Report of the Office of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights report’, A/HRC/WG.6/27/GBR/2 (22 February 2017) 
paras 41 and 57 referring to measures taken since its previous UPR (Modern Slavery Act 2015 and more 
inclusive education, respectively). There are no references in Yemen’s second cycle OHCHR compilation to UPR 
recommendations, however there are numerous in Somalia’s, UNHRC, ‘Compilation prepared by the Office of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in accordance with paragraph 15 (b) of the annex to 
Human Rights Council resolution 5/1 and paragraph 5 of the annex to Council resolution 16/21: Somalia’ 
A/HRC/WG.6/24/SOM/2 (23 November 2015) and UNHRC, ‘Compilation prepared by the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in accordance with paragraph 15 (b) of the annex to Human 
Rights Council resolution 5/1 and paragraph 5 of the annex to Council resolution 16/21: Yemen’ 
A/HRC/WG.6/18/YEM/2 (11 November 2013). 
461 Keohane and Victor (n 5) 16-17. 
462 ibid 17. 
463 Including the establishment and activities of a Thai CSO Coalition for the UPR, 6-11, and opportunities 
offered by the Paraguayan National Mechanisms for Reporting and Follow-up (NMRF) UPR Info ‘Butterfly 
Effect’ (n 463) 11-13. For a comprehensive interim report example, see ‘Universal Periodic Review of Ireland 
Interim Reporting Stage: Progress scorecard, government’s interim report and NGO stakeholder review’, 
March 2014, 2-11, http://www.rightsnow.ie/assets/33/D33ABD13-E5DA-4A01-
8E3B5D67B7E4587D_document/ICCL_UPR_Interim_Stage_compendium_March_2014.pdf last accessed 23 
April 2018.  
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function-dysfunctional, the position of the UPR will vary subject to the SuR and the extent of 
its engagement and perception of the authority and standing of the UPR.    
Determinacy is the third dimension: ‘important both to enhance compliance and to reduce 
uncertainty’.464  Here the function of domestic and regional courts is key, as well as General 
Comments issued by treaty committees that determine and clarify state obligations.465  The 
extent to which the UPR secures determinacy is subject to how SuRs respond to 
recommendations and is variable, as addressed in chapters 5 and 6, arguably more closely 
aligned to ‘dysfunctional’ than ‘functional’.  The fourth dimension, sustainability, requires a 
regime to ‘have components that reinforce one another and may also build in redundancy, 
to withstand shocks’.  The multi-directional nature of the regime complex, discussed in 
section 4.1.1, to some degree functions to support sustainability.  However, for Yemen, as 
chapter 7 shows, there are numerous entities within the regime complex reporting and 
making resolutions regarding the human rights situation in the country yet little evidence of 
subsequent action, thereby undermining the authority, power and sustainability of 
individual regimes.   
The penultimate dimension is epistemic quality.  This can vary according to the ‘consistency 
between [the regime’s] rules and scientific knowledge’.466  Linking this to the international 
human rights regime complex, epistemic quality relates most closely to knowledge of the 
human rights situation within a state, increasingly measured by human rights indicators 
reliant upon fact-finding and investigation missions.  Epistemic quality in this respect may be 
questionable, as identified in section 5.4, chapter 5.   
Keohane and Victor are pragmatic regarding the final dimension, that of fairness, because 
‘multilateral institutions always reflect disparities of power and interest, they never perfectly 
reflect abstract normative standards of fairness’.467  Normative standards of fairness come 
into question according to state behaviour at the UPR discussed in section 4.4 below despite 
                                                             
464 Keohane and Victor (n 5) 16-17. 
465 The African Court on Human and Peoples Rights, The European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, for example, and CCPR,‘General Comment No. 8 Article Right to Liberty and 
Security of Persons’ HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I) (30 June 1982).  
466 Keohane and Victor (n 5) 17. 
467 ibid. 
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the UPR conquering to some degree ‘disparities of power’ through its structural and 
procedural fair treatment of states.  By comparison, the Council has been less successful, for 
example, provoking polarisation regarding membership and perceived bias.468  
4.1.3 Reinforcing the state-centric paradigm: the distribution of sovereignty  
The international human rights regime complex is populated by international organisations 
that reinforce a global order based upon a state-centric paradigm, positioning the state as 
the primary protector and violator of human rights.  For this reason, the human rights legal 
and political, and moral and social, framework has evolved to focus upon the obligations of a 
nation state towards its subjects and those within its territory or territorial reach.   
The protection of human rights and holding state authorities to account increasingly relies 
upon support from non-state actors, namely civil society but, as discussed in section 1.5, 
chapter 1, also comes under threat from non-state actors, namely, insurgents, armed rebel 
groups, and organised terrorism.  In the wake of 9/11 the political and media rhetoric moved 
away from the danger of nuclear and chemical weapons,469 towards the threat posed by 
weak and fragile states and their inability to control activities in border and other regions 
creating ‘safe havens’ for non-state actor terrorist groups and insurgents.470  As noted in the 
                                                             
468 See above section 2.1, chapter 2. 
469 Although more recently there has been renewed focus on western concerns of the nuclear armament of 
certain states, namely Iran and the Peoples’ Republic of North Korea, for a small selection of recent press, see: 
Ed Pilkington, ‘It will not be very pleasant,’ Iran warns, if Trump sabotages nuclear deal’ The Guardian (22 April 
2018) https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/apr/22/it-will-not-be-very-pleasant-iran-warns-if-trump-
scraps-nuclear-deal; Julian Borger, ‘Iran nuclear deal: sanctions waived as Trump begins countdown to keep US 
in’ The Guardian (12 January 2018) https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jan/12/iran-nuclear-deal-
trump-waives-sanctions-but-sets-deadline-for-overhaul; Justin MCurry, ‘North Korea halts nuclear and missile 
tests ahead of planned Trump summit’ The Guardian (21 April 2018) 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/20/north-korea-suspends-nuclear-missile-tests; Patrick 
Cockburn, ‘The Iran crisis presents a bigger danger to peace than North Korea now that Trump seems 
determined to end the nuclear deal’ The Independent (27 April 2018) 
https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/iran-nuclear-deal-north-korea-donald-trump-emmanuel-macron-
a8326146.html, all last accessed 17 August 2018.  
470 Where the training and planning of terrorist acts in the west as well as across the Middle East dominated 
the security agenda, prior to the advent of Daesh, see for example, OECD ‘Fragile States 2013: Resources Flows 
and Trends in a Shifting World’ 11 http://www.oecd.org/dac/incaf/FragileStates2013.pdf last accessed 23 
September 2014; Jeremy M Weinstein, John Edward Porter, Stuart E. Eizenstat, ‘On the Brink: Weak States and 
US National Security’, Center for Global Development, 6 August 2004, 
http://www.cgdev.org/doc/books/weakstates/Full_Report.pdf last accessed 31 August 2018. 
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introductory chapter to this thesis, insurgent and terrorist non-state actors pose a security 
threat with a global relevance.471  
There has been, it is argued, a paradigmatic shift whereby sovereignty is no longer 
predicated upon ‘might is right’, but rather ‘rightful authority’ that depends upon the 
perceived legitimacy of the actor seeking to exercise authority.472  The UPR and the 
international human rights regime complex support this; whilst there is confirmation of state 
sovereignty, the authority the state commands is under scrutiny where rights protection is 
concerned.  Significantly, and more so than the other entities within the rights regime 
complex, the UPR reinforces the ‘distribution of sovereignty by an international legal order 
committed to the principle of the formal equality of sovereign States’.473  This is via the 
equal treatment of all states at the very heart of its design.  As Patrick Macklem also notes, 
‘the normative value of this principle [equal treatment of states] should not be overstated, 
but nor should it be understated’.474  Yet whilst the Council in creating the UPR seeks to 
promote and secure this principle’s continued relevance it remains that the international 
human rights regime complex is constructed and operates to protect state sovereignty that 
undermines principles of universality, for example, by allowing derogations and limitations 
to treaty law at a state level,475 and by the fact that the power to support or note a UPR 
recommendation rests with the state.  
4.1.4 Coherence and fragmentation  
Chapter 3 addressed concerns raised by scholars and international lawyers of the 
fragmentation and lack of coherence in the field of public international law.  Whilst the 
presence of a regime complex in a particular field might confirm these concerns, certain 
benefits arise because regime complexes are ‘not just politically more realistic but they also 
offer some significant advantages such as flexibility and adaptability.'476  A fragmented 
                                                             
471 Barry Buzan uses the term ‘security complex’ in a similar manner to the use here of regime complex but in 
the sense of discussing patterns of amity and enmity that emanate from a variety of causal factors such as 
border disputes, ethnically related populations, ideological alignments, and historical links, Buzan (n 73) 190. 
472 Hamel-Green (n 391) 430: Held observes that ‘Sovereignty has been redefined from ‘might is right’, a notion 
that pervaded international law from the sixteenth century to the late nineteenth century’, being changed 
‘from effective power to rightful authority: that is, authority that upholds cosmopolitan principles, democratic 
standards and human rights standards’. 
473 Macklem (n 47) 49. 
474 ibid 49. 
475 Wolfsteller (n 441) 235. 
476 Keohane and Victor (n 5) 15. 
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regime complex can allow strategic behaviour on the part of states in terms of those aspects 
of the regime they choose to engage with and those they do not; in the context of climate 
change, ‘different states can sign on to different sets of agreements making it more likely 
that they would adhere to some constraints on greenhouse gases’.477   
Understanding the international human rights framework and its constituent parts as a 
regime complex helps to address, though not resolve, the challenge of the adoption and 
application of universal norms and practice.478  By having a regime complex that includes 
within it a variety of mechanisms, from treaties to standing invitations for special 
procedures, from the UPR to commissions of inquiry, and from regional human rights 
systems to local engagement with civil society, it is more likely that states will choose to 
engage with some aspect of human rights monitoring and protection, rather than none.   
The international human rights regime complex is constructed, intentionally or otherwise, to 
afford states a degree of autonomy as to which regime(s), or aspects of a particular regime 
within the complex, it engages with.  Viewed in this way, regime complexes do not remedy 
the lack of a comprehensive unifying regime but present an improvement; although there is 
‘an absence of an overall architecture or hierarchy that structures the whole set’,479 there is 
a degree of commonality with each regime’s foundation emanating from those principles 
enshrined in the UN Charter and the UDHR, built upon by subsequent human rights 
instruments.  
4.2 Authority 
The authority commanded by the UPR is referred to throughout this chapter and so this 
separate section makes some succinct and important comments directly relevant to the 
manifestation of authority at the UPR.  The UPR commands authority by having a tight grip 
on its procedural aspects, however, in order to successfully command authority those 
stakeholders with a vested interest in the mechanism, civil society, NHRIs, rights holders, 
                                                             
477 ibid. 
478 One such challenge is presented by René Wolfsteller with reference to the way that the international 
human rights regime is constructed to protect the sovereignty of states, by allowing for derogations and 
limitations, over the rights of individuals, Wolfsteller (n 441) 235. 
479 Keohane and Victor (n 5) 8. 
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etc., need to continue to be persuaded of the UPR’s legitimacy.  If this fails, the UPR will 
struggle to maintain authority.    
In chapter 3, two facets of authority were identified: one that is commanded on normative 
grounds, having the right to rule, the other on sociological grounds, widely perceived as 
having the right to rule.480  The UPR does not ‘rule’ as such, and so in this respect authority is 
treated as referring to the right to operate.  The normative ground of the UPR’s authority is 
explored in section 3 of this chapter regarding its mandate under its founding instruments.  
Sociological grounds for its authority are more challenging; the fact of a state’s engagement 
with the UPR does not necessarily reflect wider perceptions of the UPR’s right to exist, 
although civil society’s proactive engagement may do.  
Section 3.2.2, chapter 3 considers the sharing of a persuasive legal authority ‘horizontally’ 
between state-centred constitutional structures and the building of new ‘vertical’ hierarchies 
of authority, through standard setting, outside these structures.  It initially appears that 
authority at the UPR exists both vertically and horizontally.  Horizontal authority is present 
through peer review and takes on a persuasive form akin to soft power that informs the 
intricate web of intra-state regionalism and diplomacy, see chapter 5.  There is the weight of 
legal authority to those recommendations that cite a state’s failure to comply with its legal 
obligations under ratified treaty law and request action to rectify the matter.   
Vertical authority is asserted through the auspices of the Working Group report.  However, 
given this report is little more than a collation and grouping of the recommendations made 
to the SuR during peer review, with some self-preserving pruning and editing undertaken at 
the behest of reviewing states and SuRs,481 this is in fact a repackaged form of horizontal 
authority.  The UPR thus accommodates a more liquid form of authority,482 without denying 
that rigid traditional forms of authority are relevant and to be adhered to.  In this respect, 
the UPR errs towards the postmodern, whereby the rigid structures and certainty of 
modernity are simultaneously rejected and reasserted.483 
                                                             
480 Buchanan and Keohane (n 20) 405. 
481 Interview with CSO 07, changes made at Syria’s request to how the government should be referred to in a 
recommendation by Ireland. 
482 Nico Krisch, ‘Authority, solid and liquid, in postnational governance’, in Cotterrell and Del Mar (n 31) 25-48. 
483 ‘Difference is asserted and then buried in an assumption of universal harmony; a gesture which no more 
than repeats the central paradoxical supposition in postmodernism of radically decentred identities in a world 
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State engagement with the UPR, even in its most diluted form of attendance at the Working 
Group in Geneva, bestows some authority and thus credibility on the mechanism.  Yet 
ultimately it is the state that chooses when and how to act in response, further 
demonstrating the relevance of an expanded concept of authority to the UPR that stands in 
contrast to the command-based enforcement of vertical authority.  
4.3 Input (source) legitimacy 
Input (source) legitimacy in the context of the UPR is secured via the organ that created the 
UPR acting within its mandate, and having the perceived and/or actual authority of those 
subject to it to do so.  It also refers to the method by which the UPR was created, namely the 
relevant resolutions and their source.   For these reasons, this section assesses the powers 
vested in the relevant organs, their standing and power to design institutions and pass 
instruments that led to the UPR’s creation.  Given chapter 2 presented the UPR’s principles 
and objectives, this section tracks the source of the relevant resolutions, but does not 
rehearse their content.   
As we know from chapter 3, democracy in the context of input legitimacy has been 
described as consisting of two components: a democratic principle and a deliberative 
principle.484  Although it has been said that the modelling of political institutions as 
democratically legitimate ‘becomes incoherent’ at the level of global governance because 
there is no guarantee of a connection between those that establish norms and those that 
are affected by them,485 there is, however, some evidence of the deliberative principle being 
met with regard to the UPR’s conception and formation.  This is on the basis that it was the 
result of various proposals, discussion and debate by those that were to be subjects of it, 
namely, state representatives, civil society and civil servants.486  There is some evidence of 
the satisfaction of the democratic principle on the basis that it was state representatives that 
actively participated in debates informing the ultimate decision to create the UPR, and state 
                                                             
of instant and unprecedented technical connection’, Peter Brooker, ‘Introduction: reconstructions’, in Peter 
Brooker (ed) Postmodernism / Modernism (London and New York: Pearson Education Limited 1992, 
republished Routledge 2014) 13. 
484 Zürn ‘Democratic governance beyond the nation state’ (n 22). 
485 Wheatley (n 302) 97. 
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representatives that voted on the relevant General Assembly and Human Rights Council 
resolutions.  
The deliberative principle dictates that ‘any decision should be backed by arguments 
committed to values of rationality and impartiality’.487  This is similarly achieved by states 
agreeing and then voting upon the content of a given resolution.  The method by which an 
institution has been created influences its acceptance and perceived legitimacy by those that 
fall within its remit and scope as well as those with the power to input and interact with the 
institution.  Such acceptance by both categories of actors, those subject to a process and 
those that contribute to the process, is crucial; without it, state and non-state actors may fail 
to be persuaded of the value of the mechanism and vote with their feet by disengaging.   
In terms of relevant organs having the mandate and authority to conceive of the UPR, article 
7, paragraph 1, of the UN Charter provides for a General Assembly to be established as a 
principal organ of the UN.488  Paragraph 2 of the same article states: ‘Such subsidiary organs 
as may be found necessary may be established in accordance with the present Charter’.  
Article 22 provides that: ‘The General Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it 
deems necessary for the performance of its functions’.  In accordance with these powers, 
the Human Rights Council was established as a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly 
with its origins in resolution 60/251.489 
General Assembly resolution 60/251 is the founding resolution of the Human Rights Council. 
Pursuant to that resolution, the Council is obliged to ‘undertake universal periodic review of 
the fulfilment by each state of its human rights obligations and commitments’.490  The 
Council therefore proceeded in Resolution 5/1 ‘Institution-building of the United Nations 
Human Rights Council’, to establish its institutions and their scope, processes, methods, 
                                                             
487 Zürn ‘Democratic governance beyond the nation state’ (n 22) 186, citing Jon Elster ‘Introduction’ in Jon 
Elster (ed) Deliberative Democracy (Cambridge University Press 1998) 8 and Rainer Schmalz-Bruns Reflexive 
Demokratie: Die demokratische Transformation moderner Politik (Baden-Baden: nomos 1995). 
488 Charter of the United Nations, article 7 (1): There are established as principal organs of the United Nations: 
a General Assembly, a Security Council, an Economic and Social Council, a Trusteeship Council, an International 
Court of Justice and a Secretariat. 
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membership, principles, etc., of which the UPR was one.491  Council resolution 5/1 is further 
evidence of the UPR’s source legitimacy and follow up resolutions seek to maintain that 
legitimacy.  Human Rights Council resolution 16/21, for example, reported a review of the 
work and functioning of the Council conducted by an open ended intergovernmental 
working group to supplement resolution 5/1 and confirmed the UPR’s process and 
modalities.492   
To conclude, if the process of negotiation, drafting and voting upon proposed resolutions of 
the General Assembly and Human Rights Council is accepted as being legitimate being 
rational and informed by principles of democracy and deliberation, the input legitimacy of 
the UPR is to all intents and purposes secured. This section confirms the source legitimacy of 
the UPR, as such its legitimacy is not solely defined by its non-selective process and equal 
treatment of all UN member states, although these are important aspects of its procedural 
legitimacy.  Procedural legitimacy of the UPR very much depends upon the nature of state 
practice during the process and motivations for that practice.  
4.4 Procedural legitimacy 
There is an argument that the fact of universal state engagement with the UPR at a basic 
level, see figure 3, appendix 3, levels of state engagement, means the UPR’s procedural 
legitimacy is secure.  However, compliance with process is not of itself a sufficient measure; 
universal engagement comes at a price.  The nature of state compliance with procedure in 
terms of the substance and extent of state engagement is a key concern, and there is a risk 
that some states treat engagement with the UPR as sufficient in terms of international 
reporting obligations.493  Whilst the UPR’s conception in the context of the Commission’s 
demise is relevant, an obsession with the ills the UPR was designed to assist in fixing skirts 
over the challenges it faces as well as the potential it has. 
                                                             
491 UNHRC A/HRC/RES/5/1 (n 9), other mechanisms established within the Human Rights Council in this 
resolution were: Special Procedures (section II), the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee (section III), 
Complaint Procedure (section IV), the agenda and framework for the Human Rights Council’s work (section V), 
the Council’s methods of work (section VI) and its rules of procedure including regular and special sessions 
(section VII). 
492 UNHRC A/HRC/RES/16/21 (n 201). 
493 As highlighted by one interviewee quoted in chapter 5, sub-section 5.3.2: Acculturation. 
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The UPR’s procedural legitimacy can be contested on various grounds that fall into three 
areas: one, that politicisation is rife leading to recommendations that are driven by political, 
regional and other affiliations; two, that compliance with routine procedural aspects rather 
than substantive compliance with recommendations is translated into compliance per se; 
three, that global human rights institutions encourage the bureaucratisation, 
institutionalisation and legalisation of human rights.494  This section considers each matter in 
turn, although the matter of politicisation is addressed only briefly here being addressed in 
greater detail in chapter 5.   
4.4.1 Politicisation and the UPR 
Politicisation happens in an international organisation following ‘the introduction of 
unrelated controversial issues by countries seeking to further their own political 
objectives’.495  As Rosa Freedman notes, ‘overt and subtle forms of politicisation are both 
capable of affecting a body’s ability to fulfil its mandate’.496  Politicisation and regionalism is 
inevitable when a body comprises representatives from a state’s government as opposed to 
individuals that are independent and non-governmental.497  Given that state diplomats with 
a political mandate make UPR recommendations, politicisation is not surprising.   
The Syrian delegation’s opening statement at its first UPR in 2011 was overtly political;498 it 
declared its commitment to universal human rights and the building of a democratic society 
but stated it was only willing to accept advice from certain African, Asian and Latin American 
countries.499  In its view, Western countries had no right to provide human rights advice 
given their role in conflicts in Libya and Iraq and their colonial legacy.500  Syria’s interactive 
dialogue occurred during the height of the Arab spring, related to this the US condemned 
the Syrian government for committing gross violations of human rights against its own 
                                                             
494 Oberleitner Global Human Rights Institutions (n 23) 14, whereby global human rights institutions ‘seek to 
translate the concerns of human rights – upholding human dignity, protecting the vulnerable, empowering the 
powerless, remedying wrongdoing – into processes and procedures’. 
495 Freedman (n 1) 11 citing G.M. Lyons, D.A. Baldwin and D.W. McNemar, ‘The “Politicization” Issue in the UN 
Specialized Agencies’, (1977) 32(4) Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 89. 
496 Freedman (n 1) 12. 
497 Alston (n 1) 189. 
498 The content of this paragraph and the paragraph that follows is based upon Riches (n 8) 173.   
499 Discussion of the ongoing civil war in Syria and related matters of international law is the scope of this 
thesis; this example is by means of simple illustration.  
500 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, Syrian Arab Republic’, 
A/HRC/19/11, 24 January 2012, paras 7 and 10. 
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citizens in the form of ‘mass arrests, arbitrary detentions, torture and targeted killing’ that 
‘continued unabated’, and called for President Assad to step down immediately.501  Cuba 
made a point of order that the US’s approach was entirely unacceptable because neither the 
Council nor any other UN forum was the appropriate environment for such a request.  It fell 
to the President of the Council to restore order and remind all representatives to continue 
the process ‘in the customary climate of respect’.502  This reveals the potency of the UPR in 
terms of the space it creates for the playing out of the political dynamic between states.  
The approach of the Syrian government and its supporters might simply reflect a denial of 
violation, or may hark towards a justification for action during a state of emergency. 
Alternatively, decisions may be deemed legitimate in the broader context of the US’s current 
and historical human rights abuses outside of its own territory as being indicative of 
acceptable norms of unilateral state behaviour (for example, Guantanamo Bay and the US’s 
use of military unmanned aerial vehicles, particularly in parts of the Middle East).  By 
comparison, rather than being based on a normative approach, the US’s request for the 
resignation of the Syrian government might have been determined by legal principles, with 
the US perceiving the interpretation of Syrian national law by the Syrian government, and its 
actions towards its citizens, as fundamentally incompatible with international human rights 
law, regardless of the US’s own previous and current actions.  
Writing in 2017, this thesis’ author hypothesised that regionalism and politicisation could 
prompt an SuR to accept and move towards implementation of a recommendation from an 
ally in order to maintain good relations.503  Findings published by Rochell Terman and Erik 
Voeten in 2018 support this hypothesis.504  Following their quantitative study of the 41,066 
first and second cycle recommendations, Terman and Voeten found that states ‘are less 
likely to criticize their friends’ and ‘are more lenient towards their strategic partners in the 
peer-reviewing process’.505   
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Realpolitik permeates the UPR; politicisation and regionalism is inevitable when a body 
comprises representatives from a state’s government as opposed to individuals that are 
independent and non-governmental.506  Furthermore, regionalism is at the heart of the UN’s 
structure divided as it is into five regions with the UPR providing a space for states wishing to 
engage in ‘ideological warfare’ against Western states, states such as Cuba,507 and Syria.508  
The need to resist politicisation and maintain the UPR’s credibility was expressed by the 
President of the Council in his opening remarks at the UPR’s 18th Working Group.  He 
reiterated that recommendations made must focus only on human rights in order to 
‘maintain and “beef-up” the credibility of the UPR system’ and that the SuR must respond to 
all recommendations.509  
Civil society representatives have expressed similar views, betraying a lack of confidence in 
the UPR in this respect: 
(…) in our opinion it is a peer review and it’s even worse in a way than a 
peer review because it’s a review of Saudi Arabia by Egypt for example 
and I don’t think anyone is really in a position to criticise one another’s 
human rights records…. I don’t think it ever can [be a success] so long as it 
remains a review of states by states because it’s never going to be 
independent or impartial.  It’s going to be driven by politics and by 
interest and, you know, a state that has good relations with another state 
is not going to make really tough comments or concerns / 
recommendations.  You know it’s going to be ‘we welcome the efforts 
made by Saudi Arabia’.  
In our opinion, I guess it has remained the same, there is no point [to the 
UPR], it’s never going to be an independent review.  I don’t think, I don’t 
feel, that states feel bound this process.  I don’t think states at the end of 
the review really feel like, ‘Ok, I have accepted this one hundred 
recommendations, and I have to go back home and I have four years to 
implement them’.  Maybe for some European or some Western countries 
this is how it works, but in this Arab region I can tell you 100% that states 
could not care less about implementing UPR recommendations.510 
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This is a damning indictment.  However, there is evidence that allies do not entirely shy away 
from passing criticism and when they do criticise their contribution may be more effective 
because ‘their recommendations are accepted more often than substantially identical 
recommendations emanating from other states with fewer strategic ties’.511  Reasons for 
accepting recommendations out with the content of the recommendation can also be 
conceptualised according to Joseph Raz’s second order reasons for action, considered in  
section 5.3.1, chapter 5.512 
Analysis of recommendations made during the first and second cycles of the UPR reveals 
that the political nature of the UPR means it can operate with a ‘strong but informal 
influence’.513  Further, its political nature has also been seen as a key lever in its success: 
‘…countries are on the world stage during their review. No one wants to look bad’.514  In a 
similar vein, a Bangladeshi government official commented that ‘…not wanting to be seen to 
be doing poorly creates a sort of competition to see who has done the most’.515  That said, 
some civil society actors remain sceptical of the approach of some states to the UPR process 
of making recommendations: 
(…) largely speaking, or in many instances… recommendations are not 
rigorous, critical, grounded in human rights principles and obligations 
but rather a reflection of the human rights priorities of the 
recommending state together with their perceived national, political, 
economic, security and other interests and so the sometimes 
congratulatory and overwhelming positive, constructive nature of the 
UPR is something that appeals to diplomats.516 
This scepticism was shared by a number of interviewees, expressing concern that ‘powerful 
countries and their allies come together to shield themselves from scrutiny’ so that the UPR 
is ‘…very often a filibuster of praise where those that make it on the speakers list are those 
that want to draw attention away from the actual violations in the country’.517  There was 
evidence of this during Working Group of China in 2013.  The Syrian Mission to the UN, for 
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example, applauded China’s ‘open’ state report and recommended it continue to play an 
active role in the Council’s work and continue to contribute to solving issues relating to 
human rights in a fair, objective and non-selective manner.518  Russia also welcomed China’s 
human rights achievements, whilst the UK expressed concern regarding restrictions on 
freedom of expression and association and urged greater transparency over the use of the 
death penalty.519   
4.4.2 Compliance with routine procedural aspects of the UPR  
The above sub-section addresses some aspects of motivation for state compliance with the 
UPR’s processes and procedure in a substantive manner.  This sub-section refers to evidence 
of compliance and deviation from procedure as a means to further measure procedural 
legitimacy.  An agreed procedure that is considered to be adequate and fair has a 
legitimising effect.520  Compliance with a mechanism’s procedures signals to stakeholders 
that an entity is authoritative, fostering a positive perception of that entity and encouraging 
stakeholder commitment to it.   
In terms of the more routine aspects of the UPR process, procedural legitimacy follows when 
an institution’s relevant actors make their submissions in the relevant timescale and format, 
and attend and contribute to reviews as appropriate.  The Council took a detailed and 
prescriptive approach in modelling the UPR process, as described in section 3, chapter 2, 
aware that securing universal engagement from the outset was going to be a key factor 
contributing to the UPR’s perceived success.  A senior member of the OHCHR, interviewed as 
part of the research for this study, explained that the calendar of reviews for the first UPR 
sessions was complex and constructed so that those states that were members of the 
Council were scheduled first, followed by Council non-member states.  To this end 
commitment was made by those states elected as members of the Human Rights Council to 
present themselves to the UPR.521  Those states due to come to the end of their Council 
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membership soonest were in the first tranche of reviews, the remaining of the 47 members 
immediately followed.  The interviewee explained: 
When you reach the 48th state and you are the first one that doesn’t want 
to come, you look seriously bad. Small, big or whatever, political, 
whatever reason, you look absolutely bad. So no one dared to say we 
cannot come. They all came and that was a major success.522 
At the time of writing, no state has failed to attend its review during the first, second or third 
cycle.523  Analysis reveals that all those states scheduled for the first session of the third 
cycle had submitted national reports for all three cycles, with all reports for these states 
over the three-cycle period appearing to have been submitted ahead of the Working Group, 
save for two.524  Crucially, no UPR report has gone unwritten.  Compliance with procedure in 
terms of the submission and processing of UPR reports is exceptionally high; that the UPR 
does not suffer the backlog that characterises the work of so many treaty committees and 
overdue reports is quite remarkable and sound evidence of its procedural legitimacy.525 
There has, however, been the occasional procedural irregularity.  Israel was scheduled for its 
second cycle review on 29 January 2013, however it failed to submit a national report when 
it was due in October 2012, and did not attend its review in Geneva as per the timetable.526 
This was related to Israel having suspended its involvement with the Council in May 2012;527 
its UPR absence was widely criticised and concerns were raised at the time that Israel’s 
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actions might ‘set a dangerous precedent’ for the UPR.528  However, Israel had contacted the 
Council’s President in January 2012 and requested a postponement of its second cycle 
review, evidence of a temporary cessation only and presumably deemed not sufficient to 
take action under paragraph 38 of Council Resolution 5/1 on the grounds of non-persistent 
cooperation.529  The review was rescheduled for the 17th Working Group (21 October - 1 
November 2013) and Israel engaged accordingly,530 although ties with the Human Rights 
Council were reportedly re-established only 48 hours before its rescheduled review.531  
Another procedural irregularity relates to the UK and it changing its previously stated 
position regarding certain second cycle recommendations shortly before its third cycle.  It 
changed its position in relation to some recommendations from supported to noted, 
reducing the number of supported recommendations from 95 to 66.532  As UPR Info 
observes, seeking to change its position, particularly on the eve of a subsequent review, 
suggests the UK was avoiding accountability for implementation of previously accepted 
recommendations.533  For this reason, and to preserve the success thus far with procedural 
compliance, this practice should not be permitted.  
Nonetheless, as Christian Tomuschat notes, ‘the UPR is founded on an almost irreproachable 
base as far as the fairness of the proceeding is concerned’.534  The result is that all states 
have the option to pass comment and make recommendations to others, regardless of any 
rights violations past or present.  The fact that all states have this opportunity has been met 
with criticism in some quarters,535 yet the UPR’s inclusive nature remains fundamental to its 
credibility as a mechanism premised upon equal treatment.  That said, it is Western states 
that are most active at the UPR; this requires further attention to ensure the UPR evolves to 
                                                             
528 Citing Pakistan, on behalf of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference; Gabon, on behalf of the African 
Group, and Turkey, Israel absent from its own UPR (n 526).  
529 UNHRC A/HRC/RES/5/1 (n 9). 
530 UPR Info ‘Israel absent from its own UPR’ (n 526).  
531 Lazaroff (n 527).  
532 UPR Info ‘The UK changes its position on recommendations received at previous review’, Press Release, 25 
May 2017, https://www.upr-info.org/en/news/the-uk-changes-its-position-on-recommendations-received-at-
previous-review last accessed 05 April 2018. 
533 According to UPR-Info, the recommendations it sought to alter its position in relation to included (but were 
not limited to) ratification of international treaties and lifting reservations to others, human rights protection 
and detention, children’s rights, gender equality, non-discrimination, welfare rights, migrants’ rights, and 
women’s rights, ibid.  
534 Tomuschat (n 127) 610. 
535 Interview CSO 01.  
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foster engagement that is truly global.536  A further cause for concern, expressed by some 
interviewees, is that some states might view the UPR as the forum for discussion of country 
specific matters rather than the Human Rights Council regular sessions.537  If this view were 
to become widespread it might prompt disengagement by states with the Council’s regular 
sessions, undermining the Council and placing a heavy and unrealistic burden on the UPR.  
Benjamin Gregg refers to thin norms and thick norms, stating proceduralism is a thin norm 
easily adopted by many.538  In the same vein, he suggests there are rights that are 
normatively thin and those that are normatively thick.  He presents the latter, rights that are 
normatively thick, as being more particular, relevant to a smaller set of people and less likely 
to be apt for universal adoption, while those that are normatively thin are, conversely, of 
broader appeal and more likely to be adopted universally.  Procedurally, the UPR operates as 
a normatively thin mechanism: the inclusion of all states, its cooperative approach, and 
there lack of formal enforcement mechanisms give it wide appeal.   
The UPR does not therefore contribute to what Zürn flags as a ‘legitimation problem’ for 
global governance whereby ‘central decision makers within international institutions are 
their secretariats and, more importantly, the executive representatives from the most 
powerful nation states’.539  The downside is that the UPR is not perceived by powerful states 
as a means of leverage and so holds less attraction than those international organisations 
premised upon hierarchies that ‘institutionalize [sic] inequality between states’.540  With 
regard to the dissemination of international norms and rights protection, the UPR is largely 
normatively thin, promoting rights with wide appeal.  However, when reviewing states 
challenge the status quo of an SuR by making recommendations that seek to alter what are 
often entrenched social, cultural or religious norms that flout principles of international 
human rights law, such as the death penalty, female genital mutilation and child marriage, 
the UPR operates as a normatively thick mechanism.   
                                                             
536 Tomuschat (n 127) 618-9 for example, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia, 
France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom and Japan. 
537 Interview CSO 03 and CSO 06 respectively. 
538 Benjamin Gregg, Human Rights as Social Construction (Cambridge University Press 2012), 69. 
539 Zürn A Theory of Global Governance (n 284) 10. 
540 ibid.  
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The role of international law and human rights norms reveals a complex interaction with 
sovereignty based upon systemic and dynamic dimensions of the distribution of 
sovereignty.541  The distributional reach of international law envelopes all states and 
underpins its systemic dimension, whilst new political developments, majority and minority 
rights, and the evolving inclusion of certain minority rights that were previously excluded, for 
example, indigenous rights, inform international law’s dynamic character.542  The systemic 
and dynamic dimensions of the distribution of sovereignty are at the heart of the UPR: in the 
three and a half hours of the Working Group of an SuR there is sharp and succinct focus on 
the essence of the human rights challenges a state faces via the recommendation process 
and the documents upon which the UPR is based.  It is wise, however, to treat the content of 
the national report with some degree of caution, which by its nature is less candid.  The 
narrative of the national report varies; some states present what appears to be a frank 
assessment of the challenges faced in terms of implementing recommendations and the 
progressive, incremental nature of such a task.543  
From a socio-legal perspective, the UPR process is inclusive in terms of state and non-state 
actors and its capacity to contribute to the creation and maintenance of networks and 
communities of practice by the creation of formal and informal networks, thereby further 
enhancing the UPR’s procedural legitimacy.544  In particular, and as chapter 7 explores, 
communities of practice linked to the UPR have been emerging within civil society.  As 
discussed in chapter 3, the socio-legal perspective perceives the practice and experience of 
authority ‘as empirical social phenomena’ that ‘does not need conclusive, timeless 
definitions of authority and legitimacy but only ways of understanding these ideas that can 
help in provisionally identifying relevant social practices’.545  Communities of practice are 
                                                             
541 Macklem (n 47) 46-7. 
542 ibid, these points are made by Macklem in defence of international law as a legitimate legal order, distinct 
from that of national orders, 42-43 and 47-9.  
543 Of the eighteen pages that form the main part of Argentina’s first cycle report, half outline the challenges 
and limitations on the part of the state and a summary of action taken and action proposed. This includes 
details of issues in prisons and detention centres in 2004, and measures that have been taken by the state to 
ensure compliance with UN minimum standards for the treatment of prisoners and a monitoring committee, 
as well as an account of matters relating to pre-trial detention, indigenous peoples, women, adolescents, 
children and social exclusion, UNHRC, ‘National Report Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 15(A) of the 
Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1: Argentina’ A/HRC/WG.6/1/ARG/1 (10 March 2008). 
544 As noted in chapter 3, communities of practice, or networks of communal practice, are those that  
545 Cotterrell (n 277) 262 - 263. 
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those that are subject to the ‘power’ that claims authority and, by being subject to that 
power, confer upon it its legitimacy.546  By engaging with the UPR process both before and 
after a state’s review, those actors that comprise the community of practice legitimise the 
UPR process; it is worthy of their time and effort.   
This social practice links with Homi Bhabha’s work on the ‘Third Space’, which can be a literal 
or metaphorical space, in which binary distinctions are dissolved in a bid to understand 
cultural knowledge and cultural performance not as something that is homogenous, original 
or pure, but rather as a process of translation and negotiation.547  This dynamic process is 
very much at the heart of the UPR where myriad cultures interact and intersect, negotiating, 
sharing and disseminating international human rights norms within a particular defined 
territory.548  Communities of practice include networks emerging from the composition of 
the internal machinery of the UN, for example, diplomatic state missions to the UN, the 
membership of the Human Rights Council, the working group troika of the UPR, as well as 
those parties external to the UN, such as civil society.  Thus, networks both transcend the 
formal boundaries of the sovereign state and reinforce those boundaries.  
As with any such regulatory or advisory mechanism, there is the risk of a culture of tacit 
engagement developing in some quarters that proceeds unchecked in the short term.  If this 
persists, it will undoubtedly undermine the UPR’s credibility and legitimacy.549  The 
interaction of state representatives with civil society, before, during and after a state’s 
review provides a means of exposing repeated tacit engagement.  To mitigate the risk of 
superficial compliance with process there should be a requirement for substantiated 
evidence in the national report of consultation by government officials with civil society and 
NHRIs.  A requirement for the SuR to provide a formal document detailing follow up against 
                                                             
546 CA Thomas, The Concept of Legitimacy and International Law, LSE Legal Studies Working Paper 12/2013 
(London, London School of Economics, 2013) 22 and Katharina P Coleman, International Organisations and 
Peace Enforcement: The Politics of International Legitimacy (Cambridge University Press 2007), 22 both cited 
by Cotterrell (n 277) 263 and 264. 
547 Homi K. Bhabha, ‘Cultural Diversity and Cultural Differences’, in ed. B. Ashcroft, G. Griffiths, H. Tiffin, The 
Post-Colonial Studies Reader, (Routledge, New York 2006) 155–157.   
548 The concept of the space created by the UPR and pluralism, legal and normative, is a related field of study 
explored in Riches (n 8) 161-181; there is scope to further conceptualise the UPR thus, although it is outside 
the scope of this thesis.  
549 Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Making Human Rights a Reality (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press 
2013) 94, expresses a similar view, that ‘lower compliance erodes legitimacy’. 
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supported recommendations would further promote substantive engagement, see appendix 
4, Matrix for Implementation.   
4.4.3 Bureaucratisation, institutionalisation and legalisation of human rights  
Taking firstly the concern that human rights monitoring mechanisms reduce human rights 
protection to a process of bureaucratisation, institutionalisation and legalisation.550  The 
codification of individual rights protection has indeed mushroomed during the latter part of 
the twentieth century and into the twenty-first.551  Michael Elliott observes there is a 
decoupling between the codification of principles at an international level that promotes 
universality, and protection at the domestic level, which depends upon the state as both 
protector and aggressor.552  Elliott argues that whilst this decoupling further institutionalises 
human rights, such institutionalisation is an integral part of the move towards individual 
rights definition and protection via articulation and particularisation.553  
Other recent scholarship similarly challenges the negative connotations of the 
institutionalisation narrative.  René Wolfsteller observes that human rights norms are 
embedded in social practice precisely by the conditions of their institutionalisation.554  
Wolfsteller seeks to construct a framework for the operation of an ‘ideal type human rights 
state’ based on Max Weber’s notion of the ‘ideal type’ and by reconceptualising Benjamin 
Gregg’s normative political theory of the human rights state as expressed in his earlier 
work.555  Gregg proposes withdrawal from the international human rights regime to a focus 
on the nation state and local protection of rights, which also combines a refocus away from 
exclusionary practices adopted by states, whereby citizens of the nation state are given 
                                                             
550 Oberleitner Global Human Rights Institutions (n 23) 14, whereby global human rights institutions ‘seek to 
translate the concerns of human rights – upholding human dignity, protecting the vulnerable, empowering the 
powerless, remedying wrongdoing – into processes and procedures’. 
551 Namely, UDHR (1948), ICCPR (1966), ICESCR (1966), ICERD (1965), CEDAW (1979) and OP-CEDAW (1999), 
CAT (1984) and OP-CAT (2006), CRC (1989) and its optional protocols (2000), ICMW (1990), ICRPD (2006), 
ICPED (2006), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/TreatyBodies.aspx last accessed 05 April 2018. See 
also, Michael A Elliott, ‘The Institutionalization of Human Rights and its Discontents: A World Cultural 
Perspective’ (2014) 8(4) Cultural Sociology, 407-425, 413, for a graph showing the number of human rights 
instruments drafted each year for the period 1863-2003. 
552 ibid 408. 
553 ibid 414 - 416. 
554 Wolfsteller (n 441) 230-251, Wolfrum (n 335) makes a related point, 2040-2041. 
555 ibid 231, citing Max Weber (trans. ed. Edward Shils and Henry Finch), The Methodology of the Social 
Sciences (New York: Free Press 1968) 90, the ‘ideal type’ being used by Weber to ‘characterise the 
conceptualisation of typifications in the historical and social sciences, compared to the typifications in the 
natural sciences’, 241 and 236, with reference to Gregg (n 548). 
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preference, to a focus on the individual whether they be from outside the sovereign territory 
of the state or not.556  Wolfsteller uses this model to demonstrate that protection at the 
local level is at its best when rights are institutionalised and legalised as positive state-based 
law, emphasising the structural conditions of rights realisation.557  Whilst Michael Elliott 
states that the fact of institutionalisation increases attempts at norm dissemination,558 
Benjamin Gregg argues that although human rights are constructed and institutionalised, 
they will ultimately only be valid for those communities that embrace them.559  In a similar 
vein, Sally Engle Merry observes that ‘over time, a gradual expansion of norms creates 
institutional structures, leading to norm cascade as the ideas of human rights become 
widespread and internalized [sic]’.560 
Nonetheless, the bureaucratisation of the UPR process and of state engagement risks the 
legitimacy of the UPR, as one interviewee, reflects: 
The risk is now that this process may become a bit bureaucratised. 
States may lock themselves in a situation where they send a delegation 
just for the reason of sending a delegation here, responding to 
questions, getting recommendations and not even considering them at 
all. And so we may lose a sense of purpose if we do not manage, and 
that is the main challenge with the third cycle, to transform this into a 
good implementation tool. And that is far from happening, this is far 
from happening so I’m not absolutely optimistic now.561 
These are potentially dark prophecies for the UPR from an interviewee that was part of the 
discussions of the architecture of the UPR and has been closely involved with it since that 
time.  That said, Alison Brysk finds there is a simultaneous expansion and contraction of the 
human rights regime: expansion being via the regime ‘introducing new actors, claims, 
mechanisms, and proposed responsibilities’, whilst contraction occurs dues to ‘various 
                                                             
556 Wolfsteller (n 441) 236 with reference to Gregg (n 548). 
557 ibid 232. 
558 Elliott (n 551) 407-425. 
559 Gregg (n 548) 3. 
560 Sally Engle Merry, Human Rights and Gender Violence: translating International Law into Local Justice 
(Chicago and London: Chicago University Press 2006) 221. 
561 Interview UN 01. 
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shortfalls in the social contract at all levels’, including the rise of popular democracy and its 
contradiction with international human rights norms.562   
What emerges is the sense that, given the structure of the global political landscape and the 
creation of systems that operate on an inter-national basis primarily at the behest of the UN, 
some degree of bureaucratisation, institutionalisation and legalisation is inevitable.  It is 
unavoidable that the UPR is similarly characterised, and no doubt consciously so, as part of 
its search for legitimacy and acceptance by the ‘international community’.  Whilst 
bureaucratisation, institutionalisation and legalisation of human rights at the UPR, and 
across the international human rights regime complex, will not necessarily prevent human 
rights norm dispersal and protection and, in some instances, will enhance it, there is also the 
risk that motivations underpinning bureaucratisation, institutionalisation and legalisation 
will foster ritual and ritualism.  
Ritualism has been defined as the ‘acceptance of institutional means for securing regulatory 
goals, while losing all focus to achieving the goals or outcomes themselves’.563  One 
interviewee expressed concern in relation to the UPR and ritualism in the following terms: 
I think there is a real risk of the UPR descending, or descending even 
further into ritualism. I mean we already see some evidence of that 
with states arranging for their allies to applaud their human rights 
progress and record. States like Cuba and China have many other 
states make laudatory comments about their human rights situation in 
those countries. And accepting recommendations that in many 
instances they have no intention of implementing, or alternatively, 
where they claim that their national policy and practice already 
complies with that implementation [sic - recommendation].564  
Similar concerns were expressed by another interviewee suggesting an element of game 
playing at the UPR, observing that: 
(…) they [state’s] use it as a bit of a game. So, The Philippines is coming 
up for review and in three of the sessions I've attended this week, 
                                                             
562 Brysk and Stohl (n 441) 1-2. 
563 J Braithwaite, T Makkai and V Braithwaite, Regulating Aged Care: Ritualism and the New Pyramid, 
(Cheltenham, UK, Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar 2007) 7, cited by Etone (n 3) 261. 
564 Interview CSO 06. 
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they've given no recommendations, just praise to the country that's 
under review. I mean, it could just be that they don't have 
recommendations for those three particular states, but your first 
thought would be is it because they have their own review coming up 
next week. It's kind of like a politeness, a quid pro quo.565 
As discussed in section 3.2, chapter 3, Charlesworth and Larking debate the presence of 
ritual in the UPR process.566  They define ritual/s as those ‘ceremonies or formalities that, 
through repetition, entrench the understandings and the power relationships that they 
embody’ and a risk an ‘embodied performance’ that overshadows the significance of a 
process and its requirements in terms of regulation, or governance.567  They posit that the 
UPR’s ritual character is reinforced via its cyclical nature and its process, which is ‘intricately 
managed and highly formalised’.568  This may be so, but there is a sound rationale for such 
intricacy as chapter 2 in particular illustrates.  Further, the UPR is not unique in its cyclical 
nature; treaty monitoring is also cyclical, although not as closely managed as the UPR.  
Charlesworth and Larking suggest a counterbalance comes in the form of ‘positive 
information-sharing and coalition-building among diverse NGOs’ and collaborations between 
the OHCHR Secretariat and in-country NGOs and NHRIs, particularly in the Pacific, as well as 
via the media by promoting ‘wider public engagement mobilisation’.569  
Other evidence to suggest that ritualism has not taken a stronghold relates to the approach 
of reviewing states to determine what recommendations to make to an SuR.  The response 
given by a Permanent Mission to the UN of a state in crisis when asked ‘How do you decide 
what countries you’re going to make recommendations to, and secondly, what 
recommendation you then make?’, indicates that state practice in this respect is informed by 
UPR documentation: 
That’s a good question. We check the list first, of the countries that 
made us recommendations. We (…) then read their national report of 
what they did and the United Nations report and of the stakeholders.  
                                                             
565 Interview CSO 05. 
566 Charlesworth and Larking (n 330) 9.  
567 ibid 8-9.  
568 ibid 9.  
569 ibid 17, referring to Sarah Joseph’s chapter in the same collection, ‘Global media coverage of the UPR 
process’. 
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And we see what are they recommending, what are the general 
recommendations.  And we take from them one or two.570 
Whilst the indication here is that recommendations are sourced from the UPR documents, 
namely the OHCHR compilation and the stakeholder summary, this reply also reveals 
reciprocity; to determine which countries to make recommendations to, the reviewing state 
starts by looking at which states it has previously received recommendations from.  If this 
were the only means by which states determined which states to make recommendations 
to, the UPR would be at risk of ritualism.  Yet there are some positive consequences of 
reciprocity in this form; it encourages engagement with the human rights situation in a 
particular state at a diplomatic level.  It is the UPR’s strength that it fosters inter-nation 
diplomatic engagement in this fashion and also in a way that encompasses non-state actor 
stakeholders.  Furthermore, representatives of states in crisis are looking at the situation of 
another country and able to take note of good practice.  The process of states engaging with 
the substance of UPR documentation, regardless of the motivation, is a form of norm 
dispersal and an assertion of the UPR’s legitimacy. 
The practice of making recommendations is not limited to reciprocity; states with a poorer 
human rights record receive more recommendations than those states with a better 
record,571 which accords with the analysis in chapter 6 that states in crisis receive more 
recommendations than stable states, and from a higher number of recommending states.572  
There is, therefore, a greater diversity of states making recommendations to those states 
most in need of improving the human rights situation in their country.  
There are certain unifying aspects of ritual that should not be lightly dismissed, of which 
social consensus is one; engaging in ritual offers a means of ‘enacting a social consensus’ 
that can function to reduce contestation and indicate that ‘a way of thinking or being has 
achieved some degree of permanence and importance’.573  This is an important aspect of the 
UPR.  Now that the third cycle is under way, the UPR’s capacity to trade off its novelty is 
greatly diminished.  It is reasonable to expect states to be more aware of their UPR 
                                                             
570 Interview UN 03. 
571 Milewicz and Goodin (n 127) 522. 
572 See Tables 2 – 6 inclusive in chapter 6 of this thesis for evidence and analysis of this.  
573 Charlesworth and Larking (n 330) 9.  
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obligations, aided by the provision of more specific guidance and support in terms of 
preparation and follow up and the need to consult with civil society and interested 
parties.574  By appropriating aspects of ritual and ritualism, it may be possible that state 
commitment to the UPR process is developed which in turn leads to normative change.  The 
constructivist view is that social pressure is far more likely to have an impact if the state 
concerned wishes to be a member of such a club,575 and this may well influence state 
practice at the UPR.   
Furthermore, a state delegation attending the Working Group in Geneva has time away from 
the domestic setting, presenting an opportunity to focus and reflect upon pertinent human 
rights issues.  Furthermore, for states in crisis, such a ritual can affirm statehood and relay a 
message of strength and commitment to the international community and a willingness to 
work towards a stronger performance of statehood.576  When questioned about the role of 
the UPR in supporting the performance and validation of statehood for states in crisis, one 
interviewee agreed, observing that ‘… depending on circumstances, even the worst case 
scenario, even Yemen, they may want to show some elements of implementation to show 
they are not a failed state.’577 
Conclusion 
Whilst there is an emerging body of work on the UPR analysing its successes and its 
challenges, there has been no evidence of a broad assessment of the UPR’s governance 
function and how that relates to its legitimacy and authority.  With this in mind, this chapter 
has undertaken a broad and critical assessment of the dynamic, the achievements, and the 
challenges related to the UPR’s input (source) legitimacy and its procedural legitimacy.  A 
similar assessment in relation to output (substantive) legitimacy follows in chapter 5.   
                                                             
574 Etone (n 3) 264-5, notes that concerns were raised about South Africa’s lack of consultation prior to its 
review in both the first and second cycle.  
575 Cofelice (n 138) 244, citing T Flockhart, ‘”Complex Socialization”: a framework for the study of state 
socialization’, (2006) 12(1) European Journal of International Relations 89-118, 97 and Milewicz and Goodin (n 
127) 514 citing Gunnar Myrdal as founding secretary of the Economic Commission for Europe, that participants 
at meetings form a ‘club’ and that ‘not upholding an agreement is something like a breach of etiquette in a 
club’, 8 and 20. 
576 Interview CSO 03, CSO 07 and UN 01. 
577 Interview UN 01. 
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Section 1 illustrates that the presiding international human rights framework is suited to be 
conceptualised as a global governance ‘international human rights regime complex’.  Despite 
certain tensions, the UPR largely supports a functional, rather than dysfunctional, operation 
of the regime complex in terms of the six dimensions outlined by Keohane and Victor.  It is 
evident from section 1 that the UPR occupies a unique position within this multi-directional 
regime complex and has the capacity to provide in one place and space a spectrum of 
detailed and complex information.   
The proposed international human rights regime complex provides a degree of 
harmonisation by the promotion of universal rights, principles and norms in comparison to 
anxieties expressed elsewhere of international law’s fragmentation and incoherence.  Yet 
difference within the regime complex is also maintained; each body retains a separate 
function and identity from the focus of the UPR on persuasion and promotion to provoke 
action, to treaty bodies having a far more detailed rights-specific approach premised upon 
states’ legal obligations and for some a mandate to hear individual complaints, and those 
entities that function to enforce rights, such as domestic and regional courts.   
The UPR reinforces a state-centric paradigm of international law, as does the international 
human rights regime in general.  The primary actors during the Working Group are peer-
reviewing states.  As discussed in section 2, whilst the Working Group report might appear to 
suggest vertical authority, it is in fact a repackaged form of horizontal authority referring as 
it does to recommendations made during the peer review process of the interactive 
dialogue.  There is no binding higher authority that an SuR is subject to, linking with the 
concept of a more liquid form of authority.578  In tracing the UPR’s formation via resolutions 
made by the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council, both in terms of the UPR’s 
inception and its ongoing development, the UPR is shown in section 3 to have a strong claim 
to input (source) legitimacy.  The democratic principle and the deliberative principle both 
have a role to play in securing the source legitimacy of an entity although there is inevitably 
some difficulty in applying these principles in their purest forms to international 
organisations, including the UPR.  
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Regarding state compliance with procedure, on the face of it, the UPR’s procedural 
legitimacy is ostensibly secure; all states have engaged with the review process by producing 
a national report and by sending a delegation to appear as part of the Working Group in 
Geneva.579  Furthermore, all states are treated equally and fairly in terms of the structure of 
the UPR, combined with its soft powers of regulation, the UPR is unlikely to induce anxiety in 
states in terms of threatening sovereignty.580  As with other regime complexes, state actors 
will choose to engage with those entities they perceive to present a more palatable option 
but universal engagement with the UPR since its inception suggests it is the preferred 
mechanism within the regime complex.   
Concerns of procedural compliance prevailing over substantive outcomes are legitimate. 
Two recommendations for improvements to the UPR can go some way towards mitigating 
the risk of superficial compliance with process.  The first is a requirement to include 
substantiated evidence in the national report of genuine consultation with civil society and 
NHRIs in the preparation of the report.  The second, that there should be a formal document 
the SuR is required to complete with concise but specific information regarding follow up 
against each of the recommendations accepted at its previous review, an example matrix is 
provided at figure 4, appendix 4.   
Nonetheless, the unique character of the UPR should not be swiftly dismissed; all states can 
pass comment upon the human rights challenges and achievements of other states, 
regardless of their size or power, or their own human rights record.  As discussed, this brings 
to the UPR a bureaucratisation, institutionalisation and legalisation of rights of which there 
are positive consequences as well as negative ones.  At its best, the pertinent human rights 
issues and failings of the SuR are relayed on the world stage, the status quo challenged, the 
support of the international community pledged and critical recommendations from allies 
may prompt action that might otherwise not occur.   
At its worst, the UPR risks a zombie-like form of engagement whereby a delegation is sent, 
recommendations accepted and little importance is attached to the process because of a 
                                                             
579 During the first cycle, South Africa was the only state reported as having failed to submit its report prior to 
the Working Group in Geneva, instead submitting it on the day of its review, Etone (n 3) 264. 
580 Eyal Benvenisti, The Law of Global Governance, (Hague Academy of International Law 2014) 17, suggests 
that global governance entities such as the WTO may be cause for state’s concern. 
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lack of intent to implement.  The sentiment expressed here chimes with scholarship on ritual 
and ritualism, which this chapter addresses both in terms of the risks it poses and its 
benefits.  Whilst ritual may give rise to an ‘embodied performance’, for states in crisis, the 
ritual of the UPR can affirm a willingness to work towards strengthening state institutions 
and infrastructure to better promote and protect human rights and contribute to a positive 
demonstration of statehood and a reaching out to the international community for 
assistance.  Similarly, although reciprocity was revealed during interviews for this study as a 
motivating factor for reviewing states to make recommendations, there are also positive 
implications to this approach.  One is diplomatic engagement with another state’s human 
rights matters that supports norm dissemination and dispersal in deliberative and non-
threatening, non-partisan manner.   
As this chapter has demonstrated, there are a number of measures of legitimacy that do not 
depend upon output; output is not the sole indicator of the UPR’s successful functioning 
although it is an important measure.  Given the legacy of the Commission that the Council 
and the UPR were designed to counter, it is hardly surprising that the UPR has been 
structured to involve all states, with states conducting a peer review.  It is, however, time to 
draw the UPR away from the shadow cast by that legacy and for it to be judged on its own 
merits.  The iterative and cyclical nature of the UPR reveals those states whose actions 
repeatedly fail to reflect their words.  There may be scope for these matters to be directly 
addressed in the regular sessions of the Human Rights Council at the point of the Working 
Group Report being adopted.581  
As we move into chapter 5, how the output of the UPR is defined and measured and what 
successful output looks like is pertinent to a fuller comprehension of the UPR’s authority and 
legitimacy.  This further clarifies the UPR’s role and its conceptualisation as a global 
governance mechanism, with the objective of mitigating a loss of credibility in the long term, 
particularly where states in crisis are concerned.   
  
                                                             
581 UNHRC A/HRC/RES/5/1 (n 9) para 35: ‘The Council should have a standing item on its agenda devoted to 
the universal periodic review’, see further in section 5.6, chapter 5. 
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Chapter 5 – A claim to governance: assessing the UPR’s output (substantive) legitimacy   
Introduction 
As set out in section 1.3 of chapter 1, the start of the third UPR cycle has seen a renewed 
focus on follow up and implementation.582  There is a growing sense that functioning as a 
vehicle for commitment without corresponding compliance is no longer feasible for the 
future success of the UPR, as one interviewee pessimistically commented, ‘the future of the 
UPR is very much like the past of the UPR and the present. Limited in effect and impact’.583 
In relation to ‘follow up’, Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1 states variously that: ‘The 
outcome of the universal periodic review, as a cooperative mechanism, should be 
implemented primarily by the State concerned and, as appropriate, by other relevant 
stakeholders’, with the review in the next cycle focusing on ‘the implementation of the 
preceding outcome’.584  In addition, ‘the international community will assist in implementing 
the recommendations and conclusions regarding capacity-building and technical assistance, 
in consultation with, and with the consent of, the country concerned’ and ‘the Council will 
decide if and when any specific follow-up is necessary’.585  
In light of this aspect of the UPR’s founding resolution, it is evident that the substantive 
engagement of some states with the UPR falls short.  It is given that ‘after exhausting all 
efforts to encourage a State to cooperate with the universal periodic review mechanism, 
the Council will address, as appropriate, cases of persistent non-cooperation with the 
mechanism’.586  One question that arises is the meaning and interpretation of ‘persistent 
non-cooperation’ and whether in the future this could encompass those states that fail to 
make tangible progress against recommendations, namely those that are action oriented.  
To date there is no evidence of the Council having taken action against a state and it may be 
                                                             
582 HRC General Debate on the UPR (n 35); UNHRC Concept Note (n 36). 
583 Interview CSO 01. 
584 UNHRC A/HRC/RES/5/1 (n 9) para 33. 
585 ibid paras 3 and 37, respectively. 
586 ibid para 38. 
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that cooperation by way of a national report and attending the Working Group is deemed 
sufficient.587   
Continuing with the modelling of the UPR as a global governance mechanism situated within 
an international human rights regime complex, this chapter addresses dilemmas that have 
been more broadly grappled with in the field of both international law and international 
relations in terms of state practice and compliance with international human rights.588   
The first two sections of this chapter consider what amounts to UPR output and the extent 
to which state compliance with recommendations informs the substantive legitimacy of the 
UPR, and the move towards a focus on UPR implementation.  Taking an inter-disciplinary 
approach by referring to concepts and theories informed by international law and 
international relations the remaining sections each explore: the motivations for states to 
engage and make recommendations; the challenges posed by the proliferation of the 
assessment of compliance and rights protection by indicators; the nature of the 
recommendations made; and how to determine state action and substantive compliance as 
a result.  The primary emphasis of this chapter is a general consideration of the UPR’s output 
legitimacy; chapter 6 goes into more specific detail by analysing the UPR’s output for Yemen 
as a state in crisis, with reference to sample comparator states.   
5.1 Defining Universal Periodic Review output  
The overarching determinant of the UPR’s output legitimacy is the extent to which its 
objectives are achieved.  These are set out in Council Resolution 5/1 as: 
(a) The improvement of the human rights situation on the ground; 
                                                             
587 ibid para 38. It is recommended in chapter 8 as part of the conclusion to this thesis that the Council provide 
guidance as to what ‘cases of persistent non-cooperation’ might include. 
588 See for example, Philip Alston and Sarah Knuckey (eds) The Transformation of Human Rights Fact Finding, 
(Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press 2016); David H. Bearce and Stacy Bondanella, ‘Intergovernmental 
Organizations, Socialization, and Member-state Interest Convergence’ (2007) 61 International Organization, 
703-733; Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, ‘On Compliance’ (1993) 47(2) International Organization, 
175-205; Goodman and Jinks (n 119); Hafner-Burton ‘Making Human Rights a Reality’ (n 549); and James 
Harrison and Sharifah Sekalala, ‘Addressing the compliance gap? UN initiatives to benchmark the human rights 
performance of states and corporations’ (2015) 41 Review of international Studies, 925-945; and Tomuschat (n 
127). For scholarship on state motivations to commit to human rights, see Hathaway ‘Why do Countries 
Commit to Human Rights Treaties?’ (n 58). 
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(b) The fulfilment of the State’s human rights obligations and commitments 
and assessment of positive developments and challenges faced by the State; 
(c) The enhancement of the State’s capacity and of technical assistance, in 
consultation with, and with the consent of, the State concerned; 
(d) The sharing of best practice among States and other stakeholders; 
(e) Support for cooperation in the promotion and protection of human 
rights; 
(f) The encouragement of full cooperation and engagement with the Council, 
other human rights bodies and the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights.589 
Objectives (c) – (f) are pursued actively during the interactive dialogue, via advance 
questions and also through UPR documentation namely the OHCHR compilation of UN 
information and the OHCHR stakeholder summary.  It is the first two objectives, (a) and (b), 
that are the most challenging in terms of measuring fulfilment.  How to assess the human 
rights situation on the ground and measure improvement or failings, and the methods by 
which a state’s fulfilment of its human rights obligations and commitments are determined, 
is fraught with difficulty.   
It is an accepted principle of international law that treaties are legally binding; as Chayes and 
Chayes highlight, the principle of pacta sunt servanda (treaties are to be obeyed) is born out 
in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.590  There is the view that 
‘almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their 
obligations almost all of the time’.591  However, improvement on the ground and fulfilment 
of obligations and commitments are not the only objectives of the UPR; as suggested in 
chapters 3 and 4, whether strict compliance in terms of implementation is necessary to 
evidence its legitimacy is questionable.  In a similar vein, it has been said that ‘the treaty 
regime as a whole need not and should not be held to a standard of strict compliance but to 
                                                             
589 UNHRC A/HRC/RES/5/1 (n 9), paragraph 4. 
590 Chayes and Chayes (n 588) 185. 
591 Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave (2nd ed., New York: Columbia University Press 1979) 47; and Louis 
Henkin, ‘International Law: Politics, Values, and Functions: General Course on Public International Law,’ (1989) 
261, Recueil Des Cours, 1-416, 69, emphasis in the original, as cited by Chayes and Chayes (n 588) 176. 
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a level of overall compliance that is "acceptable" in the light of the interests and concerns 
the treaty is designed to safeguard’,592 and we might say the same of the UPR.   
As chapter 3 illustrates, an institution that issues or supports recommendations as part of its 
governance function is not within the realm of rule making and enforcement.  The UPR is not 
a rule making body, UPR recommendations refer to rules and principles agreed and adopted 
elsewhere.  There is an argument therefore that strict compliance with UPR 
recommendations is not mandatory; a recommendation is merely that, neither an 
instruction nor a demand, merely a suggestion, albeit a powerful one, that serves to 
communicate a recommending state’s endorsement of the relevant human rights principle 
or norm.  Writing in the context of global governance and security, Nance and Cottrell 
consider the view that focusing on compliance ‘…underestimates the difficulty of verifying 
noncompliance and overestimates the likelihood that enforcement alone can address the 
problem’.  This is on the basis that ‘even under the most intrusive monitoring arrangements, 
concrete evidence of noncompliance is extremely difficult to detect and verify.’593  
In identifying the output of the Council, Freedman cites its policy programmes, operational 
activities and information activities.594  There is no direct reference here to state compliance 
or response to those programmes and policies.  With this in mind, two UPR output 
categories can be discerned, firstly, those that are commitment and statement oriented and, 
secondly, positive change in state practice.    By supporting a recommendation it receives, a 
state’s response is placed upon a spectrum: it might reflect a principled acceptance of the 
substance of the recommendation; an indication of the will to act; or a commitment to 
adhere to the norm with a firm intent to act.  These are important factors to take into 
account regarding the UPR’s governance function, particularly in relation to states in crisis 
that may have the will but lack capacity and technical expertise to follow up and implement 
recommendations. 
The first output category identified above, which is commitment and statement oriented 
includes various facets such as: the number of states that have undergone UPR (all states, 
equating to success); the number of states that make recommendations – which 
                                                             
592 Chayes and Chayes (n 588) 176. 
593 Nance and Cottrell (n 380) 281. 
594 Freedman (n 1) 114 – 118. 
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demonstrates commitment to the UPR process (across the first and second cycles, only 22 
countries made no recommendations);595 the volume of recommendations made and, 
comparatively, the volume of recommendations supported by states under review as well as 
the nature of the recommendations made and supported (including by which states and to 
whom).  These matters can be assessed on a quantitative basis, although the content, 
themes and action required by recommendations is often not unique to the UPR as section 
6.7, chapter 6, demonstrates.   
The second category, positive change in state practice, is evidenced by a combination of the 
state’s own declared progress against recommendations, the view of civil society and 
evidence provided by other human rights institutions in the international human rights 
regime complex.  Progress is often corroborated by data that has been collated into human 
rights indicators.  Depending upon indicators as a means to measure human rights progress 
and violations presents a challenge, particularly for states in crisis regarding the availability 
and nature of data and its collection.  Other issues relate to whether data is aggregated or 
disaggregated and its currency, in terms of how ‘old’ the data is, coupled with the fact that 
human rights fact-finding is often politicised.596  In addition, the self-reported progress by 
states needs to be treated with caution in respect of bias and over-inflated statements of 
action and achievement.597  These and related matters are returned to in section 5.4 below. 
5.2 Implementation and the third cycle 
There is some consensus of a dearth of empirical evidence to answer in a systematic fashion 
why legal commitments to international law are made by governments, and the concomitant 
effect of that commitment on state action.598  Equally, there is some agreement that 
                                                             
595 In the first cycle a total of 39 states did not make any recommendations, in the second cycle there was a 
reduced total of 25, the global total of states that have not made any recommendations is stated as 22, UPR 
Info: Statistics of Recommendations (n 126). 
596 Harrison and Sekalala (n 588) and Alston and Knuckey (n 588). 
597 Interview CSO 01. 
598 Asher Alkoby, ‘Theories of Compliance with International Law and the Challenge of Cultural Difference’ 
(2008) 4(1) Journal of International Law and International Relations, 151; Chayes and Chayes (n 588); Beth A 
Simmons, ‘International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary 
Affairs’ (2000) 94(4), American Political Science Review, 819-835; Joel P Trachtman, ‘International Law and 
Domestic Political Coalitions: The grand theory of compliance with international law’ (2010) 11(1) The Chicago 
Journal of International Law, 127-158; F.R. Castro, ‘Rawls and Kant on Compliance with International Laws of 
Justice’, in A. Faggion, A. Pinzani and N Sanchez Madrid (eds), Kant and Social Policies (Palgrave Macmillan 
2016).  
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democratic states with a strong civil society are more likely to comply with international 
law.599  Whilst it is difficult to attribute change directly to the UPR when a state appears to 
have taken action, it is not implausible.600  As one interviewee commented: 
(…) what they [states] will tell you is that if they make changes, they 
will link it to the UPR, but in all fairness, it is not linked to the UPR, it is 
just someone in an office like this one saying, “oh, we can say this is 
linked to the UPR”.601 
Given the work being undertaken by civil society in terms of UPR follow up, discussed in 
chapter 7, and the renewed focus on implementation for the third cycle, traction emanating 
from the UPR, or being attributed to it as this comment suggests, is increasingly likely.  That 
said one interviewee was less hopeful about the prospect of tangible progress having 
observed some repetition in the third cycle of recommendations previously made because of 
the SuR having so far failed to follow up.602  
Yemen’s second cycle national report, considered in January 2014, cited a number of 
examples presented as action on the state’s part to address the human rights situation in the 
country.  This included a national human rights conference in December 2012, a ‘national 
dialogue’, a Bill to establish an NHRI, the establishment of a National Committee to Combat 
Human Trafficking, which had subsequently drafted a Bill on Human Trafficking and the 
enactment of various Acts relating to matters indirectly relevant to human rights 
protection.603  These are all matters that reflect progressive action but little in terms of 
substantive improvement; there was no evidence of the outcomes of the national dialogue 
                                                             
599 Goodman and Jinks (n 119) 3, citing Simmons (n 110); Eric Neumayer, ‘Do International Human Rights 
Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?’, (2005) 49 Journal of Conflict Resolution, 925; Linda Camp Keith, 
‘The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Does It Make a Difference in Human 
Rights Behavior?’ (1999) 36 Journal of Peace Research 95. 
600 Damian Etone states that the backlog of overdue reports that South Africa has at the time of its first cycle 
UPR was significantly reduced following its second cycle review when in November 2014 ‘it submitted to the 
various UN human rights committees 12 of its 14 outstanding treaty body reports’. However, Etone notes that 
‘it is difficult to establish a causal relationship between engagement with the UPR and compliance with treaty 
body reporting obligations’ but that it is ‘plausible that the former has had an impact on the latter’ Etone (n 3) 
265. This is particularly so in light of the fact that according to the UPR Info database, in the first cycle of the 
UPR 828 of the recommendations made, amounting to approximately 4% of the total recommendations made 
to states under review, referred to compliance with treaty obligations, UPR Info: Statistics of 
Recommendations (n 126).  
601 Interview UN 01. 
602 Interview CSO 05. 
603 UNHRC, ‘National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights Council 
resolution 16/21: Yemen’ A/HRC/WG.6/18/YEM/1 (08 November 2013) paras 10, 7-8, 27 and 29 respectively. 
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having been implemented and only talk of drafting a new constitution.604  Whilst the conflict 
in Yemen has been cited as having understandably stalled progress against UPR 
recommendations,605 it did not fully take hold until March 2015, some 14 months after 
Yemen’s second cycle review by which time action towards implementing change could have 
been actively pursued.   
Yemen is not unique as a state whose claims to make progress fall well short of 
implementation.606  The question thus arises as to whether such a failure threatens the 
legitimacy and credibility of the UPR.  During a debate held as part of the Council’s 34th 
regular session in March 2017, a number of states spoke of the need to enhance focus on 
follow up and implementation of accepted recommendations.607  The UK was unequivocal in 
asserting that: 
The beginning of the third cycle meant it was time to focus on the 
sustainable implementation of recommendations.  Many 
recommendations remained imprecise, and States under review had a 
responsibility to provide a clear response to each 
recommendation.  Technical assistance was important to help States 
implement recommendations.608 
Other states expressed similar sentiments, for example, Switzerland indicated that 
‘additional efforts would be needed to follow-up the implementation of recommendations’ 
urging the international community not to ‘rest on its laurels; good practices included 
formulating quantifiable recommendations and following up on the recommendations’.609  
Sierra Leone highlighted a challenge for states in crisis in terms of implementation by 
stressing ‘the need for technical assistance to countries which had the political will but 
                                                             
604 ibid paras 25-35, and UNHRC ‘Stakeholder summary: Yemen’ A/HRC/WG.6/18/YEM/3 (n 17). 
605 Interview UN 03. 
606 UNHRC, ‘National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights Council 
resolution 16/21: Somalia’, A/HRC/WG.6/24/SOM/1 (28 October 2015) which provides little evidence of 
tangible follow up, reporting it is ‘currently initiating’, ‘is implementing’, and ‘legislation that must be enacted’, 
paras 7, 11, and 17 respectively. By comparison, the national report of Iraq for the second cycle is more 
specific, naming domestic policies and laws enacted and referring to statistics as evidence of improvement, for 
example, in relation to infant mortality and specific examples of efforts to empower women and protect 
women and children, para 24, UNHRC, ‘National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex 
to Human Rights Council Resolution 16/21: Iraq’, A/HRC/WG.6/20/IRQ/1 (22 August 2014).  
607 HRC General Debate on the UPR (n 35). 
608 ibid. 
609 ibid. 
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lacked the technical or financial capacity to implement Universal Periodic Review 
recommendations’.610  Statements made by other stakeholders point to the same overall 
opinion of success being driven by implementation: ‘Beyond numbers and promises, the 
success of the third cycle … will inevitably be measured against its ability to deliver 
sustainable implementation of UPR recommendations’.611 
At the opening of the UPR’s third cycle on 01 May 2017, the President of the Human Rights 
Council affirmed the third cycle presented an opportunity to take stock of implementation 
and follow up processes.612  Further, the importance attributed to implementation is 
reflected in a newly created OHCHR overview of the UPR that encourages states to draft an 
implementation plan by giving a set date on which such a plan is due.613  Currently the 
provision by a state of an implementation plan (or mid-term report) is voluntary and has 
emerged over the course of the UPR’s lifetime.  As set out in section 2.3.3, as of July 2018 
mid-term reports relating to the first and second cycles of the UPR had been submitted by a 
total of 71 member states, of which 55 related to the first cycle and 34 to the second cycle, 
within these figures, only 18 states had submitted for both cycles.614  Granted, not all states 
have reached their mid-term point between the second and third cycles and so it is too early 
to conclude whether the evolving practice of producing such a report has increased.  The 
submission of mid-term reports by NGOs as of July 2018 totals only total eleven.615  
As the third cycle progresses, more specific direction for follow up and implementation has 
been issued.  Within this, states are encouraged to establish a specific national mechanism 
tasked with reporting and follow-up, alongside an acknowledgment of three particular 
challenges: the resources demanded by increased reporting obligations for states; the need 
for sustainable technical expertise at the national level to ensure timely and quality 
reporting; and effective follow-up and implementation by government ministries nationally 
and at the local level.616  OHCHR guidance proposes that a national mechanism could take 
                                                             
610 ibid. 
611 UPR Info, ‘Butterfly Effect’ (n 441), iv. 
612 Mr Joaquin Alexander Maza Martelli opening the first Working Group of the third UPR cycle, the review of 
Bahrain, at the United Nations, Palais Des Nations, Geneva, on 01 May 2017, from author’s own notes, taken 
whilst in attendance.  
613 OHCHR UPR third cycle (2017-2021/22) (n 38) 
614 OHCHR ‘UPR mid-term reports’ (n 258). 
615 ibid, one submission for Bangladesh, two for China, two for Denmark, one for Germany, one for Honduras, 
one for Lebanon, one for Singapore, and two for the United States. 
616 OHCHR ‘National mechanisms for reporting and follow up’ (n 262) 2. 
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the form of a standing/permanent governmental structure, with a commensurate budget 
and a stable staffing.617  It is stated that this approach would be comprehensive in two 
respects, firstly, by covering all human rights mechanisms and, secondly, by having a 
comprehensive legislative and policy mandate, and ascribing it four key ‘capacities’: 
engagement, coordination, consultation and information management.618   
This guidance is sensible in terms of bolstering the legitimacy and authority of the UPR; a 
national mechanism of this ilk would assist in increasing engagement with the voluntary and 
emerging state practice of submitting to the OHCHR an interim plan summarising progress 
against accepted recommendations from the previous review, but does not guarantee it.  If a 
national mechanism along these lines is to succeed in those states whose populations most 
require protection, it needs to be coupled with comprehensive support and technical 
assistance given states in crisis are most lacking in terms of human rights infrastructure and 
therefore least likely to commit to creating such an government that in turn functions 
effectively.   
It was acknowledged at the time of the first cycle that additional support for UPR 
engagement and follow up would be required; a request to the UN Secretary-General was 
made to establish a voluntary trust fund ‘to facilitate the participation of developing 
countries, particularly least developing countries’ and for a Voluntary Fund for Financial and 
Technical Assistance.619  The terms of reference for the fund were not agreed until some 
time after, in 2009.620  This fund has been employed to provide field-based briefings to 
member states to assist with the national report.621  As of 24 February 2012, sixty-six 
requests had been made to the Voluntary Fund for Participation in the UPR, but the funds 
available remain modest.622  Whilst no subsequent and specific records for this fund are 
                                                             
617 ibid 5. 
618 ibid 6-10. 
619 UNHRC, Establishment of funds for the universal periodic review mechanism of the Human Rights Council, 
HRC/res/6/17, 28 September 2007. 
620 UPR Trust Funds, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPRTrustFunds.aspx last accessed 10 
August 2018. 
621 OHCHR ‘Voluntary Fund for Participation in the Universal Periodic Review Mechanism, Field-based briefings 
to Member States in the preparation of their national report, 2008 – 2011’, 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/UPR/2011SummarizedTable-Trainings.pdf accessed 05 March 
2018. 
622 OHCHR ‘Requests for financial assistance under the Voluntary Fund for Participation in the UPR Mechanism’ 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/VPUFinancialRequest.pdf last accessed 10 August 2018. 
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available, it is evident that workshops on UPR participation have been supported as recently 
as April 2018 in Uganda.623  In addition, the OHCHR has supported regional meetings, 
however the information available refers to 2010-2011.624 
The renewed emphasis on UPR implementation and the desire to bolster the relationship 
between civil society and state actors, and other agencies, is further evidenced by an annual 
Human Rights Council high-level panel discussion that in 2018 had the UPR as its specific 
focus.625  During his statement at this event, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, the then UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, referred to UNCTs better engaging with human rights 
mechanisms including the UPR and implied a role for UNCTs in terms of follow up and 
working with civil society in their relevant posting,626 no doubt as part of efforts to 
mainstream human rights throughout the UN.627  
An innovation for the third cycle has been the High Commissioner for Human Rights sending 
a letter to the head of the state’s UPR delegation following a state’s Working Group, 
requesting the state draft a national human rights action plan ‘to achieve concrete results in 
the areas contained in the annex [to the High Commissioner’s letter]’.628  The annex 
summarises pertinent human rights matters referred to in both the OHCHR compilation and 
the OHCHR summary of stakeholder submissions.629  The letter is adapted to make specific 
                                                             
623 OHCHR ‘UPR Fund for Participation’ https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPRTrustFunds.aspx 
last accessed 10 August 2018. 
624 OHCHR ‘2010 – 2011 (planned)– OHCHR Regional/Subregional meetings to share experiences on follow-up 
to UPR outcomes and implementation of recommendations (with the participation of State representatives, 
NHRIs, civil society groups and UN agencies and programmes)’,  
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/UPR/2010-2011_list_regional_meetings_March2011.pdf 
accessed 10 August 2018. 
625 UNHRC Annual high-level panel discussion (n 36). 
626 Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, the then United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘…members of UNCTs 
will have the opportunity to develop stronger relationships with national institutions and civil society 
movements focused on human rights. Their contributions and expertise can powerfully improve the 
pertinence and impact of the work of the UN on the ground’ Statement, OHCHR, ‘Promotion and protection of 
human rights in light of the UPR mechanism; challenges and opportunities’, 37th session of the Human Rights 
Council (26 February 2018) 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=22708&LangID=E accessed 09 May 
2018. 
627 United Nations Development Group Human Rights Working Group, established in 2009, 
http://undg.org/human-rights/undg-human-rights-working-group/ last accessed 11 July 2018. 
628 For third cycle documents, see Cycles of the Universal Periodic Review: third cycle, column headed: Letters 
by the HC to the Foreign Ministers of member States 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/CyclesUPR.aspx  
629 ibid, for example, the letter to the UK refers to the announcement that there are no plans to withdraw from 
the ECHR post-Brexit; the letter to Brazil refers to the fight against all contemporary forms of slavery, for 
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reference to issues directly relevant to the particular SuR being addressed.  By way of 
example, the High Commissioner wrote to Bahrain’s Assistant Minster for Foreign Affairs on 
29 September 2017,630 subsequent to Bahrain’s review on 02 May 2018 and the adoption of 
its Working Group Report by the Council during its 36th regular session on 21 September 
2018,631 referring specifically to matters raised in the OHCHR compilation and summary of 
stakeholder submissions.  At the time of writing, it remains to be seen if this convention will 
be continued by the new High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet Jeria.632 
A personal letter such as this is a matter of high diplomacy; it further reinforces the 
governance function of the UPR within the international human rights regime complex, 
sourcing information as it does from treaty bodies, special rapporteurs and civil society.  
Some CSOs have been urging the OHCHR to take a more active role in coordinating reporting 
of implementation,633 believing that the OHCHR recognises 'an information gap in terms of 
critical and objective assessment of implementation and that without such an assessment 
there is a much greater risk of ritualism’.634  The approach of the High Commissioner in 
sending a personal letter implicitly acknowledges an ‘information gap’ and reflects efforts to 
pursue implementation in a more direct manner. 
This section has explored some of the methods by which states are being encouraged to 
progress implementation and bolster reporting on follow up, from making more specific 
action-oriented recommendations to guidance as to which themes and recommendations 
should be treated with priority.  Implicit is the view that the UPR’s legitimacy fragility, or 
deficit, can be addressed through procedure and through output, the latter of which, it 
                                                             
Bahrain there is reference to amendments to the Bahraini Citizenship Act to recognise children of women 
married to non-Bahraini men as Bahraini citizens, accessed via Letters by the HC to the Foreign Ministers of 
member States (n 655).  
630 UNHRC Letter from Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, the then High Commissioner for Human Rights, to Assistant 
Minster for Foreign Affairs H.E. Mr Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, 
http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session27/BH/BahrainHCLetter.pdf accessed 17 April 2018. 
631 UNHRC Outcome of the universal periodic review: Bahrain, A/HRC/DEC/36/101, 26 September 2017, 
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G17/281/78/PDF/G1728178.pdf?OpenElement accessed 
17 April 2018. 
632 OHCHR, ‘Michelle Bachelet Jeria’ Press Release 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/aboutus/pages/highcommissioner.aspx last accessed 07 September 2018. 
633 Interviews CSO 03 and CSO 06, respectively. 
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appears from the views expressed by states and the OHCHR is defined in terms of follow up 
and implementation.  
5.3 Motivations for state engagement and compliance 
This section addresses the fact that the motivations for states to participate as a reviewing 
state and as an SuR are varied and often not directly related to a desire to improve human 
rights protection and promotion in the SuR.  The analysis in this section illustrates that 
reliance upon naming and shaming to prompt compliance may be waning but that 
politicisation and reciprocity remain powerful.  It also demonstrates that social and cultural 
influences linked to acculturation and the desire to take action that is non-partisan are 
relevant considerations.   
5.3.1 Political reasons for action  
Some scholars pursue the narrative that states are prompted to take action to effect human 
rights norms because the state’s own failings have been highlighted, often by adversaries, 
through a process of applying pressure via naming and shaming, which of itself is a political 
act.635  As noted generally and in particular in section 1.1, chapter 1 as an intergovernmental 
mechanism politicisation is bound to play a role at the UPR, despite the declaration that it 
should be ‘conducted in an objective, transparent, non-selective, constructive, non-
confrontational and non-politicized [sic] manner’.636  Whilst some states may use the UPR 
as an opportunity for political retaliation others, such as those in receipt of aid, may feel 
silenced when it comes to speaking openly about the human rights failings of donor 
states.637  
For those states with little intention of implementing recommendations, the motivation to 
engage is politically driven.  An interviewee with an international NGO considered that: 
I think it's a cost benefit analysis for them, you know, ‘is my loss of 
not showing up [at the UPR] bigger than the possible gains for 
                                                             
635 Emilie M Hafner-Burton, ‘Sticks and Stones: Naming and shaming and the human rights enforcement 
problem’ (2008) 62(4) International Organization, 689-716, 694-5. See also Elvira Dominguez-Redondo, ‘The 
Universal Periodic Review: is there life beyond naming and shaming in human rights implementation’ (2012) 
New Zealand Law Review 673. 
636 UNHRC, A/HRC/RES/5/1 (n 9) Para 3(g) 
637 Alston (n 1) 189.  
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showing up?’ Despite the embarrassment and the naming and 
shaming that would occur during a review it's still a fairly easy way 
for them to... a fairly safe way for them to show they are serious 
about human rights.638 
Naming and shaming suggests confrontation, but the UPR is largely cooperative; a 
cooperative approach and political affiliation does not preclude success.  In certain 
circumstances, it is precisely because of political affiliation that a human rights norm 
presented for acceptance in a particular recommendation is more palatable; Dominguez-
Redondo argues that ‘a non-confrontational and non-selective country mechanism may be 
the optimum strategy, or at least a reasonable strategy, to promote and protect human 
rights’, suggesting that criticism received from an ally can be powerful in nudging the 
recipient into action.639  Inter-state politics and allegiances have the potential therefore to 
aid human rights protection on the ground.  As noted in chapter 4, whilst Rochell Terman 
and Erik Voeten ‘find strong evidence that states spare their strategic partners in the review 
process, giving less severe commentary on average’, this is countered by the discovery that 
‘when friendly states do offer criticism, their recommendations are more likely to be 
accepted by the state under review compared to substantively identical recommendations 
coming from other countries’.640   
It is possible that when an SuR supports and then acts upon a recommendation, it does so 
because of what Joseph Raz presents as ‘protected reasons for an action’.641  Applied to the 
UPR, this would mean a state supports and acts upon a recommendation not because it 
believes action should follow in accordance with legitimate principles of international human 
rights law, but because of a different ‘protected reason’, that is not immediately obvious 
from the decision / action taken.  In the context of the UPR, the protected reason might be 
the desire to forge or maintain harmonious political, trade, cultural, or other relations with 
the recommending state.   
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639 Dominguez-Redondo (n 635) 674. 
640 Terman and Voeten (n 2) 2. 
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In theorising sources of authority, normative power, and reasons for action, Joseph Raz 
defines normative power as the ability to change the protected reason for action.642  He 
firstly gives the example of a positive second order reason to act being a father instructing 
the son to obey the son’s mother and wear his coat, the son having refused to act upon the 
mother’s instruction because he does not like the coat – both father and mother have the 
authority to instruct the son.  Raz explains that a negative second-order reason would be the 
father instructing the son not to do as the mother asks; by following his father’s instruction, 
the son achieves the outcome he desires without revealing his true position, his own reason 
for action is thus protected.643  
Normative power here would operate to change the son’s attitude towards the coat.  In the 
context of the UPR, success in this respect would be achieved by an SuR accepting 
recommendations and taking action not because of the identity of the reviewing state, but 
rather because of a change in attitude towards the substance of the recommendation 
made.644  The challenge arises in investigating when such normative change has taken place, 
and why.  One possibility is that normative change over the course of a number of UPR 
cycles may occur as a result of acculturation.  
5.3.2 Acculturation  
In their work on state compliance, Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks refer to scholarship that 
identifies material inducement and persuasion as the two factors that motivate and drive 
state compliance, finding that such scholarship provides ‘an indispensable but plainly 
incomplete framework’.645  In their view, material inducement ‘fails to grasp the complexity 
of the social environment within which states act’, whilst persuasion ‘fails to account for 
many ways in which the diffusion of social and legal norms occurs’.646  Their solution is to 
outline a third factor that motivates compliance, that of ‘acculturation’, meaning ‘the 
general process by which actors adopt the beliefs and behavioral [sic] patterns of the 
                                                             
642 ibid. 
643 ibid 16-18. 
644 ibid 18-19. 
645 Goodman and Jinks (n 119) 4. 
646 ibid 4, referring to ‘a rich cluster of empirical studies from different academic disciplines document 
particular processes that socialize states in the absence of material inducement or persuasion’ but do not cite 
the studies.  
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surrounding culture’ which includes ‘microprocesses’ such as ‘mimicry, identification, and 
status maximization’.647   
Goodman and Jinks do not dismiss the influence of material inducement and persuasion out 
of hand, being of the view that material inducement, persuasion, and acculturation are 
‘likely to have distinct implications along a number of dimensions including the durability of 
norm adherence, patterns of adoption, and modes of contestation’.648  Nor are they overly 
optimistic about the solution they propose.  They note that theirs is an exploration of a 
sociological process in the context of international law and that because sociological 
processes are inherently recursive in nature, underpinned by multiple actors and roles, and 
overlapping influences and preferences, as well as the enactment of ‘multiple highly 
legitimated scripts for social action’, it is not always possible to fully make sense of the role 
of a normative system in the acculturation process.649  
Nonetheless, the concept of acculturation strikes a chord with the findings of this thesis in 
terms of evolving state and non-state actor interaction with the UPR, and subsequent state 
and non-state actor practice, the latter being explored in chapter 7.  It also echoes the 
themes of ritual and ritualism, explored in section 3.2, chapter 3 and section 4.4.3, chapter 
4,650 and state engagement to be part of a ‘club’, section 4.4.3.  Acculturation is evident via 
the recursive nature of the UPR process and its position within the international human 
rights regime complex, particularly as a subsidiary mechanism within the machinery of the 
Human Rights Council and the explicit means and methods by which the Council, with 
support for and from other entities, continues to seek to shape and influence state and non-
state actor engagement and practice, as noted in the conclusion section of this chapter 
below.   
Acculturation also occurs because states attend the UPR to seek and receive advice and 
support, as the Permanent Mission to the UN for Yemen, explained: 
When we listen to the different representatives from different 
countries, what their concerns are, what they see Yemen needs, we 
accept that, we learn from other countries how to improve our human 
                                                             
647 ibid 4.  
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rights system in Yemen. How we can develop some new measures in 
Yemen, how we protect children, women, the community in general, 
journalists, political activists. This is most important. We learn from 
them. And we are keen to improve the situation in Yemen.651 
This view is also shared by an INGO representative: 
(…) looking at that broader situation, on the one hand the UN, but also 
the international community, what is it that that community can do to 
put pressure, to encourage, to help, to assist, whatever form the 
engagement can take to try and improve the human rights situation on 
the ground and improve adherence to its human rights obligations.652 
The presence and contribution of civil society in terms of influencing state practice 
contributes to the process of acculturation; prior to the Working Group, NGOs and INGOs 
will lobby participating states to make certain recommendations, with the lobbying of 
smaller, less powerful states reportedly being more successful.653   
Conversely, there are those states that seemingly engage with the UPR as means to absolve 
their responsibility to other international human rights monitoring mechanisms, as one 
interviewee revealed: 
I've seen myself in some closed door meetings with some Arab 
permanent missions saying, ‘the UPR is so much better than the 
committees’, because we were discussing treaty bodies and late 
submissions by states and there was someone from an Arab permanent 
mission who said 'well we just did our UPR and it went great so we don't 
see why we would need to submit our report to the Human Rights 
Committee or the Committee against Torture’, so it's also an argument to 
sort of say, look our human rights situation has already been reviewed so 
we don't need a review by this bunch of independent experts who are 
just going to say the truth about the situation on the ground.654 
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Whilst this reveals a somewhat flippant attitude of some states to the UPR, the reporting 
burden placed upon states that are parties to numerous treaties risks disengagement due to 
lack of resource, capacity and reporting fatigue.   
5.3.3 State practice according to legal and normative behaviour 
The UPR is a site of both legal and political contestation.  Tomuschat suggests it has the 
potential to provide clarification of the legal human rights obligations of states under the UN 
Charter.655  He refers to the ICJ’s advisory opinion in the Namibia case as acknowledging the 
Charter as ‘a source of genuine legal obligations’,656 but that whilst ‘commitments deriving 
from the Charter have increased in depth and breadth (…) no absolutely reliable and 
uncontroversial inference can be drawn as to their specific substance’; his hope is that it ‘is 
precisely the practice under the UPR which may shed a helpful light on this issue’, although 
he refrains from suggesting how this might be achieved.657   
UPR recommendations are rooted in both legal and political normative behaviour.658  In part, 
normative change emanates from the development of legal principles and the process of 
standard setting in terms of the expressive function of law.659  Here, the law functions as a 
means to say something, to dictate action to conform to a social norm or aspire to an 
emerging norm and, therefore, operate in a symbolic manner.660  The primary means by 
which international human rights are promoted is by encouraging states to commit to 
international human rights treaties and to introduce and implement domestic legislation 
accordingly.  The UPR, however, promotes human rights principles and protection via other 
non-legal normative orders that may provide a more palatable basis for a state to base 
                                                             
655 Tomuschat (n 127) 612-3. 
656 ibid 612, citing Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (Advisory Opinion) [1970] ICJ Rep 1971, 16–57, 
para 131. 
657 ibid 612-3. 
658 Human rights can be understood from both a legal and a sociological perspective. In legal terms, the 
modern cannon of human rights law can be traced over the last seventy years from the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights in 1948 onwards, but in sociological terms it has been argued that international human rights 
law only began to exercise influence in the 1970s, Eric A Posner, The Twilight of Human Rights Law (Oxford 
University Press 2014), 19 citing Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: human rights in history (The Belknap Press, 
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subsequent action upon.  A state may prefer, for example, to accept a recommendation 
made by an ally with whom it already shares certain cultural and/or moral norms.  
Compliance can thus be justified in accordance with a non-legal normative order, rather than 
a legal one that the receiving state might perceive as a reinforcement of Western 
hegemony.661 
A primarily legalistic stance is evident in the US’s recommendation to Yemen during Yemen’s 
first cycle review that the state ‘step up enforcement of laws protecting women from rape 
and violence, criminalize spousal rape and treat honour killings no differently than 
murder’.662  After postponing a response and examining the issue, during a subsequent 
Council session Yemen submitted it accepted the recommendation with the qualifying 
statement that: 
(…) what the recommendation calls “spousal rape” does not exist. All 
marriages are concluded based on consent between the two partners, 
and a wife who wishes to separate from her husband on her own motion 
is entitled to file for divorce and for dissolution of the marriage in 
accordance with the Islamic sharia and the applicable Personal Status 
Act.663 
This interpretation of national law and custom does not align with the US’s position, or a 
Western approach, to the issue raised.  Yemen’s statement, however, suggests it considers 
its domestic law sufficient and fit for purpose.  Remarkably, the Council appears not to have 
pursued the matter further.  The exchange highlights the plurality of norms underpinning 
domestic law and the extent to which custom and religious practice informs this.  It also 
exposes the Council’s passive approach in this matter, the result being that a conflict with 
norms at the international level remains unresolved, one of the weaknesses of the pluralism 
that characterises the UPR.  One explanation is that the UPR reflects the view of some that 
the current age of globalization has seen a move away from the age of modernity, which was 
characterized by a primacy of law, and a return to the primacy of norms that prevailed in the 
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pre-modern age.664  In this context, action that might otherwise be unlawful, for example 
under international law, might be justified as legitimate in accordance with, for example, a 
moral or cultural norm.665 
5.3.4 Holding states to account 
As referred to in section 4.4.2, chapter 4, shortly before its third cycle review took place the 
UK sought to change its position to ‘noted’ in relation various recommendations it had 
previously supported.666  This change was reportedly related to recommendations regarding 
the ratification of international treaties; the lifting of treaty reservations; to human rights 
protection and detention; children’s rights; gender equality; non-discrimination; welfare 
rights; migrants’ rights; and women’s right.667  One of the affected recommendations had 
been made by Mexico to the UK and Mexico was quick to address this via the medium of 
advance questions.668  
At the time of the UK’s second cycle review, Mexico had ‘expressed its appreciation for the 
United Kingdom’s outstanding tradition on human rights and its contributions to the rule of 
law and the legal framework for the protection of the person’ and had made 
recommendations ‘about the implementation of human rights rulings, and the indefinite 
detention of migrants’.669  In its advance questions, Mexico expressed concern for the UK’s 
substantial change in position with no motivation for the change being presented in the 
national report for the third cycle and reminded the UK that the UPR is based upon 
transparency, asking the UK to elaborate on its motivations for changing its position and 
going into some detail regarding relevant domestic legislation and policy in the UK.670  This is 
                                                             
664 Touko Piiparinen, ‘Exploring the Methodology of Normative Pluralism’, in Jan Klabbers and Touko Piiparinen 
(eds), Normative Pluralism and International Law, (Cambridge University Press 2012) 36, citing Ramesh Thakur, 
The Responsibility to Protect: Norms, Laws and the Use of Force in International Politics (Routlegde 2011) 3, 
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unlawful under international law, as it lacked a security council resolution, but was argued by many as 
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tangible evidence of state practice on the part of Mexico in accordance with the UPR’s 
objectives; it demonstrates a reviewing state seeking to hold an SuR to account in no 
uncertain terms.  This is to be encouraged amongst reviewing states as a means of 
strengthening the UPR’s authority and legitimacy. 
Concerns were raised that whilst states should indicate their response to recommendations 
in line with the Council’s requirement to support or note them, this should not be used as a 
smokescreen to accountability for follow up and implementation.671  The UK’s change in 
position mirrors an emerging trend of a reduction by some SuRs in the proportion of 
recommendations supported, the UK included.  During the first cycle the UK accepted 22 
recommendations out of the 35 received, amounting to a 63% acceptance rate (the low 
number of recommendations received is explained in chapter 6).  In its second cycle review, 
it received 137 recommendations, of which it accepted 91, amounting to a 66% acceptance 
rate.  In the third cycle, the UK’s acceptance rate fell to 42%, and has attracted criticism.672   
A similar trend can be seen regarding the Netherlands and the Philippines.673  This is not 
universal though; during the third cycle, Brazil is reported to have accepted 98% of its 
recommendations, Morocco and Finland 78%, and South Africa and Algeria 77%.674  Nor is 
this practice unique to the third cycle; as the then Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in 
Cambodia detailed in his 2014 annual report, between the Working Group in January 2014 
and the adoption of the Outcome of the Working Group, Cambodia had changed its position 
from supported to noted in relation to eight recommendations.675  The Special Rapporteur 
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stated he believed this reflected the ‘reluctance of the Government to accept and therefore 
commit itself to act on important human rights issues’.676 
Conversely, a move by a state to reduce the number of recommendations it supports may 
prove to be a positive development in terms of the UPR’s credibility; if a state supports 
fewer recommendations, it may reflect the state is taking the commitments it makes in the 
Working Group report more seriously coupled with a firm intention to substantively engage 
by implementing those recommendations that it does support.   
5.4 The challenge of human rights indicators  
Notwithstanding the complex forces at play in relation to state practice when it comes to 
making, supporting and responding through practice to recommendations, there remains 
the fraught matter of how to measure compliance.  The renewed focus at the start of the 
third UPR cycle on implementation makes this matter all the more pertinent: if a key aspect 
of the UPR’s legitimacy depends upon the implementation of human rights 
recommendations, how will such implementation and the human rights performance of a 
country be assessed, and what issues / problems does such assessment give rise to? 
How recommendations are implemented will vary from one state to another and this may 
be perfectly legitimate, particularly when we consider the margin of appreciation permitted 
under the European Convention of Human Rights.  This derives from the French ‘marge 
d’appréciation’, and ‘is more helpfully translated as ‘margin of assessment/appraisal/ 
estimation’’,677 affording states a degree of flexibility in terms of interpretation and 
fulfilment of obligations in accordance with diverse cultural practice and tradition.  
Increasingly, however, the human rights record of a state is determined with reference to 
quantitative data, disaggregated and/or aggregated, and processed into a statistic to 
indicate a state’s performance and progress.  Indicators are also used as a comparative tool, 
for example, in assessing a country’s position on the UN Human Development Index,678 or its 
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position on the fragile states index,679 although human rights indicators do not appear as yet 
to be used to compare one state against another.680    
A human rights indicator has been defined as ‘a piece of information used in measuring the 
extent to which a legal right is being fulfilled or enjoyed in a given situation’,681 and is 
‘essentially a proxy for determining the level of fulfillment of human rights’ obligations’.682  
The OHCHR defines human rights indicators as: 
(…) specific information on the state or condition of an object, event, 
activity or outcome that can be related to human rights norms and 
standards; that addresses and reflects human rights principles and 
concerns; and that can be used to assess and monitor the promotion and 
implementation of human rights.683 
For Sally Engle Merry, human rights indicators are: 
(…) a named collection of rank ordered data that purports to represent 
the past or projected performance of different units. The data, in this 
simplified or processed form, are capable of being used to compare 
particular units of analysis (such as countries or institutions or 
corporations), synchronically or over time, and to evaluate their 
performance with reference to one or more standards.684   
The use of indicators per se has developed over the last two centuries, initially in the context 
of labour and then, during the 20th century, in the field of economic and financial auditing.685  
Social indicators gained currency in the 1970s, particularly in the United States, followed by 
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the use of development indicators by the UN during the 1990s, which continues apace.686  
Relatively speaking, human rights indicators are ‘a more recent invention’, with various 
treaty bodies inviting states to develop human rights indicators and benchmarks in order to 
monitor their (the state’s) compliance with its human rights obligations under the relevant 
treaty.687   
There is some consistency across sectors increasingly reliant upon indicators and audits to 
measure and determine performance and related success.  This is a dualism that, on the one 
hand, welcomes an evolving culture of dependency on indicators and audits as a key 
element of regimes of governance whilst,688 on the other, expresses concern that indicators 
lead to processes that are counter-productive and can foster mistrust.689  The latter results 
in dysfunctional behaviour driven by a focus on indicators and targets rather than the 
conceptual rationale underpinning the perceived need for the indicator in the first place.690   
Todd Landman has written positively of the contribution of measuring human rights 
performance, finding there is a ‘continued need for and use of meaningful, valid, time-series 
measures of human rights protection’ in order to bridge the gap between proclamations of 
human rights rights protection and actual implementation.691  He formulates four functions 
of human rights measurement, namely:  
(1) contextual description, monitoring, and documentation of violations;  
(2) classification of different types of violations;  
(3) mapping and pattern recognition of violations over space and time; 
and  
(4) secondary analysis that provides explanations for violations and policy 
solutions for reducing them in the future.692 
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Landman argues in favour of a form of standardisation in terms of human rights 
investigations and the gathering of material, particularly given the reliance upon such 
evidence in courts and tribunal hearings.  These are important matters to address but as 
Frederic Megret explains, whilst fact-finding is ‘witnessing a new popularity, particularly in 
the context of human rights’, coupled with indicators and benchmarks, facts are not always 
as they seem.693  Whilst facts might be used to increase legitimacy or in pursuit of a claim to 
authority, they are ‘part and parcel of discursive strategies’, so that fact-finding is a form of 
power.694   Although the fact-finding mission may be driven by impartiality, those finding 
facts may be ‘norm-entrepreneurs’, which Megret posits as being trained to promote human 
rights, rather than find ‘facts’.695  Further, the language of fact-finding is informed by ‘the 
labels that the law has given us’; 696 it is not simply a case of discovering what happened but 
also what crimes have been committed. 
Philip Alston and Colin Gillespie seek to provoke ‘vibrant debate’ as to the most appropriate 
means by which to gather and share human rights information recognising the limitations 
inherent in any human rights reporting process.697  Alston and Gillespie sensibly note that 
past proposals to create a ‘single authoritative record’ for each country were critically 
received due to a lack of a single ‘truth’; a pursuit for such singular truth is futile - reporting 
is influenced by the perceptions, values and judgements of those collating data and diverse 
approaches with regard to the information collected and the interpretations made has some 
value.698  Furthermore, those organisations collecting data do not do so in a comprehensive 
manner, and the variety of actors collecting data are often not aware of others working in 
close proximity.699  This gives rise to the issue of ‘dispersed information’ where information 
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is held by a wide range of actors and those actors are not in effective communication with 
one another.700   
The UPR has some capacity to address this dispersal by bringing data, both quantitative and 
qualitative, into one arena.  It has been suggested that states are more willing to collect data 
for development indicators, aligned to support a state’s requests for aid, rather than collect 
and collate data relating to human rights indicators, the findings of which may well provide 
ammunition with which to criticise the aid-seeking government.701  That said, the apparent 
willingness to favour development indicators may be due more to received practice rather 
than resistance; the collation of data for this purpose is better established,702 with human 
rights indicators ‘still in their infancy’.703  Further, there is some evidence at the national 
level of states using indicators to report upon UPR progress.704 
A recent culmination in the increasingly widespread use of indicators is an OHCHR guide 
produced to promote their use in measuring implementation.705  The OHCHR conceptualises 
human rights indicators as structural, process and outcome, which can be aligned, 
respectively,  with respecting, protecting and fulfilling rights, reflecting a state’s evolutionary 
progress through the scope of its human rights obligations.706  Whilst the use of structural, 
process and outcome indicators form the spine of the OHCHR’s 2012 publication, it had 
published on the matter some four years previously in a report that had been commissioned 
in 2006, stating: 
                                                             
700 ibid 1093. 
701 de Beco (n 686) 35, citing T. Hammarberg, ‘Searching the Truth: The Need to Monitor Human Rights with 
Relevant and Reliable Means’, (2001) Statistical Journal of the United Nations ECE 18, 136. 
702 AnnJanette Rosga and Margaret L. Sattherwaite, ‘The Trust in Indicators: Measuring Human Rights’ (2009) 
27(2) Berkeley Journal of International Law 253-315, 266-268. 
703 Harrison and Sekalala (n 588) 935. 
704 Brazil has been reported as having committed to devising a national system of human rights indicators and 
using statistics to assess racial inequalities between white and Afro-descendent people using disaggregated 
socioeconomic statistics, indicating the high rate of homicide in the country, particularly among children, Brazil 
state report A/HRC/WG.6/1/BRA/1, paras 26 and 81, as cited in OHCHR ‘Human Rights Indicators’ (n 683) 26. 
705 OHCHR ‘Human Rights Indicators’ (n 683). 
706 ibid. 
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(…) structural indicators refer to the ratification and adoption of 
international treaties and the institutional structures and mechanisms 
within a state that facilitate the resolution of human rights matters. 707  
Measuring structural indicators is a relatively straightforward process and, on the face of it, 
reflects the first stage in a state’s realisation of its declared aspiration to commit to the 
promotion and protection of human rights.  The Inter American Court of Human Rights 
(IACtHR) is of the view that structural indicators should be used to indicate the extent of 
domestic law compliance with international obligations.708  Along similar lines, Kalantry, 
Getgen and ArriggKoh propose that an appropriate approach would be to limit the use of 
structural indicators for measuring the extent to which a state’s laws reflect, incorporate, 
and implement its international treaty obligations, with the focus being on process 
indicators to account for the extent to which the state has, or has not, ‘created appropriate 
institutions and taken additional implementation measures to fulfill its obligations’.709   
Process indicators are those that refer, for example, to institutions, policies and measures, 
the receipt of complaints and the timescale to address the same.710  Therefore, although 
outcomes indicators relate to attainment they may be reflective of success in terms of a 
process indicator, one example provided by the OHCHR being life expectancy and mortality 
rates (outcome) as related to immunization (process).711  Outcome indicators monitor the 
extent to which a state is actually realising, promoting and protecting a given right ‘on the 
ground’, focusing on the results of efforts made by states with regard to process 
indicators.712 
Whilst the overriding sentiment of the OHCHR is to support the use of human rights 
indicators, having declared its commitment to them as a means to ‘provide concrete, 
                                                             
707 ‘Report on Indicators for Promoting and Monitoring the Implementation of Human Rights’ HRI/MC/2008/3 
6 June 2008 http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/indicators/docs/HRI.MC.2008.3_en.pdf accessed 12 
October 2016. 
708 D.A. Gonzalez-Salzberg, ‘Do States comply with the compulsory judgments of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights? An empirical study of the compliance with 330 measures of reparation’, (2014) Revista do 
Instituto Brasileiro de Direitos Humanos, 13. 
709 Kalantry, Getgen and ArriggKoh (n 682) 282. 
710 OHCHR ‘Human Rights Indicators’ (683) 36. 
711 ibid 37. By way of further example, the number of mothers attended by medical personnel at birth provides 
evidence of a process indicator, whereas the outcome indicator related to that process might be the number 
of infants that survive the first three months of life, Green (n 685) 1075. 
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practical tools for enforcing human rights and measuring their implementation’,713 there is 
passing acknowledgement by the OHCHR that in some quarters there is: 
(…) limited capacity to collect and compile information on appropriate 
indicators, their periodicity, analytical techniques, the institutional 
arrangements required for undertaking human rights assessments, lack of 
adequate resources and political indifference to human rights.714 
This is of particular alarm if indicators are being used to inform budget allocation, as is 
suggested by the OHCHR.715  Disquiet regarding credibility of data and findings is said to arise 
due to a limited group of Western organisations and governments leading the way in terms 
of methodology and on the ground collation, and the unintended consequence of budget 
allocation according to indicators acting as an incentive for states to under-report progress 
in order to evidence need for financial and other support operating.716 
There is a significant risk that human rights indicators present unreliable evidence.  The 
recording and collecting of data in a country such as Yemen is sporadic, may be prone to 
duplication and is therefore not sufficiently reliable in terms of drawing concrete 
conclusions.717  What emerges is a process that is more art than science; as Brian Root, the 
Quantitative Analyst at Human Rights Watch states, ‘human rights fact-finding is largely a 
qualitative affair, and researchers will always rely on the narrative interviews as a key source 
of information and evidence’.718  In addition, as de Beco observes, complaints in repressive 
states are less frequent due to the absence of redress mechanisms and, when they do exist, 
there is a lack of trust in their value and effectiveness.719  The fact of a lower number of 
complaints does not reflect a better human rights situation.  This is all the more reason to 
                                                             
713 OHCHR ‘Human Rights Indicators’ (683) 2. 
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715 ibid 125. 
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rely on qualitative data in tandem with the quantitative information revealed by structural, 
process and outcome indicators.   
Human rights indicators are generally used to determine progress within a specific country 
rather than by comparing the performance of one country, unlike the use of indicators when 
measuring development.720  In the view of the OHCHR, this is because ‘human rights are 
absolute standards that all societies have to strive towards; this aim cannot be diluted by 
creating relative performance benchmarks based on cross-country comparisons’.721  
However, the OHCHR suggests some indicators may be used for comparison between 
countries, but that ‘such use is bound to be confined to comparing performance on a few 
specific human rights standards at a time’ referring to the right to education or right to life 
(or aspects of these rights) and ‘not the entire gamut of human rights’.722  Yet there is no 
indication as to why comparison across countries for some indicators and not others might 
be acceptable and what purpose it might serve.  
Engle Merry describes indicators as ‘knowledge creation’, warning that knowledge is often 
restrictive and contingent and relies heavily upon translation and commensuration.723  David 
McGrogan draws parallels between the human rights indicator project and a ‘strong 
rationalist propensity’; the rationalist perspective is that technical knowledge, rather than 
practical knowledge, is supreme, with the sovereignty of technique encouraging and pushing 
for universal use of human rights indicators, but not universal agreement as to what those 
indicators should or should not be.  His view is that: 
(…) whilst there may never be a complete set of universal indicators, it 
is nonetheless the case that what has been advocated is the universal 
use of indicators and a universal framework for their use. Uniformity 
and certainty, in other words, manifest themselves not at the level of 
direct implementation but, rather, at the level of conceptualization 
[sic].724   
                                                             
720 Kalantry, Getgen and ArriggKoh (n 682) 257. 
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It is in this spirit that structural, process and outcome indicators form the spine of the 
approach advocated by the OHCHR.725  However, if technique reigns over substance, there is 
a risk that nuance and particularity is lost; the desire to conceptualise, measure, and assess, 
means that ‘the unpredictable, ungovernable, chaotic nature of changing social norms, 
which may seem dormant for decades before undergoing dramatic shifts, is lost amid the 
need to demonstrate structure, process and outcome’.726  In a similar vein, Engle Merry 
critically assesses the value of quantification; she accepts there is worth in the gathering of 
statistical data in terms of comparisons that can be made on a national / international scale 
but notes that much of the detail and context is lost in this endeavour.727  The result is a 
disparity between ‘qualitative, locally informed systems of knowledge production and more 
quantified systems with global reach’.728  One danger is that quantification provides 
knowledge that is ‘decontextualized, homogenized and remote from local contexts of 
meaning [sic]’ but that nonetheless goes on to inform policy.729   
To help understand the limitations associated with indicators, Merry refers to the potential 
impact of the use of indicator data / findings with reference to ‘knowledge effect’: statistical 
knowledge may be accepted as non-political, objective and scientific, even though the 
collection methods may not be; and ‘governance effect’: decisions regarding aid, 
intervention, etc. being determined by a country’s individual performance against a set of 
indicators.730  In reporting on her ethnographic study, Merry concludes that: 
(…) the way indicators are constructed and used shows that they 
reflect the social and cultural worlds of the actors and organisations 
that create them and the regimes of power within which they are 
formed.731 
This suggests the framework will be biased towards a particular agenda or set of norms, that 
an objective assessment of the performance of one institution against another, one region 
against another, or one state against another, will be essentially impossible.  Other concerns 
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arise, rather than ‘objective representations of the world, such quantifications are social 
constructs formed through protracted social processes of consensus building and 
contestation’.732  Therefore, if the construction and use of indicators is driven by the regimes 
of power within which they are formed, careful consideration ought to be given to those 
actors involved in the forming process in order to avoid the creation of a neo-imperialist 
and/or neoliberal vehicle that validates bias, policy and practice favoured by a particular 
elite.   
This chimes with Merry’s coining of the phrase ‘expertise inertia’ whereby those setting 
indicators are the ‘experts’ meaning that the inexperienced and the powerless are 
excluded.733  At their worst, rather than improve the human rights situation on the ground in 
a given country, human rights indicators can have negative consequences by entrenching the 
power of the political elite at the expense of those most in need of rights protection.  There 
is a risk that instead of reviewing the situation on the ground, the result is masking and 
misleading.734 
Given the scepticism surrounding reliance upon human rights indicators, one might be 
forgiven for a sense of despondency when it comes to any attempt to monitor state 
compliance and progress against UPR recommendations.  Yet, no system of assessment is 
ever foolproof and a key measure of the UPR’s success sits outside the realms of human 
rights indicators, being rooted in specific state practice when it comes to interaction with the 
UPR as an international organisation with a global governance function, in particular a 
state’s role in making recommendations and how it responds to the recommendations it 
receives.  
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173 
 
5.5 Output (substantive) legitimacy of the UPR: making and responding to recommendations 
The nature of recommendations made to states under review and how those states respond 
to those recommendations are two important aspects of the UPR’s output.  This section 
explores a system for codifying UPR recommendations according to action category and 
theme undertaken by Edward McMahon, working with UPR Info.735  This exploration is 
conducted as a means to interrogate whether the output in respect of recommendations 
varies between stable states and states in crisis as a means to further investigate the 
governance function of the UPR generally, and particularly where states in crisis are 
concerned.  It also addresses some of the motivations for states implementing UPR 
recommendations and the potential role of domestic state parliaments in encouraging and 
supporting this.  
Under McMahon’s methodology,736 each recommendation is coded according to one of five 
categories based on the nature of the action recommended as follows: 1 - minimal action; 2 - 
continuing action; 3 - considering action; 4 - general action; and 5 - specific action. Category 
1 recommendations are the softest in terms of the demands they make and include the 
verbs such as ‘call on, seek, share’. Category 2 emphasise continuity in actions and/or 
policies, with key action verbs being ‘continue, maintain, persevere, pursue’. Category 3 
comprises recommendations that consider change and include verbs such as ‘analyse, 
consider, envisage, envision, explore, reflect upon, revise, review, study’. Categories 1-3 
refer to recommendations that are easier to implement because of their minimal demands 
of the SuR.  
Recommendations within category 4 refer to action that is more focused and specific, yet 
still erring towards the generic, containing verbs such as ‘accelerate, address, encourage, 
engage with, ensure, guarantee, intensify, promote, speed up, strengthen, take action, take 
measures or steps towards’.  Again, these recommendations may be received more 
favourably being relatively simple in terms of follow up but are more difficult to assess in 
terms of tangible progress.  Category 5 recommendations require specific action and are 
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therefore the most demanding of the SuR.  These recommendations commonly include the 
verbs to ‘conduct, develop, eliminate, establish, investigate, undertake as well as legal verbs: 
abolish, accede, adopt, amend, implement, enforce, ratify’.  Such specificity means these are 
the clearest recommendations with ‘the most potential to impact the human rights situation 
because these recommendations leave the least amount of room for window dressing of the 
human rights efforts taken by the state’. 
The action-category of the recommendation relates to output as it has a direct bearing on 
the ability to measure tangible follow up and implementation.  A state can easily report 
implementation against those recommendations that require minimal action, continuing 
action, general action or that action be considered without having, for example, undertaken 
any change in law, policy or practice, or ratified a particular treaty.737  For action category 5 
recommendations, evidence of implementation may be presented but action may not be 
directly attributable to the UPR, particularly if the recommendation links with a treaty 
committee recommendation, or that from another international human rights mechanism. 
That said, if the UPR has performed a reinforcement role in terms of norm dispersal and 
dissemination, that of itself is a measure of success.  Aggregated global data regarding 
implementation of the ten most cited issues for those states in the first half of the first UPR 
cycle revealed the vast majority of recommendations were not implemented.738  
Other coding approaches are, of course, possible.  Elvira Dominguez-Redondo highlights, for 
example, that human rights obligations ‘are commonly classified under the generic rubric of 
“promotion and protection”’.739  Such a rubric could be used to codify UPR 
recommendations, for example, according to those that seek to offer encouragement, 
support and assistance (promotion) and those that are more directive and coercive 
(protection). However, this presents a binary approach that does not account for the array of 
                                                             
737 Tomuschat (n 127) 613, referring to: recommendations to Fiji to preserve freedom of expression and the 
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recommendation type.  Given the sheer number of UPR recommendations, as attested 
below, the pragmatic approach is to utilise the coding and extensive sorting of the thousands 
of recommendations that has already taken place. 
If action category 5 recommendations are those that require the most of states in terms of 
action, and are therefore more likely to prompt positive impact in terms of rights protection, 
as well as being more reliable in terms of evidencing compliance, it follows that reviewing 
states should be encouraged to make more, or only, category 5 recommendations. 
Table 1 Overall recommendations statistics: category 5 
Cycle No. Recns    Specific action (category 5)   No. reviewing states 
      No. % % Variance      
1st cycle 21355   7364 34.5 N/A   154 
  
 
            
2nd cycle 36331   13404 36.9 +2.4%   168 
During the UPR’s first cycle, a total of 21,355 recommendations were made, of which 7,364 
(34.5%) contained specific action (category 5).  Thirty-nine countries made no 
recommendations at all during the first cycle. 740  A greater number of recommendations 
were made over the course of the second cycle, amounting to 36,331 (an increase of 14,976, 
amounting to just over 70%).  Of those 36,331 recommendations made, 13,404 (36.9%) were 
action category 5.  Despite the significant increase in the overall number of 
recommendations made in the second cycle, the ratio of specific action recommendations 
made was similar, keeping the figure at just over a third of all recommendations for both 
cycles (34.5% / 36.9% respectively). 
Many of the commitments made by an SuR during its UPR refer to legislative action, 
indicating a state’s parliament has a central role to play.  This has been the subject of a 
OHCHR report, which notes the: 
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(…) importance of the active participation of parliaments in the follow-
up process, as one of the key national stakeholders, also bearing in 
mind that more than 50 per cent of universal periodic review 
recommendations require or involve parliamentary action.741   
The report recommends that states establish a permanent parliamentary human rights 
committee,742 and engage parliaments as relevant stakeholders in the consultation process 
for the UPR national report.743   
5.6 The Human Rights Council regular sessions: supporting the UPR’s governance function 
The regular sessions of the Human Rights Council, which take place three times each year, 
play a crucial role in the UPR governance process via standing item number 6 on the regular 
session agenda,744 and have the potential to contribute to the UPR’s substantive legitimacy.  
Item 6 includes the adoption of the outcome of the UPR for those countries reviewed during 
the preceding UPR session and space for general, although time-limited, debate on the UPR.  
In the event that a state had ‘noted’ a recommendation at the time of the Working Group, 
the state is at this stage required to provide an update regarding its position.   
During the adoption of the Working Group report at the Council’s regular session, the SuR, 
reviewing states, and civil society have the opportunity to pass comment upon the particular 
state’s review and the outcome document.  Mozambique, for example, explained it had 
framed the majority of the recommendations received during its review in its ‘Five-Year 
Programme of the Government’.745  This indicates the commitment of some states in terms 
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of capacity, resources and/or will to take a comprehensive approach to follow up and 
implementation for UPR recommendations.  Belgium reported being committed to ‘a 
systematic manner through internal consultations on an administrative level every six 
months’ with consultation to also take place at a political level.  For Belgium, 
implementation was not limited to UPR recommendations but included those 
recommendations made by treaty bodies and the Council of Europe, and was to involve the 
participation of civil society.746   
Whilst this is evidence of the co-ordinated human rights governance approach being 
pursued by the Human Rights Council and its institutions, and of the multi-directional nature 
of the international human rights regime complex, the acceptance of the Council by the 
state’s position in response to a noted recommendation does not always advance its 
governance function, as illustrated above in section 5.3, in relation to Yemen and the US’s 
recommendation regarding spousal rape.  A state’s review remains a live issue; both the 
specific comment on a state’s outcome and the general debate at the regular session 
demonstrates that the UPR process is not limited to the shelf life of the Working Group.  
The regular session of the Council soon follows an SuR’s review being three to five months 
after the most recent UPR session.  With each cycle now lasting five years, this indicates that 
a further formal process for reporting on progress and implementation is required, rather 
than the informal practice that has evolved and is being supported.  Equally, it is not always 
the formal processes that prompt action, as illustrated by an anecdote shared by one 
interviewee that explained that one country’s Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs had 
requested some project ideas it could pursue with the UNDP (UN Development Programme) 
in relation to the UPR.747  Therefore, during a visit to that country prior to its second cycle 
review, the interviewee had provided the Vice Minister with a list of possible human rights 
programmes that could be pursued by the government with suggestions covering persons 
with disability, or issues relating to sexual orientation, and that others might include the 
administration of justice, torture and freedom of expression.   
The interviewee expressed that he was ‘totally sceptical’ of any of the programmes being 
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adopted and pursued.  He saw the Vice Minister at the UN the following year for the 
country’s UPR, and discovered the Vice Minister had proceeded to implement programmes 
on persons with disability and torture.  When asked why these programmes had been 
adopted in preference to others, the interviewee was informed it was on the basis they 
related to ‘technical’ matters and not ‘political’ ones.  When asked how the distinction 
between the two was made (because the interviewee considered torture to be a very 
political issue), he was told that a review of all the UPR recommendations revealed that all 
states had received recommendations relating to the matter of persons with disabilities and 
relating to torture.  On the basis that such recommendations had been made to all states, 
they were not biased or targeted by one grouping of states against another, and that made 
them acceptable.   
Whilst this was shared during an interview as an anecdote, one important revelation is the 
rational and forensic approach of a state in deciding what to focus their efforts and 
resources on in terms of improving rights protection.  Further, the measure of that which is 
technical and that which is political, approached in this way, could be shared to encourage 
more action at the domestic level on projects that do not suggest bias towards a particular 
recommending state/s and, thirdly, that it is possible for a coordinated approach at state 
level that unites the objectives of the UPR and the UNDP.  Although much of the concept 
and content of human rights is Western in terms of historical foundation,748 ‘they are 
currently important for social justice movements in many parts of the world’.749  In order to 
speak to those nations whose ruling elite denotes an anti-Western sentiment, 
recommendations at the UPR need to relinquish a partisan approach.  One way of achieving 
this is to ensure that WEOG recommending states make recommendations that are similar in 
terms of their substance to states in their own group as well as those in others.750  
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Conclusion  
This chapter illustrates that the output of a state’s UPR includes the nature of the 
recommendations it receives and its response of either supporting or noting 
recommendations, and the message that response relays in terms of norm acceptance and 
dissemination.  This is neatly illustrated by the backlash the UK faced in supporting fewer 
recommendations at its third cycle review compared to the previous cycles, and seeking to 
change its previous position regarding certain supported recommendations. 
By being present at the interactive dialogue and listening to the recommendations by a 
multitude of states, state delegations are exposed to prevailing international human rights 
norms and required to give careful consideration to whether to accept and support those 
norms, or not.  Whilst there are various factors that influence whether recommendations 
are accepted, not all of which are born of a desire to improve the human rights situation, the 
national delegation is nonetheless making a powerful declaration on the world stage of the 
country’s position, which civil society and citizens of the state can then refer to when 
seeking to hold the government to account, as discussed in chapter 7.  
Even so, the primary focus of the UPR’s substantive legitimacy is undoubtedly moving 
towards follow up and implementation.  This in turn begs the question of state engagement 
with international human rights, from ratification of treaties to compliance with the 
commitments made, that has occupied the minds of the academy of international 
lawyers.751  It has been illustrated throughout this chapter that there are a number of factors 
that influence state practice such as politicisation, the ‘club’ mentality, reciprocity, 
acculturation and being held to account through naming and shaming.  However, it is almost 
impossible to know at a given time what particular factor has determined state action.  As 
one anecdote shared as part of the research for this thesis revealed, even the most 
experienced of UN personnel can be surprised with the approach taken by states to 
determine what to act upon and what not to. 
                                                             
751 See, for example, Hathaway (n 58); Courtney Hillebrecht, Domestic Politics and International Human Rights 
Tribunals: The Problem of Compliance, (New York:  Cambridge University Press 2014); Risse et al The Persistent 
Power of Human Rights (n 46). 
 
 
180 
 
Some important points to note surface from the analysis conducted throughout this chapter.  
It is evident the political reasons for taking action during the UPR process are not always 
coupled with negative connotations; that states respond more positively to 
recommendations from their allies nonetheless goes towards fulfilling one of the UPR’s 
objectives of the improvement of the human rights situation on the ground, even when 
recommendations made by allies are critical.  Nonetheless, there remains the issue, as this 
research reveals in section 5.3.1 above, that the UPR provides a vehicle via which known 
abusers of human rights congratulate one another on their human rights progress, 
particularly in the Arab region.   
Acculturation has surfaced as a useful way of conceptualising the longer term motivations 
for state compliance and the nature of state engagement with the UPR, particularly for 
states in crisis whereby the UPR presents an opportunity to learn from the practice of other 
states as well as seek advice and support for the future.  Output in this respect can be 
defined according to two categories, one is a state making a commitment to act by 
supporting a recommendation, demonstrating an acceptance of the relevant human rights 
principle, norm, or other governance mechanisms in the international human rights regime 
complex.  The other is positive change in state practice.  This also feeds into state practice 
according to legal and normative behaviour and state behaviour according to protected 
reasons for action, taking note from the work of Joseph Raz and applying those thoughts to 
the UPR dynamic.   
A state’s inaction against accepted recommendations can be indicative of one or more 
different factors.  Inaction may be symptomatic of an historic disdain toward human rights 
protection that has little to do with the UPR, although a symptom of such disdain is that the 
UPR’s credibility, and that of the international human rights regime complex, is 
compromised.  It may also be evidence of the progressive nature of the human rights 
movement and the time it takes to address and adjust state practice.  There may be very 
specific country-related circumstances that have prevented progress, the war in Yemen 
being a case in point addressed in the following chapter, or a state being in a post conflict 
transitional phase whereby there is the will but there remains a lack in terms of means and 
infrastructure, for example, Somalia.  Conversely, it may be possible for a state to present a 
more positive picture of implementation than reality on the ground would suggest due to 
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low action category recommendations, or aggregated data that masks more fundamental 
matters that remain stagnant.  
Ultimately, the governance function of the UPR is at its most successful when it facilitates 
state action that complies with recommendations made across the international human 
rights regime complex.  As illustrated in section four above, the most effective 
recommendations are those that require specific action.  It is also the case that these are 
also the most easily identified and measured in terms of compliance.  However, category 5 
type recommendations, which are relevant to this point, account for an average of just over 
35% of all recommendations made across both the first and second cycles.   
There are a number of practical steps being adopted by the OHCHR to further promote 
follow up and implementation and these have been set out above.  These include 
embedding in to the UPR cycle a date by which states reviewed in a particular session are 
due to submit an implementation plan and a letter from the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights to those states recently reviewed.  That the High Commissioner for Human Rights has 
at the start of the third cycle adopted the practice of sending a personal and tailored letter 
to each state delegation following its review to encourage the devising of a national 
implementation plan and making specific reference to follow up steps to take, is a matter of 
high diplomacy, as noted in section 5.2.  To better track a state’s view of its progress against 
implementation, specific guidance in terms of structuring subsequent national reports and 
the state’s presentation at the start of the Working Group is required.  As one interviewee 
observed on the second day of the start of the third cycle: 
(…) what I’m missing is that the country immediately starts by presenting a 
report reflecting on the recommendations which they previously had and 
they say, ok this has been implemented, and they are still lax, we need help, 
we need assistance and these things, this awareness.752 
Finally, section five of this chapter explored the way on which the Human Rights Council 
supports the governance function of the UPR via standing item 6 on the agenda of the 
Council’s regular sessions, however, this observation comes with a word of warning; the 
Council needs to be mindful of allowing inadequate responses provided by states under 
                                                             
752 Interview CSO 03. 
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review to noted recommendations that undermine the UPR’s legitimacy and the principle of 
universal rights protection.  
Potentially the most brutal assessment of the substantive legitimacy of the UPR is to ask 
what would be lost if there was no UPR.  This is a question that stumped some interviewees 
and offended others.753  This is picked up at the close of chapter 8 as final thoughts on this 
thesis’ findings.  With this in mind, chapter 6 turns to focus purely on the governance 
function of the UPR in relation to states in crisis by assessing the nature of the 
recommendations made to such states and their response.   
                                                             
753 Interview CSO 01 and CSO 02.  
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Chapter 6: The UPR and states in crisis – recommendations  
Introduction  
As discussed and explained in the introductory chapter, Yemen is the primary state in crisis 
this study focuses upon.  A small ‘sample’, Somalia and Iraq as other states in crisis, and the 
UK and New Zealand as stable states, is included by way of comparison and illustration, as 
detailed in the introduction, section 1.5.  In investigating the governance function of the UPR 
for states in crisis, this chapter addresses the mechanism’s operation by tracking the number 
and nature of the recommendations Yemen receives compared to the sample states, and the 
number of states making those recommendations.  This is to discover if there is any 
discernible difference or pattern for states in crisis compared to stable states.  This chapter 
also assesses the response of Yemen to recommendations, that is, the number and nature of 
the recommendations it supports against those it notes.   
The UPR is not designed as a mechanism to respond and take action in situations of 
immediate crisis and/or emergency; that role falls to the UN Security Council and other UN 
institutions, subject to the nature of the situation.754  Nor can the UPR resolve deep-seated 
discord and fragmentation of the type that characterises Yemen.755  The matter of the 
significant and far reaching impact of the current war in Yemen on the most basic of human 
rights has been addressed over the last few years by a number of UN institutions including 
the Human Rights Council, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the 
Security Council.756   
                                                             
754 For example, the United Nations Disaster and Assessment Coordination, 
http://www.unocha.org/legacy/what-we-do/coordination-tools/undac/overview, the United Nations Refugee 
Agency, UNHCR (High Commissioner for Refugees), http://www.unhcr.org/uk/emergencies.html both last 
accessed 21 May 2018.  
755 Safa AlAhmad, ‘Meeting the Houthis - and their enemies’, BBC News (17 March 2015) 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-31907671 last accessed 18 May 2018, referring to, for example, the 
desire in certain quarters for secession of the South from the North and the competing interests and pursuit of 
power by a triumvirate of the Houthis, forces loyal to the Hadi government, and Al Qaida in the Arab Peninsula 
(AQAP). 
756 As a result of the request made to the High Commissioner for Human Rights in UNHRC ‘Technical assistance 
and capacity-building for Yemen in the field of human rights’, A/HRC/RES/30/1 (30 September 2015) the then 
High Commissioner presented his report on 04 August 2016, UNHRC ‘Situation of Human Rights in Yemen: 
Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights’, A/HRC/33/38 (04 August 2016), para 1. Other reports are 
cited in this chapter.  
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Given the multi-agency involvement in the human rights and security situation in Yemen, the 
question arises of the function of the UPR for a state such as this.  The purpose and success 
of the UPR can only be measured relative to the situation on the ground for each SuR, a 
situation that is a complex mélange of law and politics as determined by broader domestic 
economic, social, religious and cultural conditions, often with regional and global geopolitical 
dynamics operating as a significant factor, as this chapter will discuss. 
As this thesis has illustrated, the UPR Working Group provides a forum within which the 
adoption of, and commitment to comply with, international human rights obligations and 
norms is encouraged, capacity building considered, and technical assistance requested or 
offered.  These are pertinent matters for states in crisis; whilst the engagement of a state in 
crisis during the interactive dialogue is important, the human rights failings Yemen faces are 
now so entrenched in the country’s conflict that any recommendations reviewing states 
make in terms of improving progress (against structural, process or outcomes indicators) will 
prove particularly challenging in terms of compliance whilst the conflict is ongoing.   
Nonetheless, the UPR continues to have an important governance role to play where Yemen 
is concerned both in terms of regulation and the setting of standards.  Importantly, the UPR 
creates a space and forum within which the international community will centre solely upon 
Yemen’s human rights issues.  Yemen’s third cycle review is scheduled for January 2019.  
This review will focus global attention on the serious human rights failings and violations in 
Yemen that are directly linked to the ongoing conflict and that also predate it in terms of 
historic, civic, political, cultural, social and economic rights violations. There is the potential 
for state actors to be further mobilised to offer support and resources in terms of current 
and future rights protection, and Yemen can engage in dialogue and make specific requests.  
The Working Group will provide a space for the state delegation to appeal to the 
international community for assistance in rebuilding the fabric of Yemeni society.  
Preparations for the Working Group will allow civil society and other entities within the 
international human rights regime complex to (re)present allegations and evidence of 
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conflict and non-conflict related violations that also encompass international humanitarian 
law breaches by all parties to the war.757   
The ongoing war has created a complex geopolitical situation in terms of the warring parties 
and the support / provision of resources by their allies, the Saudi and UAE-led coalition with 
weapons and military support from the US and the UK, and the Houthis in receipt of support 
from Iran; despite the large scale humanitarian crisis in Yemen, media coverage has been 
sparse and often biased.758  Attempts to broker peace have not succeeded.759  Nonetheless, 
the Yemeni government, state missions to the UN, global and domestic civil society, and 
those playing a part in the war,760 will each have the opportunity to contribute to Yemen’s 
UPR.  In making their recommendations, reviewing states may well reveal their own view of 
                                                             
757 For evidence presented by civil society in relation to human rights and humanitarian law violations by all 
parties to the war see, for example: Human Rights Watch ‘World Report: Yemen events of 2017’ 
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/yemen; Mwatana Organization for Human Rights, 
Annual Report 2017 http://mwatana.org/annul-report-2017/; Amnesty International ‘Yemen: Three years on, 
US and UK arms supplies to Saudi Arabia-led coalition are devastating civilian lives’ (28 March 2018), 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/03/yemen-three-years-on-us-and-uk-arms-supplies-to-saudi-
arabia-led-coalition-are-devastating-civilian-lives/ all accessed 21 May 2018; Mwatana Organization for Human 
Rights and Columbia Law School Human Rights Clinic ‘Submission to the United Nations about the Universal 
Periodic Review of Saudi Arabia’ (29 March 2018) http://mwatana.org/en/submission-to-the-united-nations/ 
last accessed 10 August 2018.  
758 Compare, for example, the tone and focus of Peter Welby, ‘Yemen’s Houthi Rebels should be treated like 
ISIS’ The Times (25 June 2018) https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/yemen-s-houthi-rebels-should-be-treated-
like-isis-7bzqzrqfl to Owen Jones, ‘Saudi Arabia and Israel are killing civilians and Britain is complicit’ The 
Guardian (10 August 2018) https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/aug/10/saudi-arabia-israel-
civilians-britain-yemen-palestinian-arms both last accessed 10 August 2018. For a non-Western journalistic 
view of the nature of the reporting, or lack of, in the world press of the war in Yemen, see ‘What the US and 
the UK won't tell you about the war in Yemen’, and accompanying film from The Listening Post, Al Jazeera, 25 
June 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/listeningpost/2018/06/uk-media-won-war-yemen-
180624152733811.html last accessed 10 August 2018. 
759 Martin Griffths, United Nations Envoy to Yemen, has been trying secure to the first peace talks in two years, 
having taken up position in March 2018 after ‘two predecessors quit in frustration over the gnawing conflict 
that attracts few headlines and scant attention from the great powers’, James Reinl, ‘Who is Martin Griffths, 
UN’s new envoy to Yemen?’ Middle East Eye (23 February 2018) https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/who-
martin-griffiths-yemens-new-un-envoy-1120969214; ‘De-escalation of fighting in Hodeida is key to ‘long-
overdue’ restart of Yemen peace talks: UN envoy’, United Nations News, 28 June 2018; Patrick Wintour, ‘UN 
Envoy confirms first peace talks in two years: negotiations to resolve civil war due to be held in Geneva in 
September’ The Guardian (02 August 2018) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/02/un-envoy-
yemen-peace-talks-civil-war-houthis both last accessed 10 August 2018; peace talks due to take place in 
Geneva on 6 September did not go ahead, Patrick Wintour, ‘Saudis admit error over deaths of second group of 
Yemeni children’ The Guardian (06 September 2018) 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/06/yemen-campaign-hit-civilians-saudi-coalition-admits last 
accessed 08 September 2018. 
760 As at August 2016, the coalition consisted of ‘all the states members of the Gulf Cooperation Countries 
(with the exception of Oman), as well as Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Senegal and the Sudan’, UNHRC ‘Situation of 
Human Rights in Yemen: Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights’ UNHRC A/HRC/33/38 (n 756) 
para 10. 
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the situation, potentially committing to working with relevant parties and agencies to assist 
in rebuilding public infrastructure and stability in Yemen.  Any commitments of assistance 
made during Yemen’s UPR will be recorded and will provide civil society with a basis upon 
which to return to when approaching reviewing states to follow up offers of support.  
Therefore, despite there being severely limited prospects, if any, on the part of Yemen’s 
state delegation in the third cycle being in a position to report follow up to second cycle 
recommendations, the governance function of the UPR will be maintained.  This will be 
achieved in accordance with the source and procedural legitimacy of the UPR, as discussed 
in chapters 3 and 4, with relevant state and non-state actors making an active contribution 
to the process, although the extent of civil society’s contribution will be hampered, as 
addressed in chapter 7.  
Even so, ahead of the third cycle review, Yemen has said it will engage with civil society in 
anticipation of preparing its national report.761  The second cycle national report was 
reported to have been written in consultation with civil society,762 however there are now 
particular challenges in that respect as activity by CSOs is vastly reduced coupled with 
concerns of politicisation and influence by the faction in control of the area in which the 
organisation or personnel is based.763  Furthermore, given the allegations of violations by all 
sides to the conflict being made by civil society, it is yet to be seen how the government will 
manage engagement with groups making allegations against it.   
The first part of this chapter provides a brief contextual background to the current political 
situation in Yemen and its impact upon human rights promotion, protection and violation. 
The second section presents the recommendations statistics for Yemen’s first and second 
cycle reviews against those for the sample states.  This process reveals certain UPR trends 
relating to states in crisis, namely that they receive a higher number of recommendations, 
generally from a higher number of reviewing states, but that the proportion of those 
                                                             
761 Email from United Nations Permanent Mission of Yemen in Geneva to Louisa Riches, 03 June 2018, on file 
with the author. 
762 ‘…there was very good cooperation, and they made workshops and they contacted each other. Also, in the 
second cycle of the UPR they worked together to prepare the national report. It was a very good indication 
that the government would like to improve their relations with the NGOs’, Interview UN 03. 
763 ‘…But after, in the war situation, they [CSOs] divided. Some of them are in the area where the Houthis are 
supporting them and the others are in the area of the government, they support the government. In fact, it is 
politicised now, their work’, Interview UN 03. 
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recommendations that require specific action is consistent across all states considered.  The 
third section explores the multi-directional interaction of actors in the international human 
rights regime complex with the UPR.  It does so by tracking the nature of recommendations 
made by civil society and by other human rights mechanisms in the regime complex 
compared to those made by reviewing states.  The final section provides some critical 
assessment of those recommendations that are supported compared to those that are 
noted and the process by which the SuR and the Human Rights Council deals with noted 
recommendations.  
6.1 Contextual background and current position: Yemen 
The presence and operation of various UN agencies in Yemen is complex,764 as is the political 
situation and ongoing conflict.  Much of the unrest, violent conflict and crises that have 
engulfed Yemen for the last decade and a half (and that predate the current civil war) have 
been attributed to ‘…underlying problems of unequal access to power and resources.’ 765  
Such conflict is stated as including: 
(…) fighting within the Sa’ada Governorate since 2004; a separatist 
movement in the southern governorates; the active presence of Al-
Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, including in open confrontations with 
government forces in the south; conflict between pro- and anti-
government groups and contenders to the presidency (e.g. tribal and 
military factions) in Sanaa, Taiz and Aden; and sustained 
demonstrations and sit-ins by youth and other sections of the 
population, which have often met with violence. 766 
This was the case at the time of the report’s writing in 2012 and the situation has 
deteriorated further.  Following the ‘Arab spring’ and so-called ‘youth revolution’, a multi-
dimensional framework was created, referred to as the Joint United Nations Framework to 
Support the Transition in Yemen (2012-2014),767 and an OHCHR country office was opened in 
                                                             
764 UNDP and the UN system: Yemen, 
http://www.ye.undp.org/content/yemen/en/home/operations/undp_un.html last accessed 05 June 2016.  
765 UNDP ‘Joint United Nations Framework to Support the Transition in Yemen, 2012-2014: A multi-
dimensional framework to support a peaceful and inclusive transition’ (30 March 2012) 
http://www.ye.undp.org/content/dam/yemen/Leadership/Docs/Joint%20UN%20Framework%20Yemen.pdf 
last accessed 05 June 2016. 
766 ibid 4. 
767 Ibid. 
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Yemen in 2013.768  The adverse implications for human rights promotion and protection are 
significant, contributing to the high rate of poverty and malnutrition suffered by a large 
proportion of the country’s population (the World Bank estimates 75% (22.2 million people) 
need humanitarian aid769), its almost chronic under-development,770 and the impact of a 
cholera outbreak in the midst of the country’s health system facing ‘near collapse’.771  
Yemen faces challenges not only in terms of its internally displaced population but also as a 
result of refugees coming into the country from the horn of Africa.772   
Having previously been cited as having a ‘vibrant and diverse but highly fragmented civil 
society’,773 the capacity of national civil society has since declined significantly, although 
reports are still being produced.774  In February 2016, Human Rights Watch with a coalition 
of NGOs submitted a joint letter to the Human Rights Council reiterating requests made 
during the 30th regular session of the Council for the creation of an international mechanism 
to investigate the allegations of serious violations of international humanitarian law and 
                                                             
768 UNHRC ‘OHCHR Compilation: Yemen’, A/HRC/WG.6/18/YEM/2 (n 460) para 17. 
769 ‘The World Bank in Yemen’, 16 April 2018. It also estimates that 17.8 million are food insecure, 8.4 million 
people are severely food insecure and at risk of famine, 16 million lack access to safe water and sanitation, and 
16.4 million lack access to adequate healthcare, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/overview, last 
accessed 27 August 2018.  
770 Joint United Nations Framework (Yemen) (n 765) 4. 
771 ‘Yemen crisis: Fighting the world’s largest outbreak in cholera’ The World Health Organization, 07 May 
2018, http://www.who.int/emergencies/yemen/en/ last accessed 21 May 2018. 
772 In 2012, more than 300,000 people were reportedly living as displaced by past conflict in northern Yemen 
and more than 150,000 people displaced by recent fighting in the south, and hundreds of thousands of 
refugees from the Horn of Africa, Joint United Nations Framework (Yemen) (n 765) 4. People have continued 
to arrive as refugees coming into Yemen, and leaving Yemen, see Rachel Savage and Mohammed Ali Kalfood, 
‘All roads lead to Djibouti as refugees flee Yemen even as migrants head there’, The Guardian (23 May 2016) 
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/may/23/all-roads-djibouti-refugees-flee-yemen-
civil-war-migrants-head-there; Sophia Akram, ‘Yemen’s other refugee crisis’ Al Jazeera (17 March 2017) 
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/03/yemen-refugee-crisis-170307094750333.html; and 
Tom Gardiner and Charlie Rosser, ‘Deadly journeys: how despair drives young Ethiopians to flee to Yemen’, 
The Guardian (09 May 2018) https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/may/09/young-
ethiopians-poverty-yemen-the-gulf all last accessed 14 May 2018.  
773 World Bank ‘Yemen Civil Society Organizations in Transition: A Mapping and Capacity Assessment of 
Development-Oriented Civil Society Organizations in Five Governorates’ (Washington, DC. 2013) 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/16638 last accessed 14 May 2018. 
774 Nadia al-Sakkaf, ‘the Tragedy of Yemen’s Civil Society’ The Washington Institute (29 February 2016) 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-tragedy-of-yemens-civil-society Saba Albess, 
‘Two years of war: supporting Yemeni Civil Society’s path to peace’ Safer World, 
https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/news-and-analysis/post/219-after-two-years-of-war-it-is-time-to-
step-up-support-to-yemeni-civil-society all last accessed 22 May 2018 Human Rights Watch ‘World Report: 
Yemen 2017’ (n 757); Mwatana ‘Annual Report 2017’ (n 757). 
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abuses of international human rights law committed by all parties to the conflict.775  It was 
only in September 2017 that a Council resolution was passed to establish an international 
panel of independent experts, considered further below.776  
Access to basic human rights, including clean water and food, is being denied for a significant 
proportion of the Yemeni population as a direct result of the conflict.777  Multiple human 
rights violations and violations of international humanitarian law have been documented by 
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and others as having been committed by all 
parties to the war in Yemen, including unlawful airstrikes, indiscriminate artillery attacks, 
targeting of civilian objects such as electricity and water treatment works, the use of cluster 
munitions, arbitrary detentions, and torture and enforced disappearances.778  The military 
offensive led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE to take the country’s key port of Hodeidah from 
Houthi control has exacerbated the situation by interfering with the flow of aid and medical 
supplies into the country.779 
Whilst there appears to have been a European sea change in attitude towards arming the 
Saudi-led coalition, with reports of Finland, Germany, Greece and Norway halting sales of 
arms as a result of their use in the conflict in Yemen,780 the UK is not following suit,781 nor 
                                                             
775 ‘Joint letter to HRC: Create an International Investigating Mechanism for Yemen’, 23 February 2016, 
Amnesty International, Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen 
Participation, Human Rights Watch, International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/02/23/joint-letter-hrc-create-international-investigating-mechanism-yemen 
accessed 10 October 2017.  
776 ‘Human rights, technical assistance and capacity-building in Yemen’ Human Rights Council Resolution 
36/31, passed on 29 September 2017, A/HRC/RES/36/31, 03 October 2017, para 12 https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G17/289/51/PDF/G1728951.pdf?OpenElement accessed 21 May 2018. 
777 Peter Beaumont, ‘A cynical PR exercise': critics round on $3.5bn plan to allay Yemen suffering’ The Guardian 
(01 March 2018) https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/mar/01/saudi-arabia-plan-yemen-
cynical-pr-exercise accessed 14 May 2018. 
778 Amnesty International ‘Yemen: Three years on’, Human Rights Watch ‘World Report: Yemen 2017’ (n 757); 
Mwatana ‘Annual Report 2017’ (n 757). 
779 ‘Houthis: 22 children killed by air raids on Yemen's Hodeidah’ Al Jazeera, 24 August 2018, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2018/08/houthis-saudi-uae-air-raids-kill-dozens-including-22-
children-180823181946517.html last accessed 27 August 2018. 
Patrick Wintour, ‘Yemen: Saudi-led coalition begins battle for vital port’ The Guardian (13 June 2018) 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/13/yemen-saudi-led-coalition-begins-battle-for-vital-port last 
accessed 18 June 2018.  
780 Patrick Wilcken, ‘Britain and the US must stop fuelling the bloody Saudi war on Yemen’ The Guardian (20 
March 2018) https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/mar/20/yemen-arms-saudi-arabia last 
accessed 14 May 2018. 
781 Saudi Arabia: Arms Trade: written questions – 139052, addressed to the Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs by Dan Carden, MP for Liverpool, Walton, on 27 April 2018, which indicates that  there 
is no evidence of discussions by the UK Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs with his 
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the US.782  Legal action has been in progress since early 2016 led by Campaign Against Arms 
Trade (CAAT) in the form of an application for judicial review of the UK’s decision to continue 
to licence the sale of arms to Saudi Arabia.783  A Court of Appeal hearing to determine 
whether to grant permission to CAAT to appeal against an earlier High Court ruling 
dismissing its application took place on 12 April 2018 with judgment being given on 04 May 
2018.784  CAAT was granted permission to appeal on three of the four open grounds of 
appeal and on all three of the closed grounds of appeal, with the case due to be heard by the 
Court of Appeal in April 2019.785 
Arguably, these are matters that go beyond the capacity of the UPR to address, but given the 
basis of the UPR includes reference to ‘applicable international humanitarian law’ it may not 
be beyond the UPR’s scope to operate as a forum in which to raise such matters with the 
UK.786  That said there is no evidence of comment or question to the UK during its third cycle 
review in May 2017 regarding the matter.787  This may reflect a concern that if states 
thought they might come under fire for matters regarding security and broader international 
relations, they would most likely disengage with the UPR.788  Saudi Arabia is due to be 
reviewed in November 2018 and, as referred to in chapter 7, the Yemeni NGO Mwatana has 
made a stakeholder submission that refers directly to Saudi Arabia’s part in the war and 
allegations of international humanitarian law violations.789  It remains to be seen if reviewing 
states make reference during Saudi Arabia’s UPR to its involvement in Yemen.  
                                                             
German counterpart of Germany’s 2017 decision, https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-
questions-answers-statements/written-question/Commons/2018-04-27/139052 accessed 14 May 2018. 
782 Saeed Kamali Dehghan, ‘Nearly half of US arms exports go to the Middle East’ The Guardian (12 March 
2018) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/12/nearly-half-of-us-arms-exports-go-to-the-middle-
east last accessed 08 September 2018. 
783 R (on the application of Campaign Against Arms Trade) (n 477). For documents made public before the first 
hearing that took place on 7 and 8 February 2017, see https://www.caat.org.uk/resources/countries/saudi-
arabia/legal-2016/before-hearing last accessed 08 September 2018. 
784 R (on the application of Campaign Against Arms Trade) [2018] EWCA Civ 1010. 
785 Expected date for listing on file with the author, email from CAAT to the author, September 2018. 
786 ‘…given the complementary and mutually interrelated nature of international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law, the review shall take into account applicable international humanitarian law.’, 
UNHRC A/HRC/RES/5.1 para 2.  
787 UNHRC Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland, A/HRC/36/9 (14 July 2017).  
788 Informal conversation between the author and a permanent mission to the United Nations, and between 
the author and an INGO representative, January 2014.    
789 Mwatana and Columbia Law School Clinic UPR Submission (n 757). 
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The third cycle reviews of both Yemen and Saudi Arabia are timely and will serve to focus the 
attention of the international community on a matter that has suffered from under-
reporting.790  In addition, the international panel of independent experts appointed in 
September 2017791 recently completed its mission to the country.792  It published a report of 
its investigations in August 2018 that alleges potential war crimes by all parties to the 
conflict and highlights the role of the UK and the US in advising and supporting the Saudi-led 
coalition, requesting the international community to refrain from providing arms that could 
be used in the conflict.793  It is anticipated that the report and its recommendations will 
inform the substance of some of the comments and observations both during Saudi Arabia’s 
UPR in October 2018 and Yemen’s in January 2019.  
Yemen’s third cycle UPR will be observed closely by civil society and other interested parties 
in terms of the nature of the recommendations made and by which states.  When asked if 
Yemen will be sending a delegation to its third review in January 2019, the UN Permanent 
Mission for Yemen responded that a delegation will be present that ‘will be competent to 
present the challenges facing Yemen and what the government hopes to fulfil its human 
rights obligations’.794  When questioned how the UPR could function most effectively for 
Yemen, the response was that it ‘will be effective if it focuses on issues that are appropriate 
to the current conditions in Yemen such as protecting civilians and facilitating the access of 
food and medicine to them’.795  The reply also stated the need to protect the rights of 
                                                             
790 Yemen conflict: UN accuses the world of ignoring crisis’, BBC News online, 06 December 2016, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-38220785; Owen Jones, ‘Britain is at war with Yemen, so why 
does nobody know about it?’ The Guardian (28 January 2016) 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jan/28/britain-war-yemen-saudi-arabia-military-advisers 
all last accessed 20 May 2018. 
791 UNHRC A/HRC/RES/36/31 (03 October 2017) (n 786); ‘Yemen: Zeid appoints group of eminent international 
and regional experts’, OHCHR press release, 04 December 2017, 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22483 last accessed 21 May 2018.  
792 Conversation between the author and a member of the investigating team at Cambridge International Law 
Journal 7th Annual Conference, University of Cambridge, 04 April 2018, who had just returned from Yemen 
having undertaken investigations there.  
793 UNHRC ‘Situation of human rights in Yemen, including violations and abuses since September 2014: Report 
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights containing the findings of the Group of 
Independent Eminent International and Regional Experts and a summary of technical assistance provided by 
the Office of the High Commissioner to the National Commission of Inquiry’, A/HRC/39/43 (17 August 2018). 
794 During an interview with Mohamed A. Al-Foqumi, Minister Plenipotentiary, Deputy Permanent 
Representative of Yemen to the United Nations and other International Organisations, in May 2017 the view 
was expressed that ‘it would be very difficult for the government to go in the third UPR cycle’, Interview UN 
03, however, it has since been confirmed that Yemen will be attending, Riches (email 03 June 2018) (n 768).  
795 ibid.  
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women and children, achieve peace by ending the war and stopping the coup as well as 
holding those responsible for violating human rights in Yemen to account, ‘not allowing 
impunity or providing impunity according to any political settlement solution that does not 
redress the damage’.796  Final comments were for recommendations to be ‘reasonable and 
commensurate with the government’s capacities at this stage’.797   
6.2 United Nations resolutions and reports on Yemen 
Although the Security Council has not been included in the entities that populate the 
international human rights governance regime complex proposed in this thesis, it is worthy 
of some consideration.  Prior to 2011, the Security Council had made no substantive 
resolutions in relation to Yemen, yet since then it has made eight that include matters of 
concern regarding human rights violations.798  The first was in the wake of the Arab spring 
and 2011 uprising in Yemen; at that time the Security Council expressed ‘serious concern’ in 
relation to a number of matters including the: worsening security situation; deteriorating 
economic and humanitarian situation due to the lack of progress on a political settlement; 
potential for the further escalation of violence; increasing number of internally displaced 
persons and refugees in Yemen; alarming levels of malnutrition caused by drought and 
soaring fuel and food prices; increasing interruption of basic supplies and social services; 
increasingly difficult access to safe water and health care; increased threat from Al-Qaida in 
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the risk of new terror attacks in parts of Yemen.799  
The resolution proceeded to ‘strongly condemn’ human rights violations by Yemeni 
authorities, which included ‘the excessive use of force against peaceful protestors’ as well as 
acts of violence, use of force, and human rights abuses perpetrated by other actors.  It 
                                                             
796 ibid.  
797 ibid.  
798 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the human rights situation in Yemen, 
Human Rights Council 19th session, A/HRC/19/51, 13 February 2012, para 8 cites Security Council Resolution 
2014 (2011), as the Security Council’s first resolution on Yemen, S/RES/2014 (2011), 21 October 2011, 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session19/A-HRC-19-51_en.pdf and 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2014(2011) respectively, both accessed 18 
May 2018. There were, however, two previous resolutions, one in 1947 and the other in 1967, recommending 
Yemen for UN membership, and recommending Democratic Yemen (the People’s Republic of Southern Yemen) 
for UN membership, Resolution 29 (1947), S/RES/29, 12 August 1947 and Resolution 29 (1947), S/RES/243, 12 
December 1967.  
799  Security Council Resolution 2014 (2011), S/RES/2014 (2011), 21 October 2011, 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2014(2011) accessed 18 May 2018. 
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stressed ‘that all those responsible for violence, human rights violations and abuses should 
be held accountable’.800  The resolution made other demands of the Yemeni authorities and 
armed groups with regard to the exercise of fundamental human rights and freedoms by the 
Yemeni people, including the right to peaceful assembly and freedom of expression and that 
‘all armed groups remove all weapons from areas of peaceful demonstration, refrain from 
violence and provocation, refrain from the recruitment of children, and urges all parties not 
to target vital infrastructure’.801  It is therefore evident that the human rights situation in 
Yemen was of serious concern well ahead of Yemen’s second cycle review in January 
2014.802  The Security Council has also reached out to civil society for its perspective on the 
situation; in May 2017, Radhya al-Mutawakel, Head of Mwatana, a Yemeni CSO, was invited 
to present evidence to the Security Council.803 
In addition, Yemen has been the subject of seven Human Rights Council resolutions, five 
Human Rights Council reports, a number of Security Council presidential statements, and a 
UN Secretary-General Report, followed by an addendum to that report.804  The content of 
the latter two raises questions of the political influence asserted by, and/or on behalf of, 
Saudi Arabia and the acquiescence to that influence by UN organisations.  Within the 
Secretary-General’s Report on children and armed conflict, dated 20 April 2016, is a section 
on Yemen that details the involvement of children in the conflict including the recruitment of 
seven hundred and sixty-two verified cases of boys as child soldiers, with the Houthis 
reportedly responsible for 72%, followed by the pro-Government popular committees at 
15%, and AQAP, 9%.805  It goes on to report that during 2015, the UN ‘verified a six fold 
increase in the number of children killed and maimed compared with 2014, totalling 1,953 
child casualties (785 children killed and 1,168 injured)’, and that 60% of the casualties, of 
                                                             
800  Security Council Resolution 2014 (2011), S/RES/2014 (2011), 21 October 2011, para 2, 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2014(2011) accessed 18 May 2018. 
801 UNSC S/RES/2014 (2011) 21 October 2011, para 8. 
802 A further eight Security Council recommendations have since been made to Yemen, including in February 
2014, only one month following Yemen’s second cycle UPR, the imposition of sanctions to freeze the assets 
and impose travel bans against designated individuals and entities, UNSC S/RES/2140 (2014) 26 February 2014. 
803 Chapter 2 ‘Yemen in the Security Council’, Mwatana ‘Annual Report 2017’ (n 757).  
804 UN documents for Yemen, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/yemen/ last accessed 17 
August 2018. 
805 ‘Children and armed conflict: Secretary-General’s report’, A/70/836–S/2016/360, 20 April 2016, para 165. 
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which more than 70% were boys, were attributed to Saudi led coalition forces (510 deaths 
and 667 injuries).806   
The report states that ‘owing to the very large number of violations attributed to the two 
parties, the Houthis/Ansar Allah and the Saudi Arabia-led coalition’, both parties are listed in 
its annex ‘for killing and maiming and attacks on schools and hospitals’. 807  However, a note 
indicates that ‘on 6 June, the Secretary-General removed the Saudi Arabia-led coalition from 
the listing in Annex 1 of the report, where it had been included for the first time’.808  The 
removal was confirmed in an addendum to the report, dated 24 June 2016.809  This removal 
suggests some background political manoeuvring.  To some extent, this is an aside given the 
specific focus of this thesis is the UPR, but the change made to the Secretary-General’s 
report exposes deep politicisation at the very highest ranks of the UN, the fact of the change 
made has, at least, remained in the public domain.   
The change to the annex of the original report and removal of the reference to Saudi Arabia 
illustrates the difficulty of securing human rights protection and progress on the ground in 
Yemen, particularly as it is the site of a war being co-ordinated, resourced and funded by 
those external to it.810  Furthermore, the internationally recognised government is not in 
control of the entire country.811  This poses a challenge in terms of ensuring the Yemeni 
population has the potential to benefit from recommendations accepted at the UPR; those 
accepted and subsequently implemented by the government will only apply to those 
geographical areas over which the government has control.812  Although the UN special 
envoy to Yemen, Martin Griffiths, is in dialogue with all parties to the conflict in Yemen, 
                                                             
806 ibid para 167. 
807 ibid para 228. 
808 UN documents on Yemen (n 804). 
809 ibid. 
810 Mwatana and Columbia Law School Clinic UPR Submission (n 757); Patrick Wintour, et al, ‘Johnson says 
Saudi Arabia is a 'puppeteer' in Middle East proxy wars’ 08 December 2016, 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/dec/07/boris-johnson-accuses-saudi-arabia-of-twisting-and-
abusing-islam last accessed 20 May 2018; Wilcken (n 780); Jonathan Saul, Parisa Hafezi, Michael Georgy, 
‘Exclusive - Iran steps up support for Houthis in Yemen's war: sources’ Reuters, 21 March 2017, 
https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-yemen-iran-houthis/exclusive-iran-steps-up-support-for-houthis-in-yemens-
war-sources-idUKKBN16S22P last accessed 27 August 2018. 
811 European Council on Foreign Relations, ‘Mapping the Yemen Conflict’ (n 90). 
812 This point was raised by one interviewee in relation to Libya and Afghanistan, as well as Yemen, interview, 
CSO 05. 
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reviewing states at the UPR are required to direct their recommendations to the recognised 
government of the SuR and to frame their recommendations in such language accordingly.813   
Taking all this into account, one would be forgiven for thinking that Yemen appearing for its 
third cycle review in January 2019 will be an exercise in futility.  Notwithstanding UN led 
human rights missions, investigations and reports, and civil society led investigations and 
reports,814 if key actors in conflicts, particularly those conducted as ‘proxy wars’,815 deny 
accountability and responsibility for violations, and are shielded in that process both via the 
removal of references in reports and by being permitted to remain on the Human Rights 
Council membership (see section 2.1, chapter 2 on this matter), there is little hope for 
improvement on the ground and the function of the UPR.  If such a climate persists, the 
international human rights regime complex as a whole risks descending into ritual and 
ritualism due to a lack of will at the highest level to hold all states and actors accountable.  
6.3 Structural and process indicators: Yemen 
One measure of the extent of Yemen’s engagement with aspects of the international human 
rights regime complex is to chart the number and nature of international human rights 
treaties it has ratified.  This measure links with structural indicators, as defined in chapter 5, 
and Yemen’s status in this respect can be seen at figure 5, appendix 5.816  Those human 
                                                             
813 When Ireland made a recommendation to Syria during Syria’s second cycle UPR, it is said to have made its 
recommendation to the ‘Syrian Regime’, interview CS0 07.  This prompted the Syrian delegation to raise a 
point of order, stating that ‘speakers were required, pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1, to use 
diplomatic language when addressing the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review’. The response of 
the President of the Human Rights Council was to encourage ‘all speakers to use standard United Nations 
terminology in the interactive dialogue’, ‘Report of the Working Group of the Universal Periodic Review: Syrian 
Arab Republic’, Human Rights Council 34th Session, 27 February – 24 March 2017, A/HRC/35/4, 27 December 
2016, paras 22-24. 
814 See the various reports of the High Commissioner for Human Rights referred to in this chapter and the 
recently published 2017 report of domestic CSO, Mwatana, http://mwatana.org/annul-report-2017/ 
815 Patrick Wintour, et al, ‘Johnson says Saudi Arabia is a 'puppeteer' in Middle East proxy wars’ 08 December 
2016, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/dec/07/boris-johnson-accuses-saudi-arabia-of-twisting-
and-abusing-islam accessed 20 May 2018. 
816 This appendix refers to information exported from the ratification status pages of the OHCHR website, 
‘Status of Ratification: Interactive Dashboard’, http://indicators.ohchr.org/ last accessed 14 May 2018.  
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rights treaties ratified by Yemen are numerous and include CAT,817 ICCPR,818 CEDAW,819 
CERD,820 ICESCR,821 CRC,822 OP-CRC/AC,823 OP-CRC/SC,824 CRPD.825  The situation in Yemen 
that pre-dates the current conflict reflects aspects of the weakness of the treaty system, a 
matter that goes beyond the focus of this study but is debated elsewhere.826 
The OHCHR compilation report during the first and second cycles provided a useful means of 
measuring progress according to structural and process indicators by recording a state’s 
treaty ratification and compliance (or not) with reporting obligations.827  The compilation for 
Yemen produced in anticipation of its second cycle UPR indicated that since its first UPR, 
Yemen had ratified the CRPD, but that the initial report had been overdue since 2011 and 
that four reports had been submitted to the relevant treaty bodies and were awaiting 
consideration, with three due in the future, meaning that only the CRPD report was 
                                                             
817 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Adopted and 
opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 39/46 of 10 December 1984, 
entry into force 26 June 1987, in accordance with article 27 (1).  
818 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and 
accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 entry into force 23 March 1976, in 
accordance with Article 49. 
819 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women Adopted and opened for 
signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 34/180 of 18 December 1979 entry into 
force 3 September 1981, in accordance with article 27(1). 
820 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Adopted and opened for 
signature and ratification by General Assembly resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 December 1965, entry into force 4 
January 1969, in accordance with Article 19. 
821 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Adopted and opened for signature, 
ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, entry into force 3 
January 1976, in accordance with article 27. 
822 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by 
General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989, entry into force 2 September 1990, in accordance 
with article 49. 
823 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement  
of children in armed conflict, Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General 
Assembly resolution A/RES/54/263 of 25 May 2000, entry into force 12 February 2002. 
824 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children,  
child prostitution and child pornography, Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by 
General Assembly Resolution 54/263, A/RES/54/263 of 25 May 2000, entered into force on 18 January 2002.  
825 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol, adopted on 13 December 
2006, entered into force on 3 May 2008, General Assembly Resolution, 61/106, A/RES/61/106, 24 January 
2007. 
826 Forthcoming ‘2020 Treaty Body Review’ pursuant to UNGA ‘Strengthening and enhancing the effective 
functioning of the human rights treaty body system’ A/RES/68/268 (21 April 2014), see also, for example, 
Michael O’Flaherty, ‘Reform of the UN Human Rights Treaty Body System: Locating the Dublin Statement’ 
(2010) 10(2) Human Rights Law Review 319–335; Subedi (n 14); Weiss What’s Wrong with the UN (n 25). 
827 The reporting convention has now changes so that third cycle OHCHR compilations do not contain the same 
summary of ratification, referring only to treaty committee recommendations and evidence of progress made.   
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overdue.828  This was a marked improvement against the situation at the time of Yemen’s 
first cycle UPR in 2009.  At that point the follow up response to CERD had been overdue for 
two years since 2007; the follow up response to the Human Rights Committee overdue since 
2006; and the second, third and fourth reports to CAT had been overdue since 1996, 2000 
and 2004 respectively, although a report is referred to as having been submitted and 
considered in 2002.829   
Of the recommendations Yemen received during its first cycle review, two required action to 
cooperate with treaty bodies and submit reports by the due date (Republic of Korea and 
Germany) and Yemen supported both recommendations.830  It is possible these 
recommendations had a bearing on the action Yemen undertook to improve compliance 
with reporting obligations, further evidence of the UPR successfully fulfilling a governance 
function, albeit they are only two of the one hundred and fifty three recommendations 
Yemen received in that cycle.  
However, as these indicators relate to structural and process matters they cannot of 
themselves be heralded as reflecting success in terms of the promotion and protection of 
human rights on the ground and give little reassurance of rights protection.  This is 
particularly the case if structural indicators at a global level are not coupled with structural 
provisions at the national level, namely legislation.  Similarly, if process indicators at the 
global level are not linked to, for example, enforcement and judicial infrastructure, they are 
not effective in terms of implementing norms and principles in the treaties ratified.  
6.4 The challenge of follow up for states in crisis 
The longevity of commitments made by states in crisis during the UPR is limited, and the 
likelihood that recommendations received by states in crisis will be implemented is slim, as 
one interviewee said, for Yemen as a state in crisis ‘the UPR is an awareness raising 
mechanism. It's not the solution. It's a stepping-stone’.831   
                                                             
828 UNHRC ‘OHCHR Compilation: Yemen’, A/HRC/WG.6/18/YEM/2 (n 460). 
829 UNHRC ‘Compilation prepared by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in 
accordance with paragraph 15 (b) of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1 Yemen’ 
A/HRC/WG.6/5/YEM/2 (09 March 2009). 
830 UNHRC ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Yemen’ A/HRC/26/8, 07 April 2014. 
831 Interview CSO 07. 
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As set out below in table 2, of the 191 recommendations made to Yemen during the second 
cycle, 166 enjoyed its support, equating to an acceptance rate of 87%.  Although this 
indicates a commitment to making progress to protect rights, there is little evidence of 
Yemen having made progress against first cycle recommendations and as noted above, even 
less likelihood now of progress against second cycle recommendations.  
Yemen’s second cycle national report refers to strengthening the national human rights 
infrastructure following the first cycle review.832  Progress is reported as including the 
Government and the OHCHR jointly drafting a National Human Rights Institution Bill, 
however, there is no evidence of this having gone beyond consultation, reportedly with civil 
society and as part of Yemen’s national dialogue.833  In 2009 during its first cycle review, 
Yemen received and supported five recommendations relating to an NHRI.834  Two were 
action category 5: establish an independent NHRI (France), and finalise procedures aiming at 
the establishment of an independent NHRI (Jordan).  Of the other three recommendations, 
one was action category 4 (proceed with the intention to create an NHRI – Algeria), one 
action category 3 (consider establishing an NHRI – South Africa) and the third, action 
category 2 (continue to endeavour to create an NHRI – Thailand).  Based upon the weak 
nature of the lower action category recommendations, confirming compliance with 
instructions to ‘proceed with the intention to create’, ‘consider establishing’ and ‘continue 
to endeavour to create’, is straightforward.  The fact remains, however, that an NHRI was 
not established.  This not only indicates very slow progress but also a reluctance to see the 
project through and reflects poorly on the state in terms of the nature of its engagement 
with the UPR.   
Yemen’s second cycle national report refers to a National Committee to Combat Human 
Trafficking as having been established, but the Committee’s output amounts only to drafting 
and consulting upon a bill on human trafficking.835  A General Department for Human Rights 
was reportedly established as part of a restructure of the ministry for human rights.836  
Other progress reported includes: the establishing of human rights offices in a number of 
                                                             
832 UNHRC ‘National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights Council 
resolution 16/21: Yemen’, A/HRC/WG.6/5/YEM/1, 08 November 2013, paras 25-35. 
833 ibid paras 26-7. 
834 UNHRC ‘Working Group Report: Yemen’ A/HRC/12/13 (n 662). 
835 UNHRC ‘National report: Yemen’ A/HRC/WG.6/18/YEM/1 (n 603). 
836 ibid para 30. 
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governorates and human rights coordinators having been appointed to work in them; the 
expansion of the Technical Committee to include a larger number of governmental 
institutions that monitor human rights and mainstream them into their plans and 
programmes; an increase in the membership of the Advisory Body of the Ministry of Human 
Rights, representing CSOs that deal with human rights as well as academics, activists, 
journalists and trade unionists, with 60 members as of the date of the national report; and 
action to enhance the links between the government and civil society.837  Much of what is 
reported here refers to initial steps rather than action that will actually secure protection of 
rights, and no doubt any progress will be seriously compromised in the face of the war in 
Yemen.838  
In some respects, Yemen implicitly acknowledged its extremely limited capacity to be 
proactive in matters relating to rights protection.  In its second cycle national report it 
accepted the country was ‘going through a humanitarian crisis, which is linked to food and 
fuel-price hikes, the rising incidence of poverty, falling standards in social services, supply 
shortages, and internal conflicts’.839  Even so, the overriding tone of that report was positive.  
It cited efforts, amongst others, to form a national human rights institution and attempts to 
address matters raised as part of the youth uprising during the Arab spring via the National 
Dialogue.  However, stakeholders repeatedly raised concerns both formally through 
submissions made to the UPR Working Group, and informally at a parallel event in Geneva 
during the UPR’s 18th session, that there had been failure on the part of the country to 
implement those recommendations that had been supported at the time of the first UPR 
cycle.840  
As noted, between Yemen’s first and second UPRs was the Arab spring followed by the 
current war and instability of the country.  This, combined with the poverty faced by so 
                                                             
837 ibid paras 31, 32, 33, and 34 – 35. 
838 Human Rights Watch ‘World Report: Yemen 2017’ (n 757); Mwatana ‘Annual Report 2017’ (n 757). 
839 UNHRC ‘National report: Yemen’ A/HRC/WG.6/18/YEM/1 (n 603) para 9. 
840 In terms of formal concerns, see submissions by the Middle East Foundation for Social Development and 
Youth Development Foundation, and Youth Without Borders for Development, UNHRC ‘Stakeholder summary: 
Yemen’ A/HRC/WG.6/18/YEM/3 (n 17). 3. With regard to those concerns raised on a more informal basis, the 
Yemeni non-governmental organisation Alkarama hosted a side event attended by journalists, human rights 
activist and others at which grave concern was expressed in relation to Yemen’s failure to take action to 
implement previous recommendations supported and the situation relating to the rights of women and 
children and human rights defenders, author’s own notes, 28 January 2015. 
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much of its population makes it impossible to predict success in terms of the UPR’s 
objectives being satisfied.  However, the Yemeni Permanent Mission to the UN expressed 
the view that the government had tried to implement many of the second cycle 
recommendations by moving to a federal state underpinned by principles of democracy and 
reflected in the new draft constitution, which he explained was not implemented because of 
the now more urgent situation of how to feed people and how to protect civilians.841   
To conclude this section, a high rate of acceptance of recommendations appears to reflect 
commitment on the part of the SuR to rights protection, but the cyclical nature of the UPR 
soon exposes whether that commitment leads to action to effect change on the ground.  
Lower action category recommendations encourage compliance but weaken the utility of 
the UPR because they do little to effect tangible change on the ground.  It is action category 
5 recommendations that will, if implemented, secure the longer-term governance function 
of the UPR. 
6.5 Recommendations: statistics and type – states in crisis compared to stable states842 
This section presents statistics in relation to the number of recommendations made to 
Yemen compared to the other sample comparator states and cites the number of 
recommendations requiring specific action.  This exercise is undertaken to determine if the 
experience of states in crisis in terms of the number and nature of recommendations 
received at the UPR is any different to stable states, and to compare the acceptance rate 
between sample states. 
As per the data in tables 2 – 6 below, during the first cycle, 153 recommendations were 
made to Yemen by 56 states, of which Yemen supported 131 (85.6%).  Of the 153 made, 33 
(21.5%) were category 5, which is 13% below the overall average for the same cycle.  During 
its second cycle review, Yemen received a higher number of recommendations, 191, from 78 
states, 21 states more than during the first cycle, of which it supported 166 (87%). This 
represented an increase of almost 25% in the number of recommendations made to Yemen 
in the second cycle compared to the first, which is lower than the overall percentage 
                                                             
841 Interview UN 03. 
842 All data in this section is extracted from the recommendations database and statistics of UPR Info: Database 
of Recommendations (n 125) and UPR Info: Statistics of Recommendations (n 126). 
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increase in recommendations made during the second cycle compared to the first, 
approximately 70%.  Of those 191 recommendations made, 60 (31.5%) were action-category 
5, more in keeping with the overall average of specific action across the two cycles. 
Table 2: Yemen – recommendations: statistics and type 
Yemen  No.   Specific action 
 
Supported 
 
No.  States 
      No. % % Variance 
 
No. % % Variance 
  
1st cycle 
(May 2009)  
153 
 
33 21.6 N/A 
 
131 85.6 N/A 
 
56 
  
           
2nd cycle 
(Jan 2014) 
191 
 
60 31.4 9.8 
 
166 87 1.40% 
 
77 
 
Table 3: UK – recommendations: statistics and type 
UK No.   Specific action 
 
Supported 
 
No.  States 
  
 
  No. % % Variance 
 
No. % % Variance 
  
1st cycle 
(Apr 2008) 
35   11 31.4 N/A 
 
22 62.9 N/A 
 
16 
  
 
  
         
2nd cycle 
(May 2012) 
137   48 35.0 3.6 
 
91 66.4 1.40% 
 
55 
 
Table 4: New Zealand – recommendations: statistics and type 
New 
Zealand 
No. 
 
Specific action 
 
Supported 
 
No.  States 
  
  
No. % % Variance 
 
No. % % Variance 
  
1st cycle 
(May 2009)  
73 
 
19 26.0 N/A 
 
38 52.1 N/A 
 
29 
  
           
2nd cycle 
(Jan 2014) 
155 
 
39 25.2 -0.9 
 
121 78.1 1.40% 
 
70 
In terms of the experience of other states, the figures for the UK’s first cycle review are, as 
noted in chapter 5, out of sync with SuRs in subsequent UPR sessions.  This is attributable to 
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the UK being part of the first UPR session.843  Other states reviewed during the first session 
similarly received a disproportionately lower number of recommendations.  Bahrain, for 
example, received a total of 12 recommendations, a third compared to the UK, Argentina 
received a higher number of 41, and India received 30.  It is therefore difficult to reach any 
substantive conclusions for that review or indeed that UPR session.   
Looking at the UK’s second cycle review compared to Yemen’s, we can see Yemen received 
54 more recommendations, from 22 more countries.  This might indicate more widespread 
concern with the human rights situation in Yemen compared to that of the UK.  Yemen has a 
higher acceptance rate than the UK for both cycles, Yemen being 85.6% and 87% for the first 
and second cycles respectively, the UK being 62.9% and 66.4%, respectively. 
Comparing Yemen against New Zealand for both cycles reveals the same pattern.  Yemen 
received more recommendations than New Zealand, 80 more in the first cycle and 36 more 
in the second cycle.  In the first cycle, Yemen’s acceptance rate was significantly higher than 
New Zealand’s: Yemen supported 85.6% of the recommendations it received, against 52.1% 
for New Zealand.  The variance between the two states was reduced for the second cycle, 
with Yemen’s acceptance rate remaining higher: Yemen 87%, New Zealand 78.1%. 
Table 5: Iraq – recommendations: statistics and type 
Iraq No. 
 
Specific action 
 
Supported 
 
No.  States 
  
  
No. % % Variance 
 
No. % % Variance 
  
1st cycle 
(Feb 2010) 
179 
 
64 35.8 N/A 
 
136 76.0 N/A 
 
52 
  
           
2nd cycle 
(Nov 2014) 
242 
 
87 36.0 0.2 
 
175 72.3 1.40% 
 
84 
 
                                                             
843 Interview UN 01, during which the interviewee notes ‘The first cycle, apart from the universality, the 
challenge was to form this into a meaningful exercise and if you look at the first two, three or four sessions, 
some of the recommendations were ridiculous, there were very few of them. It was clearly a system that was 
looking for its aim and soul and purpose and so on’. 
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Table 6: Somalia – recommendations: statistics and type 
Somalia No. 
Recns 
 
Specific action 
 
Supported 
 
No.  States 
  
  
no. % % Variance 
 
no. % % Variance 
  
1st cycle 
(May 2011) 
155 
 
58 37.4 N/A 
 
155 100.
0 
N/A 
 
47 
  
           
2nd cycle 
(Jan 2016) 
256 
 
117 45.7 8.3 
 
180 70.3 1.40% 
 
80 
Both Iraq and Somalia received a similar number of recommendations to Yemen during their 
first cycle reviews (Yemen: 153, Iraq: 179, Somalia: 155), however during the second cycle, 
both Iraq and Somalia received significantly more recommendations than Yemen (Yemen: 
191, Iraq: 242 (51 more than Yemen), Somalia: 256 (65 more than Yemen).  The number of 
states making recommendations to states in crisis compared to stable states in this sample is 
higher across both cycles; there is a higher divergence in the first cycle, but the pattern does 
continue into the second cycle: Yemen 56/77, Somalia 47/80, and Iraq 52/84 - compared to 
UK 16/55 and New Zealand 29/70.  
In terms of the percentage of recommendations requiring specific action across the sample 
states from one cycle to the next, the increase is the most significant for Yemen and Somalia; 
this brings Yemen more in line with the overall average, but takes Somalia almost 10% 
higher than the overall average.844  Yemen received an increase in recommendations 
requiring specific action of nearly 10% in the second cycle compared to the first (31.4% in 
the 2nd cycle, lower than the overall average of 36.9%), and Somalia an increase of 8.3% 
(45.7% in the 2nd cycle).  The UK experienced only a slight increase (3.6%), New Zealand a 
marginal decrease (0.8%) and Iraq a marginal increase (0.2%). 
It would appear from a sample analysis that states in crisis receive a higher number of 
recommendations, from a higher number of recommending states, but that those 
recommendations do not always reflect a higher rate of specific action being recommended.  
For the first cycle, Yemen received recommendations from more states than any other in 
                                                             
844 Yemen: 1st cycle - 21.6% / 2nd cycle - 31.4%; UK: 1st cycle - 31.4% / 2nd cycle - 35%; New Zealand: 1st cycle - 
26% / 2nd cycle - 25.2%; Iraq: 1st cycle - 35.8% / 2nd cycle - 36%; Somalia 1st cycle - 37.4% / 2nd cycle - 45.7%. 
 
 
204 
 
this sample.   This suggests Yemen attracted the attention of a higher proportion of the 
international community compared to other states.  This may be due to a number of factors.  
Reciprocity can play a part, as can regionalism, as discussed in chapter 5 and presented in 
more detail below.  Further, the events of the Arab spring attracted global media coverage 
and may have contributed to a broader awareness raising of rights issues in Yemen.  
Geopolitical factors detailed above will also have an influence.  Ultimately, the fact that 
more states are engaging with the human rights situation in Yemen in this way evidences 
closer international monitoring of the domestic rights situation and can be utilised by 
national and international NGOs as leverage in the follow up and consultation and advocacy 
process, as detailed in section 7.4, chapter 7. 
Two further questions flow from this assessment of the monitoring process according to the 
nature and number of recommendations made to Yemen.  These are, firstly, which states are 
making recommendations to Yemen? Secondly, what is the source of those 
recommendations?  In terms of the former, of the 56 states that made recommendations to 
Yemen during the first cycle, states belonging to the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) 
made the most recommendations (53 recommendations / 34.64%).845  The EU was the 
second highest recommending grouping of states (43 / 28.1%), and the Arab League the 
third highest (34 / 22.2%).846  That the OIC was the highest recommending group to Yemen 
might reflect politicisation in the form of regionalism, religious and cultural connections and 
reciprocity, or be an expression of regional concern.  Of the 56 recommending states in the 
first cycle, 26 made action category five recommendations, six of which were made by 
counties in the OIC, of which four were also members of the Arab league.  Five of these six 
recommendations were supported.  The recommendation was from Iran and requested 
Yemen ‘Develop a national plan of action aimed at fostering a culture of human rights and at 
raising public awareness of human rights among the society’, and was supported.  Whilst it 
refers to specific action, that action is broadly framed and therefore is not contentious.  
Therefore, whilst Yemen received more recommendations from OIC countries than any 
other grouping of states, the fact they were lower action category means they are more 
straightforward in terms of compliance.  This further supports the view that allies treat each 
                                                             
845 UPR Info: Statistics of Recommendations (n 126).  
846 ibid. 
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other favourably in the UPR forum, contributing to the ‘success’ of a state’s review.  This can 
also be said of the second cycle as the analysis of data at the end of this section below 
shows.  
Other states recommending specific action included: Austria, one on economic, social and 
cultural rights, women’s rights and international instruments, and a second on rights of the 
child – both supported; the US, three in total, all supported, one on freedom of opinion and 
expression and freedom of the press, the second on detention, and the third on labour; and 
Argentina, one on enforced disappearances and international instruments, and one on 
detention, international instruments and torture.847  There does not appear to be a 
particular pattern emerging here. 
In the second cycle, 77 states made 191 recommendations to Yemen, with the EU and the 
OIC making an almost identical number, 58 and 59 respectively, amounting to 30.89% and 
30.37%, followed by the OIF (Organization Internationale Francophonie), a total of 43, 
amounting to 22.51%.848  A total of 60 specific action recommendations were made by 35 
states, see appendix 6 ‘Action category 5 recommendations to Yemen 2nd cycle’.  The 
majority, 35 recommendations, were made by EU states.  Whilst this is an increase in the 
number of category 5 recommendations compared to the first cycle, it still represents under 
a third of the total recommendations made.  Four members of the OIC, Bahrain, Jordan, 
Morocco and the Maldives made specific action recommendations to Yemen, a similar figure 
to that in the first cycle.  Those recommendations referred to human trafficking, general 
rights protection, human rights education and training, and justice.849 
6.6 Content of recommendations made to Yemen 
Given that Yemen has ratified the majority of the UN international human rights treaties, 
most of the thematic content of the recommendations Yemen received refer to legal 
obligations and rights protection that Yemen has previously committed to.  The content of 
the recommendations thus reveals the international community’s view of the areas in which 
Yemen is falling short of its legal obligations and commitments.  This demonstrates the 
                                                             
847 UPR Info: Database of Recommendations (n 125) filtered according to Yemen, first cycle, action category 5. 
848 UPR Info: Statistics of Recommendations (n 126) filtered according to Yemen, second cycle. 
849 See appendix 6 for the specific recommendations made.  
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multi-directional nature of the international human rights regime complex and the UPR’s 
particular function in this respect.  
In the first cycle, the issues that were the subject of most recommendations were women’s 
rights (45/29.41%) and rights of the child (19/12.42%).  Yemen broadly supported 
recommendations requiring non-discrimination against women and laws to prohibit violence 
and forced marriage, supporting 43 of the 45, and noted only one of the 19 
recommendations received regarding rights of the child during the first cycle (to raise the 
legal age of marriage to 15 – Australia).850   
In the second cycle it was again women’s rights (49/25.65%) and rights of the child 
(51/26.7%) that received the greatest focus.  Of the 51 rights of the child recommendations, 
9 were noted (17.64%), whereas only one of the 49 recommendations on women’s rights 
was noted (become party to the operational protocol to CEDAW - Australia).  Most of the 
rights of the child recommendations that were noted referred to eliminating the death 
penalty for those under the age of 18 (France, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Mexico, Norway, 
Switzerland, Uruguay), and eliminating punishment by stoning for those under 18 (Uruguay).  
There was one noted recommendation regarding the ratification of OP-CRC/CP (Portugal).  
Yemen’s refusal to support these recommendations is evidence of a lack of intention or will 
to change its position regarding the application of the death penalty to those under the age 
of 18.  However, those recommendations that referred to eliminating child, early and forced 
marriage were all supported (save for raising the age of marriage to 15), as were those 
referring to domestic violence and traditional practices including female genital 
mutilation.851  We might question whether such support will translate to greater protection 
for women and children in this respect.  Effecting change on the ground where historic 
cultural and religious practice is concerned is a significant challenge and can only be 
                                                             
850 UPR Info: Database of Recommendations (n 125). 
851 There is some crossover in the UPR-Info database with some recommendations characterised as rights of 
the child and women’s rights (for example, marriage and traditional customs / practices) which meant that 
some recommendations in the statistics are counted twice (indicative of the indivisibility and intersectionality 
of rights), ibid. 
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supported by significant efforts on the part of policy and practice by public authorities and 
enforcement of laws that prohibit the action referred to.852 
Charting the response of Yemen to recommendations relating to torture and cruel, inhuman 
and degrading treatment also reveals the substance of what the government is willing to 
entertain movement on and that which it is not, as well as the importance attributed by 
reviewing states to this issue for Yemen.  Yemen is a party to CAT yet received only 17 
recommendations over the course of the first and second cycles in relation to torture and 
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.853  Seven were received during the first cycle, of 
which four were noted and three supported.  Those that were noted included reference to 
the abolition of: corporal punishments such as flogging and, in a few cases, amputation of 
limbs, in violation of article 7 of ICCPR (Nigeria); torture and other cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment in all forms, in particular stoning, flogging and the amputation of limbs, 
and the execution of minors, as recommended by the Human Rights Committee and the 
relevant special mandate holders (Israel) (note the direct reference here by Israel to another 
governance entity within the international human rights regime complex – further evidence 
of the complementarity facilitated by the UPR and the multi-directional function of the 
regime complex); and ratifying the OP-CAT (Argentina and the Czech Republic).854  In its 
comments and observations, Nigeria ‘noted the inadequate training of persons monitoring 
abuses and limited resources, and called upon the international community to assist Yemen 
in these areas’ whilst Israel ‘expressed concern about forced early marriages, draconic 
methods of execution and punishment, and discrimination and violence systematically 
directed against women and children’.855   
Of the ten recommendations in the second cycle referring to torture and cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment, seven referred to female genital mutilation.  Only three referred 
                                                             
852 For various discussions relating to cultural relativism and associated challenges of universal rights 
realisation see, for example, Seyla Benhabib, The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era, 
(Princeton University Press 2002); Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca, N.Y.; 
London: Cornell University Press 2002); Michael Goodhart, ‘Origins and Universality in the Human Rights 
Debates: Cultural Essentialism and the Challenge of Globalization’ (2003) 25(4) Human Rights Quarterly 935-
964; and Stephen A. James, ‘Reconciling International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism: The Case of 
Female Circumcision’ (1994) 8(1) Bioethics 1. 
853 UPR Info database of recommendations (n 125) 
854 ibid. 
855 UNHRC ‘Working Group Report: Yemen’ A/HRC/12/13 (n 662). 
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directly to CAT, one being to implement all CAT recommendations (supported) and two that 
referred to ratification of OP-CAT, Denmark and Tunisia, (noted).  Stoning is referred to in 
two recommendations, in the context of the death penalty and stoning to death one from 
Canada that was supported,856 the other by Uruguay which was noted, but this may be due 
to other matters referred to in the same recommendation.857  The position of Yemen in 
relation to the three issue types referred to above, rights of the child, women’s rights and 
torture, is self-evident via the ‘noted’ responses it gives to particular recommendations.   
The absence in the second cycle of any recommendations directly regarding corporal 
punishment such as stoning, flogging and the amputation of limbs is surprising in the context 
of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.858  
In the first cycle, just under a third of those recommendations that enjoyed the support of 
Yemen related to the rights of women, for example, calling for action to promote and secure 
gender equality, to observe commitments under CEDAW, to ratify the optional protocols to 
CEDAW, and to strengthen existing constitutional and legal frameworks.859  In its statement 
to Yemen during the first cycle of the UPR, Norway noted that ‘discrimination against 
women reportedly remained rampant and enquired about steps envisaged to implement the 
new law fixing a minimum marital age.’860  It also echoed concerns that had been raised by 
the CEDAW committee, concluding it remained ‘concerned about reports of harassment and 
intimidation against people expressing their views through peaceful demonstration.’861   
The recommendations and the analysis conducted above evidences the UPR’s 
complementary governance function as an entity within a multi-directional international 
human rights regime complex.  This is illustrated in particular when reviewing states cross-
reference treaty obligations and repeat concerns and recommendations previously raised by 
                                                             
856 ‘Put an end by law to death by stoning and reduce the number of crimes that are punishable by the death 
penalty, excluding the death penalty for crimes related to drugs’. 
857 ‘Review legislation on the death penalty in order to eliminate the use of the death penalty, including 
stoning, as well as ratify the Second Optional Protocol to ICCPR and comply with the provisions of article 6, 
paragraph 5, of the Covenant on crimes committed by persons under the age of 18’. 
858 UPR Info: Database of recommendations (n 125). 
859 Author’s own figures compiled with reference to the first cycle UNHRC ‘Working Group Report: Yemen’ 
A/HRC/12/13 (n 662). 
860 ibid para 78. 
861 ibid. 
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another human rights mechanism in the regime complex.  This has occurred in both of 
Yemen’s UPR Working Groups to date.   
As discussed in section 5.6, chapter 5, in the event that a state ‘notes’ a recommendation 
rather than supports it, the state is required to provide an update of its position at the 
Council’s regular session immediately following that state’s review pursuant to standing item 
6 of the Council’s agenda. This is further evidence of the co-ordinated human rights 
governance approach pursued by the Human Rights Council and its institutions and of the 
multi-directional nature of the international human rights regime complex.  However, the 
failure of a state to give a full and substantial response to a noted recommendation, which is 
then not addressed, suggests that the governance function of the UPR can be easily 
undermined and proceeds with some fragility.  This was evident in Yemen’s failure to fully 
respond at a Human Rights Council’s regular session to a recommendation made by the US 
regarding spousal rape, with that failure proceeding unchecked by the Council, see section 
5.3 chapter 5.   
6.7 The source of recommendations made to Yemen 
The multi-directional global governance of the international human rights regime complex is 
further evident from an analysis of the UPR documentation for Yemen with reference to the 
potential source of recommendations made during the interactive dialogue by reviewing 
states.   
Table 7 at appendix 7 tracks reference to a specific right / issue as referred to by treaty 
bodies in the OHCHR compilation report and whether that matter is subsequently the 
subject of a reviewing state’s recommendation to Yemen.  Table 8 at appendix 8 takes a 
similar approach with reference to the High Commissioner’s report on the OHCHR mission to 
Yemen in December 2011, as does table 9 at appendix 9 regarding a sample of stakeholder 
submissions.  Tracking recommendations in this manner reveals the extent to which other 
entities and actors within the regime complex contribute either directly or indirectly to the 
UPR peer review process.  Due to the length of these tables they have been included as 
appendices rather than embedded into the main body of the text.  
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It is evident from the information presented in tables 7, 8 and 9 that the work of other 
entities within the regime complex is endorsed and reinforced via the UPR monitoring 
process.  Tables 7 and 8 demonstrate that the OHCHR compilation report provides a vehicle 
to reiterate concerns and recommendations previously made (the report of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, for example, is referred to on nine separate occasions in 
the OHCHR Compilation report) and is a fertile source of recommendations to Yemen during 
the second cycle.  This appears most successful when the OHCHR report names 
recommendations previously made to Yemen via other monitoring mechanisms.  Where 
reference is made to reports of matters of concern and/or allegations these are not 
necessarily picked up during the UPR recommending process.  The OHCHR compilation 
report cited, for example, widespread allegations of extrajudicial killings and excessive use of 
force by security forces and affiliated groups against civilians and civilian targets, torture or 
other ill-treatment by the Republican Guard and the Central Security Forces and individuals 
allegedly tortured in detention centres in Sana’a.862  Linked to this, the OHCHR reported it 
had received information that more than 320 cases of violations affecting journalists, 
including illegal arrest and detention, had been reported since January 2011.  However none 
of these specific matters featured in second cycle recommendations to Yemen.  This may be 
due to the nature of the subject matter and the fact it refers to specific cases of allegations, 
or it may be because such material is not phrased in the language of a recommendation and 
is therefore less easily extracted by reviewing states in preparing their recommendations.  
Table 9 tracks a sample of stakeholder submissions to determine the extent to which civil 
society recommendations and matters of concern are referred to by reviewing states during 
peer review.  From the data presented it appears that reviewing states actively access 
stakeholder submissions as a source of information and influence for the recommendations 
they then construct and deliver.  Whilst the majority of recommendations made by civil 
society included in this sample form the basis of recommendations to Yemen, of which the 
majority are supported, there are certain recommendations that do not.  This includes 
recommendations to protect the Muhammasheen, a minority group in Yemen, from 
discrimination,863 a recommendation to repeal amnesty laws and a recommendation to 
                                                             
862 UNHRC ‘OHCHR Compilation: Yemen’, A/HRC/WG.6/18/YEM/2 (n 460). 
863 UNHRC ‘Stakeholder summary: Yemen’ A/HRC/WG.6/18/YEM/3 (n 17) para 19. 
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criminalise honour crimes.  Colombia made the only recommendation citing protection of 
minorities, which was supported.864  There was one specific reference to honour crimes 
during the interactive dialogue by Lithuania that ‘noted efforts to eliminate discrimination 
against women but remained concerned about honour killings and forced marriages.’865  
However, there was no direct reference to honour killings in the recommendations made 
(Spain recommended that marital rape and domestic violence be criminalised, which was 
supported), and there appears to have been no reference to amnesty laws or matters 
relating to impunity.866  
To conclude, reviewing states access the OHCHR compilation and stakeholder submissions, 
the content of which then shapes the recommendations reviewing states make,867 with 
some states reportedly copying and pasting recommendations.868  By engaging with the 
documents and the processes of the UPR in this manner, reviewing states endorse the 
authority of the UPR process and of those other mechanisms and international organisations 
within the regime complex.  Although not all of the recommendations made by other 
mechanisms and by stakeholders are adopted by reviewing states, the UPR fulfils an 
important function in terms of collating data and information from across the regime 
complex and creating a space within which it is presented to all interested parties.  
Conclusion: the UPR and Yemen 
This chapter has confirmed that the governance function of the UPR operates within a multi-
directional international human rights regime complex; the procedural legitimacy of the UPR 
is reinforced by the substantive output of other reporting mechanisms being collated and 
accessed by reviewing states.  In turn, many of the recommendations from other 
mechanisms then form the basis of UPR recommendations.  In this manner, the UPR 
operates as a means to centralise the concerns made in other more fragmented fora.  In 
doing so, it asserts the authority of those other fora and their legitimacy whilst 
                                                             
864 UNHRC ‘Working Group Report: Yemen’ A/HRC/26/8 (n 830) para 115.49. 
865 ibid para 58. 
866 Related to this, Lithuania recommended Yemen ‘Take measures to protect women and girls from domestic 
violence and to ensure that acts of such violence are fully investigated and those responsible are held 
accountable’ (supported), ibid para 115.72. 
867 Interview UN 03. 
868 ‘We do get an awful lot of states that do admit to copying and pasting NGOs recommendations that they 
provide’, interview CSO 05. 
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simultaneously enhancing its own. The UPR ultimately provides a succinct record of the 
human rights reviewing and monitoring activity in the period since the last UPR by other 
human rights governance regimes within the regime complex in a formal arena for reflection 
and comment.   
It is acknowledged in this chapter that the UPR was not conceived as a mechanism to 
respond to emergency situations or to maintain international peace and security.869  
Although the UPR is limited in its capacity in the interactive dialogue and via the process of 
making and receiving recommendations to take account of the very complex cultural, 
historical and political factors that impact upon a state’s human rights situation, rarely do 
crisis situations emerge without some forewarning.  Many of the issues raised by treaty 
bodies, the UNCT to Yemen and civil society ahead of Yemen’s second cycle review were 
long-term matters of concern.  Many predate the uprising of 2011 and the current war, 
stemming from entrenched social and cultural practices such as child marriage, poor 
treatment of women, poor levels of literacy and access to health care and education to 
name a few.870  A review of the first and second cycle UPR documentation for Yemen reveals 
warning of fragmentation, corruption, and widespread human rights violations; an indication 
Yemen could quickly become the site of more significant and fundamental human rights 
suffering and violations, as is now the case.871   
Extreme poverty and poor human rights protection have been prevalent in Yemen for many 
decades, and whilst there appeared to be evidence of some improvement towards the end 
of the 1990s following the unification of Yemen, this was limited and short-lived.872  The 
position of women within Yemeni culture, female illiteracy, reported in 2004 as being 90% of 
women in rural areas, and a high birth rate and expanding population present further 
                                                             
869 This falls within the remit of the Security Council, and other United Nations agencies referred to in the 
introduction to this chapter, United Nations Charter, Article 24, paragraph 1 ‘In order to ensure prompt and 
effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for 
the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this 
responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf’. In addition, the Human Rights Council does have some 
mandate in this regard, UNGA A/RES/60/251 (n 143) para 5(f). 
870 UNHRC ‘Stakeholder summary: Yemen’ A/HRC/WG.6/18/YEM/3 (n 17). 
871 ibid, and UNHRC ‘OHCHR Compilation: Yemen’, A/HRC/WG.6/18/YEM/2 (n 460), for example.  
872 ‘Report submitted by the independent expert on extreme poverty’ E/CN.4/2004/43/Add.1 (n 717) 4 with 
reference to a visit in 1999 during which there was evidence of greater freedom of expression for women and 
a greater awareness of human rights objectives within the Government. 
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developmental challenges.873  Such challenges seriously undermine the capacity of the state 
to meet its human rights commitments and obligations; for example, whilst women legally 
have the right to work, this right is rarely enforced and conservative social pressures 
invariably prevail.874   
As this chapter illustrates, the UPR does not operate in a vacuum; references and warnings 
of concern abound in Security Council resolutions, OHCHR reports and, of course, in the UPR 
documentation including the recommendations made, the OHCHR compilation and the 
summary of stakeholder submissions.  The Middle East Foundation for Social Development 
and Youth Development Foundation and Youth Without Borders for Development, for 
example, noted in their joint second cycle NGO submission ‘that Houthis and affiliates of the 
doctrine of al-Zaidi raise several problems and concerns, including threats on the media, 
religious confrontation and sectarianism and risks of instability’.875  
By referencing and collating the findings of various human rights monitoring institutions and 
UN agencies, the UPR presents a site at which information from an array of organisations 
and civil society is assembled and should be paid close attention to.  Further, the UPR is part 
of the Human Rights Council and there is a flow of information and intelligence between the 
Human Rights Council and the Security Council, as well as civil society, as illustrated above. 
However, a question arises as to the nature of the duty of the UN and the international 
community and it meeting that duty in terms of action it takes when in receipt of such 
information. 
If UN monitoring mechanisms with a governance function fail to take heed of the warning 
signs and act accordingly, the credibility and purpose of those mechanisms should rightly be 
questioned.  There is an argument that the situation in Yemen both now and at the time of 
the second cycle provides grounds for calling the UN and those states that have invested so 
heavily in the human rights monitoring and reporting machinery to account for inaction.  To 
                                                             
873 ibid. 
874 ibid. 
875 UNHRC ‘Stakeholder summary: Yemen’ A/HRC/WG.6/18/YEM/3 (n 17), para 62, submission by Middle East 
Foundation for Social Development and Youth Development Foundation (YDO) and Youth Without Borders for 
Development (YWBD). 
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refrain from doing so may relegate the work of entities within the international human rights 
regime complex to little more than pen pushing.  
In the case of entrenched and exacerbated human rights failings, it would nonetheless be 
naïve and idealistic to advocate that the UPR will prompt implementation of human rights 
protection when so many others have failed.  Yet the normative space that the Working 
Group in Geneva creates, being the physical space of the interactive dialogue and the textual 
space of the UPR documentation, combined with the attention the human rights situation in 
Yemen is receiving at the highest level,876 means that diplomatic pressure from and upon the 
international community will be significant.  It is possible that this pressure will be informed 
by the decision of a number of Western states to suspend their arms exports to Saudi Arabia 
as a result of evidence of their use in Yemen in violation of international humanitarian 
law,877 and the fact that the UK’s Court of Appeal has agreed to hear Campaign Against Arms 
Trade’s appeal against the High Court declining to interfere the UK government’s decision to 
continue to sell arms to the Saudis.878 
The analysis of quantitative data conducted in this chapter demonstrates that states in crisis 
receive more recommendations from a higher number of countries.  This may indicate a 
greater degree of concern from reviewing states, an acknowledgement of the need to 
encourage human rights protection in states where people on the ground are most in need.  
States in crisis also accept a higher number of recommendations compared to stable states 
and this trend looks set to continue despite a decrease in the proportion of supported 
recommendations by some states during the third cycle.  In terms of the identity of 
recommending states, for Yemen it was the OIC group of states that made the most 
recommendations in the first cycle, although only one required specific action, suggesting an 
                                                             
876 The High Commissioner for Human Rights, presented evidence of violations and abuses of international 
human rights law and violations of international humanitarian law, ‘in particular those relating to the impact of 
attacks on the population in Yemen, the recruitment of children for their use in hostilities, and violations of 
freedom of expression that allegedly took place between 1 July 2015 and 30 June 2016’, UNHRC A/HRC/33/38 
(n 756) para 10 and para 1. This report also refers to failings on the part of the national commission of inquiry 
that was set up to investigate allegations of human rights violations that have been reported since 2011. The 
national commission of inquiry was set up in accordance with UHNRC ‘Technical assistance and capacity-
building for Yemen in the field of human rights’ A/RES/HRC/24/32 (09 October 2013) and UNHRC ‘Technical 
assistance and capacity-building for Yemen in the field of human rights’ A/RES/HRC/27/19 (03 October 2014). 
877 Wilcken (n 780). 
878 R (on the application of Campaign Against Arms Trade) v Secretary of State for International Trade [2018] 
EWCA Civ 1010. 
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element of regionalism and reciprocity.  The OIC and the EU made the highest number of 
recommendations to Yemen in its second cycle review.  A review of the nature of the 
recommendations made to Yemen during both cycles suggests that the OHCHR compilation 
and summary of stakeholder submissions are fertile sources of recommendations for 
reviewing states, but not all substantive matters raised in those reports translate into 
recommendations.  
Looking to the third cycle, as discussed in section 5.3.2, chapter 5, the UPR in January 2019 
can contribute to a broader acculturation for Yemen, taking guidance from other states as to 
how they approach human rights protection, particularly those in transition to peace.879  A 
question asked during a number of the interviews for this study was whether the UPR might 
present an opportunity for Yemen to reassert its sovereignty and statehood.  A number of 
interviewees agreed with this hypothesis; one commented ‘depending on circumstances, 
even the worst-case scenario, even Yemen they may want to show some elements of 
implementation to show they are not a failed state,’ another that ‘a government that might 
be vying for legitimacy back home would see the UPR as an additional platform to reify its 
existence as the legitimate state. I could see that being a dynamic’.880  A further thought 
expressed was that making recommendations as a reviewing state was also a means of 
validation, particularly by giving specific and well considered recommendations that 
reflected research on the part of the recommending state.881  
One civil society representative indicated that good practice, advice and recommendations 
made whilst a country such as Yemen is in the midst of conflict may not be immediately 
referred to, but in the post-conflict peace building phase, such reports and 
recommendations can be returned to and form the basis upon which to plan and 
coordinate.882  Furthermore, there will be attention given to the comments, 
recommendations and the role of Yemen’s neighbouring countries during its third cycle 
review.  The same interviewee commented that for civil society it may not be possible ‘to 
                                                             
879 Interview CSO 03. 
880 Interview UN 01 and CSO 07 respectively. 
881 Interview CSO 05. 
882 Interview CSO 03. 
 
 
216 
 
have a consultation in the country but you can have it in neighbouring countries to have a 
regional perspective on it and to bring it to attention’.883  Another view was that, for Yemen: 
(…) depending how the situation evolves, I think the UPR provides some 
opportunities... it provides the opportunity for a frank assessment of the 
situation on the ground at the time, drawing from expert sources. I think 
it provides an opportunity for states to really elaborate a blue print for 
reform and for, again depending on the situation, an end to the conflict 
and accounting for the human rights violations that have occurred in the 
context of the ongoing crisis. 
I think it also provides an opportunity to focus humanitarian and 
development assistance, both bilaterally and at the UN level. One way in 
which I think that more could be made of the UPR is through the 
integration of critical UPR recommendations in the programming and 
planning of UN country teams and UNDP and to some extent in bilateral 
relations.884 
This interviewee went on to emphasise the UPR’s role ‘in mapping out the steps that may 
need to be taken to end the conflict, and to re-build post conflict, sometimes associated with 
development assistance’, making the very valid point that given Yemen’s third cycle review 
will be in January 2019 that ‘those UPR recommendations then remain valid or are intended 
to be relevant for the period 2019 until at least 2023’; recommendations that might not be 
possible to follow up immediately can be returned to in the future.885  This is all the more 
reason for UPR recommendations to Yemen to be precise, action oriented and well thought 
out:  
(…) some dealing with the current crisis and ensuring compliance with 
international law in the context of the current crisis, some dealing with 
what's needed to end the crisis and some dealing with what's needed 
to ensure the establishment of a rule based order and human rights 
based development and accountability post-crisis.886 
One interviewee’s opinion was that it would be reasonable to expect the situation in Yemen 
to be addressed under item 4 of the agenda of the Human Rights Council’s regular session; in 
                                                             
883 Interview CSO 03. 
884 Interview CSO 06. 
885 ibid. 
886 ibid. 
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his view this had not occurred because of the identity of those states involved in the Saudi-
led coalition.887  In a similar vein, media reports refer to the view that the situation in Yemen 
is not being addressed at the UN Security Council in the way that it should because the UK is 
protecting its ally Saudi Arabia.888  
The push to focus the UPR’s third cycle on follow-up and implementation is all the more 
timely for Yemen; whilst progress against second cycle commitments will be all but absent, 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights has a vested interest to maintain the legitimacy of 
that office given the number and content of reports issued in the last few years on the 
human rights situation in Yemen discussed in section 6.2 above.  The human rights failings 
detailed and the allegations of breaches of international humanitarian law cited in those 
reports evidence that the need for follow up with a longer term move towards 
implementation and a co-ordinated multi-agency approach is particularly acute.889  The UPR 
provides a further international forum within which to bring together and voice these 
concerns.   
 
  
                                                             
887 Interview UN 01: ‘I suppose that is one of the responses to your question, I guess in the case of Yemen it is 
far more complicated because there the situation is chaotic and the coalition is in a moving nature and there 
are the states form the Gulf, there are other states from the WEOG, and the situation is not being dealt with at 
the level of the Council except for at the UPR. There have been several joint statements, but it has not moved 
beyond this, which is an anomaly’. 
888 Andrew Mitchell, ‘Britain is complicit in Saudi Arabia’s war on Yemen’ The Guardian (13 June 2018), asking 
‘the government rightly condemned Assad’s attack on Aleppo. Why is it silent on Hodeidah?’, possibly implying 
that the UK’s role in Yemen echoes the role of Russia in Syria’s attack on Aleppo, 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jun/13/britain-complicit-saudi-arabia-war-yemen-
hodeidah both last accessed 15 June 2018. 
889 UNHRC A/HRC/33/38 (n 756). 
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Chapter 7 – Civil society and states in crisis at the UPR 
Introduction 
Pursuant to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1, it is a principle of the UPR that all 
stakeholders, including NGOs and NHRIs, participate in the review.890  In addition, the 
objectives of the review require ‘the sharing of best practice among states and other 
stakeholders’, and under the process and modalities of the review states are ‘encouraged to 
prepare the information through a broad consultation process at the national level with all 
relevant stakeholders’.891  With this in mind, the purpose of this chapter is twofold: to 
critically address the role of civil society (defined below) in relation to the UPR and how that 
role might be strengthened, and to evaluate the particular challenges faced by civil society 
seeking to operate in states in crisis, such as Yemen.  These matters are important given the 
inclusion of civil society in Resolution 5/1.  Furthermore, as a stakeholder and a non-state 
actor, the role of civil society is central to the concept of global governance, as discussed in 
section 3.3.1, chapter 3.  
The role of civil society in terms of human rights advocacy, follow up and implementation is 
evolving, particularly in relation to the UPR.  The presence and influence of civil society in its 
capacity as a non-state actor on state practice is at the heart of the evolving concept of 
global governance (chapter 3), and civil society is a key actor in the international human 
rights regime complex (chapter 4).  The traditional binary positioning of states as the subject 
of international law, with individuals and non-state actors as the objects does not reflect the 
emerging complex web of interaction between states and non-state actors,892 an interaction 
that is given particular emphasis by theories of global governance.  
One important contribution of the UPR in respect of the role and function of civil society has 
been to promote and help to create the conditions for dialogue between a state and civil 
                                                             
890 UNHRC A/HRC/RES/5/1 (n 9) para 3(e), and that this is ‘in accordance with General Assembly resolution 
60/251 of 15 March 2006 and Economic and Social Council resolution 1996/31 of 25 July 1996, as well as any 
decisions that the Council may take in this regard’. 
891 ibid, para 4(d) and para 15 (a) respectively. 
892 Ruth Alice Houghton, ‘Hybrid Processes for Hybrid Outcomes: NGO Participation at the United Nations 
Human Rights Council’, in Lemay-Hébert and Freedman (n 8) 75, citing Robert McCorquodale, ‘The individual 
and the international legal system’ in Malcolm Evans, International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014) 
280-308, 281. 
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society that may not have otherwise existed.893  With reference to documentary evidence 
and interviews with representatives of NGOs, this chapter progresses over four sections that 
incorporate a critical perspective to acknowledge the achievements as well as the challenges 
and limitations of the role and function of civil society in the context of the UPR.  A specific 
focus on Yemen as a state in crisis is integrated into a more general approach throughout.   
The first section provides a critical assessment of the concept, origins and definition of civil 
society.  Section two applies the concept of communities of practice to the UPR and civil 
society, exploring how collaboration between different civil society actors in the preparation 
of joint stakeholder submissions and via parallel events to the UPR and Human Rights 
Council sessions can be conceived as building communities of practice.  The third section 
interrogates civil society’s capacity to consult and conduct advocacy with state actors during 
the UPR process.  This relates to contact with the SuR as part of the state’s preparation of 
the national report, and with reviewing states as to the recommendations they will make.  
Section four addresses the crucial issue for states in crisis of civil society’s role with regard to 
follow up and implementation of recommendations, and the inherent challenges with this 
aspect of the UPR process.  It also briefly considers how the evolving role and importance of 
civil society echoes aspects of the concept of experimentalist governance.   
This chapter concludes by making and evaluating policy and process recommendations in 
terms of a more formal definition of the governance role of CSOs and resourcing support for 
this.  
7.1 Civil society: concept, origins and definition  
Civil society is populated by diverse actors and its standing is perceived to be increasingly 
important and authoritative; the investigation and reporting of human rights violations by 
civil society and the reliance placed upon such information by reviewing states in the context 
of the UPR, as well as the dependence upon such reporting by committees of experts treaty 
bodies is evidence of this.894  The OHCHR defines civil society actors as: ‘individuals who 
voluntarily engage in forms of public participation and action around shared interests, 
                                                             
893 Interview CSO 03, CSO 06 and CSO 07. 
894 Matua (n 372). 
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purposes or values that are compatible with the goals of the United Nations.’895  For Makau 
Matua, civil society comprises ‘nonstate, nongovernmental formations that are formally 
independent from the state’, with NGOs having become ‘key players in international 
governance.896  David Armstrong and Julia Gibson trace the concept of civil society from John 
Locke’s reference to ‘an association based on the rule of law and formed by men in a state of 
nature to protect their property’ thereby assuming ‘a force standing in opposition to 
oppressive state power’ as being akin to its role today.897  Armstrong and Gibson then cite a 
more recent definition offered by David Held:  
Civil society constitutes those areas of social life - the domestic world, 
the economic sphere, cultural activities and political interaction – 
which are organized [sic] by private or voluntary arrangements 
between individuals and groups outside the direct control of the state 
(emphasis in the original).898   
Of particular note for this study is the developing importance being attributed to civil society 
‘in both the legitimacy and the effectiveness of global/regional governance’,899 particularly in 
the face of rights issues that are not territorially limited to the borders of one state or 
another.900  Armstrong and Gibson refer here to matters such as the environment, trade and 
finance, however, conflict, migration and the refugee crisis are good examples of symptoms 
of rights violations that have a transnational reach and through which non-state actors are 
increasingly connecting with one another to share knowledge, intelligence and the fruits of 
their investigatory labours conducted in often extremely difficult and dangerous conditions, 
as discussed in section two below in relation to communities of practice. 
As well as ranging from NGOs to NHRIs, civil society actors include community and faith 
based groups, coalitions and networks, unions and social movements.901  Such actors have 
been described as ‘the eyes of the people’ seeking to ‘police the actions of the state at the 
                                                             
895 OHCHR ‘Handbook for civil society’ (n 373) vii. 
896 Matua (n 372) 85. 
897 Armstrong and Gibson (n 290) 4, citing D. Armstrong, L. Lloyd, and J Redmond, International Organisation in 
World Politics: The Making of the Twentieth Century (3rd edn, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2004). 
898 ibid 4, citing David Held, Political Theory and the Modern State (Cambridge: Polity Press 1993), 6.  
899 ibid 5. 
900 ibid 5. 
901 Andreas Godsater and Fredrik Soderbaum, ‘Civil Society in Regional Governance in Eastern and Southern 
Africa’, in David Armstrong et al, Civil Society and International Governance: the role of non-state actors in 
global and regional regulatory frameworks, (Routledge 2011) 149. 
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national level’ and prevent states from ‘going rogue’ (although, as Mutua notes, hate groups 
also fall within the definition of an NGO).902  The notion of civil society emanates from 
Western intellectual thought and reflects a particular construction of society based upon the 
social contract, as discussed by Rousseau in the late eighteenth century.903  Rousseau 
explored concepts of dualism and situated civil society in opposition to the ‘natural’ state of 
human behaviour whereby there was no fabric of society; behaviours and actions were 
dictated by passion and immediate survival rather than by reason and thoughts of the 
future.904  Pursuant to the social contract, social and cultural mores and norms have 
developed which in turn underpin the construction of the international human rights 
paradigm.  Civil society serves to entrench this paradigm by disseminating its norms on a 
local, national and global level.   
Although civil society actors are gaining power and traction, CSOs are largely dominated by 
Western agencies that are funded by the global north.905  With this there arguably comes the 
risk of a civilising mission that echoes imperialism and potentially validates criticisms levied 
against the operation of the international human rights framework as a neo-imperialistic 
vehicle.906  Philip Alston and Colin Gillespie are critical of the reporting methods employed 
by NGOs, suggesting that a norm has evolved for the structure and character of reports 
produced mainly spearheaded by Human Rights Watch simply because its production of 
reports has been so prolific.907  They perceive that reports are not designed to encourage 
‘sharing’, or to form part of a broader enterprise and that other limitations abound, such as 
competition for funding amongst NGOs, the perceived need to have a finished product 
distinct from others, branding, and influence and authoritativeness.908  The conclusion is that 
funders of this work need to be convinced of the merits of sharing to encourage a move 
away from the current segregated model of reporting and dissemination.909 
Other scholarship cites the influence of the national origins of an international NGO as being 
determinative to a significant extent of what is planned or undertaken by the organisation 
                                                             
902 Matua (n 372) 85. 
903 Frank M Turner, Western Intellectual Reason from Rousseau to Nietzsche,  (Yale University Press 2015). 
904 ibid 10-12. 
905 Matua (n 372) viii and 80. 
906 ibid viii and 80. 
907 Alston and Gillespie (n 697) 1107. 
908 ibid 1109. 
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and also the factors that influence its operation in the field in host countries.910  Many NGOs 
are at pains to point out that they do not accept funds from governments and therefore 
operate independently of state-backing and associated influence.  Human Rights Watch, for 
example, states that it ‘does not seek or accept financial support from any government or 
government-funded agency’, but there is no explicit reference to the private funders and 
donors in either its annual report or audited accounts.911   
The Gulf Centre for Human Rights states that it does not accept funds from any governments 
in the countries in which it works and refers to being funded by ‘Open Society Foundations, 
Sigrid Rausing Trust and International Media Support, among other donors’.912  Whilst the 
work of the Open Society Foundations, established by George Soros, previously a hedge fund 
manager,913 may be notable in terms of range and reach, the particular focus may well be 
driven by the personal and political concerns and connections of its founder and leader, with 
George Soros having been the subject of criticism as well as praise.914  Most notable in terms 
of its independence may be Amnesty International, which is ‘almost alone in relying 
essentially on membership contributions rather than foundations, large individual donors, or 
governments’.915  
To return to Rousseau, for Rousseau the process of socialisation corrupts human kind and 
society is said to become more corrupt because ‘as it develops it embodies more inequality 
and hence more oppression’, and so the need for non-partisan work to be carried out and 
                                                             
910 Sarah S Stroup, Borders Among Activists: International NGOs in the United States, Britain and France, 
(Ithaca London: Cornell University Press 2012). 
911 Human Rights Watch, Inc, Financial Statements year ended 30 June 2016, note 1, page 10 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/financial-statements-2016.pdf Human Rights 
Watch Annual Report 2016, 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/news_attachments/english_annual_report-2016.pdf both accessed 5 
June 2017.  
912 ‘About us’, Gulf Centre for Human Rights, http://www.gc4hr.org/page/about_us last accessed 20 August 
2018.  
913 Being established in 1979 when Soros had apparently ‘decided he had enough money’, Open Society 
Foundations background https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/about/history last accessed 5 June 2017.  
914 Editorial, ‘In Praise of George Soros, The Guardian (28 October 2010) 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/oct/28/in-praise-of-george-soros; Lizzie Dearden, 
‘George Soros criticised by pro-Israel groups as conspiracy theorists seize on Open Society Foundations leak’, 
The Independent (16 August 2016) https://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/george-soros-pro-israel-
groups-conspiracy-theorists-open-society-foundations-leak-hack-documents-a7193166.html Daniel Wiser, 
‘Critics: George Soros Using Political Connections to Benefit His Foreign Policy Goals’ The Washington Free 
Beacon (13 May 2014) https://freebeacon.com/politics/critics-george-soros-using-political-connections-to-
benefit-his-foreign-policy-goals/ last accessed 5 June 2017. 
915 Alston and Gillespie (n 697) 1109. 
 
 
224 
 
contribute to the demand for transparent government only continues to increase.916  
Rousseau adopted a constructivist perspective in his observation that ‘…the social order is a 
sacred right which serves as a foundation for all other rights. Nevertheless, this right does 
not come from nature, it is therefore founded on convention’.917  Furthermore, that which 
has been constructed does not universally hold morality and virtue as its pressing pursuit.  
The concerns of Rousseau reflect the contemporary problems of a world order dominated by 
a neoliberal sensibility: ‘Ancient politicians spoke incessantly of mores and virtues; ours 
speak only of commerce and money’.918   
Although this may be a somewhat over-simplified interpretation of the contemporary web of 
politics that the international human rights framework and, vis-à-vis, civil society is caught 
up in, Jean Bricmont illustrates this complexity by constructing a critique of what he refers to 
as ‘humanitarian imperialism’.919  Bricmont draws parallels between the ‘civilising’ mission of 
the European colonial era to be rid of the ‘barbarous’ acts discovered in far off lands to 
‘violations of human rights, the absence of democracy or the fate of women in Muslim 
countries’ as contemporary versions of barbarisms.920  The position he takes is not to belittle 
the rights abuses and political issues he refers to, but to illustrate that the ‘denunciation of 
those customs’ has been used to ‘legitimize [sic] our interventions, wars and interference.’921  
Gerd Oberleitner is simultaneously supportive and sceptical of the rise and role of NGOs.  
Whilst they have become ‘indispensible to the successful development and implementation 
of human rights’, he poses a pertinent question when he asks whether such entities are the 
antithesis of inter-governmental organisation, or ‘merely another complement in a 
proliferating global ‘bureaucratic’ web’.922  Ruth Houghton is less pessimistic and has 
conceptualised the participation of civil society in the promotion and protection of human 
rights in hybrid terms, suggesting that the Human Rights Council might be understood as a 
                                                             
916 Turner (n 903) 10-13. 
917 ibid 16 citing Jean Jacques Rousseau ‘On the Social Contract Book I’ in in Donald A Cress (trans. ed.) The 
Basic Political Writings (Indianapolis Hackett Publishing Company 1987) 141. 
918 ibid 9, citing Rousseau ‘Discourse on the sciences and art’ in Cress ibid 4. 
919 Jean Bricmont, Humanitarian Imperialism: using human rights to sell war (New York University Press 2006) 
preface.  
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‘third space’ within which NGOs can influence states.923  Houghton explains that ‘hybridity 
‘reshapes the terms of the binary’ between subject and object to highlight not only the role 
of participation, but also the role of informal participation, in discussing the actors involved 
in international decision-making’.924  Understood in this way, there is also a certain hybrid 
approach to the formulation of UPR recommendations in terms of their source as presented 
in section 6.7, chapter 6. 
What is apparent is the requirement for civil society to function independently of the state, 
to operate from a position that is external to the state’s machinery.  This is important 
bearing in mind that, as considered in chapter 3, a key aspect of an entity securing a 
governance function is the extent to which it achieves externality from the state actor.925  
However, the extent to which the UPR promotes externality comes under question given the 
limited role of civil society in the final stages of the recommending process, section 7.5 
below provides analysis of stakeholder capacity in this respect.  As well as civil society, 
reviewing states are external to the SuR but, as sections 4.4 and 5.3 in chapters 4 and 5 
respectively illustrate, due to the dynamic of politicisation and regionalism externality 
cannot necessarily be equated with objectivity.   
Civil society occupies a stronger position of externality.  The absence of civil society’s direct 
voice during the interactive dialogue was met with dismay but comes with (unintended) 
potential benefits.  Initial discussions about the concept of the UPR and what it would 
involve included a central role for civil society.926  When Resolution 5/1 was presented, it 
was to the ‘shock and horror and disappointment’ of civil society that it would not be an 
active participant in the Working Group.927  Unlike the Council’s regular sessions, which 
permit a verbal as well as a written contribution from CSOs to the debate,928 at the UPR’s 
                                                             
923 Houghton (n 892) 81-3. Homi K. Bhabha has previously used the concept of the ‘Third Space, Bhabha (n 
547). 
924 ibid Houghton 81, citing Amar Acheraiou, Questioning Hybridity, Postcolonialism and Globalization (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan) 93. 
925 Möllers (n 277) 320. 
926 Interview CSO 02 and UN 01 respectively. 
927 Interview CSO 02. See also, Lilliebjerg (n 127) 311, which states at footnote 1: ‘During the negotiations of 
the Human Rights Council Amnesty International campaigned for a review mechanism with human rights 
expertise at its centre, thorough analysis of each situation, a dedicated follow up mechanism and a greater 
role for civil society’. 
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those actors ‘that are otherwise omitted in a state-centric narrative’, Houghton (n 892) 76.  
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Working Group the stakeholder’s voice is muted.929  As cited in chapter 3, Thomas Weiss and 
Rordan Wilkinson have raised the concern that governance in the global arena fails to 
represent stakeholder interests due to ‘club models of power’ that make decisions in their 
own interests,930 and the exclusion of civil society’s voice in the space created by the 
interactive dialogue may exacerbate this concern.   
The function of civil society in states in crisis and in autocratic states is particularly 
challenging.  During its 27th session, in September 2014, the Human Rights Council adopted 
resolution 27/31 on civil society space requesting that the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights ‘prepare a compilation of practical recommendations for the creation and 
maintenance of a safe and enabling environment for civil society, based on good practices 
and lessons learned.’ 931  This request was informed by an expression of deep concern of 
instances of civil society being hindered and endangered at both a national and international 
level.932  The outcome was a series of practical recommendations put to the Human Rights 
Council in April 2016, centred around five essential ‘ingredients’ deemed by the then High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, to be necessary to optimise ‘civil 
society’s transformative potential’.933  The five requirements were: a robust legal framework 
compliant with international standards that safeguards public freedoms and effective access 
to justice; a political environment conducive to civil society work; access to information; 
avenues for participation by civil society in decision-making processes; and long-term 
support and resources for civil society.934  Much of this report reads along the lines of a list 
of examples of ‘good practice’ that was submitted to the High Commissioner by civil society 
representatives.935 
Of themselves, these ingredients are laudable.  How realistic they are for states in crisis is 
questionable.  As with many of the reports produced by the international human rights 
                                                             
929 UNHRC A/HRC/RES/5/1 (n 9), which provides that ‘relevant stakeholders may attend the Review in the 
Working Group’, para 18(c). 
930 Weiss ‘Governance, good governance and global governance’ (n 279) 207-215. 
931 UNHRC ‘Civil society space’ A/HRC/RES/27/31 (23 September 2014) paragraph 15.  
932 ibid preamble.  
933 UNHRC ‘Practical recommendations for the creation and maintenance of a safe and enabling environment 
for civil society, based on good practices and lessons learned: Report of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights’ A/HRC/32/20 (11 April 2016) para 4. 
934 ibid para 4. 
935 OHCHR ‘Contributions from Stakeholders’ 
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machinery at the behest of the UN, the content is context specific and narrowly focuses on 
success.  At paragraph 43, for example, brief reference is made to the part played by civil 
society in strengthening efforts to eradicate Ebola in west Africa, but with no 
acknowledgment of the difficulties faced in dealing with the spread of the disease, its 
treatment and its prevention both on the ground in terms of resources, and the response of 
the international community.936  The report’s section on education refers to numerous 
examples of good practice in seeking to combat racism and other forms of discrimination, 
but does not acknowledge concerns elsewhere that media reportage and political rhetoric 
may serve to undermine and unravel the good work and progress made by civil society 
initiatives.937  What is increasingly clear is the concern within the Human Rights Council of 
the limitations placed upon the freedoms of civil society actors by certain sates, as further 
evidenced by the invitation of the Human Rights Council to the UN Secretary-General to 
report upon such matters, as discussed in section 7.3 below.938  
7.2 The Working Group and Consultative status 
A civil society actor does not require ECOSOC consultative status in order to make a written 
submission to the OHCHR ahead of a state’s UPR, although this status is required to arrange 
and host a parallel event, as detailed in the section 7.3.2 below.  Guidelines for submissions 
are provided in Human Rights Council Decision 6/102 and required that single submissions 
should be no more than five pages, and joint submissions can be up to ten pages.939  
Supplementary guidance is given in the OHCHR Civil Society Handbook.940  The capacity of 
civil society to engage with the UPR is, however, diluted compared to its role in the treaty 
system of human rights monitoring and protection.  Ahead of a state’s treaty body review, 
                                                             
936 See, for example, Aimee Summers, ‘Challenges in Responding to the Ebola Epidemic — Four Rural Counties, 
Liberia, August–November 2014’, 63(50) Weekly (19 December 2014) 1202-1204, 
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an NGO can apply to be accredited with observer status in order to attend the review and, in 
addition, can arrange an informal briefing with members of the committee of experts prior 
to the formal review.941  Such intimate contact with state missions prior to a state’s UPR is 
only possible via informal pre-sessions organised by UPR Info, the nature and role of pre-
sessions being addressed in section 7.4.2 below.  Furthermore, NGOs and broader civil 
society can submit a report directly to a treaty committee for consideration, which is then 
provided in full to the state concerned.942   
An NGO with consultative status can, however, apply to be accredited with observer status 
and attend the UPR Working Group of an SuR.943  Despite the Human Rights Council falling 
within the remit of the General Assembly, the application to gain consultative status in 
relation to the UPR (and the Human Rights Council) is to be made via ECOSOC.944  ECOSOC’s 
power to grant consultative status is pursuant to article 71 of the UN Charter and detailed in 
ECOSOC resolution 1996/31.945  NGOs may have their consultative status withdrawn if by a 
vote of members of the ECOSOC NGO Committee it is decided the NGO concerned has 
conducted itself in breach of the principles within resolution 1996/31.946  This power needs 
to be exercised objectively and with caution and there is a risk that this process could fall 
prey to politicisation.  In 2015, the decision to withdraw consultative status from two African 
                                                             
941 See, for example, CED ‘The relationship of the Committee on Enforced Disappearances with civil society 
actors’ CED/C/3 (30 December 2013) and OHCHR ‘ICERD and CRED: A guide for Civil Society Actors’ The 
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NGOs, the African Technology Development Link and the African Technical Association, at 
the request of Pakistan in its capacity as a member of the ECOSOC NGO Committee at that 
time, has been criticised as a way ‘to mute unwanted criticism’ and evidence that ‘Member 
States in the NGO Committee retaliate for the statements and participation of NGOs at the 
Human Rights Council’.947 
Returning to the role of civil society with consultative status during the Working Group, 
representatives can be physically present in Salle XX of the Palais des Nations where the 
Working Group takes place, but there is no scope to make a verbal submission.  As one 
interviewee commented, the silencing of civil society at this juncture may be part of the 
UPR’s attraction to states: ‘…we [NGOs/civil society] of course can see why it is they [states] 
love the UPR so much; they are in control, sovereignty reigns, civil society can’t take the 
floor in the UPR working group’.948  Paradoxically though, it may be that civil society’s silence 
at the interactive dialogue prompts state actors to say the more difficult things they might 
usually leave to NGOs.  When this interviewee was asked if states over-rely on civil society 
for the making of recommendations, the response was an emphatic yes, particularly in those 
forums where civil society has a voice:  
(…) within the UN human rights system and the Human Rights Council in 
particular I think states are very reliant on civil society saying the difficult 
things.  Even countries we would consider like-minded might not say 
something that is going to impact on their relationship with a particular 
country if they know an NGO that is further down the speakers’ list will say 
that thing.949 
In the interviewee’s opinion, the ‘heavy lifting’ of making the more difficult 
recommendations is generally left to the domain of smaller states, whilst others such as the 
US, Canada, Australia or Argentina keep their recommendations safe and vague to preserve 
relations.  However, the marginalisation of civil society from the UPR recommending process 
means that:  
                                                             
947 International Service for Human Rights ‘Withdrawal of UN consultative status for two NGOs could have 
‘chilling effect’ on civil society’ (04 June 2015) https://www.ishr.ch/news/withdrawal-un-consultative-status-
two-ngos-could-have-chilling-effect-civil-society last accessed 01 July 2018. 
948 Interview CSO 02. 
949 Interview CSO 02. 
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(…) by putting it on its head we are seeing that there is a silver lining 
nonetheless, because it means that those states are now committed to the 
Human Rights Council and the UPR being not an abject failure. They realise 
that they have to go in and raise some of those difficult issues, otherwise 
they won’t be raised.950 
The extent to which state practice is moving towards the making of difficult 
recommendations is an area for further study.  As chapter 6 indicates, there have been key 
changes in the response of states to the recommendations they receive which would suggest 
states are starting to take their implementation and follow up obligations more seriously.  In 
tandem with this, state practice may well be evolving to improve the quality of 
recommendations made as states more properly comprehend their role in the 
recommending process and its impact upon the UPR’s credibility and legitimacy, and 
therefore its success.  
7.3 Communities of practice 
This section explains and applies the concept of communities of practice to the UPR and civil 
society as a means to conceptualise the coalitions between civil society actors that are 
emerging as a result of the UPR, and to further consider how to consolidate the role of civil 
society for states in crisis at the UPR to strengthen its governance function.  In doing so, this 
section explores collaborations between civil society actors in the preparation of UPR 
stakeholder submissions and also via participation in parallel events.   
A community of practice refers to those with a shared interest or practice or pursuit of 
knowledge.951  The creation and existence of a community of practice generates legitimacy 
in a social sense.952  Three characteristics are crucial to the existence of a community of 
practice: the domain, whereby ‘identity is defined by a shared domain of interest’; secondly, 
the community, within which members engage ‘in joint activities and discussions, help each 
                                                             
950 Interview CSO 02. 
951 Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger, Situated Learning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1991); Etienne 
and Beverley Wenger-Trayner, ‘Communities of Practice: A brief Introduction’ http://wenger-trayner.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/07-Brief-introduction-to-communities-of-practice.pdf accessed 18 June 2018; 
Cotterrell (n 277) 262 – 268. 
952 CA Thomas, The Concept of Legitimacy and International Law, LSE Legal Studies Working Paper, 12/2013, 
(London, London School of Economics, 2013) 22. 
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other, and share information.  They build relationships that enable them to learn from each 
other; they care about their standing with each other’; and, thirdly, the practice, whereby 
practitioners ‘develop a shared repertoire of resources: experiences, stories, tools, ways of 
addressing recurring problems—in short a shared practice.’953 
Through communities of practice there is the potential to legitimise and support the 
mainstreaming of civil society advocacy and activism within the UPR and to strengthen the 
role of civil society across the international human rights regime complex.  There are three 
primary methods by which such communities are developed: one is the coming together of 
civil society actors, domestic and global, to form a coalition that prepares and submits a joint 
submission; the second is the hosting of a parallel event at the UN in Geneva alongside the 
relevant Working Group of an SuR; the third is via in-country workshops.  These methods are 
critically explored in the subsections below. 
By coming together to create communities of practice, civil society creates a space akin to 
that which Bhabha conceptualises as the ‘Third Space’, as touched upon in chapter 4, section 
4.4.2.954  This is a space in which ‘the historical identity of culture as a unifying force’ is 
challenged by seeing cultural knowledge and cultural performance as a process of 
translation and negotiation.955  Forging links and combining interests between different 
organisations and groups through the UPR means that civil society can operate to create 
new, dynamic, and ideologically open spaces within which difference is shared in pursuit of a 
common goal.  By building coalitions, it has been suggested that the recommendations 
reviewing states make are more relevant and better facilitate follow up by civil society with 
the relevant government.956   
                                                             
953 Wenger-Trayner (n 951) 2. 
954 Bhabha (n 547) 155–157.  
955 ibid.   
956 ‘The huge value of working as a coalition of CSAs in the submission of the report and in lobbying 
governments in the UPR process resulted into more relevant recommendations. This also facilitated follow-up 
and our active engagement with the government on their implementation’, The Medical Action Group, leading 
a CSO coalition in the Philippines and meetings with 16 diplomatic missions to raise awareness of matters 
relating to torture, as cited in OHCHR ‘How to Follow Up on United Nations Human Rights Recommendations: 
A Guide for Civil Society’ (October 2013) 19, 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/AboutUs/CivilSociety/HowtoFollowUNHRRecommendations.pdf last 
accessed 20 August 2018.  
 
 
232 
 
As one interviewee commented: ‘Some of the strongest successes we've seen is the way the 
UPR has been a rallying point for domestic civil society to build coalitions, come together 
and influence their government’.  In the interviewee’s experience, this success was often 
dependent upon the pre-existing conditions within the SuR:  
The space in which the UPR has been most useful is areas where there 
is enough democratic space that civil society can come together and 
influence the outcomes, and perhaps less influential in cases of conflict 
or very closed states.957  
Tunisia provides an example communities of practice within civil society emerging as part of 
a political transition to democracy and in acknowledgement of human rights abuses that 
have been perpetrated by the state.958  Another example is Egypt where civil society actors 
came together to collectively follow up with the government its progress on UPR 
recommendations; various NGOs monitored implementation of UPR recommendations as 
part of a ‘100 days’ campaign, providing updates on a daily basis over a period of 100 days 
according to the thematic area of their organisation’s focus.959  
Despite the ongoing war, ahead of Yemen’s third cycle review there is emerging evidence of 
communities of practice including domestic and international NGOs in the form of 
stakeholder submissions.960  Another indication of civil society coalescing to support rights 
                                                             
957 Interview CSO 05. 
958 ‘Tunisia would be a good example of that [civil society being strengthened]. You had a big group of NGOs 
that organised themselves together to prepare and to contribute to Tunisia national report. I think that was 
quite capacity building for those NGOs and it brought to NGOs a lot of knowledge about how NGOs work and 
gave them a more international context to the work they had been doing up to that point, which had been 
mainly focused on national reform. And I think for them it was an opportunity for them to use their arguments 
and their research and the work they had done, kind of broadcast it at a larger audience’, interview CSO 05.  
There was a similar reference made to Tunisia by a separate interviewee, interview CSO 03. 
959 As relayed during interview CSO 05, see also: Egyptian Initiative for Human Rights ‘Our Rights in 100 Days: 
“The Form” Launch a Campaign to Monitor the President [sic] Human Rights Priorities’ 
https://eipr.org/en/press/2012/07/our-rights-100-days-%E2%80%9C-form%E2%80%9D-launch-campaign-
monitor-president-human-rights-priorities last accessed 17 August 2018. 
960 Joint Submission ‘UPR Submission Yemen 2018’, Joint Submission by CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen 
Participation, Gulf Centre for Human Rights (GCHR) and Front Line Defenders (25 July 2018) 
https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/statement-report/upr-submission-yemen-2018 last accessed 20 
August 2018, which states that it specifically analyses: ‘Yemen’s fulfilment of the rights to the freedoms of 
association, peaceful assembly and expression, and unwarranted restrictions on HRDs, since its previous UPR 
examination in January 2014. To this end, we assess Yemen’s implementation of recommendations received 
during the 2nd UPR cycle relating to these issues and provide a number of specific, action-orientated follow-up 
recommendations’. The deadline for stakeholder submissions was 12 July 2018; at the time of writing, not all 
submissions are publicly available.  
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protection in Yemen is a criminal complaint reported in April 2018 to have been submitted 
by a coalition of NGOs against an arms manufacturer regarding Italian arms exports and the 
use of such arms in an attack in October 2016.961  Even so, the fabric of civil society in Yemen 
is unsurprisingly extremely fragile; at a Human Rights Council regular session side event in 
June 2017, Kristine Beckerle of Human Rights Watch explained that whilst she had been to 
Yemen many times to document the human rights situation the current conditions meant 
this was now proving to be very difficult.  She explained that space for civil society in Yemen 
had shrunk dramatically, that whilst it had never been easy to be a defender, activist, or 
lawyer in Yemen it was ‘now incredibly (…) difficult’.962   
These difficulties are not limited to civil society operating in states in crisis, but also for those 
within states that are known human rights violators.  Whilst for some states, peer review 
may provide a political motivation for action, for others, the pressure of having one’s human 
rights situation visible on the world stage can exacerbate the desire to repress and silence 
the expression of criticism or descent and prompt reprisal via the detention of human rights 
defenders, and/or imposition of travel bans.  This was evident during Bahrain’s most recent 
review, which took place as part of the first UPR session of the third cycle in May 2017.  
During Bahrain’s Working Group interactive dialogue, a number of reviewing states 
expressed concern that travel bans had been imposed on certain human rights defenders to 
prevent them from travelling to Geneva, and those civil society actors interviewed during 
the author’s visit to the UN at that time expressed similar concerns.963   
                                                             
961 Complaint submitted to the Italian Public Prosecutor’s Office, Rome, ‘Coalition of NGOs files criminal 
complaint against RWM Italia S.p.A a subsidiary of German Arms Manufacturer Rheinmetall AG and Italian 
Export Arms Authority: Are arms manufacturer and Italian Authorities complicit in deadly Saudi-coalition 
airstrike in Yemen?’, Press Release, European Centre for Constitutional Rights, Mwatana (Yemen) and Rete 
Disarmo, Berlin/Rome/Sana’a (18 April 2018) http://mwatana.org/en/criminal-complaint-against-rwm-italia-s-
p-a-and-italian-arms-export-authority/ last accessed 28 August 2018.  
962 Kristine Beckerle’s panel contribution was via a remote appearance on the panel via video, from the 
author’s own notes in attendance at the panel event, following an invitation to the author by the Gulf Centre 
for Human Rights, ‘The ongoing attacks on public freedoms in Yemen during wartime’, Human Rights Council 
Side Event, Palais des Nations, United Nations, Geneva, 21 June 2017.  
963 ‘Estonia expressed disappointment about incidents of reprisal against human rights defenders, in particular 
the travel ban imposed on Sayed Hadi al-Musawi, who was supposed to speak at the pre-sessional meeting for 
the review of Bahrain’, para 76, Germany was ‘troubled by reports about human rights defenders being 
banned from travelling to attend pre-sessional meetings for the current universal periodic review session’, to 
which the state delegation’s response was ‘everyone should be free to leave any country, “including his own”, 
and that right should not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law and are 
necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of 
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Travel bans have also been reportedly imposed to prevent travel to Human Rights Council 
regular sessions.964  Similar action in China in 2013 has been said to have led to the death of 
human rights activist Cao Shunli; Shunli was detained by Chinese authorities at Beijing 
airport whilst she was seeking to travel to Geneva to attend a advocacy training ahead of 
China’s second cycle UPR and later died in detention reportedly being denied medical 
access.965  Indeed, there are reports that it was personnel at the OHCHR that provided the 
names of human rights defenders planning to attend human rights advocacy training ahead 
of the Human Rights Council session in September 2013 to the Chinese government.966  If 
these allegations are well founded this is of particular concern where the legitimacy and 
authority of the UPR is concerned and its successful function as a governance entity.  Yemen 
has also been cited as having raided the premises of human rights defenders and subjected 
them to acts of intimidation thought to have related to Yemen’s first cycle UPR.967  More 
generally, the Council has raised with the UN Secretary-General concerns regarding 
instances of intimidation and reprisal.968   
For the UPR to support tangible output for states in crisis such as Yemen it is paramount that 
civil society is able to coalesce as a community of practice.  These are issues that are 
heightened in places of conflict; the already fragile and limited presence and activity of 
                                                             
others.’ UNHRC ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Bahrain’ A/HRC/36/3 (10 July 
2017) paras 79, 83 and 86 respectively. Concerns were expressed by civil society in person during interviews, 
as well as in various publications, interview CSO 06. 
964 European Centre for Democracy and Human Rights ‘Bahrain Authorities Prevent Civil Society Members and 
Human Rights Defenders from Participating in UN HRC 32’ (13 June 2016) https://www.ecdhr.org/bahrain-
authorities-prevent-civil-society-members-and-human-rights-defenders-from-participating-in-un-hrc-32/ last 
accessed 24 May 2018. 
965 Jonathan Kaiman, ‘Chinese activist Cao Shunli dies after being denied medical help, says website’ The 
Guardian (14 March 2014) reporting her death following her initial detention in September 2013,  
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/14/china-activist-cao-shunli-dies-human-rights; International 
Service for Human Rights ‘China interrupts moment of silence for Cao Shunli at the UN Human Rights Council’, 
(20 March 2014) 
http://www.ishr.ch/news/china-interrupts-moment-silence-cao-shunli-un-human-rights-council and UPR Info 
‘China prevents moment of silence in memory of human rights defender’ (26 March 2014) https://www.upr-
info.org/en/news/china-prevents-moment-silence-memory-human-rights-defender all accessed 24 May 2018. 
966 Bea Edwards, ‘A Third Whistleblower Unsuccessfully Seeks Protection from Retaliation at UN/OHCHR’, 
Government, 01 February 2017, Accountability Project, https://www.whistleblower.org/blog/014301-third-
whistleblower-unsuccessfully-seeks-protection-retaliation-unohchr accessed 24 May 2018. 
967 UNHRC ‘Report of the Secretary-General on cooperation with the United Nations, its representatives and 
mechanisms in the field of human rights’, A/HRC/14/19 (07 May 2010) paras 48-51, citing an urgent appeal 
sent by the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression and the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders to Yemen on 02 December 
2009. 
968 UNHRC A/HRC/RES/12/2 (n 938). 
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domestic civil society in Yemen is exacerbated by the conflict and its consequences.  Normal 
civil society mechanisms are not able to function, they are not free to operate.  This is 
evidenced by the lack of personal safety of those that speak out in support of human rights 
and reports of human rights defenders and journalists having been unlawfully detained by 
both sides of the conflict, as discussed below.  One individual interviewed for this study is a 
Yemeni woman who fled Yemen following the Arab Spring because of the threat to her 
safety due to her involvement in the youth uprising to seek asylum in the West.  
Freedom of expression is curtailed by the reported detention of journalists and the risks they 
face,969 and by the fatalities of the conflict including Yemeni journalists killed by airstrikes.970  
Access to information and freedom of expression is also prevented by censorship and limits 
on internet access.971  Furthermore, freedom of movement is limited, having a detrimental 
impact upon the investigation of violations and freedom of expression and association; a 
recent press release issued by the Gulf Centre for Human Rights (GCHR) in June 2018 refers 
to two Yemeni human rights defenders being detained by Saudi and UAE-led coalition forces 
whilst en route to engage in human rights activities overseas.972  These individuals have also 
reportedly been detained on previously by Houthi security services.973  At the time, a 
number of international NGOs are cited in support of the statement issued by GCHR 
demanding immediate release, evidence of a developing global civil society community of 
                                                             
969 Gulf Center for Human Rights, ‘Yemeni Human Rights Blogger Hisham Al-Omeisy has been missing for 150 
days’ Press Release (11 January 2018), reporting that Al-Omeisy had been detained in Sana’a by security 
officers of the Houthi-controlled National Security Bureau on 17 August 2017, via email with the author. 
970 Reference to the detention of journalists by Houthi forces and to the killing of Takieddin al-Hudhaifi, a 
freelance cameraman, and Wael al-Absi who worked for the official Yemen TV channel allegedly by Houthi 
shell fire on 26 May 2017.  Such action is not limited to the Houthis, with reports that those loyal to President 
Hadi have conducted ‘arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, raids against media offices, the closure and 
confiscations of newspapers, unfair trials, and the blocking of websites’, ‘Caught between Saudi Coalition and 
Houthi Rebels, Yemenis journalists face challenges on all sides’ Global Voices (28 June 2017), 
https://globalvoices.org/2017/06/28/caught-between-saudi-coalition-and-houthi-rebels-yemeni-journalists-
face-challenges-on-all-sides/# last accessed 01 July 2018. 
971 ibid. 
972 Those temporarily detained were reported as being the President of Mwatana Organization for Human 
Rights in Yemen, Radhya Al-Mutawakel (a panellist at a Human Rights Council side event in June 2017 in 
Geneva to which the author of this study was invited to attend and spoke with), and Executive 
Director Abdulrasheed Al-Faqih. They are reported as having been detained for a day by Saudi and United Arab 
Emirates-led coalition forces at Sayoun Airport in the Hadhramout region of Yemen and having been ‘taken to 
an unknown location, before being released late at night’, Gulf Centre for Human Rights ‘Yemen: Human Rights 
Groups Condemn Arbitrary Detention of Yemeni Human Rights Defenders and Urge Authorities to Permit 
Advocates to Freely Travel and Conduct Human Rights Work’ Press Release (June 2018) 
https://www.gc4hr.org/news/view/1889 last accessed 05 July 2018. 
973 ibid. 
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practice for Yemen and the governance role of that community outside of formal UN 
forums.974  
7.3.1 Stakeholder submissions 
This section addresses the formal aspect of CSO engagement with the UPR, making a written 
stakeholder submission to the OHCHR.  Other civil society interactions with the UPR are ad 
hoc being variously dependent upon state practice and the resources an NGO has access to.  
They include: consultation with the SuR in respect of the state’s preparation of the national 
report; attendance and advocacy at pre-sessions organised by the international NGO UPR-
Info;975 hosting or being party to parallel events at the UN in Geneva during a UPR session;976 
and follow up with the SuR, each of which is considered further below.   
The deadline for stakeholder submissions is some six months ahead of a state’s review; for 
example, the deadline for stakeholders ahead of Yemen’s third cycle Working Group in 
January 2019, was no later than 12 July 2018.977  Given the dynamic, fast-moving situation in 
Yemen, and ongoing serious human rights violations, stakeholder reports will inevitably be 
out of date and would benefit from updating by the time of the Working Group.  Even so, 
the prevailing view of civil society actors is that each opportunity to bring the situation in 
Yemen to the attention of the international community should be taken,978 and the UPR is 
relevant in this respect.   
Mwatana, a domestic Yemeni NGO referred to above, made a joint submission with 
Columbia Law School Human Rights Clinic in respect of Saudi Arabia’s third cycle UPR 
(scheduled for November 2018), reporting on the NGO’s human rights investigations of 
                                                             
974 Those cited at the foot of the press release are: Amnesty International; Article 36; Cairo Institute for Human 
Rights Studies; Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC); Control Arms Coalition; European Center for 
Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR); Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect; Global Justice Clinic 
(NYU School of Law); Gulf Centre for Human Rights (GCHR); Human Rights Clinic (Columbia Law School); 
Human Rights Watch; International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) within the framework of the 
Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders; International Service for Human Rights (ISHR); 
PAX; Reprieve; Rights Watch (UK); World Organization Against Torture (OMCT) within the framework of the 
Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders, ibid. 
975 UPR Info ‘Pre-sessions’ https://www.upr-info.org/en/upr-process/pre-sessions last accessed 15 June 2018. 
976 A number of side events have been attended by the author at the United Nations in Geneva as part of the 
research for this thesis, this includes a side event at the time of Yemen’s second cycle review, a side event 
hosted by Amnesty International in relation to its international advocacy during the first session of the third 
cycle in May 2017, and a side event linked to Human Rights Council regular session 32 during June 2017 that 
focused on the human rights situation in Yemen.  
977 OHCHR ‘3rd UPR cycle: contributions and participation of “other stakeholders”’ (n 228). 
978 Interview CSO 03, CSO 04 and HRD 01 respectively.  
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violations committed by the Saudi-led coalition.979  This submission is an example of a 
community of practice emerging between academia and a human rights NGO.  It also reveals 
a further opportunity afforded as a result of the UPR for domestic civil society located in 
states in crisis: to engage with the UPR of those states that are reported and understood to 
be committing human rights violations extra-territorially and in breach of principles of 
international humanitarian law.   
It is a reflection of the strength of the UPR that a domestic Yemeni NGO such as Mwatana is 
able to contribute to an event on the world stage about Saudi Arabia, an internationally 
high-profile state that wields significant geopolitical power and is, controversially, as noted 
in chapter 4, section 4.2.1, a current member of the Human Rights Council.  Whilst detailed 
discussion of the content of Mwatana’s submission is beyond the specific focus of this study, 
the nature of the rights violations reported upon refer to international human rights law and 
principles of international humanitarian law, both of which, as detailed in chapter 2, fall 
within the scope of UPR.  The joint submission cites violations by Saudi Arabia in Yemen in 
relation to: civilian casualties and the right to life; civilian infrastructure damage, forced 
displacement and the rights to health, education, and water; severe restrictions on 
humanitarian aid and access to medical treatment; restrictions on humanitarian aid and the 
supply of basic goods: impacts on the rights to life, health and food.980  The allegations 
presented accord with media coverage of the conflict and the recent report by international 
experts.981   
The success of a stakeholder submission is in part measured according to the 
recommendations it makes being adopted by a reviewing state.  As investigated in chapter 6, 
                                                             
979 Mwatana and Columbia Law School Clinic UPR Submission (n 757). 
980 ibid. 
981 UNHRC ‘Situation of human rights in Yemen’ A/HRC/39/43 (n 793) and, for example, Mohammed Ghobari, 
Death toll from air strike on Yemen wedding party rises above 130: medics’, Reuters (29 September 2015) 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security/death-toll-from-air-strike-on-yemen-wedding-party-rises-
above-130-medics-idUSKCN0RT0XT20150929; Staff Agencies, ‘Saudi-led coalition admits to bombing Yemen 
funeral: ‘Incorrect information’ meant hall in Sana’a was mistaken for military target, leading to 140 deaths, 
says US-backed mission’, The Guardian (15 October 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/15/saudi-led-coalition-admits-to-bombing-yemen-funeral; and 
Jon Sharman, Ghaida Ghantous and Ahmed al-Haj, ‘Yemen: 'At least 20 killed including bride' after airstrike by 
Saudi-led coalition hits wedding party’, The Independent (23 April 2018) 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/yemen-airstrike-wedding-party-killed-injured-bani-
qayis-saudi-coalition-latest-updates-a8317826.html, all last accessed 06 July 2018. 
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of the sample of stakeholder submissions and recommendations made, the majority formed 
the basis of recommendations made by reviewing states, see also table 9 at appendix 9.  For 
states in crisis such as Yemen, the role of civil society is even more fundamental in terms of 
helping to shape the recommendations of reviewing states to ensure the recommendations 
made are the most useful and directed to assist those on the ground in the SuR.982 
It is possible that some UPR recommendations to Saudi Arabia during its third cycle review 
will directly refer to the actions of the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen and their consequences 
which have led to ‘the world’s worst humanitarian crisis’.983  That said, no specific comments 
or recommendations were made by reviewing states to the UK during its third cycle review 
in May 2017, although Peru made a general recommendation that the UK ‘in the context of 
the defence of the right to life, carefully assess the transfer of arms to those countries where 
they are likely to be used for human rights abuses and violations’.984  This was despite the 
UK’s role in the Yemen conflict as an ongoing supplier of arms to Saudi Arabia and its 
provision of strategic military training and support having come under scrutiny both in the 
media and via legal action.985  Surprisingly, reference in stakeholder submissions to the UK’s 
role in this respect was made only in general terms and only in two submissions.986  At the 
time of writing, the summary of stakeholder submissions relating to Saudi Arabia’s 
forthcoming UPR is not available publicly and so cannot be assessed in terms of the extent 
and nature of any other stakeholder submissions citing Yemen.987  
                                                             
982 Interview CSO 05. 
983 Guterres (n 169). 
984 UNHRC Report of the Working Group (UK), A/HRC/36/9 (n 810) para 134.132. 
985 An appeal against the High Court’s dismissal of the application for judicial review, led by Campaign Against 
Arms Trade (CAAT), of the UK’s decision to continue licensing the supply of arms to Saudi Arabia was heard by 
the UK Court of Appeal in early 2018. The Court of Appeal handed down its ruling in May 2018 granting CAAT 
permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal against the High Court’s decision, R (on the application of 
Campaign Against Arms Trade) (n 477). Examples of media reports raising concerns about the role of the UK 
(and the us) include: Richard Spencer, ‘UK military 'working alongside' Saudi bomb targeters in Yemen war’, 
The Telegraph, 15 January 2016, 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/saudiarabia/12102089/UK-military-working-
alongside-Saudi-bomb-targeters-in-Yemen-war.html and Wilcken (n 780). 
986 The Center For Global Nonkilling ‘commended the State’s support towards abolishing the death penalty 
worldwide and encouraged it to enhance the respect for the right to life in its constitution and to progressively 
and duly limit arms transfer’, with the relevant footnote also citing Rights Watch (UK), UNHRC ‘Summary of 
other stakeholders’ submissions United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’, 
A/HRC/WG.6/27/GBR/3 (27 February 2017) para 58. 
987 ‘Universal Periodic Review: Saudi Arabia’, Human Rights Council, OHCHR, 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/SAindex.aspx last accessed 21 August 2018. 
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As variously discussed in chapters 2, 4 and 6, the OHCHR produces a précis of the 
submissions it receives in a summary document limited to ten pages.988  Single or joint 
submissions may be made, and OHCHR guidelines must be adhered to.989  Ahead of Yemen’s 
second cycle review, eight joint submissions were made to the OHCHR, five of which were 
made by a combination of domestic and international or regional civil society organisations, 
and six single submissions, made by individual INGOs.990   
The UPR has thus ‘been a catalyst for dialogue within national civil society and between 
national civil society and international civil society… in some instances, the UPR has provided 
a platform for dialogue between the state and civil society whereas it may not otherwise 
exist’.991  The UPR’s capacity to encourage the forging of links between CSOs and the 
strengthening of their cause is further illustrated by one interviewee, an international 
advocate for a global NGO, explaining the motivation for making a stakeholder submission: 
(…) sometimes in the past we have engaged with the UPR even though 
if we looked at it very narrowly we could see the UPR would have a 
very limited impact in that country, but sometimes we nonetheless 
engage, we make a submission of information either in an act of 
solidarity with other partners who would like to have [the 
international NGO’s] voice there, we are a big organisation, we have a 
strong brand, we have a lot of access to many places and sometimes 
we are conscious that we need to wade in in order to support the 
advocacy by other organisations (…) so that would be a consideration 
for us (…).  
If [the international NGO] is not saying something there is the danger it 
will be misunderstood and seen that the matter is not important, that 
is because the human rights movement is political and of course we 
can never be naive and we have to play our cards in the best possible 
way. But it doesn’t mean that we don’t also have strategy and those 
considerations weigh in the hardest and the heaviest. Our interest 
                                                             
988 UNHRC A/HRC/RES/5/1 (n 9), paras 15(c). Only the summary document is provided on the OHCHR’s 
extranet, OHCHR ‘Modalities and practices for the universal periodic review process’, Statement of the 
President of the Human Rights Council 8/PRST/1 (09 April 2008) para 15. 
989 OHCHR ‘UPR (Third Cycle): Information and guidelines for relevant stakeholders’ (n 229).  
990 UNHRC ‘Stakeholder summary: Yemen’ A/HRC/WG.6/18/YEM/3 (n 17) 12. 
991 Interview CSO 06, with reference to Singapore as a good example, where the UPR ‘opened a space for them 
[CSOs] to engage in dialogue with government around critical human rights issues that didn’t otherwise exist’ 
in relation to preparation of the national report, during conduct of the UPR and follow up’. 
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always in a UPR engagement, a treaty body engagement, always is 
what will the impact be on the human rights situation in the ground.992 
This statement reveals the power of endorsement and the legitimising impact provided by 
certain civil society human rights actors.  It also betrays that a level of game playing and 
strategy is required to secure tangible improvement that in turn may have the (unintended) 
consequence of elevating one right or norm above another.  Importantly in terms of this 
study, it indicates the burgeoning power and standing of certain civil society actors in the 
global governance of international human rights, as given consideration in section 7.1 above.  
In terms of stakeholder submissions, and by association the OHCHR compilation, it may be 
appropriate to approach the content with a degree of criticality and caution in light of the 
discussion relating to fact-finding and human rights indicators in section 5.4, chapter 5. 
7.3.2 Parallel (side) events 
A further method by which communities of practice are developed and strengthened by the 
UPR (and the Human Rights Council) is via the hosting and participation of parallel events, 
commonly referred to as side events.   As explained in section 7.2, to arrange a parallel event 
linked to a UPR session or a regular session of the Human Rights Council an NGO must have 
consultative status.993  These events are generally hosted by one or more CSOs with a focus 
on a particular genre of rights, a specific rights issue (such as human rights defenders), or the 
general human rights situation in a particular country or region.  As part of the research for 
this thesis, the author attended various parallel events at the UPR’s 14th session, January-
February 2014, and 27th session, May 2017 and an event linked to the 36th regular session of 
the Human Rights Council in June 2017.  Other parallel events in relation to Yemen have 
been hosted during 2016 and 2017.994  
                                                             
992 Interview CSO 02. 
993 ‘Working with ECOSOC: an NGO’s guide to consultative status’ (n 943). 
994 For example, ‘Nothing is Safe: Yemen’, hosted by Geneva International Centre for Justice with the 
cooperation of EAFORD and Women Journalists Without Chains Organization during Human Rights Council 33rd 
regular session, 23 September 2016, which included Ms. Hooria Mashhour, a former Minister of Human Rights 
in Yemen and a human rights activist, as a panellist, http://www.gicj.org/conferences-meetings/human-rights-
council-sessions/side-events/982-side-event-at-the-human-rights-council-yemen accessed 09 July 2018, and 
‘Accountability, ending impunity, and protection of human rights defenders in Yemen’, Gulf Centre for Human 
Rights (GCHR), 36th session of the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva, Press Release, GCHR, 21 
September 2017. 
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Commonly, there is a panel comprised of domestic and international civil society, human 
rights defenders and journalists and, for example, personnel from the OHCHR.995  Given that 
UPR parallel events occur at the time of the state’s review, impact on recommendations 
made is highly unlikely.  Some interviewees questioned the utility of parallel events at the 
UPR, surmising that they may have some purpose in relation to being part of a larger 
strategy, ‘a meeting point to head up something else at the Human Rights Council’, or to 
form a civil society taskforce.996  Whilst their utility can be ‘wildly variable’,997 parallel events 
can be strategically timed and used as a forum to raise the profile of rights issues, with 
panellists carefully chosen to add credibility and legitimacy to the event and the topics under 
scrutiny, as well as providing an opportunity to invite state parties and other stakeholders.   
A parallel event at the 36th regular session of the Human Rights Council on 19 September 
2017 regarding Yemen and hosted by the Gulf Centre for Human Rights (GCHR), called for an 
end to impunity, for accountability, and for the establishment of an international 
committee.998  Two Special Rapporteurs were members of the panel, making a specific 
request for Yemeni human rights defenders to provide them with information relating to 
human rights abuses to assist in documenting the situation in Yemen.999  It is acknowledged 
by civil society actors that a parallel event or a submission is part of a much broader process, 
as one interviewee explained with reference to the situation in Yemen and the role of civil 
society:  
(…) we are a human rights organisation, we are not involved in politics. We 
can't call for an end to the war, but always we are calling for people to get 
engaged in dialogue, healthy dialogue, to end this because really without 
                                                             
995 Based upon the author’s experience of attending side events in person.  
996 Interview CSO 05. 
997 Interview CSO 06, with reference to the success of a parallel event in which a film on the situation in Sri 
Lanka was shown and the Sri Lankan Ambassadors response at the event to the film as sending a powerful 
message to the Human Rights Council that a national investigation into human rights violations would have 
little value, ‘and therefore there was a need for the international community to act’.   
998 Gulf Centre for Human Rights ‘Accountability, ending impunity, and protection of human rights defenders in 
Yemen’, 36th session of the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva, Press Release (21 September 
2017). 
999 ibid, the panellists were Radhia Al-Mutawakel, Chairperson of Mwatana for Human Rights, Dr. Annalisa 
Ciampi, UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Michel 
Forst, UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, and Safa Al-Ahmad, Award-winning 
Saudi journalist and filmmaker. 
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dialogue it seems to me this is going to be just to kill the ordinary 
citizens.1000 
The pressure on the UN to call an independent international inquiry into the situation in 
Yemen had been building for a number of years.  It may be that the repeated hosting of 
parallel events, the profile of panel members and the persistent and growing call for an 
international inquiry helped force the hand of the UN to announce the establishment of an 
International Committee of Experts in September 2017, referred to in section 6.2, chapter 6. 
To conclude this section, ultimately, an NGO’s engagement with the UPR of a particular SuR 
will be determined by a number of factors.  Clearly, domestic civil society has a vested 
interest in making its voice heard via a submission.  However, global NGOs have a number of 
factors to consider in determining where to allocate their resources and energies.  As one 
interviewee, an international advocate with a global NGO, acknowledged, engagement with 
a particular state’s review is subject to a number of factors: 
We never knee jerk into the UPR for the sake of it. We always look at the 
UPR, what does it have to offer, the same way we look at a treaty body 
review of a country (…), the prospect of a visit by a special rapporteur, 
whatever it is that is within the realm of possibility for what is coming up 
through the UPR schedule, the treaty body schedule, and employ our own 
resources against those opportunities that we think are most effective.1001 
7.4 Consultation and advocacy 
This section critically addresses the potential for civil society to engage in consultation with 
an SuR as part of that state’s process of preparing the national report.  In addition, it 
considers the advocacy civil society conducts in terms of recommendations to be made by 
reviewing states with the final section addressing advocacy regarding follow up and 
implementation.  Throughout, the particular challenges faced by civil society based in 
conflict zones and states in crisis are considered.   
As set out above in this chapter, the function of civil society in states in crisis such as Yemen 
and in autocratic states is often curtailed by detention, travel bans and other limits on the 
                                                             
1000 Interview CSO 04. 
1001 Interview CSO 02. 
 
 
243 
 
freedom of expression.  Whilst civil society’s voice is only indirectly present in the UPR’s 
interactive dialogue there is some limited direct reference to civil society via comments and 
recommendations by reviewing states.  Such recommendations include impressing upon an 
SuR the need to protect the right to freedom of expression that is core to the work of civil 
society, and to put an end to arbitrary detention of human rights defenders.1002   
There are, however, relatively few such comments and recommendations and there appears 
to be a slight downward trend.  In the first cycle, a total of 481 out of 21,355 
recommendations were made relating to civil society, amounting to 2%.1003  Of those 481, 
113 (23%) referred to specific action (action category 5) and the majority were supported 
(352, amounting to 73%).  In the second cycle, 650 recommendations out of 36,331 referring 
to civil society were made, amounting to 1.7%, of which 217 (33%) were action category 5 
and 468 were supported (72%).  This suggests a consistent rate of recommendations 
referring to civil society, but this is a small proportion overall, despite the majority of those 
being made being supported by the SuR.  At the time of writing, for the third cycle there are 
no recommendations recorded regarding civil society for the 3,328 recommendations so far 
captured.1004  
The low number of recommendations may indicate that many reviewing states do not see 
the operation of civil society as a priority human rights matter.  It may also reflect the limits 
some states are imposing; concerns about the ability of civil society to function freely have 
been raised by Philip Alston in his capacity as the UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty 
and Human Rights: 
(…) rather than “shrinking civil space” the reality is that the space has 
already closed in a great many countries. In my capacity as United 
Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights 
I have seen this first hand in my country visits to Mauritania and to 
                                                             
1002 For example, China received six recommendations at its second cycle review regarding civil society, five of 
which it supported. These included ‘Intensify efforts to facilitate the participation of NGOs, academic 
institutions and the media in safeguarding human rights’ (Nigeria), and ‘Facilitate the development, in law and 
practice, of a safe and enabling environment in which both civil society and human rights defenders can 
operate free from fear, hindrance and insecurity’ (Ireland). The one recommendation that was noted was ‘Set 
up a national institution in line with the Paris Principles and ensure a climate that is favourable to the activities 
of human rights defenders, journalists and other civil society actors’ (Tunisia), UPR Info: Database of 
Recommendations (n 125). 
1003 ibid. 
1004 UPR-Info: Database of recommendations (n 125) 
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China, while other countries are excellent students in this domain. 
Egypt recently passed a law limiting the activity of nongovernmental 
organisations (NGOs) to social and development work, and banning all 
NGOs from cooperating in any way with any international body 
without governmental approval.1005 
 
Regardless of the training and support provided to civil society by INGOs, such as UPR Info or 
the OHCHR, as Alston’s sentiments allude to, this support is futile in the face of restrictive 
domestic legislation and reprisals in places where the efforts of civil society may be most 
needed.  
7.4.1 Consultation: the national report 
As indicated above, the process and modalities of the UPR do not oblige an SuR to consult 
with civil society in preparing its national report; states are ‘encouraged’ to undertake ‘a 
broad consultation process at the national level with all relevant stakeholders’.1006  To 
‘encourage’ reflects the spirit of the international human rights framework as it is currently 
constructed, premised upon cooperation and the promotion of good practice.  Yet this may 
be at the expense of a state taking its human rights commitments and obligations seriously.   
As chapter 6 explains, it has taken time for states to determine how to approach the 
recommending process and the same is true of state consultation with non-state actors in 
preparation of the national report.  Interviews conducted with a selection of commonwealth 
states at the close of the UPR’s first cycle revealed that a somewhat haphazard and 
uncoordinated approach undermined the quality of state reports and civil society’s capacity 
to engage.1007  Given the mechanism was a novelty for all parties at that point this is not 
surprising.  Guidance for civil society was initially prepared based upon experience garnered 
during the UPR’s first cycle (2008 – 2012).1008  This and subsequent guidance focuses upon 
                                                             
1005 Philip Alston, ‘Human Rights under Siege’, (2017) 14 (25) SUR International Journal on Human Rights, 267-
272. 
1006 UNHRC A/HRC/RES/5/1 (n 9), para 15 (a). 
1007 Sen (n 188) 12 and 21. 
1008 Connectas ‘Road Map For Civil Society Engagement with the UPR (Draft Version)’ http://www.upr-
info.org/sites/default/files/general-document/pdf/roadmap_en_13.01.11.pdf produced by Connectus, an NGO 
based in Spain, www.conectas.org; Franciscans International ‘UPR Follow-Up Strategy: Practical Advocacy 
Initiatives’ 
http://www.upr-info.org/sites/default/files/general-document/pdf/upr_follow-up_strategy.pdf both last 
accessed 24 April 2014.  
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how to foster proactive engagement and good practice, suggesting how civil society could 
prioritise which UPR recommendations to focus on and encourage an SuR to follow up and 
implement, as well as holding the SuR to account.1009  This guidance is well and good but 
depends upon the extent to which the SuR responds to the contact it receives from civil 
society.  A useful and telling indicator would be a requirement that states include in the 
national report details of the number of CSOs that had been in contact with the SuR 
regarding follow up, whether the state had responded and in what terms.  This would be an 
effective means of enhancing the content of the national report and its focus on 
implementation, as well as building communication between the state and civil society.  
In order to strengthen the governance function of the UPR and to better promote the 
development of a dialogue between stakeholders within civil society, a further Human Rights 
Council resolution should be agreed to set consultation with civil society as a requirement to 
be undertaken by the government of the SuR.  A requirement for the report to include 
details of such dialogue and consultation might assist in securing safer and uninterrupted 
passage of civil society representatives and human rights defenders to human rights 
advocacy and training and UPR Working Groups.  
According to the UN Permanent Mission of Yemen in Geneva, Yemen will be engaging with 
the UPR and the government is keen to involve civil society in the preparation of the national 
report.1010  The Permanent Mission reported that the government will ‘continue 
consultations with civil society to achieve a balanced national report despite the war 
conditions in Yemen’.1011  Although the intention may be for Yemen to consult with civil 
society ahead of its third cycle review, given the country is controlled by a Houthi 
government in some areas, and the Hadi government in others,1012 it is unlikely that all civil 
                                                             
1009 OHCHR ‘UPR (Third Cycle): Information and guidelines for relevant stakeholders’ (n 229); OHCHR ‘How to 
Follow Up on United Nations Human Rights Recommendations’ (n 956); and UPR Info, The Civil Society 
Compendium: A comprehensive guide for civil society organisations engaging in the Universal Periodic Review’ 
(UPR Info 2017), https://www.upr-info.org/sites/default/files/general-
document/pdf/upr_info_cso_compendium_en.pdf last accessed 20 August 2018. 
1010 Riches ‘email 03 June 2018’ (n 768).  
1011 Riches ‘email 03 June 2018’ (n 768).  
1012 European Council on Foreign Relations, ‘Mapping the Yemen Conflict’ (n 90), a comparison of 2015 against 
2017 indicates Houthi controlled areas as reduced in 2017 compared to 2015. 
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society representatives will have access to a consultation process,1013 or that the 
consultation process will meet the ‘broad’ requirement with ‘all relevant stakeholders’.1014  
As a result, principles of democratic governance may inevitably be compromised.   
One interviewee was not optimistic about the contribution civil society can make for states 
in crisis where the UPR is concerned, stating: 
If you look at it from a state perspective, perhaps it’s more appropriate 
to ask what can the other states use the UPR for. We [civil society] 
don’t have a direct role in the working group, our influence has to be 
via states, and what is it that other states can use the UPR for, mindful 
that they can seek to encourage engagement with special procedures, 
encourage engagement with fact-finding missions are agreed and 
dispatched, as is the case at the moment with Yemen where the 
OHCHR is mandated to assist with a national process.   
So, looking at that broader situation, on the one hand the UN, but also 
the international community, what is it that that community can do to 
put pressure, to encourage, to help, to assist, whatever form the 
engagement can take to try and improve the human rights situation on 
the ground and improve adherence to its human rights obligations.1015 
The second cycle national report of Yemen makes a number of references to civil society (20 
in total), for example, in the context of steps taken to follow up on UPR recommendations in 
conjunction with civil society; the sharing of the draft report with cooperation from UN 
Development Programme and funding for workshops with civil society provided by the 
governments of Norway and Sweden; and the organising of a national dialogue and in 
relation to Yemen’s first National Human Rights Conference held in December 2012.1016  
This follows the pattern of other national reports; for example, Norway makes general 
reference to consultation with civil society in open meetings regarding its national report 
                                                             
1013 The United Nations Special Envoy for Yemen, Martin Griffiths, has been in consultation with the Houthi 
Government under-secretary Faisal Amin Abu-Rass, and representatives of the Hadi government, Associated 
Press, ‘Saudi-led forces seize airport in Yemen city of Hodeidah’ The Telegraph (16 June 2018) 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/06/16/saudi-led-forces-seize-airport-yemen-city-hodeidah/ last 
accessed 18 June 2018.  
1014 ‘States are encouraged to prepare the information through a broad consultation process at the national 
level with all relevant stakeholders’, UNHRC A/HRC/RES/5/1 (n 9), para 15(a).  
1015 Interview CSO 02. 
1016 UNHRC ‘National report: Yemen’ A/HRC/WG.6/5/YEM/2 (n 832), paras 2, 4, 7 and 10 respectively.  
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and other matters, such as a report on the possible Norwegian ratification of the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on establishing an individual 
complaints mechanism.1017  No specific CSOs, however, are cited as having been included in 
the consultation process.  The third cycle national report for Argentina also gives a number 
of examples of consultation with civil society for example, the prevention of torture, 
discrimination, migrants, disabilities and freedom of expression.1018  Again, no specific civil 
society organisations are named in the report.  For civil society in other countries, the same 
opportunities are not afforded; Sohair Riad, for example, notes that in relation to Egypt the 
potential to get involved was significantly undermined by the Egyptian government.1019  
There is divergence amongst civil society actors as to the future utility of the UPR both 
generally and in relation to states in crisis.  Some disquiet and frustration was expressed by 
representatives of an international NGO whose work focuses on the Middle East and North 
Africa region,1020 and representatives of other international NGOs expressed similar 
misgivings.1021  On the other hand, there were two interviewees that discussed the UPR’s 
potential for states in crisis to bring the deep and complex human rights challenges within 
Yemen to the international stage.1022  Of these two interviewees, one was from an NGO that 
campaigns for freedom of expression in the Gulf region, the other from an organisation 
whose objective is to strengthen civil society and citizens across the world.1023  A more 
general comment from a further interviewee was the potential for the UPR to invigorate the 
link between governments and civil society at the domestic level,1024 crucial for states in 
crisis in terms of reconciliation and genuine communication and consultation to identify 
need and secure rights protection on the ground.  For Yemen, this is further complicated by 
                                                             
1017 UNHRC ‘National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights Council 
resolution 16/21: Norway’, A/HRC/WG.6/19/NOR/1, 03 February 2014, paras 4 and 11, see also paras 89, 112 
and 113.   
1018 UNHRC ‘National Report Argentina’ A/HRC/WG.6/28/ARG/1 (n 543) paras 11, 103, 132, 148, 162, 184. 
1019 Sohair Riad, ‘Local Media Coverage of the UPR: Egypt and Bahrain as Case Studies’, Researcher, the Cairo 
Institute for Human Rights Studies, (publication date would appear to be circa 2013), 
http://www.arabstates.undp.org/content/dam/rbas/doc/DemGov/10b%20UPRmediaCoverage%20SR.docx 
last accessed 16 July 2016. 
1020 Interview CSO 01. 
1021 Interview CSO 05.  Another interviewee expressed similar misgivings but asked for this to be removed from 
the transcript. 
1022 Interview CSO 03 and CSO 04. 
1023 Interview CSO 04 and CSO 03, respectively. 
1024 Interview CSO 03. 
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the influence, and interference, of Saudi Arabia with the government of Yemen and the 
freedoms afforded for civil society as well as rights protection more broadly.  
7.4.2 Advocacy: reviewing states 
Once the national report has been submitted there is a limited period of time before the 
Working Group during which the Geneva based INGO UPR Info hosts pre-sessions.  These are 
designed to provide a forum within which civil society representatives and NHRIs have 
between five and seven minutes ‘to share their assessment of the human rights situation in 
the country since the previous review’ as well as progress on recommendations.1025  
Member State Permanent Missions to the UN are invited to attend pre-sessions and can ask 
civil society advocates questions to assist in formulation of recommendations to the relevant 
SuR.   
Any representation civil society can make to reviewing states in the lead up to a state’s 
review is crucial in terms of seeking to influence and shape recommendations and 
comments during an SuR’s interactive dialogue.  NGOs will draft recommendations and send 
them directly to reviewing states advocating for that state to make their recommendations 
at the particular state’s review.1026  It is apparent that the advocacy process involves some 
strategic engagement on the part of civil society, particularly global actors, to increase the 
likelihood of securing commitment from a reviewing state to make a recommendation 
identified by a civil society actor.  During an informal conversation with an international NGO 
representative the author was informed that NGOs would often seek to lobby those smaller 
states that may be more open to influence.1027  For some NGOs, the pre-sessions are 
considered to be one of the most effective forms of advocacy, alongside the stakeholder 
submission on the basis that permanent missions are highly unlikely to read all of the 
submissions made in respect of each state’s review.1028  
                                                             
1025 See the guide published at the end of the second cycle with the third cycle in mind: UPR Info Pre-sessions: 
empowering human rights voices from the ground, (UPR Info, Geneva 2016) https://www.upr-
info.org/sites/default/files/general-document/pdf/pre-sessions_web.pdf and information stored here: 
https://www.upr-info.org/en/upr-process/pre-sessions both accessed 15 June 2018. 
1026 Interviews CSO 01, CSO 02, CSO 05, CSO 06 and informal conversations between the author and INGOs, 
January 2014.  
1027 As explained during an informal conversation with an INGO representative at the UPR’s 14th session 
January 2014.  
1028 Interview CSO 01. 
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The associated costs and resources for attending pre-sessions in Geneva may limit an NGO’s 
capacity to participate, particularly domestic civil society and even more so civil society in a 
state in crisis, although some funding is available.1029  For these reasons, a community of 
practice is all the more important; if a joint submission has been made by a domestic NGO 
and a high(er) profile international entity, the latter may be better placed to attend and 
advocate at the pre-session. 
Furthermore, there is no guarantee that civil society advocacy in the pre-session forum, or 
any other forum, will be translated by UN State Missions into recommendations.  
Nonetheless, the role of civil society to lobby and advocate to State Missions, and to provide 
reports and investigations by which those missions can become better informed of a state’s 
human rights situation is pivotal.  A more recent development has been the co-ordination of 
workshops within the territory of the country with a forthcoming UPR.  This has been with 
the support of OHCHR and the UPR Fund for Participation aiming to create further links 
between civil society and strengthen its standing and the profile of issues within a particular 
state.1030   
This approach continues to evolve as illustrated by the in-country workshop in May 2018 
with CSOs ahead of Cambodia’s third cycle review, scheduled during the same session as 
Yemen’s third cycle review.1031  These forums have the potential to play a strengthening role 
in shaping and securing the governance function of the UPR.  Evidently, it is not feasible to 
organise such a session in Yemen at this time, but this is something that a post-conflict 
Yemeni civil society can work towards.  
                                                             
1029 In particular, ‘Voluntary Fund for Financial and Technical Assistance for the Implementation of the 
Universal Periodic Review’, set up in response to UNHRC ‘Establishment of funds for the universal periodic 
review’ A/HRC/RES/6/17 (n 619). 
1030 Workshop on the UPR process for English Speaking African States, on 23 April to 24 April 2018, in Entebbe, 
Uganda, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPRTrustFunds.aspx last accessed 12 July 2018. A 
similar event in Cambodia in May 2018 is noted below.  
1031 ‘Cambodian CSOs gear up for the third cycle’, 24 May 2018, it is reported by UPR Info that on 09 and 10 
May 2018, 80 participants joined the Civil society submission follow-up workshop, co-organised by Cambodian 
Center for Human Rights (CCHR), Office in Cambodia of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR) and UPR Info in Phnom Penh, Cambodia https://www.upr-info.org/en/news/cambodian-csos-
gear-up-for-the-3rd-cycle. The full report is available here: https://www.upr-
info.org/sites/default/files/cambodia_activity_report_step_1.1.pdf both accessed 15 June 2018. 
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7.5 Recommendations, follow up and implementation: evolving practice 
Human Rights Council resolution 5/1 provides that civil society has a role to play in follow up 
to the UPR.1032  This role is evolving and individual NGOs are forging a follow up 
methodology, detailed below.  In association with UPR Info, OHCHR is promoting a more 
coordinated and comprehensive approach to review preparation that integrates reporting 
on follow up both ahead of state’s review and at the mid-term point.1033  The renewed focus 
on implementation at the start of the UPR’s third cycle, as outlined in chapter 5, has been 
said to have ‘created a new momentum for constructive and cooperative engagement on 
the implementation of recommendations of international human rights mechanisms, 
including those emanating from the UPR’.1034  
The role of civil society is arguably at its most effective in terms of follow up when a 
methodical approach is adopted, although not all CSOs will have the necessary resources.  
One interviewee for this study outlined the systematic and coordinated approach to follow 
up and implementation being adopted under her instruction at the INGO she works for.1035  
The interviewee outlined the approach for the different stages of the UPR process, 
explaining it was still embryonic.  At the outset, prior to a particular state’s Working Group, 
the INGO sends ‘concrete’ and specific recommendations to all member states to request it 
take these recommendations into account when formulating its UPR recommendations.  
Following a the review, the INGO identifies which recommendations remain under 
consideration by the state and, of those, which refer to specific action and will add value by 
being ‘potentially transformative at the national level’.1036 A letter is then sent to the state 
indicating why those recommendations are important and urging it to accept them.  A letter 
is also sent to the recommending state, requesting it use its contacts with the embassy of 
the SuR to urge acceptance.  
                                                             
1032 UNHRC A/HRC/RES/5/1 (n 9), para 33. 
1033 ‘UPR Mid-term reporting - Optimising Sustainable Implementation: Good Practice for UPR Stakeholders, 
UPR Info 2018, https://www.upr-info.org/sites/default/files/general-
document/pdf/upr_midterm_report_web_v1_high.pdf last accessed 21 August 2018. 
1034 UPR: Overview of the Voluntary Fund for Implementation’, Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, undated document that covers the period 2002-2017, 5, 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/UPR/UPR_VF_for_Implementation.pdf accessed 09 July 2018. 
1035 Interview CSO 02. 
1036 ibid. 
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Following the formal adoption by the Human Rights Council of the Working Group report, 
the INGO reviews the final list of recommendations supported by the SuR and writes to the 
state suggesting it devise an implementation plan, referring not only to UPR 
recommendations, because ‘in isolation… they’re never going to be strong enough’, but also 
to those recommendations made by treaty bodies and other mechanisms such as special 
rapporteurs.1037  The interviewee reported that whilst this is a time-consuming process it 
goes beyond a more basic and less fruitful tick box approach, and that receiving letters back 
from states pays dividends and endorses the approach being taken.  This approach is further 
evidence of the role of the UPR’s governance capacity and its function as a site for cross-
referencing and emphasis, thereby placing importance upon and legitimising, the work and 
governance function of other entities within the regime complex.  
In 2017, UPR Info reported that the coming together of over one hundred activists resulted 
in joint stakeholder submissions supported by sixty-four civil society organisations to 
Thailand’s second cycle UPR.  Following Thailand’s review ‘in an unprecedented step, the 
coalition was invited to present [to the Thai government] their views on the 
recommendations Thailand received after their second UPR’, and that the CSO coalition had 
‘noted a clear shift in the way the Government approached them’.1038 
The evolving role of non-state actors in the implementation of UPR recommendations 
corresponds with the proposition of experimentalist governance, ‘that such inclusiveness 
could improve implementation of standards or regulations, as implementation often is a 
local action’.1039  Chapter 3 touched upon the concept of experimentalist governance which 
is premised upon the ‘systematic and substantive inclusion of all relevant stakeholders, 
ranging from the most local to the international levels of action’.1040  Experimentalist 
governance affords non-state actors a central rather than more peripheral role,1041 meaning 
it is not a model directly suited to the UPR, but is cited here to emphasise the increasingly 
important role civil society as a non-state actor is playing regarding some states in the 
success of the UPR in terms of follow up and implementation..  
                                                             
1037 ibid.  
1038 UPR Info, Civil Society Compendium (n 1009) 14. 
1039 Sen (n 188) 12 and 21. 
1040 Nance and Cottrell (n 380) 285. 
1041 ibid 285-6, citing Sabel and Zeitlin (2010) (n 384). 
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Conclusion 
Whilst non-state actors, individuals, and collectives have long influenced the changing or 
making of a country’s laws, often this has been the result of activism whereby change is long 
coming and hard-fought for, sometimes with fatal consequences.1042  The UPR offers a space 
in which change is lobbied for peacefully, and diplomatically, aligned with issues brought to 
the fore by civil society and given weight and global state-based endorsement via the 
recommending process.  It has been said that ‘the main challenge that the Human Rights 
Council and the NGO community faces is to move beyond participation of civil society in the 
work of the Council, to a true partnership between Member States and civil society’.1043  
Despite the concerns and criticisms levied at the UPR by various civil society actors 
interviewed for this study, the work of the organisations they represent by making 
stakeholder submissions, organising and/or contributing to parallel events, attending pre-
sessions, etc. demonstrates some level of commitment to the UPR and is an endorsement of 
its legitimacy.1044   
This chapter has illustrated examples of how partnerships are being formed and 
communication channels are being opened.  There remains much to be achieved in this 
respect, particularly in relation to states in crisis where the existence of civil society is 
extremely fragile and in those states in which civil society and human rights defenders are 
subject to repression via travel bans and detainment.  
Nonetheless, as evidenced in this chapter, domestic and international civil society continues 
to report upon the state of human rights in Yemen and make recommendations via 
stakeholder submissions, and in doing so forges links with other civil society actors to create 
communities of practice.  The analysis in chapter 6 reveals that those recommendations and 
themes of concern that are documented in the OHCHR summary of stakeholder submissions 
                                                             
1042 Marianne Hester, Liz Kelly and Jill Radford (eds) Women, violence and male power: feminist activism, 
research and practice (Open University Press 1996). 
1043 OHCHR ‘Handbook for civil society’ (n 373) 91, quoting Ambassador Luis Alfonso de Alba of Mexico, First 
President of the Human Rights Council (2006-2007). 
1044 One civil society interviewee responded to the author’s request to speak with some caution.  She was 
mindful that the UPR is still a relatively young mechanism and was keen to be reassured that the task of this 
thesis was not to undermine the mechanism entirely, being of the mind that so much had been vested in the 
mechanism that it was too early for an overtly critical assessment. 
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are subsequently reflected in the recommendations received by the SuR.  If a state declares 
to the world that it supports a recommendation, a civil society actor has a basis upon which 
to make a subsequent approach to the relevant state’s authorities and request a progress 
report.   
The UPR thus offers civil society a ‘way in’.  As one interviewee, a senior member of the 
OHCHR, explained when questioned about the role of civil society and the UPR for a state in 
crisis such as Yemen:  
It is a situation that is very chaotic and a situation of conflict… in very dire 
and difficult circumstances the UPR brings forward this element of being 
able to speak with the authorities; when you are from civil society and if 
you get there and you say you want to talk about torture, they will slam 
the door in your face and you will not be received by anyone. But if you say 
you want to see the people in the administration and want to talk about 
the situation relating to the implementation of the UPR, then in all 
likelihood you may be provided with the opportunity to speak with people.  
It may happen and it may be the case that they want to look good, 
particularly one year before the UPR, it may be that they want to look 
good, they want to show they have done something. So just this element of 
face saving and this element of being able to report on some changes will 
have an impact on civil society being able to do something about it.  So on 
this account, yes, it will remain an excellent tool and it will be very 
helpful.1045   
As such, the governance function of the UPR has the potential to facilitate and generate a 
new nexus between voice, entitlement and civil society and this is crucial in respect of the 
function of the UPR in relation to states in crisis.  It can support the positioning of civil 
society as a key non-state actor both in terms of norm building and implementation as well 
as its position in relation to the state and to rights holders.  At its most effective, the UPR can 
provide civil society with the means to access state authorities and be heard by government, 
contributing to global governance in a tangible manner.   
To a lesser degree, there is a community of practice amongst those constituted to form part 
of the internal machinery of the UN, for example, diplomatic state missions to the UN, the 
                                                             
1045 Interview UN 01. 
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membership of the Human Rights Council, the Working Group troika of the UPR, and those 
parties external to the UN, such as civil society and the states themselves.  Thus the 
networks both transcend the formal boundaries of the sovereign state and reinforce those 
boundaries.  The operation of, and engagement with, such networks fosters cultural 
authority and legitimacy.   
Finally, although civil society struggles to operate in Yemen, there is evidence that the UPR 
will give much needed voice to domestic and global civil society as part of the forthcoming 
UPR.  As one interviewee, a Yemeni human rights defender now living in Western Europe as 
a political refugee commented, ‘Yemenis feel there's no space for them; nobody can really 
defend them and speak for them’.1046 
 
                                                             
1046 The interviewee went on to say ‘As a Yemeni myself, I'm shocked when I hear from you because I'm 
surprised because at least someone from the international community cares to ask why this mechanism is not 
functioning in Yemen, can we really understand how this conflict is not progressing Yemen within the 
framework of the international bodies’, interview HRD 01. 
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Chapter 8: Overall Conclusion 
Introduction 
Neil Walker observes that ‘conceptual analysis and empirical inquiry alone can never solve 
normative problems.  Yet they can help us to understand these problems more clearly, and 
to provide a better route map through the moral and political maze’.1047  This sentiment 
reflects the motivation fuelling the questions posed in this thesis and the investigations 
conducted in the pursuit of answers to those questions.  
Two objectives have driven this study: one, to conduct an empirical assessment of the 
function of the UPR through the conceptual lens of global governance and, two, to take a 
case study approach to explore the nature of the UPR’s governance function for Yemen as a 
state in crisis.  These objectives have mobilised an exploration of the impact on the 
legitimacy and authority of the UPR when states in crisis repeatedly have little tangible 
follow up and implementation progress to report since the previous UPR cycle.   
In pursuit of the first objective, this thesis has adopted the research methods of conditional 
international law theory by taking the conceptual lens of global governance theory and 
applying it to the various components of the UPR as part of a critical investigation of its 
legitimacy and authority both generally and in the context of its current and potential 
function in relation to states in crisis.  This has been a theoretical and practical application, 
the latter informed by empirical research via interviews and documentary analysis.  This 
study has used aspects of global governance theory to conceptualise the global human rights 
framework as an ‘international human rights regime complex’.  It has evaluated the UPR’s 
governance function as an entity that supports multi-directional interaction between the 
institutions that comprise that regime complex.  
By assessing the conditions under which the UPR was created and investigating its 
conceptual and its real-world application, this study aligns with principles of conditional 
international law theory discussed in section 1.6 of the introductory chapter.  However, 
given the nature of the UPR, the prescience of state actors and the role of civil society as a 
                                                             
1047 Walker (n 271) 1. 
 
 
256 
 
non-state actor, this thesis has gone beyond the scope international law, entering the 
territory of international relations, for example, in relation to matters of state practice and 
compliance and the nature of international organisations. 
This study makes a number of findings and these are summarised below.  Some are more 
general in terms of how the UPR functions as a global governance mechanism, others are 
more specific to states in crisis, particularly Yemen.  
8.1 The UPR within an ‘international human rights regime complex’ 
The conceptualisation of an ‘international human rights regime complex’ illustrates the 
pivotal role of the UPR as a mechanism operating in a multi-directional fashion, uniquely 
linking with each entity located within the regime complex.  As noted in chapter 3, state 
actors may choose which of those entities within a regime complex to engage with 
according to perceived need.1048  This freedom prompts positive and negative consequences 
in terms of rights protection.  Adversely, a state’s choice editing may lead to engagement 
with entities where it has positive action to report, or to use its UPR participation to absolve 
obligations to report to, for example, treaty committees.  Constructively, such freedom 
might encourage engagement when there might otherwise be very little.  In turn, it is 
possible that the quality of that engagement is enhanced as a result.   
Of the states included in this study, there is strong evidence of engagement with a range of 
human rights monitoring entities, although the quality of that engagement varies and the 
ability to determine the success of one entity above another is difficult.  As one interviewee 
observed: 
The UPR is never the only factor contributing to positive human rights 
change, but it can certainly be a significant contributing factor, 
particularly when it’s integrated into bilateral relations and 
development plans, and so on.1049 
The fact of universal engagement by UN member states with the UPR over the first decade 
of its life suggests it has emerged as a preferred mechanism within the international human 
                                                             
1048 Keohane and Victor (n 5) 15. 
1049 Interview CSO 06.   
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rights regime complex.  This is despite the UPR’s peer review aspect, which could be 
interpreted as amounting to a threat to the principle of non-interference by one state in the 
internal affairs of another.1050  If an SuR considers a recommendation seeks to interfere in 
domestic affairs, it has the option of refusing to support it on that basis.1051  Ultimately the 
UPR functions to reassert state sovereignty by placing the state at the centre of the review 
and affording the state the power and authority to decide what recommendations it will / 
will not support.  The primacy of the state is also implicit by the move to encourage 
domestic parliaments to proactively engage with UPR follow up and implementation.1052  
The UPR is a space within which politicisation, acculturation and the institutionalisation of 
human rights all impact upon state behaviour, as discussed in section 5.3 of chapter 5.  The 
UPR is constituted to mitigate threats to the credibility of its operation that may result from 
these factors; the procedural parity that is staunchly adhered to seeks to promote and 
reinforce an international order that is supposed to be ‘committed to the principle of the 
formal equality of sovereign States’.1053 
8.2 The UPR’s Claim to Legitimacy and Authority 
8.2.1 Input (source) legitimacy, procedural legitimacy and authority  
The UPR has a strong claim to input (source) legitimacy and procedural legitimacy and as 
such has a basis upon which to command authority and secure engagement by UN member 
states and stakeholders.  Chapter 4 finds that the source legitimacy of the UPR is both 
normatively and legally sound.  It does so by tracing the mandate of the General Assembly to 
devise institutions via the UN Charter and assessing the normative and legal foundations of 
the UPR under its founding instruments, namely Human Rights Council and General 
Assembly resolutions. 
In determining the UPR’s procedural legitimacy, chapter 4 addresses the modalities and 
documentation the review is based upon and the actors involved.  It addresses the primary 
                                                             
1050 See sections 2.2 and 4.1.3 above.  
1051 ‘…the delegation expressed its regret that a number of States refused to abide by the principles of 
universal periodic review as stipulated in the Human Rights Council resolution 5/1. In this context, Syria was 
compelled to reject the recommendations of those states, as they represented flagrant interference in the 
internal affairs of an independent sovereign state’, UNHRC ‘Report of the Human Rights Council on its thirty-
fourth session’ A/HRC/34/2 (14 June 2018) para 459. 
1052 UNHRC ‘Contribution of parliaments’ (n 741) para 5. 
1053 Macklem (n 47) 49. 
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challenges to the UPR’s procedural legitimacy.  These variously include: politicisation of the 
recommendation process; routine procedural compliance displacing substantive compliance, 
risking descent into ritualism rather than robust assessment; and the prevalence of the 
bureaucratisation, institutionalisation and legalisation of human rights to the detriment of 
rights protection. 
Each of these matters reveals the nuanced and complex interplay between the dynamics of 
law, politics and the social behaviour of state actors in the global arena, where geopolitical 
matters also have a bearing.  As chapter 4 concludes, these risks are inherent with the UPR 
given it is an innately state-centric and political mechanism.  Those factors, however, also 
come with some unforeseen and at times surprising benefits.  There is evidence of states 
conceiving rights-based programmes sourced from non-political UPR recommendations, as 
indicated in chapter 5.  Reciprocity drives states to review and engage with the human rights 
situation in neighbouring countries and related stakeholder submissions, taking heed and 
making recommendations accordingly.  The institutionalisation of rights protection 
contributes towards strengthening public infrastructure and accountability.  Arguably one of 
the strongest facets of the UPR’s governance capacity is the emerging role played by civil 
society with a new and unique space for dialogue between states and NGOs being created, 
complementing and developing further the more expanded form of authority that 
characterises the UPR, as discussed in section 4.2 of chapter 4.   
Although not all recommendations are supported, and not all recommendations lead to 
action, the process facilitates global norm dispersal and dissemination.  Reviewing states 
implicitly endorse the principles and norms their recommendations refer to.  Making a 
recommendation is a powerful public statement in an international and political setting and 
the longer-term acculturation practice this supports is significant.  Importantly, the 
substance of a recommendation provides a reference point for the reviewing state and civil 
society to subsequently hold the SuR to account.   
By illustrating the input (source) legitimacy and the procedural legitimacy of the UPR, this 
thesis demonstrates the UPR’s governance function is not solely dependent upon its output 
legitimacy, commonly perceived as the follow up and implementation of recommendations, 
although this aspect does, of course, play a crucial part.  
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8.2.2 Output (substantive) legitimacy  
Measuring and verifying the UPR’s output (substantive) legitimacy is a challenging 
endeavour.  Chapter 5 interrogated two challenges: firstly, how to measure output / action 
and, secondly, if there is action, how to determine the UPR as an influencer / cause.  At a 
basic level, output includes recommendations made, the nature of those recommendations 
and the commitments given by SuRs in response.   
The investigation of global governance theory in chapter 3 indicates an institution that issues 
or supports recommendations as part of its governance function is not within the realm of 
rule making and enforcement.  There is thus an argument that compliance is not mandatory. 
However, the advent of the UPR’s third cycle has renewed focus on follow up and 
implementation.  Supporting recommendations suggests an SuR’s commitment to rights 
protection, but the cyclical nature of the UPR soon exposes an absence of action; as the 
lifespan of the UPR progresses, substantive legitimacy will be determined by what states do 
with recommendations, not simply what they say they will do.  To strengthen the UPR’s 
longer-term global governance function, states need to construct recommendations 
requiring specific action. 
During the first and second cycles, follow up was slow to take pace and few states and NGOs 
voluntarily reported at the mid-term on implementation, however, the OHCHR overview of 
the third cycle includes dates for submitting an implementation plan.1054  In addition, CSOs 
are developing follow up methods that pursue avenues of diplomacy via the UPR by 
encouraging reviewing states to follow up directly with the relevant SuR.  In addition, a 
change in state practice in some quarters to support fewer recommendations suggests UPR 
commitments are being treated more seriously. 
Attributing a state’s human rights achievements specifically to the UPR remains difficult. In 
UPR terms, state progress is communicated via UPR documents comprising the national 
report, the OHCHR compilation and the OHCHR summary of stakeholder submissions.  
Arguably, a biased national report is tempered by the OHCHR compilation and the OHCHR 
summary of stakeholder submissions.  Each of these documents variously refers to and relies 
upon structural, process and outcomes indicators, generally supported by qualitative field-
                                                             
1054 UPR Third Cycle 2017-2021 (2022) (n 38). 
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based research.  However, limitations remain irreconcilable in terms of decisions as to what 
is reported upon, where investigations take place and what information takes precedence.  
Chapter 6 illustrates improvement in process indicators for Yemen between the first and 
second cycles related to treaty reports, but this does not guarantee improvement in terms of 
outcome indicators.  Where there appears to be progress, questions of knowledge creation 
via data collection, collection techniques, and the identification of relevance is pertinent as 
discussed in section 5.4, chapter 5.  Data collection in states in crisis such as Yemen is 
sporadic, may be prone to duplication and may not produce sufficiently reliable 
conclusions.1055  For those working in the field, qualitative data such as narrative interviews 
should complement fact-finding missions and inform conclusions reached.1056   
8.3 UPR and states in crisis  
This thesis makes certain findings for the specific global governance function of the UPR 
regarding states in crisis.  Chapter 6 suggests states in crisis receive more recommendations 
than stable states, and that a higher number of states make recommendations to states in 
crisis.  This indicates the UPR has an important function in terms of global diplomatic and 
political engagement with pressing human rights issues and challenges in countries where 
many of the most basic rights are severely lacking.1057   
Analysis within chapter 6 confirms the OHCHR compilation and the OHCHR summary of 
stakeholder submissions are fertile sources of recommendations for reviewing states, 
although specific action does not always translate into the construction of UPR 
recommendations.  This illustrates one aspect of the multi-directional character and function 
of the international human rights regime complex.  It means matters of central concern for 
states in crisis are referred to across mechanisms.  The UPR offers a unique textual and 
physical space in this respect; it allows recommendations made by an otherwise range of 
                                                             
1055 ‘Report submitted by the independent expert on extreme poverty’ E/CN.4/2004/43/Add.1 (n 717) 2, citing 
issues relating to duplication of records, to the cost of issuing identity documents resulting in the poorest 
people not receiving any, which in turn limits the capability of those people from accessing public services and 
being recorded as such. 
1056 Root (n 716) 356. 
1057 See section 6.5, chapter 6. 
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fragmented monitoring regimes to be collated in one place.  The authority of other 
mechanisms is also asserted, in addition enhancing human rights norm dissemination.  
A pertinent issue remains; the challenge states in crisis face when it comes to follow up and 
implementation.  Chapter 6 acknowledges the UPR was not conceived as a first response 
mechanism in crisis situations.  Yet state instability and significant human rights violations 
are generally preceded by some indication of a (human rights) crisis on the horizon; the 
deficit of rights protection in Yemen has obviously escalated significantly during the current 
war but chapter 6 analysis of first and second cycle documentation reveals warning of 
fragmentation, corruption, and widespread human rights violations indicating Yemen could 
quickly become the site of more significant and fundamental human rights suffering, as is 
now the case.1058   
In this context, chapter 6 offers a word of warning of the need not just for actors within the 
UPR but, more generally, for UN monitoring mechanisms with a human rights governance 
function to consider how to more effectively take heed of information that should place 
relevant parties on notice of future risks to rights protection due to civil unrest and conflict.  
To criticise or rebuke the legitimacy of the UPR for the failure of a state in crisis to 
implement recommendations in this context would seem rather short-sighted. 
8.4 UPR and civil society 
Civil society’s role is fundamental to the UPR’s current and future success in monitoring and 
supporting implementation, and to counter the potential detrimental effects of ritual and 
ritualism.1059  It therefore has a central governance role to play in developing and 
maintaining the UPR’s legitimacy and authority.  A key challenge is to strengthen civil 
society’s relationship with member states.1060  This is being encouraged through UPR pre-
                                                             
1058 UNHRC ‘Summary prepared by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in 
accordance with paragraph 15 (b) of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1’ A/HRC/WG.6/5/YEM/3 
(19 February 2009); UNHRC ‘Summary of stakeholder submissions: Yemen’ A/HRC/WG.6/18/YEM/3 (n 17); 
UNHRC ‘Compilation: Yemen’ A/HRC/WG.6/5/YEM/2 (n 829); UNHRC ‘Compilation: Yemen’ 
A/HRC/WG.6/18/YEM/2. 
1059 Charlesworth and Larking ‘…the ability of the UPR to transcend ritualism and to function as an empowering 
regulatory mechanism depends heavily on effective NGO and civil society engagement in the process’ (n 330) 
16.  
1060 OHCHR ‘Handbook for civil society’ (n 373) 91, quoting Ambassador Luis Alfonso de Alba of Mexico, First 
President of the Human Rights Council (2006-2007). 
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sessions described in chapter 7, led by UPR Info and via workshops and consultations in 
certain states.  These approaches are however ad hoc and civil society’s capacity to 
contribute is far from consistent partly due to preventive action by SuRs including travel 
bans and reprisals.1061   
At its most effective, the UPR is a forum for states in crisis and stakeholders to seek support 
from the international community and for CSOs to strengthen their presence and influence 
building communities of practice.  The textual space created by stakeholder submissions and 
the physical space occupied by parallel events facilitates the creation, and enhances the 
function, of communities of practice making a positive contribution to the UPR’s governance 
role for states in crisis.  
The nature of the follow up methodology described by one interviewee has great potential 
for states in crisis in transition from conflict to peace.  Any commitments of assistance made, 
for example, during Yemen’s third cycle review in January 2019 will provide leverage for civil 
society to follow up.  A recommendation is valid for at least five years, the length of the UPR 
cycle; in the interim period civil society can use those recommendations to garner support 
and resources from the international community and UPR funds.  
Although the UPR does not afford civil society the same standing as treaty bodies do, it more 
formally endorses civil society’s voice and tangible opportunities for open communication 
between states and CSOs encouraging transparency and contributing to important aspects 
of the UPR’s global governance function have been emerging, lending weight and authority 
to CSOs as part of the follow up and implement process.  
8.5 Recommendations 
This section makes some final recommendations emanating from this study as a means to 
strengthen the governance function of the UPR in respect of all states, but particularly for 
those in crisis.  
States currently have the option to submit a mid-term report, as section 2.3.3 of chapter 2 
details, engagement with this is poor.  A requirement to submit mid-term report would be 
sensible given the length of each UPR cycle is now five years.  This would have the added 
                                                             
1061 See section 7.3, chapter 7, with regard to human rights defenders.  
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benefit of making UPR a live issue for states, rather than something to rush towards once a 
state’s review is on the horizon.  A Human Rights Council Resolution could: require states to 
devise and submit at the mid-term an implementation plan reporting on progress to date 
and ongoing implementation measures; require states to establish a specific mechanism 
tasked with UPR follow up; and encourage support for states with OHCHR country offices 
from other relevant institutions in the international human rights regime complex in a 
coordinated fashion, for example, with UNCTs playing an active and defined role.  
Linked to this some states, such as Kenya, demonstrate good practice providing a 
comprehensive implementation plan.1062  A pro forma matrix, based upon that used by 
Kenya, could be annexed to the Council resolution as guidance for presenting progress in a 
clear and comprehensive manner, citing the government department with responsibility for 
action and relevant partners / stakeholders, see the matrix for implementation, table 4 at 
appendix 3.  
States have been instructed to directly refer to progress in their national report.1063  In 
addition, states should be required to present their consultation methodology with the 
objective of enhancing communication and cooperation between non-state CSOs and state 
actors.  Information should include timescale, geographical reach, actors involved, and 
action arising.  This would provide a useful and telling indicator, enhancing transparency and 
revealing states where engagement is lacking.  To improve the multi-directional nature of 
the international human rights regime complex, the SuR should respond directly in its 
national report to treaty body and other recommendations cited in the OHCHR compilation 
where those recommendations have not been accommodated in UPR recommendations of 
the previous cycle.  
It is important that the Human Rights Council provides clear guidance as to what ‘cases of 
persistent non-cooperation’ might include.1064  For example, this could amount to repeated 
instances of an SuR preventing civil society from attending training and advocacy or failing to 
integrate consultation with civil society into UPR preparations.  The iterative and cyclical 
                                                             
1062 Kenya ‘Office of the Attorney General and Department of Justice: Universal Periodic Review Second Cycle 
Implementation Plan 2015 – 2019’ https://www.upr-info.org/sites/default/files/general-
document/pdf/kenya_2nd_cycle_final_matrix_2016.pdf last accessed 27 August 2018.  
1063 OHCHR ‘Guidance Note’ (n 218) 1-2.  
1064 UNHRC A/RES/5/1 (n 9) para 38. 
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nature of the UPR exposes those states whose actions repeatedly fail to reflect their words.  
Through such exposure the risks of ritual and ritualism are greatly reduced, however, the 
Council has a more robust role to play in this respect not only regarding persistent non-
cooperation but also via its regular sessions.  Under agenda item 6, a standing item on the 
agenda, the Working Group reports of states reviewed during the previous UPR session are 
formally adopted.  At this juncture, states confirm their position in respect of previously 
noted recommendations.  The Council should signal when a state’s response falls short of 
the expected human rights standards under treaty law and other relevant human rights 
instruments and principles of customary law, rather than allowing the response by states to 
pass by unnoticed.1065   
The UPR’s cooperative approach could more effectively include sharing good practice 
between states.  Currently, good practice is highlighted in various publications,1066 but there 
is no guarantee that states in need of support would access them.  Better awareness raising 
amongst state delegations, potentially during a parallel event for the delegation, would 
assist in this respect.  
Emerging state practice suggests a reviewing state has a vested interest in the SuR’s 
response as the example of Mexico calling the UK to account in chapter 5, section 5.3.4, 
shows.  This should be encouraged, particularly where states in crisis are concerned; it 
provides a means of enhancing follow up but could encourage support and capacity building 
for the state in crisis.  
One interviewee observed that compared to the treaty bodies, the UPR is ‘easier for the 
media to digest, it's that one day of the year that your country's being reviewed’.1067  
Research indicates however that mainstream media coverage of the UPR is low.1068  If the 
UPR can attract more widespread domestic and global media coverage it will expose those 
states that lack sincerity and that use the UPR as a ‘one-stop’ for human rights monitoring at 
the expense of engagement with other entities.  It will also assist in bringing to the fore the 
                                                             
1065 See section 5.5.3, chapter 5. 
1066 UPR Info ‘Butterfly Effect’ (n 463). 
1067 Interview CSO 05. 
1068 Sarah Joseph, ‘Global Media Coverage of the Universal Periodic Review Process’ in Charlesworth and 
Larking (n 3). 
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deep and complex geopolitical factors that have a severe impact on human rights protection 
in states in crisis such as Yemen. 
The deadline for stakeholder submissions some six months before the Working Group means 
that reports may well be in need of updating, particular in unstable situations that 
characterise many states in crisis.  Consideration should be given as to how an update could 
be accepted in the weeks before the scheduled review, whilst still allowing time for 
translation.  
8.6 Final conclusions 
The primary focus of this study has been a critical appraisal of the governance function of 
the UPR in relation to states in crisis; a crucial related question therefore is, what might a 
cessation of the UPR mean for those states?   
This would present a blow for Yemen.  It is the site of a complex geopolitical conflict 
described as having created the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, a crisis that has been 
grossly under-reported in western media.1069  As chapter 7 concludes, without the UPR 
Yemen would be denied dedicated time with global elites and the international community, 
under the watch of global media, where the sole focus is the human rights situation at a time 
when matters are otherwise under-reported, reports amended and access to Council regular 
sessions seemingly blocked.  A fundamental strength of the UPR is the space and voice it 
affords to the people of Yemen via global and domestic civil society, that is otherwise being 
all but silenced and overlooked and the opportunity for the government of Yemen to reach 
out to the international community.  In addition, it creates a space that makes publicly 
available other states’ views of Yemen’s crisis.  
The UPR has a potentially unifying effect as a confluence where multiple sources of 
information and actors are collated.  The universal scope of its subject matter means human 
rights monitoring and reporting is not siloed and those issues that are most pertinent to the 
SuR come to the fore.  Conversely, some issues are only touched upon; there is insufficient 
time or expertise for in-depth discussion and interrogation that characterises treaty body 
                                                             
1069 Guterres (n 169). 
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reviews.1070  What this does mean is that the UPR complements other mechanisms as per its 
design, whilst also affirming those mechanisms designed to assess in depth and detail, 
namely treaty committees and special procedures, via the OHCHR compilation document.  
Without the UPR the UN would lose a singular mechanism that all states have engaged with 
and have voluntarily subjected their internal affairs to transparent international scrutiny in 
an unprecedented manner.  On the premise that UPR recommendations are largely sourced 
from other UN human rights mechanisms, as chapter 6 suggests, to deny the UPR legitimacy 
and authority because states in crisis repeatedly fail to implement recommendations risks 
the entire UN human rights framework.  The threat to the UPR’s legitimacy comes less from 
states in crisis and more from those strong and stable states that have the means, resources 
and public infrastructure to improve rights on the ground but seek not to.  It comes also 
from those states that use the UPR to absolve the state of its reporting obligations to other 
mechanisms and to congratulate allies for their achievements in full knowledge of ongoing 
rights violations and repression. 
On a final closing note, the situation in Yemen as with other states in crisis, has been the 
subject of discussion in other UN organisations.  As chapter 6 explains, there have been eight 
Security Council Resolutions addressing Yemen since 2011, seven Human Rights Council 
Resolutions, five Human Rights Council reports and more recently the group in independent 
experts appointed in 2017 to investigate allegations of human rights violations in Yemen 
since September 2014 has published its findings.1071  This report contains allegations of 
potential war crimes committed by the Saudi-led coalition and highlights the role of the UK 
and the US in advising and supporting the coalition, making a plea to the international 
community to refrain from providing arms that could be used in the conflict in Yemen.1072   
With such a complex array of international organisations, state actors and non-state actors, 
it is not surprising that the reach of the UPR is limited for states in crisis.  The UPR’s strength 
may only come to bare for a state such as Yemen during post conflict peace building when 
                                                             
1070 The author of this study witnessed a far greater level of detail in terms of scrutiny and questioning during 
Germany’s treaty review in relation to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Geneva, January 2014.  
1071 UNHRC ‘Situation of human rights in Yemen’ A/HRC/39/43 (n 1104). 
1072 ibid para 18 and 112(b). 
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rights protection and promotion on the ground will be fundamental to building a resilient 
state for the future.  
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Appendix 1: Figure 1 - Compliance with UPR reporting – 3rd cycle sample - 27th session (Apr-May 2017) 
 
State under Review  State reported 
submitted for 3rd 
cycle (Y/N)* 
Date of report stakeholder 
submissions summary 
3rd cycle (Y/N) 
State report for 1st 
cycle** 
State report for 2nd 
cycle** 
Algeria Yes 20.02.17 Yes Yes (18.04.08 - post-
WGS) Review 
14.04.17 
Yes (14.04.12) Review 
29.05.12 
Bahrain Yes 13.02.17 Yes Yes (11.03.08) Review 
07.04.08 
Yes (30.03.12) Review 
21.05.12 
Brazil Yes 27.02.17 Yes Yes (07.03.08) Review 
11.04.08 
Yes (07.03.12) Review 
25.05.12 
Ecuador Yes 07.04.17 (available in 
Spanish only) 
Yes Yes (07.04.08 - day of 
WGS) Review 
07.04.08 
Yes (08.03.12) Review 
21.05.12 
Finland Yes 16.02.17 Yes Yes (18.03.08) Review 
09.04.08 
Yes (07.03.12) Review 
23.05.12 
India Yes 23.02.17 Yes Yes (06.03.08) Review 
10.04.08 
Yes (08.03.12) Review 
24.05.12 
Indonesia Yes 20.02.17 Yes Yes (11.03.08) Review 
09.04.08 
Yes (07.03.12) Review 
23.05.12 
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Morocco Yes 20.02.17 Yes Yes (11.03.08) review 
08.04.08 
Yes (08.03.12) Review 
31.05.12) 
Netherlands Yes 27.02.17 Yes Yes (07.03.08) Review 
15.05.08 
Yes (08.03.12) Review 
31.05.12 
Philippines Yes 01.05.17 (available 
English only) 
Yes Yes (07.03.08) Review 
11.04.08 
Yes (19.03.12) Review 
29.05.12 
Poland Yes 27.02.17 Yes Yes (07.03.08) Review 
14.04.08 
Yes (08.03.12) Review 
30.05.12 
South Africa Yes 11.04.17 (post-deadline 
but translations 
available)  
Yes Yes (15.04.08 - day of 
WGS) Review 
15.04.08 
Yes (07.03.08) Review 
31.05.12 
Tunisia Yes 20.02.17 Yes Yes (11.03.08) review 
08.04.08 
Yes (30.03.12) Review 
22.05.12 
UK Yes 24.02.17 Yes Yes (06.03.08) Review 
10.04.08 
Yes (08.03.12) Review 
24.05.12 
      
* information taken from http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/CyclesUPR.aspx   
** information taken from https://www.upr-info.org/en/review   
   
      
Yemen Third cycle pending January 2019 (no documents on OHCHR website as 
of 27 August 2018)  
Yes (20.02.09) Review 
11.05.09 
Yes (08.11.13) Review 
29.01.14 
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Appendix 2: Figure 2 – The International Human Rights Regime Complex 
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Appendix 3: Figure 3 - Levels of state engagement with the UPR 
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Appendix 4: Figure 4 - Matrix for Implementation1073  
 
Rec. Number Recommendation Specific Action by 
Government 
Indicators/Data to 
Track Progress of 
Implementation 
Government 
Body Responsible 
Potential 
Partners 
Time Frame 
 
 
      
  
 
     
 
 
      
 
 
      
                                                             
1073 This is based upon Kenya’s matrix, ‘Office of the Attorney General and Department of Justice: Universal Periodic Review Second Cycle Implementation Plan 2015 – 
2019’, Kenya, https://www.upr-info.org/sites/default/files/general-document/pdf/kenya_2nd_cycle_final_matrix_2016.pdf last accessed 27 August 2018. 
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Appendix 5: Figure 5 - Ratification status of human rights treaties: Yemen1074 
 
Country Treaty Description 
Treaty 
Name 
Signature Date / 
Accession (a) 
Yemen 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment CAT  05 Nov 1991 (a) 
Yemen Optional Protocol of the Convention against Torture CAT-OP   
Yemen International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights CCPR  09 Feb 1987 (a) 
Yemen 
Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
aiming to the abolition of the death penalty 
CCPR-OP2-
DP   
Yemen Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance CED   
Yemen Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women CEDAW  30 May 1984 (a) 
Yemen International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination CERD  18 Oct 1972 (a) 
Yemen International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights CESCR  09 Feb 1987 (a) 
Yemen 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families CMW   
Yemen Convention on the Rights of the Child CRC 
13-Feb-90 / 01-
May-91  
Yemen 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of 
children in armed conflict CRC-OP-AC  02 Mar 2007 (a) 
Yemen 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children 
child prostitution and child pornography CRC-OP-SC  15 Dec 2004 (a) 
Yemen Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities CRPD 
30-Mar-07 / 26-
Mar-09 
 
 
                                                             
1074 This appendix refers to information exported from the ratification status pages of the OHCHR website, ‘Status of Ratification: Interactive Dashboard’ 
http://indicators.ohchr.org/ last accessed 14 May 2018. 
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Appendix 6: Action category 5 recommendations to Yemen 2nd cycle1075 
 
SuR Rgrp Org Recommendation RS Rgrp Org Response Action Issue Session 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Ratify the Rome Statute of the 
ICC   Botswana Africa 
AU, 
Commonw
ealth 
Supported 5 
International 
instruments, Justice 
18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Ratify the Rome Statute that 
Yemen signed in 2000 and align 
legislation with all the 
obligations related to this text  
France WEOG EU, OIF Supported 5 
International 
instruments, Justice 
18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Ratify the Rome Statute and 
take necessary measures to 
ensure its implementation in 
the national legislation  
Switzerland WEOG OIF Supported 5 
International 
instruments, Justice 
18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Ratify/accede to the Rome 
Statute of the International 
Criminal Court and to 
implement it fully at national 
level and to accede to the 
Agreement on Privileges and 
Immunities of the Court   
Slovakia EEG EU Supported 5 
International 
instruments, Justice 
18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Ratify the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court and 
fully align its legislation with all 
obligations under the Rome 
Statute, including incorporating 
the Rome Statute definition of 
crimes and general principles, 
Latvia EEG EU Supported 5 
International 
instruments, Justice 
18 
                                                             
1075 Exported from UPR Info: Database of Recommendations (n 125). 
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as well as adopting provisions 
enabling cooperation with the 
Court  
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Lift the reservations to article 
29 (1) of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW)  
Belgium WEOG EU, OIF Supported 5 
International 
instruments, 
Women's rights 
18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Become party to the 
Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women  
Australia WEOG 
PIF, 
Commonw
ealth 
Supported 5 
International 
instruments, 
Women's rights 
18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Adopt national legislation 
prohibiting all domestic 
violence and discrimination in 
law and in fact against women 
and girls  
Republic of 
Congo 
Africa AU, OIF Supported 5 
Rights of the Child, 
Women's rights 
18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Establish in law a minimum age 
for marital consent to put an 
end to early marriages of young 
girls  
Spain WEOG EU, OEI Supported 5 
Rights of the Child, 
Women's rights 
18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Revise the law on marriage so 
that women and men are 
treated with equality in the 
state of marriage  
Chad Africa 
AU, OIC, 
OIF 
Supported 5 Women's rights 18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Adopt the new law proposing a 
minimum marital age as a 
matter of urgency and prohibit 
forced marriages in all cases   
Norway WEOG   Supported 5 
Rights of the Child, 
Women's rights 
18 
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Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Amend the Personal Status Law 
to bring it into conformity with 
international standards, that 
protection of women from 
domestic violence and 
investigations of violence within 
families be ensured, and forced 
marriage be prohibited in all 
cases  
Czechia EEG EU Supported 5 Women's rights 18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Amend the Press and 
Publication Act by repealing 
provisions that curtail 
journalists' rights and prescribe 
excessive penalties  
Lithuania EEG EU Supported 5 Freedom of the press 18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Finalize the procedures of 
submitting the Bill on Human 
Trafficking to Parliament for 
discussion and the adoption at 
the earliest possible time  
Bahrain Asia OIC, AL Supported 5 Trafficking 18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Establish in the new 
Constitution guarantees in the 
field of human rights and 
implement a national strategy 
for human rights, supported by 
the creation of a national 
human rights institution in 
conformity with the Paris 
Principles  
France WEOG EU, OIF Supported 5 
National Human 
Rights Institution 
18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Establish an independent 
national human rights 
institution in line with the Paris 
Principles and by strengthening 
results-based human rights 
Germany WEOG EU Supported 5 
National Human 
Rights Institution 
18 
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monitoring throughout the 
country   
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Establish promptly a national 
human rights institution in 
conformity with the Paris 
Principles  
Nicaragua GRULAC 
OAS, OEI, 
ACS 
Supported 5 
National Human 
Rights Institution 
18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Adopt legislation, strategies, 
national action plans and 
initiatives and establish 
committees on human rights  
Jordan Asia OIC, AL Supported 5 General 18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Establish and implement a 
comprehensive action plan to 
further improve and promote 
women's rights  
Republic of 
Korea 
Asia   Supported 5 Women's rights 18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Disseminate human rights 
culture through training and 
awareness programs to the 
benefit of the law enforcement 
officials and to all segments of 
Yemeni society  
Morocco Africa OIC, AL, OIF Supported 5 
Human rights 
education and 
training 
18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Strengthen its cooperation with 
the special procedures of the 
Human Rights Council by 
responding positively to the 
pending visit requests and 
eventually consider extending a 
standing invitation to all the 
special procedure mandate 
holders  
Latvia EEG EU Supported 5 Special procedures 18 
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Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Revise its death penalty 
legislation so that it complies 
with ICCPR and particularly to 
ensure that the death penalty 
does not apply to minors  
Slovenia EEG EU Supported 5 
Death penalty, 
International 
instruments, Rights 
of the Child 
18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Put an end by law to death by 
stoning and reduce the number 
of crimes that are punishable by 
the death penalty, excluding the 
death penalty for crimes related 
to drugs  
Spain WEOG EU, OEI Supported 5 Death penalty 18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Reduce the number of crimes 
punishable by the death penalty 
in conformity with the 
International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, to which 
Yemen is party  
Belgium WEOG EU, OIF Supported 5 
Death penalty, 
International 
instruments 
18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Suspend executions of persons 
whose age is subject to doubt, 
having in mind the 
establishment of a special 
commission to determine the 
age of accused suspected of 
being a minor at the time of 
commitment of the crime  
Spain WEOG EU, OEI Supported 5 
Death penalty, 
Rights of the Child 
18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Fully implement the adopted 
action plan on the recruitment 
of children to the armed forces 
and take into consideration the 
relevant recommendations 
made by the Secretary-General 
in his annual report on children 
and armed conflict  
Slovenia EEG EU Supported 5 
International 
humanitarian law, 
Rights of the Child 
18 
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Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Continue activities to protect 
and promote the rights of 
children by taking steps - such 
as implementing the Action Plan 
on Child Soldiers - to eliminate 
the unlawful recruitment and 
use of child soldiers  
United 
States 
WEOG OAS Supported 5 
International 
humanitarian law, 
Rights of the Child 
18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Take effective action to end 
gender-based discrimination, to 
ensure full protection of 
women's right, including by 
ending harmful practices such 
as female genital mutilation 
(FGM), and to criminalize 
domestic violence, including 
sexual abuse and martial rape   
Germany WEOG EU Supported 5 
Rights of the Child, 
Torture and other 
CID treatment, 
Women's rights 
18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Publish clear instructions on the 
use of force during protests in 
compliance with international 
human rights standards and 
ensure that the training of law 
enforcement personnel 
incorporates best human rights 
practices  
Czechia EEG EU Supported 5 
Freedom of 
association and 
peaceful assembly, 
Human rights 
education and 
training, 
International 
instruments 
18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Establish an effective national 
monitoring system to ensure 
that throughout the process 
detainees are protected by the 
minimum safeguards for those 
deprived of their liberty, as 
provided for by international 
law  
Mexico GRULAC 
OAS, OEI, 
ACS 
Supported 5 Detention 18 
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Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Establish a commission to 
investigate the alleged human 
rights violations in 2011 and 
ensure that all perpetrators are 
brought to justice  
United 
Kingdom 
WEOG 
EU, 
Commonw
ealth 
Supported 5 Justice 18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Conduct an independent, 
transparent and objective 
investigation to improve the 
human rights situation through 
the Commission of Inquiry  
Maldives Asia 
OIC, 
Commonw
ealth 
Supported 5 Justice 18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Put into operation this 
important mechanism, the 
Commission of Inquiry, 
including by expediting the 
appointment of its members to 
look into the 2011 events and 
bring those who committed 
human rights violation to 
account  
Thailand Asia ASEAN Supported 5 Justice 18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Install a proper reconciliation 
and transitional justice 
framework in conformity with 
international standards and 
good practice and in line with 
the recommendations of the 
National Dialogue Conference 
and the report of the UN High 
Commissioner on Human 
Rights, including effective 
legislation on transitional justice 
and the appointment of 
members in the independent 
commission to investigate 
Netherlands WEOG EU Supported 5 
Human rights 
violations by state 
agents, Justice 
18 
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allegations of human rights 
violations committed by 
Government security forces 
during the events of 2011  
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Put an end to any form of 
discrimination against women, 
both in practice and in 
legislation, particularly those 
remaining in the Code of 
Personal Status  
Belgium WEOG EU, OIF Supported 5 Women's rights 18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Implement the 
recommendation of its National 
Dialogue Conference to set the 
minimum marriage age at 18 
years in line with its obligation 
under the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child to take 
measures with a view to 
abolishing practices detrimental 
to the health of children  
Netherlands WEOG EU Supported 5 
International 
instruments, Right to 
health, Rights of the 
Child 
18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Take effective measures to end 
the practice of early, forced and 
child marriage, including by 
setting a minimum marriage age 
of 18 years for both genders   
Germany WEOG EU Supported 5 
Rights of the Child, 
Women's rights 
18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Adopt and implement 
legislation setting the minimum 
age of marriage at 18 years, as 
recommended by the National 
Dialogue Conference, and raise 
awareness of the negative 
effects of child marriage  
Ireland WEOG EU Supported 5 
Human rights 
education and 
training, Rights of 
the Child 
18 
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Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Incorporate the proposed 
recommendation of the 
National Dialogue Conference, 
to set the minimum age for 
marriage at 18 years for men 
and women equally in the 
Yemeni legislation  
Libya Africa AU, OIC, AL Supported 5 Rights of the Child 18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Take all necessary measures to 
protect journalists, particularly 
by prosecuting perpetrators of 
violence or intimidations 
against them 
France WEOG EU, OIF Supported 5 Freedom of the press 18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Promptly investigate any 
continued allegations of child, 
early and forced marriage, 
especially in the case of young 
girls, and undertake measures 
to prevent girls from being 
forced to withdraw from school   
Canada WEOG 
OAS, OIF, 
Commonw
ealth 
Supported 5 
Right to education, 
Rights of the Child, 
Women's rights 
18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Implement all the 
recommendations of the UN 
Committee against Torture  
France WEOG EU, OIF Supported 5 
Torture and other 
CID treatment, 
Treaty bodies 
18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Implement the guidance and 
the recommendations of the 
National Conference on Human 
Rights, which took place from 9 
to 10 December 2012  
Republic of 
Congo 
Africa AU, OIF Supported 5 Other 18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Ratify OP-CAT   
Denmark WEOG EU Noted 5 
Detention, 
International 
instruments, Torture 
and other CID 
treatment 
18 
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Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Ratify, as a priority, the UN 
Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime 
and the Protocols thereto, as 
well as the Rome Statute of the 
ICC, and consequently to fully 
align its national legislation with 
all obligations under the Rome 
Statute  
Slovenia EEG EU Noted 5 
International 
instruments, Justice, 
Trafficking 
18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Sign and ratify the Optional 
Protocol to ICESCR and the 
Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the 
Child on a communications 
procedure  
Portugal WEOG EU, OEI Noted 5 
ESC rights - general, 
International 
instruments, Rights 
of the Child 
18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Ratify the International 
Convention for the Protection 
of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance, the Rome 
Statute and the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment  
Tunisia Africa 
AU, OIC, 
AL, OIF 
Noted 5 
Detention, Enforced 
disappearances, 
International 
instruments, Justice, 
Torture and other 
CID treatment 
18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Become party to the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women  
Australia WEOG 
PIF, 
Commonw
ealth 
Noted 5 
International 
instruments, 
Women's rights 
18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Ensure full compliance with 
international standards on the 
death penalty, but ultimately 
establish a moratorium with a 
Australia WEOG 
PIF, 
Commonw
ealth 
Noted 5 
Death penalty, 
International 
instruments 
18 
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view to ratifying the Second 
Optional Protocol to ICCPR  
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Issue a standing invitation to all 
mandate holders of the Human 
Rights Council  
Tunisia Africa 
AU, OIC, 
AL, OIF 
Noted 5 Special procedures 18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Impose a moratorium on the 
death penalty with a view to 
abolishing the capital 
punishment. Further with 
regards to numerous cases of 
juvenile offenders facing the 
death penalty  
Czechia EEG EU Noted 5 Death penalty 18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Announce a moratorium on the 
death penalty with a view to its 
eventual abolition. Pending this, 
Germany recommends taking 
appropriate steps to reduce its 
application, to respect 
international minimum 
standards and, in particular, to 
ensure that the death penalty is 
not imposed on persons under 
the age of 18 at the time of 
infringing penal law. Due 
process of law should be 
guaranteed in all judicial 
proceedings   
Germany WEOG EU Noted 5 
Death penalty, 
Rights of the Child 
18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Establish a moratorium on the 
use of the death penalty with a 
view to its abolition and, in the 
meantime, immediately stop 
imposing the death penalty on 
anyone under the age of 18  
Lithuania EEG EU Noted 5 
Death penalty, 
Rights of the Child 
18 
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Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Establish immediately a 
moratorium on the death 
penalty as a first step towards 
the complete abolition of the 
capital punishment  
Switzerland WEOG OIF Noted 5 Death penalty 18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Establish an official moratorium 
on the use of the death penalty  
Montenegro EEG   Noted 5 Death penalty 18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Impose a moratorium on the 
execution of death sentences  
Sweden WEOG EU Noted 5 Death penalty 18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Implement a moratorium on the 
use of the capital punishment 
with a view to its abolition  
Portugal WEOG EU, OEI Noted 5 Death penalty 18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Abolish the death penalty for all 
persons considered as minors 
under international law  
Switzerland WEOG OIF Noted 5 
Death penalty, 
Rights of the Child 
18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Introduce an immediate 
moratorium on executions with 
the intention of abolishing the 
death penalty and improve 
methods to accurately 
determine the ages of all 
defendants, such as by 
improving birth registration 
rates  
United 
Kingdom 
WEOG 
EU, 
Commonw
ealth 
Noted 5 
Death penalty, 
Statelessness and 
the right to 
nationality 
18 
Yemen Asia 
OIC, 
AL 
Adhere to the global trend 
against the capital punishment 
by establishing, as a first step, a 
moratorium on its use  
Poland EEG EU Noted 5 Death penalty 18 
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Appendix 7: Table 7 - OHCHR compilation report: references to treaty bodies, treaty body recommendations and recommendations of other 
institutions, and related second cycle recommendations received1076 
Compilation report reference UPR second cycle recommendation made 
Committee against Torture (CAT) invited Yemen to ratify ICRMW and CPED Yes, Philippines (ICRMW) (noted). 
UNCT recommended ratifying CPED Yes, Argentina (supported), Tunisia (noted)1077 
CERD encouraged to consider ratifying ICRMW Yes, Philippines (noted) 
UNCT recommended ratifying OP-CEDAW and OP-CAT Yes 
OP-CEDAW - Australia (noted) 
OP-CAT – Denmark, Tunisia (noted) 
CAT recommended ratifying OP-CAT and making the declarations envisaged 
under articles 21 
and 22 of the Convention 
Yes, Denmark, Tunisia (noted) 
UNCT and the Human Rights Committee (HR Committee) encouraged to ratify 
ICCPR-OP 2 and ICCPR-OP 1 
ICCPR-OP 1 – no  
ICCPR-OP 2 – Australia, Uruguay (noted) 
CESCR and UNCT urged to ratify OP-ICESCR Yes, Portugal (noted) 
UNCT urged to expedite ratification of OP-CRC-IC Yes, Portugal (noted) 
                                                             
1076 UNHRC ‘Compilation: Yemen’ A/HRC/WG.6/18/YEM/2 (n 804). 
1077 This recommendation also included ratifying OP-CAT and may have been noted on that basis.  
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CAT and OHCHR urged to consider ratifying the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court 
Yes, recommended by: Botswana, Republic of Korea, France, Slovenia, 
Switzerland, Slovakia, Uruguay, Latvia, and Australia (supported) 
CRC and UNCT encouraged to ratify the UN Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto 
Yes, Slovenia (noted) 
UNHCR recommended that Yemen fulfil its 2011 pledge to accede to the 1954 
Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 
No 
CRC urged Yemen to finish harmonizing its legislation with OP-CRC-SC No  
Deputy High Commissioner regretted that the appointment of members of the 
Commission of Inquiry into the 2011 events was still pending 
Linked, Maldives, Netherlands, UK, Thailand (all supported) 
Ratify Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Yes, recommended by: Botswana, Republic of Korea, France, Slovenia, 
Switzerland, Slovakia, Uruguay, Latvia, and Australia (supported) 
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Appendix 8: Table 8 - OHCHR compilation report: references to High Commissioner’s report on the OHCHR Mission to Yemen in December 
2011, and related second cycle recommendations received1078 
Compilation report reference UPR second cycle recommendation made 
Yemen ratify CPED Yes, Argentina (supported), Tunisia (noted)1079 
Yemen ratify Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Yes, recommended by: Botswana, Republic of Korea, France Switzerland, 
Slovakia, Uruguay, Latvia, and Australia 
Yemen enhance cooperation with the UN, including by implementing the 
recommendations of the treaty bodies, the universal periodic review, the 
special procedures and the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict 
Yes, recommended by: Montenegro 
Yemen take immediate action to end attacks against civilians and civilian 
targets by security forces, in full compliance with its obligations under 
international human rights law particularly those concerning the use of firearms 
Yes, recommended by: Mexico  
Yemen refrain from any action intended to deprive the population of basic 
services such as electricity, fuel and water 
No 
                                                             
1078 UNHRC Compilation A/HRC/WG.6/18/YEM/2 (n 804). 
1079 This recommendation also included ratifying OP-CAT and may have been noted on that basis.  
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Appendix 9: Table 9 - OHCHR Stakeholder summary and related second cycle recommendations (sample)1080 
Stakeholder reference UPR second cycle recommendation made 
Become a party to OP-CEDAW (Amnesty International (AI)) Yes, Australia (noted) 
Remove reservations to Article 29(1) of CEDAW (AI and others) Yes, Belgium (supported) 
Ratify the international human rights instruments including OP-ICESCR, ICCPR-
OP 1, ICCPR-OP 2, OP-CEDAW, OP-CAT, ICRMW and CRPD (JS5) 
Yes, Australia (ratify OP-CEDAW) (noted); Denmark and Tunisia (ratify OP-CAT) 
(noted); Portugal (ICCPR-OP 1) (noted); Uruguay and Australia (ICCPR-OP 2) 
(noted); Philippines (ICRMW) (all noted). 
Linked, Djibouti (supported);1081 Qatar (supported).1082 
Ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Human Rights 
Watch (HRW)) 
Yes, Australia, Botswana, France, Latvia, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Tunisia, Uruguay (all supported) 
Ratify UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education (JS3)1083 No 
Repeal amnesty law guaranteeing impunity for those responsible for 
violations committed during the 2011 adopted in 2012 (Alkarama / AI) 
No  
Amend laws regarding journalists and human rights activists (JS5) Yes, Lithuania, Canada (both supported) 
                                                             
1080 The stakeholder summary also contains reference to matters of concern raised, including the lack of independence of the judiciary, concern about the existence of a 
Specialized Press and Publications Court tasked with trying all press offences since May 2009, UNHRC ‘Stakeholder summary: Yemen’ A/HRC/WG.6/18/YEM/3 (n 17). 
1081 ‘Continue the efforts in the field of the promotion and protection of the rights of vulnerable groups of the population, particularly children, women and persons with 
disabilities’ 
1082 ‘Continue the support, care and the rehabilitation of disabled persons and those with special needs, and continue to support them directly or through associations and 
specialized rehabilitation centres’ 
1083 ‘JS’ refers to a recommendation having been made as part of a joint submission between two or more CSOs, often a combination of international, regional and 
domestic NGOs. The coding used here follows the stakeholder summary for ease of cross referencing.  
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Linked, United States;1084 France;1085 Colombia;1086 Lithuania;1087 (all supported) 
Full equality between men and women - bring all laws, practices, policies and 
procedures into conformity with international human rights law and standards 
(AI and JS5) 
Yes, Chad, Switzerland (supported) 
Adopt legislation to criminalize the practices of persecution, exclusion and 
discrimination against the Muhammasheen and to develop policy measures 
(JS1) 
No  
Produce urgent legal measures and related policies to stop the cultural 
violence that lead to Muhammasheen displacement (JS1) 
No  
Establish an independent, impartial and thorough commission of inquiry, with 
international experts and assistance, to investigate human rights violations 
committed prior to 2011 (AI) 
Yes, Maldives, Netherlands, UK, Thailand (all supported) 
Hope that Yemen be invited to establish a mechanism to monitor the 
implementation of recommendations of treaty bodies, in coordination with all 
stakeholders (JS3) 
Linked, Montenegro;1088 Republic of Korea;1089  (supported) 
Issue a standing invitation to the UN Special procedures, particularly to the 
Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders (HRD’s), Special Rapporteur 
Yes, Tunisia (noted) 
Linked, Latvia1090 (supported) 
                                                             
1084 Recommendation states ‘Bolster the investigation of cases of gender-based violence and violence against journalists’, extracted from UPR Info: Database of 
Recommendations (n 125). 
1085 ‘Take all necessary measures to protect journalists, particularly by prosecuting perpetrators of violence or intimidations against them’, ibid. 
1086 ‘Take appropriate measures to ensure the lives and security of journalists and human rights defenders’ 
1087 ‘Ensure prompt and effective investigation of intimidation and threats against journalists’ 
1088 ‘Enhance cooperation with the United Nations treaty bodies system and special procedures, through implementation of the recommendations of the treaty bodies and 
the universal periodic review’ 
1089 ‘Establish and implement a comprehensive action plan to further improve and promote women's rights’ 
1090 ‘…eventually consider extending a standing invitation to all the special procedure mandate holders’ 
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on Freedom of Expression, and Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Peaceful 
Assembly and Association (JS2 and JS3) 
Protect women and girls from domestic violence and investigate all cases; 
ensure that forced marriages are prohibited in all circumstances; in the case of 
the marriage of a child under the age of 18, Yemen must establish that the 
child gives full, free and informed consent and has sufficient mental capacity 
to fully comprehend the consequences and obligations of marriage and that 
they are not forced to drop school (AI and JS5) 
Domestic violence: 
Yes, Belgium; Czech Republic; Germany; Lithuania; Republic of Congo; Spain; 
Thailand (supported) 
Forced / child marriage: 
Yes, Belgium; Canada; Denmark; Ecuador; Germany; Guatemala; Ireland; Italy; 
Japan; Libya; Lithuania; Mexico; Netherlands; Norway; Spain; Vietnam 
(supported) 
In 2009, human rights organizations and activists organized campaigns to 
demand the minimum age of marriage be raised to 18. This led to a bill raising 
the minimum age for girls to 17. However, this bill has not yet been signed by 
the President of the Republic. President to sign it urgently (JS5) 
No specific reference  
Honour crimes against women and honour killings are widespread - repeal 
mitigating factors, lower standards, and lessened sentences currently in the 
Penal Code for honour killings; pass laws to criminalize honour crimes (JS5) 
No specific reference to honour crimes 
Criminalize the practice Of FGM and enforce articles 41 and 42 of the Penal 
Code (JS5) 
Yes, Botswana; Uruguay; Guatemala; Germany; Spain; Italy; Thailand (all 
supported)1091  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1091 References in recommendations to ending / eradicating harmful traditional customs / practices and direct reference to FGM in recommendations from 
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